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  • Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 read with Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 39 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act read with Section 151 of the CPC.
  • provisions of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
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  • Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 read with Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  • Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 39 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act read with Section 151 of the CPC.
  • provisions of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two petitions connected to the same set of proceedings concerning the auction sale of property known as “The Bank Godowns” in Simla, belonging to the Simla Banking and Industrial Co., Ltd. (in liquidation).

Petition 1: Brought by Puran Chand under Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 read with Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956. Facts set out in that petition (as pleaded by the petitioner):

  • The property was auctioned by the Official Liquidator on 24-9-1956.
  • Puran Chand was the highest bidder at Rs. 24,600 and deposited Rs. 4,000 in part payment on 27-9-1956; the sale was confirmed on 1-10-1956 and the liquidator informed him of confirmation on 3-10-1956.
  • The petitioner sought completion of the sale by execution of a registered document, delivery of actual (vacant) possession, and satisfaction as to the bank’s title and right to sell; he expressed willingness to pay the balance once the vendor fulfilled obligations.
  • No relief was sought against the auctioneer (respondent No.2).

Official Liquidator’s written statement (respondent’s pleadings and separate petition):

  • The Official Liquidator admitted acceptance of the highest bid but asserted the purchaser failed to pay the required one-fourth of the purchase money (alleging only Rs.4,000 was paid and balance was unpaid).
  • At the auction, it was announced that most of the godowns (except a ground-floor room) were in the occupation of tenants and that possession would be given by attornment of tenants, not by delivery of vacant possession.
  • The Official Liquidator contended the petition was an attempt to frustrate enforcement of the default/resale clause and that the petitioner never earlier complained about delivery of vacant possession or execution of the sale deed.
  • The Official Liquidator filed a separate petition (dated 28-12-1956) under Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act read with Section 151 CPC seeking forfeiture of the Rs.4,000 deposit and resale of the property at the purchaser’s risk and cost.

Chopra J. framed four issues on 11-1-1957 for decision (listed in the opinion), evidence was led (including oral evidence and documentary exhibits such as R.1, R.5 and Exhibit R.11), and the court delivered the order summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Was it announced at the auction as a condition that vacant possession could not be given to the purchaser and therefore the purchaser is not entitled to vacant possession?
  2. Is the petitioner entitled to repudiate the sale, in case vacant possession is not delivered to him?
  3. Which party is at fault and what is its effect?
  4. Relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Puran Chand (auction-purchaser) — arguments as presented in the record

  • He sought execution of the sale deed and delivery of actual possession and asked the liquidator to satisfy him as to title and right to sell; he offered to pay the balance once the vendor was ready to fulfil obligations.
  • In reply to the Official Liquidator’s petition for forfeiture, he contended that unless the vendor delivers actual (vacant) possession he is within his rights to repudiate the contract.
  • Counsel for Puran Chand relied on Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 39 of the Contract Act, and cited authorities (e.g., Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand; Hyam v. Gubbay; Vud-dandam v. Venkatakameswara Rao; Panchapagesa Ayyer v. Arunachala Mudaliar) for the proposition that a purchaser is entitled to rescind and claim return of the advance if the vendor cannot give possession.
  • Exhibit R.11 (notice of 17-10-1956) raised doubts about the bank’s title (alleging the property was mortgaged to, not owned by, the bank) and requested titles; that notice, however, did not mention delivery of actual possession.

Official Liquidator (vendor / respondent) — arguments as presented in the record

  • Admitted acceptance of the highest bid but asserted the purchaser failed to pay the required one-fourth of the purchase money and did not make good the balance payment.
  • Contended that the auction conditions (read out at sale) informed bidders that parts of the godowns were occupied by tenants and that vacant possession would not be delivered but tenants would attorn to the purchaser.
  • Maintained that the petitioner’s present demand for vacant possession was an afterthought intended to delay enforcement of the default clause and resale; the petitioner had not previously complained to the Official Liquidator about delivery of vacant possession or execution of sale deed.
  • Argued the Rs.4,000 deposit was earnest/security (not merely refundable part payment) and, under the sale conditions and applicable law, was liable to forfeiture on the purchaser’s default; accordingly, the property should be re-auctioned at the purchaser’s risk and cost.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand, AIR 1950 Cal 333 Cited by purchaser’s counsel to support that vendor must give such possession as the nature of the property admits (under Section 55(1)(f) Transfer of Property Act). The court noted the citation but found that, on the facts, a contract to the contrary had been made at the auction (announcement that vacant possession of tenant-occupied portions would not be given), so Section 55(1)(f) did not apply here.
Hyam v. Gubbay, 32 Ind Cas 53 : (AIR 1916 Cal 1) Cited in support of purchaser’s right to rescind where vendor cannot give possession. Considered by the court as part of the purchaser’s authorities; court held contract to the contrary excluded the operation of that principle in this case.
Vud-dandam v. Venkatakameswara Rao, AIR 1951 Mad 470 Cited for the rule on possession/contractual obligations concerning delivery of possession. The court recorded the citation but concluded that an express announcement at auction contradicted the assumption that the vendor must deliver vacant possession.
Panchapagesa Ayyer v. Arunachala Mudaliar, 1932 Mad WN 122 Cited for the same proposition regarding vendor’s obligation to give possession. The court did not apply this authority to override the specific auction condition that vacant possession would not be given; hence it did not assist the purchaser on these facts.
Webb v. Macpherson, ILR 31 Cal 57 (PC) Authoritative statement that operation of Section 55(1)(f) can be excluded by contract to the contrary. The court relied on that principle to conclude the auction announcement (contract to the contrary) excluded the operation of Section 55(1)(f) in this case.
Howe v. Smith, (1884) 27 Ch D 89 Cited for the proposition that money paid as a deposit is naturally to be treated as earnest/security and may be forfeited if purchaser defaults. The court quoted and applied this reasoning to hold that the deposit operated as earnest/security and could properly be forfeited on the purchaser’s repudiation/default.
Collins v. Stimson, (1883) 11 QBD 142 Authority expressing the inference that a deposit is a guarantee for performance and may be retained on purchaser’s default. Invoked to support the conclusion that the deposit could be forfeited where the purchaser repudiated the contract.
Depree v. Bedborough, (1863) 33 LJ Ch 134; 4 Giff 479; 66 ER 795 English authority on the nature and forfeiture of deposits/earnest money. Listed among English precedents relied on for the general rule that deposits are forfeitable when the purchaser defaults; the court regarded these authorities as supportive of forfeiture.
In re Parnell, Ex parte Barrell, (1875) 44 LJ Bk 138; 10 Ch A 512 English authority on deposits/earnest money as security for performance. Included in the compendium of English decisions the court relied on to justify forfeiture of the deposit on purchaser default.
Soper v. Arnold, (1889) 59 LJ Ch 214 : 14 AC 429 English authority relevant to deposit/forfeiture principles. Cited among English decisions to support the court’s conclusion regarding forfeiture.
Hall v. Burnell, (1911) 81 LJ Ch 46 : (1911) 2 Ch 551 Another English decision on the legal treatment of deposits. Referred to as part of the established English jurisprudence supporting forfeiture of earnest on default.
Farr, Smith and Co. Ltd. v. Messers Ltd., (1928) 1 KB 397 English authority on deposit/forfeiture. Listed among the English decisions relied upon by the court in reaching its view on forfeiture.
Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1 Indian precedent following English principles on forfeiture of earnest money. Referred to as an Indian authority consistent with the English rule that deposits may be forfeited on purchaser default.
Madan Mohan v. Jawala Parshad, AIR 1950 EP 278 Indian authority on deposit/forfeiture principles. Listed among Indian decisions adopting the English position and supporting forfeiture where purchaser defaults.
Naresh Chandra Guha v. Ram Chandra Samanta, AIR 1952 Cal 93 (55 Cal WN 765) Indian decision on forfeiture of earnest/deposit. Cited as supporting the general rule that earnest may be forfeited if purchaser rescinds or defaults.
N.V. Jagannadhayya v. Ramanatha Mohanapatra, AIR 1955 Orissa 11 Indian authority following the forfeiture principle. Included as evidence of Indian Courts following English authorities on forfeiture of earnest money.
Venkoba Char v. Sanjivappa, AIR 1937 Mad 681 Indian precedent on forfeiture of deposits. Referred to among Indian cases supporting forfeiture in the event of vendee’s default.
Gopalaratna Iyengar v. Rajaratna Mudaliar, AIR 1938 Mad 246 Indian case on deposits and forfeiture. Listed as a supporting Indian authority for forfeiture where purchaser repudiates.
Krishna Chandra v. Mamud Bepari, AIR 1936 Cal 51 Indian precedent on the subject of earnest money and its forfeiture. Included as authority consistent with the court’s view that deposit can be forfeited upon purchaser default.
Dinanath v. Malvi Mody Ranchhoddas and Co., AIR 1930 Bom 213 Indian decision referenced on forfeiture of deposits. Referred to among comparable Indian authorities endorsing forfeiture on vendee’s default.
Muhammad Habib-Ullah v. Muhammad Shafi, ILR 41 All 324 : AIR 1919 All 265 Indian judgment on deposits/forfeiture principles. Listed by the court as further Indian support for the rule of forfeiture of earnest on purchaser default.
Shuttleworth v. Clews, (1910) 1 Ch 176 Cited for the rule that on resale, when calculating deficiency to be made good by defaulting purchaser, the vendor must give credit for any earnest/deposit received from the original purchaser. The court applied this principle by directing that, on resale, if the price fetched is lower than the original bid, the respondent-Bank must give credit for the deposit when computing any deficiency payable by the petitioner; this precedent was expressly invoked as guiding the remedy on resale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by evaluating documentary and oral evidence (including Exhibits R.1, R.5 and R.11 and testimony of witnesses R.W.1 and R.W.3) and by applying established contractual and equitable principles. The reasoning unfolded in two primary strands: (A) whether delivery of vacant possession was a term of the contract, and (B) whether the deposit was forfeitable on the purchaser’s default.

A. Was vacant possession a contractual condition?

  • The court examined Exhibit R.11 (a notice dated 17-10-1956) and observed that it raised doubts about title and sought copies of title-deeds, but said nothing about delivery of actual possession — indicating that the demand for vacant possession appeared only in the later petition.
  • From oral evidence (R.W.1 and R.W.3) the court was satisfied that it had been made clear to all bidders at the auction, including Puran Chand, that the godowns (except a ground-floor room) were in the possession of tenants and that vacant possession would not be given; the tenants were to attorn to the purchaser.
  • Counsel for the purchaser relied on Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and related authorities to contend that, in the absence of a contrary contract, a seller must give such possession as the nature of the property admits. The court noted the legal principle that Section 55(1)(f) can be excluded by a contract to the contrary (Webb v. Macpherson).
  • Applying those principles to the factual finding that the auctioneer read out and bidders were informed that vacant possession would not be delivered for tenant-occupied portions, the court concluded that there existed a contract to the contrary and hence Section 55(1)(f) did not apply on these facts.

B. Forfeiture of the deposit (Rs.4,000) on purchaser default

  • The court analysed the sale conditions (Exhibits R.1 and R.5) which required the highest bidder to deposit one-fourth of the purchase money forthwith and prescribed forfeiture in case of failure to pay the balance within the prescribed period.
  • Applying general contract interpretation principles, the court explained that where the real intention of the parties is not clearly ascertainable, courts will treat a deposit as both part payment (if the contract is performed) and as earnest/security (guarantee) for performance — and such a deposit is commonly forfeitable on purchaser default.
  • The court relied on established English authorities (e.g., Howe v. Smith; Collins v. Stimson and others) and a series of Indian cases following the English position, to hold that a deposit given on signing a contract is ordinarily subject to forfeiture when the purchaser repudiates or defaults, unless the contract demonstrates an intention to exclude forfeiture.
  • The court also reviewed historical doctrinal material (Roman law and early Hindu law) presented in the opinion as background showing the antiquity of the doctrine of earnest and its forfeiture, but the operative conclusion was rooted in contemporary English and Indian authorities.
  • Although forfeitures are not favoured generally, the court found that the vendor (Official Liquidator / Bank) was free from blame and that the purchaser had indicated unwillingness to perform; accordingly, the court found no objection to ordering forfeiture and resale.
  • The court directed that, on resale, if the property fetches a lower price than the original bid, the bank must give credit for the deposit when calculating any deficiency — applying Shuttleworth v. Clews.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The court dismissed Puran Chand’s petition (the purchaser’s petition seeking completion, sale deed and delivery of vacant possession) with costs on the ground that delivery of vacant possession was not a condition of the contract and that Puran Chand had repudiated the contract by refusing to pay the balance.
  • The court allowed the Official Liquidator’s petition dated 28-12-1956 with costs and ordered that the deposit of Rs.4,000 paid by Puran Chand stands forfeited to the Simla Banking and Industrial Company, Limited (in liquidation), and that the property known as “The Bank Godowns” shall be resold.
  • The court further ordered that if on resale the property fetches a price below Rs.24,600 (the price bid by Puran Chand), the Official Liquidator/Bank must give credit for the Rs.4,000 deposit when calculating any deficiency to be recovered from the petitioner; and the Official Liquidator may then apply to the Court for further steps in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence for the parties: the purchaser’s petition was dismissed and the purchaser’s deposit was forfeited; the Official Liquidator’s petition seeking forfeiture and resale was allowed.
  • The court applied settled principles that (i) where a contract expressly or impliedly excludes the vendor’s obligation to give vacant possession Section 55(1)(f) will not operate to permit rescission, and (ii) deposits paid as earnest/security are forfeitable on purchaser default unless the contract indicates an intention to exclude such forfeiture.
  • The opinion contains no statement of creating a new precedent beyond application of existing English and Indian authorities; the court stated and applied established rules about forfeiture of earnest and about contractual exclusion of Section 55(1)(f).

Order signed and delivered as recorded in the opinion: Puran Chand’s petition dismissed with costs; Official Liquidator’s petition allowed with costs; deposit forfeited and property ordered to be resold subject to the credit on resale as described above.

    Puran Chand v. The Official Liquidator, Simla Banking And Industrial Co. Ltd., Simla And Another

    1. These are two petitions arising out of same proceedings. One is by Puran Chand against the Official Receiver and G.D Khanna and Sons under Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 read with Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956. In this petition Puran Chand has alleged that property known as “The Bank Godowns” situate at Simla and belonging to the Simla Banking and Industrial Co., Ltd., (in liquidation), was auctioned by the Official Liquidator. The petitioner, who was the highest bidder had purchased it for Rs. 24,600/-. The auction took place on 24-9-1956, and in part payment of the purchase price, a sum of Rs. 4,000/- had been deposited by Puran Chand. This sale was confirmed on 1-10-1956. The liquidator had informed the petitioner on 3-10-1956 that the sale in his favour had been confirmed.

    2. In this petition it is stated that the petitioner desires that the sale be completed by execution of a registered document and by delivery of actual possession to the petitioner. The petitioner also wants the liquidator to satisfy him as to his title to the property, and his right to sell and to execute the sale deed. The petitioner has expressed his willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price when the liquidator is in a position to fulfil his obligations as vendor. No relief has been sought against respondent No. 2, who was the auctioneer who had auctioned the property.

    3. The Official Liquidator in his written statement has traversed the pleas of the petitioner. He has admitted that the highest bid of the petitioner being of Rs. 24,600/- made by him at public auction on 24-9-1956 had been accepted. He had failed to denosit ¼th of the purchase money and had only paid Rs. 4,000/- on 27-9-1956. He has not made good his promise to pay the balance of the purchase price. It was stated in the written reply that it was announced at the auction, that with the exception of the room on the ground-floor, the remaining gadowns were in the possession of the tenants and that possession would be given to the purchaser by attornment on the part of the tenants. It was pleaded, that having made a default in the payment, the petition was just an attempt to forestall the official liquidator's petition for the enforcement of the default clause and for ordering resale of the property at the petitioner's risk. He also contended that the petitioner had never complained to the Official Liquidator about delivery of vacant possession or as to the execution of the sale deed and his only object was to delay the payment of the balance amount. Regarding the Bank's title, the Official Liquidator stated, that he had always been ready and willing to satisfy the petitioner, who in fact could have no doubt about the title. It was also said, that the demand for actual possession had been made for the first time in this petition and Puran Chand knew, before making the bid, that the godowns were occupied by the tenants and that the successful bidder would not be given vacant possession of the portions of the building which are under occupation of tenants.

    4. The other petition is by the Official Liquidator purporting to be under Section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act read with Section 151 of the CPC. In this petition he has asked, that the amount of Rs. 4,000/- deposited by Puran Chand should be forfeited and the property be resold at auction-purchaser's risk and cost. In reply Puran Chand auction-purchaser has submitted that unless the vendor is prepared to deliver actual possession he is within his rights to repudiate the contract. The following issues were framed by Chopra J. on 11-1-1957:

    1. Was it announced at the auction as a condition that vacant possession could not be given to the purchaser and therefore the purchaser is not entitled to vacant possession?

    2. Is the petitioner entitled to repudiate the sale, in case vacant possession is not delivered to him?

    3. Which party is at fault and what is its effect?

    4. Relief.

    5. The above issues may be dealt with together.

    6. (His Lordship considered the oral evidence and proceeded:)

    7. Exhibit R. 11 is an important document. It is a notice given on behalf of Puran Chand by his lawyer on 17-10-1956. All that is stated in the notice is, that Puran Chand had learnt that the property auctioned and purchased by him did not belong to the bank; and that this property had only been mortgaged with the bank. This information, it was stated, had aroused doubts in his client's mind about the bank's title to the property, as to the bank's right and competency in passing a good title to his client and also as to his having peaceful enjoyment of the premises. The Official Liquidator was asked to send the copies of the title-deeds of the property in favour of the bank and his right to sell it. In this notice, not a word was said regarding the delivery of the actual possession of the property to Puran Chand.

    8. I think that the demand of delivery of actual possession is an afterthought on the part of Puran Chand and it has been made for the first time in his petition. I am satisfied from the evidence of R.W 1 and R.W 3, that it was made clear to all the bidders including the petitioner Puran Chand, that actual possession would not be delivered of the go-downs which were in the occupation of the tenants and Puran Chand was fully aware of that fact before he bid for the property. At no time was there any doubt in his mind regarding the delivery of actual possession.

    9. Mr. M.L Sethi, learned counsel for Puran Chand, has drawn my attention to the provisions of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. He has argued that in the absence of the contract to the contrary, the seller was bound to give to the buyer such possession of the property as its nature admitted. He has cited in support of his arguments Sashi Bhusan v. Rai Chand, AIR 1950 Cal 333, Hyam v. Gubbay, 32 Ind Cas 53 : (AIR 1916 Cal 1) (FB) Vud-dandam v. Venkatakameswara Rao, AIR 1951 Mad 470 and Panchapagesa Ayyer v. Arunachala Muda-liar, 1932 Mad WN 122.

    10. He has relied upon these rulings for the proposition, that when the vendor is not in a position to give possession of the property agreed to be sold by him to the purchaser, the purchaser will be entitled by virtue of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 39 of the Contract Act, to rescind the contract and claim the advance that has been paid by him. The words “such possession of the property as its nature admits” occurring in S. 55(1)(f) refer to an incident which is inherent in the property, and the presence of tenants or trespassers in the house cannot affect the nature of the property so far as the question of delivery of actual possession is concerned.

    11. The words “In the absence of any contract, to ‘the contrary”, show, that the operation of this section can be excluded by any contract or agreement between the parties: vide Webb v. Macpherson, ILR 31 Cal 57 (PC). I think that on the evidence on the record of this case, the contract to the contrary has been indicated with sufficient clarity. Before the conclusion of the sale, on an enquiry by the bidders including Puran Chand, it was made clear beyond doubt, that actual possession of that portion of the property, which was with the tenants, would not be delivered but that the tenants, would attorn to the purchaser. The provisions of Section 55(1)(f) of the Transfer of Property Act are not, therefore, attracted to the facts of this case.

    12. The learned counsel for Puran Chand has made it clear that his client is unwilling to pay the balance of the price if he is not going to obtain vacant possession of the property for which he bid at the auction. In view of my findings above, the delivery of vacant possession was not a condition of the contract. The breach of contract has been committed by Puran Chand. The legal consequences of rescission of contract must, therefore, follow. The claim of Puran Chand, as made in this petition, cannot, therefore, be sustained, and his petition is dismissed with costs.

    13. The Official Liquidator in his petition dated 28-12-1956, has prayed that the amount of deposit paid by Puran Chand should stand forfeited on account of failure on his part to abide by the terms of the contract, and the property should be re-auctioned at the risk and cost of Puran Chand.

    14. Exhibit R. 1 is a printed copy of notice of sale by public auction of three properties, including the Bank's godowns. It was mentioned in R. 1 that the highest bidder would be required to pay one-fourth of the amount of bid at the close of the auction and the balance would be payable within fifteen days of the intimation of confirmation of the sale by the High Court. Exhibit R. 5 is a typewritten document signed by the auctioneer, stating that the auction was commenced at 11-30 a.m, and the conditions of sale, reproduced therein, were read out and explained in the presence of the Official Liquidator. The conditions of sale which have relevance for decision of this case are Nos. 3, 4 and 5 which are reproduced below:

    “1. ***

    2. ***

    3. That the highest bidder shall deposit one-fourth of the purchase money forthwith with the Official Liquidator in cash or by cheque endorsed ‘GOOD FOR PAYMENT’.

    4. That the balance of the purchase money shall be paid within fifteen days of the intimation of confirmation of the sale by the High Court.

    5. That in case of failure of payment of the balance amount within the period prescribed, the earnest money of one-fourth shall be forfeited.

    6. ***

    15. It was argued by the learned counsel for Puran Chand that the deposit of Rs. 4,000/- was solely in the nature of part payment towards the price and was liable to be returned to the vendee and could not be forfeited. On the other side, it was contended by the learned counsel for the Official Liquidator that this amount was in the nature of earnest money and was paid by way of security for completion of the contract.

    16. The first rule in interpreting a contract is, that the language used by the parties should be examined in order to find a clue as to their intention. The question to be posed in all such cases is, quid inter contrahentes actum est:—what was the real intention of the contracting parties? But where it is difficult to determine the real intention then the Courts act on the principle that the deposit is not merely part payment but also a guarantee of the due performance of the contract by the purchaser, and as such, it is liable to be forfeited if the sale is repudiated by the purchaser. A deposit which is paid under a contract of sale, serves two purposes; if sale is effected the amount of deposit is credited towards the purchase money, but essentially, it is in the nature of security for the performance of the contract even where the terms of the contract do not expressly provide forfeiture of the deposit in case of default on the part of the vendee.

    17. Such a term is deemed implied unless the contract shows any intention to exclude forfeiture. By virtue of the very purpose of the deposit of the earnest, the vendor is entitled to retain it as forfeited if the agreement is not honoured by the purchaser through his default. If a person under contract to purchase, deposits money on account of purchase price the money so deposited is earnest money although the intention of the parties is, that at the time of consummation of the agreement it is to be applied towards the purchase price. “Earnest” may be money or a tangible thing given at the time it the conclusion of the contract in order to bind the bargain.

    18. Such a thing or money is given as an earnest or token of good faith, and as a guarantee, for fulfilment of the contract, and is subject to forfeiture if the contract falls through owing to vendee's default. If a contract is fulfilled then the earnest serves a further purpose and it then operates by way of part payment. Giving of earnest and making of the part payment are two separate and independent matters each with a distinct purpose.

    19. The object of giving earnest is to make the contract binding; and in its essential nature, it is not a contribution made in the course of the performance of the contract as, that, is the purpose of part payment.

    20. In the words of Fry, L.J:

    “Money paid as a deposit must, I conceive, be paid on some terms implied or expressed. In this case no terms are expressed, and we must therefore inquire what terms are to be implied. The terms most naturally to be implied appear to me in the case of money paid on the signing of a contract to be that in the event of the contract being performed it shall be brought into account, but if the contract is not performed by the payer it shall remain the property of the payee. It is not merely a part payment, but is then also an earnest to bind the bargain so entered into, and creates by the fear of its forfeiture a motive in the payer to perform the rest of the contract.” Howe v. Smith, (1884) 27 Ch D 89 (101).

    21. Baron Pollock in Collins v. Stimson, (1883) 11 QBD 142 (143) said:

    “According to the law of vendor and purchaser the inference is that such a deposit is paid as a guarantee for the performance of the contract, and where the contract goes off by default of the purchaser, the vendor is entitled to retain the deposit.”

    22. Reference may also be made to the following English decisions:

    1. Depree v. Bedborough, (1863) 33 LJ Ch 134 : 4 Giff 479 : 66 ER 795;

    2. In re, Parnell, Ex parte Barrell, (1875) 44 LJ Bk 138 : 10 Ch A 512;

    3. Soper v. Arnold, (1889) 59 LJ Ch 214 (217) : 14 AC 429.

    4. Hall v. Burnell, (1911) 81 LJ Ch 46 : (1911) 2 Ch 551;

    5. Farr, Smith and Co. Ltd. v. Messers Ltd., (1928) 1 KB 397 (408);

    6. See also Fry on Specific Performance, Second Edition, para 1460.

    23. The principles relating to forfeiture of deposit on default on the part of the vendee, as enunciated by Courts in England, have been followed by Courts in India, and reference may be made to the following, among other cases,—

    1. Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1;

    2. Madan Mohan…(Plaintiff) v. Jawala Parshad…(Defendant) ., AIR 1950 EP 278;

    3. Naresh Chandra Guha v. Ram Chandra Samanta, 55 Cal WN 765 : (AIR 1952 Cal 93);

    4. N.V Jagannadhayya v. Ramanatha Moha-napatra, (S) AIR 1955 Orissa 11;

    5. Venkoba Char v. Sanjivappa, AIR 1937 Mad 681;

    6. Gopalaratna Iyengar v. Rajaratna Mudaliar, AIR 1938 Mad 246;

    7. Krishna Chandra v. Mamud Bepari, AIR 1936 Cal 51;

    8. Dinanath v. Malvi Mody Ranchhoddas and Co., AIR 1930 Bom 213: and

    9. Muhammad Habib-Ullah v. Muhammad Shafi, ILR 41 All 324 : (AIR 1919 All 265).

    24. The law forfeiting earnest in the event of rescission by the vendee is of very ancient lineage. Both early Hindu Law and also Roman Law bear testimony to the great antiquity of the practice of giving earnest as token of good faith and a guarantee of the binding character of the bargain on pain of forfeiture. In Roman Law, if the agreement of sale was followed by the giving of earnest the buyer, if he rescinded the contract, forfeited the, earnest paid and if the vendor refused to perform the contract he was compelled to restore double I the earnest money, even though there had been; no express agreement in the matter of earnest.’ ‘Is qui recusat adimplere contractum, si quidem emptor est, perdit quod dedit, si vero venditor, duplum restiture, compellitur, licet nihil super arris expressum est’, vide Institutes of Justinian, 3.23 pr.

    25. The early Romans treated the earnest as merely evidence of the completion of the contract (argumentum est emptionis et venditionis contractae) vide Gai 3.139 In so far as the earnest made the agreement firm it was called “arra confirmatoria”. Originally the earnest (arra) was a specific thing, such as a ring (annulus) and it furnished a ‘proof of the conclusion of the contract of purchase and sale (see Dig. 18, 1, 35). The rule of Roman Law is still the law of some countries, for instance, Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Chile, Louisiana and Japan. (See Roman Law in the Modern World by Sherman, Third Edition, Volume 2, page 341). The principles of Roman Law relating to the earnest passed to the early jurisprudence of England and in the time of Bracton who died in 1268 A.D, the same principles became the law of England. (See (1884) 27 Ch D 89 (102)).

    26. According to ancient Hindu Law when for the purpose of concluding a bargain the purchaser has paid earnest money to the seller —if the transaction should fail by reason of anything done by the seller, —he shall be made to repay to the purchaser double the earnest money received by him.

    (on failure he shall be compelled to pay double the earnest). The above passage is by Narada in Apararka, but is attributed to Yajnavalkya in Smriti-chandrika. The complete coincidence of the above passage with the words of Justinian “* * * venditor, duplum restiture compellitur (vendor is compelled to restore double”) is significant.

    27. According to Vyasa in Smritichandrika—

    28. It means, that “after having paid the earnest money, if the purchaser does not come forward to receive the article sold — the article becomes relinquished by him and he forfeits the earnest money”.

    29. Reference in the above connection may be made to Hindu Law in its Sources, Volume I, By Ganganatha Jha, pages 339 and 340, and Hindu Jurisprudence by P.N Sen, page 102.

    30. It is true that forfeitures are not as a rule favoured unless the right claimed is clearly established. In this case not only the conduct of the vendor is free from blame but the defaulting purchaser even at this stage is unwilling to purchase the property. In view of the statement of the petitioner's counsel that his client does not intend to purchase the property for which he had successfully bid at the auction sale, there is no alternative left but to order its resale.

    31. If on resale the property fetches a lesser price than what had been bid for by the petitioner, then the respondent-Bank shall give credit, in calculating the deficiency to be paid by the petitioner on resale for the amount of the deposit which had been received from him. In other words, if the property is resold for less than the price for which the petitioner had undertaken to purchase it, then the Banking Company must give credit for the amount of the deposit received from the petitioner when calculating the deficiency in price on resale, vide Shuttleworth v. Clews, (1910) 1 Ch 176.

    32. In view of the above discussion, it is ordered that the amount of Rs. 4,000/- deposited by Puran Chand petitioner as earnest money stands forfeited, to the Simla Banking and Industrial Company, Limited (in liquidation). The property known as “The Bank Godowns” situated in Simla shall be resold.

    33. In case the price fetched at the resale is below Rs. 24,600/-, as bid by Puran Chand at the auction sale, it shall be open to the Official Liquidator, then, to make an application to this Court for further steps to be taken in accordance with law.

    34. In the result the petition of the Official Liquidator dated 28th of December, 1956, is allowed with costs.

    BC/R.G.D

    35. Order accordingly.

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    Puran Chand v. The Official Liquidator, Simla Banking And Industrial Co. Ltd., Simla And Another
    (Dec 19, 1958)