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Case Number

Second Appeal No. 592 of 1958

Attorney(S)

D.C. Gupta
B.S. Chawla and B.R. Aggarwal

Judges

D.K Mahajan, J.

Acts

Constitution of India. The Hindu Succession Act
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1935
HINDU SUCCESSION ACT

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — R.S.A. Nos. 592 & 601 of 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

The land in dispute originally belonged to Daya Singh, who was childless and left a widow, Smt. Ind Kaur. Daya Singh executed a will dated 21st Kartik, 1958 Bk in favour of Bakhtawar Singh (his brother-in-law's son). Under the Hadayats of the Ruler of Nabha State, the will required the Ruler's sanction. The will was submitted for sanction on 21st Kartik, 1958 Bk; sanction was initially refused on 24th Kartik, 1958 Bk. Daya Singh died in 1960 Bk and his widow Smt. Ind Kaur succeeded in possession.

The matter of sanction was later revived and on 18th Baisakh, 1963 Bk the Ruler granted sanction (Exhibit P.W), a document that recognised Bakhtawar Singh as owner under the will but placed specified restrictions (quoted in the opinion) on sale, mortgage, possession by lineal descendants and adoption qua the property.

Despite the sanction, Smt. Ind Kaur remained in possession until her death. Thereafter Bakhtawar Singh, the legatee, and on his death his widow, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur, came into possession. Smt. Bhagwan Kaur sold part of the property on 28-2-1957 to Sant Ram Dass Gurdev Singh (a second-degree collateral of Daya Singh). Sant Ram Dass brought suit asserting that the alienation would not affect his succession rights on the death of the widow. The trial court decreed the suit on 31-10-1957; an appeal failed. The present matters are two second appeals (R.S.A. No. 592 of 1958 and R.S.A. No. 601 of 1958) brought by the vendee (purchaser) and by the widow of Bakhtawar Singh.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur became the absolute owner of the property under Section 14 of the Act.
Whether Exhibit P.W (the Ruler's sanction) operated to limit Smt. Bhagwan Kaur's estate to a life estate under Section 14(2) of the Act (i.e., whether she "acquired" the property under an instrument imposing a life limitation).
Whether Smt. Bhagwan Kaur's possession was lawful for the purposes of Section 14(1) — specifically, whether collaterals of Daya Singh were immediately entitled to possession on Daya Singh's death, thus preventing the widow from being in lawful possession.
Whether the Hindu Succession Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India insofar as it purports to regulate succession to agricultural land (i.e., whether Parliament had competence to legislate on succession to agricultural land).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' (holders of the suit) Contentions as Recounted by the Court

Under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur holds only a life estate because she "got" the property under Exhibit P.W, which (it was contended) restricted the estate to life only.
Under the terms of the sanction (Exhibit P.W) Smt. Bhagwan Kaur had no right to succeed to the property because Bakhtawar Singh died without leaving lineal descendants; the widow, not being a lineal descendant of Daya Singh, could not be deemed in possession for the purpose of Section 14(1) and thus her possession was not lawful; succession would vest immediately in the collaterals of Daya Singh.
The Hindu Succession Act is ultra vires the Constitution because Parliament cannot regulate succession to agricultural land (reliance on constitutional division of legislative subjects).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Hira Mal v. Ronqi Ram, ILR (1955) Punj 1120	Illustration of the principle of adverse possession where prolonged possession without right may ripen into ownership.	The court referred to this case to support the view that if Smt. Bhagwan Kaur's possession had been unlawful yet continued for over twelve years against the rightful owner, she could acquire absolute ownership by adverse possession.
Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (1955) 1 SCR 1284; AIR 1955 SC 367	Principle that, in interpreting legislative entries/allocations of subjects, the entries should be given the widest amplitude consistent with their language.	Cited to justify a broad reading of Entry No. 5 of List III, Schedule VII of the Constitution to hold that succession (including succession to agricultural land) falls within Parliament's legislative competence under that entry.
Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, AIR 1957 SC 768	Support for the interpretive principle that entries in legislative lists should be given widest amplitude and for precedents on constitutional interpretation.	Relied upon together with Hans Muller to reinforce the conclusion that Parliament validly enacted the Hindu Succession Act under Entry No. 5, List III of Schedule VII.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in discrete steps, applying statutory construction, succession principles, and constitutional allocation of legislative subjects as presented in the opinion:

Statutory effect of the Hindu Succession Act: The court emphasizes that Section 14 of the Act makes a female Hindu who is possessed of property (whether acquired before or after commencement) an absolute owner. The court holds that on the death of Bakhtawar Singh, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur came into lawful possession, and upon the Act's commencement she became absolute owner.
Nature of Exhibit P.W and the source of the widow's estate: The court rejects the contention that Smt. Bhagwan Kaur "acquired" the property under Exhibit P.W. The opinion characterises Exhibit P.W as the Ruler's sanction validating Daya Singh's will in favour of Bakhtawar Singh; it did not itself confer an estate upon the widow. The property was acquired by Bakhtawar under the will, and the widow's estate arose by succession to her husband. For the purposes of Section 14, limitations contained in the sanction do not operate to restrict the estate that vested in the widow by succession.
Distinction between a transfer "under an instrument" and succession by operation of law: The court states that Section 14(2) is an exception to Section 14(1). Since no estate was conferred on the widow by any instrument that imposed a life-limitation, Section 14 applies to vest an absolute estate in her.
Lawfulness of possession and the rule treating the widow's life as continuation of her husband's: The court notes the settled rule that when a male holder dies leaving a widow, succession to his estate opens on the widow's death — the widow's life is treated as a continuation of the husband's life. This principle was relied on to reject the contention that collaterals were immediately entitled to possession on Daya Singh's death and to sustain the widow's lawful succession to Bakhtawar's estate.
Alternative ground — adverse possession and procedural limitation of plaintiff's remedy: The court observes that even if the widow had no right to succeed, her uninterrupted possession for more than twelve years against the alleged rightful owner would give her title by adverse possession (citing Hira Mal v. Ronqi Ram). The court also notes a procedural point: if the plaintiffs were entitled to possession they could (and should) have sued for possession rather than seek only a declaration; they did not amend the plaint to convert the suit to one for possession.
Competence of Parliament — constitutional analysis: The court compares entries in Schedule VII of the Constitution with the corresponding entry in the Government of India Act, 1935. It observes that the words "save as regards agricultural land" were omitted from Entry No. 5, List III (which now reads "wills, intestacy and succession..."), indicating an intention to include agricultural land within Entry No. 5. The court also notes the omission of the word "devolution" from the corresponding List II entry in the Constitution (compared with the 1935 Act). Applying the principle that entries should receive the widest amplitude (citing Hans Muller and Commissioner of Income-tax cases), the court concludes the Hindu Succession Act is a valid exercise of Parliament's power under Entry No. 5, List III.
Conclusion of analysis: Based on the above statutory interpretation, succession principles and adverse possession doctrine, the court finds that at the relevant date Smt. Bhagwan Kaur was the absolute owner of the property and therefore the plaintiffs' suit cannot succeed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout. The court expressly states that Smt. Bhagwan Kaur had become the absolute owner of the property at the relevant date and therefore the plaintiffs' claim fails.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: Smt. Bhagwan Kaur is treated as the absolute owner of the property for the purposes of the dispute; the appeals by Sant Ram Dass and Smt. Bhagwan Kaur were allowed and the plaintiff's suit (challenging title/alienation) was dismissed with costs.
Validity of legislation: The court held that the Hindu Succession Act falls within Parliament's legislative competence under Entry No. 5, List III, Schedule VII of the Constitution, including as regards succession to agricultural land, thereby rejecting the ultra vires challenge made in these appeals.
Precedential posture: The opinion resolves the disputes between these parties on the bases articulated (application of Section 14; succession principles; adverse possession; constitutional entries). The opinion does not purport to announce any new general rule beyond its reasoning in the case; its practical consequence is the dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit and the affirmation of the respondents' title in the circumstances recited.

Additional procedural note contained in the opinion: The court certified on the oral request of respondents' counsel that the case is fit for appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.

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Sant Ram Dass v. Gurdev Singh And Another

1. This order will dispose of two second appeals, R.S.A No. 592 of 1958 and R.S.A No. 601 of 1958.

2. The land in dispute at one time belonged to Daya Singh who was childless and left a widow Smt. Ind Kaur. He made a will of his land on the 21st of Kartik, 1958 Bk in favour of one Bakhtawar Singh, who was his brother-in-law's son. According to the Hadayats of the Ruler of Nabha State, to which the parties belong, the will had to be submitted to the Ruler for sanction. The will was submitted for sanction on the 21st of Kartik, 1958 Bk. On the 24th of Kartik, 1958 Bk the sanction was refused. In 1960 Bk. Daya Singh died and was succeeded by his widow Smt. Ind Kaur. The matter of sanction was again raised by Bakhtawar Singh and on the 18th of Baisakh, 1963 Bk the sanction was granted: vide Exhibit P.W The sanction was in these terms:

“So it is ordered that Bakhtawar Singh who is a relation of Daya Singh from his parents-in-law side be held to be owner of Daya Singh's self-acquired property according to the will made by Daya Singh on 21-7-1958 Bk which had been disallowed by orders of His Highness, dated 24-7-1958 Bk. It is directed that Bakhtawar Singh will have no right to sell or mortgage this property so long as there are lineal descendants of Bakhtawar Singh they would remain in possession of this property. Bakhtawar Singh or his lineal descendants as well will have no right to make any adoption qua the property left by Daya Singh……”

3. It seems that in spite of this sanction, Smt. Ind Kaur continued in possession of this property till her death, whereafter it was taken by Bakhtawar Singh, the legatee under the will and on his death, it was inherited by his widow Smt. Bhagwan Kaur. She, however, sold a part of this property on 28-2-1957, to one Sant Ram Dass Gurdev Singh, who is a second degree collateral of Daya Singh brought the present suit that in view of the terms of the sanction accorded by the Ruler, the alienation will not affect his rights of succession on the death of the widow. This suit was decreed by the trial Court on 31-10-1957, and an appeal against that decision also failed. The present appeals are be the vendee as well as by the widow of Bakhtawar Singh (R.S.A No. 592 of 1958 and R.S.A No. 601 of 1958).

4. After hearing the learned counsel for this parties, I am of the view that these appeals ??? succeed. After coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act the whole position is altered. Section 14 of the Act makes a female Hindu possessed of property whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act as an absolute owner of the same. It cannot be disputed that on the death of Bakhtawar Singh, Smt. Bnagwan Kaur came into lawful possession of his property, and as soon as the Act came into force, she became its absolute owner. At this stage the arguments of Mr. Chawla, learned counsel for the respondent in one appeal and Mr. Babu Ram in the other, may be enumerated before they are examined. The learned counsel contend:

1. That under S. 14(2) of the Act, Smt. Bhagwan Kaur holds a life estate in this property, because she got it under an instrument, Exhibit P.W which in terms restricted the estate for life only.

2. That under the aforesaid instrument Smt. Bhagwan Kaur had no right whatever to succeed to this property as Bakhtawar Singh had died without leaving any lineal descendant and the widow not being a lineal descendant the property immediately vested in the collaterals of Daya Singh, and as such she could not be deemed to be in possession of the property for the purposes of S. 14(1) of the Act, her possession not being lawful.

3. That the Act is ultra vires the Constitution of India inasmuch as the Central Parliament cannot regulate succession to agricultural land.

5. As regards the first contention, it can admit of no doubt that S. 14(2) is an exception to S. 14(1). It cannot be said that Smt. Bhagwan Kaur acquired any property under Exhibit P.W which Mr. Chawla calls an instrument and which, to my way of looking at it, is merely the sanction of the Ruler in favour of Bakhtawar Singh. The property was acquired by Bakhtawar Singh under the will of Daya Singh and that will could only be effective if sanctioned by the Ruler. The sanction, exhibit P.W, gave validity to the will of Daya Singh. It is no doubt true that the sanction put certain limitations, but for the purposes of the application of S. 14 of the Act, it is immaterial what those limitations are because those limitations are not put on the estate, which the so-called instrument contemplated to confer on the widow. As a matter of fact, no estate was at all conferred on the widow by any instrument. The estate she got was by succession to her husband, and any such estate by force of S. 14 vests absolutely in her, divorced of all limitations. Therefore, this argument of Mr. Chawla has no merit and is repelled.

6. The second contention raised that the possession of Smt. Bhagwan Kaur at its inception was not lawful and therefore S. 14(1) has no application, hinges on the question whether on the death of Daya Singh, the collaterals became immediately entitled to the possession of the property, the widow of Bakhtawar Singh not being a lineal descendant. This argument loses sight of the fact that Bakhtawar Singh would be deemed to be living so long as the widow lives. It is a settled rule of law that when a male holder dies leaving a widow succession to his estate opens when the widow dies — the life of the widow is treated as the continuation of the life of her husband. On his death she succeeds to him and holds the property as a limited heir.

7. This was so before the Hindu Succession Act came into force. Now, of course, the position is ??? and the widow succeeding to her husband gets an absolute estate as already stated in the earlier part of this judgment. In any case, if there is any merit in the contention of the learned counsel that on the death of Bakhtawar Singh she was not entitled to succeed to this property, then she, having remained in possession of this property without any right for over twelve years as against the rightful owner, has become its absolute owner by the rule of adverse possession. In this connection reference may be made to Hira Mal v. Ronqi Ram, ILR (1955) Punj 1120. Moreover, if the possession of the widow was unlawful as from the death of Bakhtawar Singh, the present suit would fail as the plaintiffs being entitled to sue for possession cannot sue for a mere declaration. No attempt was made by the plaintiffs right up-to-date to seek an amendment of the plaint and to convert the suit into one for possession. Looking at the matter in either way, Mr. Chawla's contention must fail.

8. Coming to the third contention, the matter admits of no doubt. Schedule VII, List III of the Constitution of India, Entry No. 5, is in these terms:

“5. Marriage and divorce; infants and minors: adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law.”

9. The corresponding entry in the Government of India Act 1935 was in these terms

“Schedule VII, List III, Entry 7.

10. Wills, intestacy and succession, save as regards' agricultural land.”

11. It would be clear from the plain reading of these entries that the words “save as regards agricultural land” have been omitted from Entry No. 5, Schedule VII, List III of the Constitution of India. The object of the omission is not far to seek. It was thought, essential to have uniformity in the matters enumerated in this entry in regard to all kinds of property, and thus it became necessary to omit these words. Wherever it was thought necessary to exclude agricultural land from List III, it has been specifically so stated. In this connection reference may be made to entries Nos. 6, 7 of Schedule VII. List III of the Constitution of India and the corresponding entries Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 in the same list in the Government of India Act, 1935.

12. The argument of the learned counsel is based on Entry No. 18 of List II of the Constitution of India. This entry is in these terms:

“18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land-improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.”

13. If this entry is compared with its counterpart in the Government of India Act, 1935, wherein it is at No. 21 and is in these terms: “21. Land, that is to-say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization; Courts of Wards; encumbered and attached estates; treasure trove it is significant that the word “devolution” has been, omitted from the corresponding entry in the Constitution of India. If these vital changes are kept in view, it is quite plain that succession to agricultural land is covered by item No. 5 in List III of the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The Hindu Succession Act regulates succession to the property of all Hindus and as such has been validly enacted by Parliament under Entry No. 5, List III. It is settled law that in interpreting entries widest amplitude should be given to them. In this connection reference may be made to Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent Presidency Jail, Calcutta, (1955) 1 SCR 1284 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 367) and Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, (S) AIR 1957 SC 768.

14. In view of my finding that at the relevant date Smt. Bhagwan Kaur had become the absolute owner of the property in dispute, the plaintiff's suit must fail.

15. For the reasons given above, I allow the appeals preferred by Sant Ram Das and Smt.

16. Bhagwan Kaur and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.

17. On an oral request by the learned counsel for the respondents, I certify that this is a fit case for appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

ED/R.G.D

18. Appeals allowed.

Sant Ram Dass v. Gurdev Singh And Another

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion — R.S.A. Nos. 592 & 601 of 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' (holders of the suit) Contentions as Recounted by the Court

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sant Ram Dass v. Gurdev Singh And Another

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