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  • Section 68 of the English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 and 9 Vict., c. 20) 1845, the Indian
  • Section 13(a) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act No. IX of 1890),
  • English Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, S. 61,
  • Section 13(c) of Act No. IX of 1890.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 68 of the English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 and 9 Vict., c. 20) 1845, the Indian
  • Section 13(a) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act No. IX of 1890),
  • English Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, S. 61,
  • Section 13(c) of Act No. IX of 1890.
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 19 January 1947, the plaintiff-appellant, Vijay Shanker, then about two years and two months old, was crossing the railway line between Hardinge Bridge and New Delhi Railway stations (opposite the residential locality of Mahabat Khan Road, New Delhi) at approximately 3 p.m. A Parcel Express coming from Agra to Delhi ran over him; both his legs were seriously injured and were later amputated near the knee joints, resulting in permanent and complete disability.

The track where the accident occurred was laid circa 1902. Residential buildings and quarters developed on both sides of the track from about 1938–1939; the plaintiff lived at No. 26-E Mahabat Khan Road and was playing near the track with other children when he attempted to cross. Other children crossed safely; the plaintiff, crawling, was struck. The train driver testified that he whistled and applied brakes, stopping the train 50–70 yards away, but the child had not cleared the track.

The plaintiff sued for damages of Rs. 100,000 (one lakh) for injuries and for recurring costs of artificial limbs. The claim was not founded on negligence by the train driver; instead it alleged negligence of the Railway (defendant, now Union of India) in failing to fence the track adjacent to residential houses and quarters. The defendant's primary defence was that there was no legal duty to fence the line.

The trial judge, while finding quantifiable losses (approx. Rs. 20,000 for artificial limbs during the plaintiff's expected lifetime and Rs. 30,000 in general damages, totalling about Rs. 50,000), accepted the defence that no statutory or common-law duty to fence existed and dismissed the suit on 13-12-1951, leaving parties to bear their own costs. The plaintiff appealed; this opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Railway (defendant) owed a legal duty (statutory or common law) to fence the railway track adjacent to residential quarters so as to prevent trespassing and consequent injuries to children, thereby rendering it liable for the plaintiff's injuries.
  2. Whether the existence (or non-existence) of a foot-way (level) crossing in the vicinity imposed any statutory or common-law duty on the Railway to maintain gates, stiles, fences or a gate-keeper, and whether such duty (if any) was breached.
  3. Whether a railway train is to be regarded as a "dangerous thing" for purposes of imposing liability on the Railway administration, particularly in relation to injuries to trespassers.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as set out in the plaint and pressed in argument)

  • The Railway track ran between residential houses on both sides; as a result, it was the defendant's duty to provide an adequate and effective fence to protect householders and children from trespassing on the line and suffering injury.
  • There was some evidence of prior accidents in the locality; therefore the Railway should have been required (or held to the duty) to fence the track for the protection of residents.
  • It was contended, alternatively, that the Railway/train is a "dangerous thing" which might attract a higher degree of responsibility, and thus the Railway should bear liability for injuries to persons coming on to the track.

Respondent's Arguments (defence relied on at trial and in this opinion)

  • No negligence by the train driver was pleaded or proved.
  • There was no statutory obligation under the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act No. IX of 1890) requiring the Railway to fence the line at that location; the relevant statutory provision (Section 13(a)) gives the Central Government power to require fencing, but no such requirement was shown to have been issued.
  • Under general common law (absent statute), there is no duty on a railway company to fence a line merely because residential development later arose; the Railway did not create a trap nor wilfully injure trespassers.
  • If a foot-way crossing existed it was not shown to have been provided or maintained by the Railway under statutory requisition (Section 13(c)), and even if voluntarily provided, duties such as keeping a gate or watchman depend on circumstances (no evidence of such circumstances here).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Latham v. B. Johnson and Nephew, Ltd., (1913) 1 KB 398 To sustain actionable negligence some wrongful act or breach of a positive duty must be shown. Used to frame the threshold requirement: plaintiff must show a breach of positive duty by the Railway; since no such breach was shown, no actionable negligence existed.
Sullivan v. Waters, (1864) 14 ICLR 460 Historical collection of cases that establish the gradation of duties owed by occupiers to trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Referenced to explain the categories of obligation and that the duty to trespassers is minimal (not to wilfully injure).
Lowery v. Walker, (1911) AC 10 Affirms that an owner must not willfully injure a trespasser; otherwise a trespasser takes risk. Relied upon to support the proposition that the Railway owed no duty to the trespassing child except not to set traps or willfully injure.
Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Barnett, (1911) AC 361 Discusses the duty of an occupier towards trespassers and limits on liability. Applied with Lowery to show established common-law position limiting liability to willful or reckless conduct toward trespassers.
Robert Addie and Sons Ltd. v. Dumbreck, 1929 AC 358 House of Lords approval that occupier's duty to trespassers is limited; cannot intentionally injure; no greater duty to child trespassers than adults except in limited exceptions. Used to hold that a distinction is not drawn in law between child and adult trespassers as to the basic extent of duty; supports dismissal.
Cliff v. Midland Railway Co., (1870) 5 QB 258 Where statute is permissive regarding diversion or fencing, the company has no obligation to fence absent legislative imposition; permissive powers do not create duties. Cited for the proposition that absent statutory compulsion the Railway had no common-law obligation to fence despite nearby residential development.
Jenkins v. Great Western Railway, (1912) 1 K.B. 525 Even where children were known to play near stacks adjacent to a fence, the railway was not negligent in not fencing the main line where no permission/license by railway was proved; permission/licence can impose duties but jury may find none. Considered a closely analogous case; court relied on it to reject the argument that the Railway was negligent for not fencing the main line for adjoining householders.
Stubley v. London & North Western Rly. Co., (1865) 1 Ex. 13 No general duty on railway companies to place watchmen at public footways crossing the railway at level; whether omission is negligent depends on circumstances. Applied to the question of any duty to keep a gate, stile or watchman at an alleged foot-way crossing; the court found no evidence of circumstances making such precautions necessary here.
Williams v. Great Western Rly. Co., (1874) 9 Ex 157 Where a statute (English Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 s.61) required a gate or stile at a public foot-path and the railway failed to provide it, jury could find negligence causing injury. Distinguished: in Williams there was a statutory duty breached and the child was found on the level crossing; here there was no statutory duty proved and evidence did not place the child on any level crossing.
(1870) 5 Q.B. 258 (Lush J.) The legislature, by authorising crossings without requiring precautions, intends that crossers take the risk; but if railway's construction increases peril, it may owe additional duties. Quoted and applied to reason that the Railway had not undertaken any construction that prevented persons from taking care or increased peril; thus no obligation to take additional precautions was imposed here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, applying statutory text and settled common-law authorities quoted in the opinion:

  1. The court first observed that neither negligence on the part of the train driver was pleaded or proved nor any evidence presented that the Railway permitted children to be on the track (which might have made them licensees). Absent such facts, the plaintiff was treated as a trespasser.
  2. The court set out the legal principle (supported by cited authorities) that an occupier's duty to a trespasser is minimal — not to wilfully injure or set traps — and that generally a trespasser takes the risk of being on the property. Authorities cited (including Lowery, Grand Trunk, and Robert Addie) reinforce that the law does not impose a greater duty towards children trespassers than adults, save in specific exceptions.
  3. Turning to statute, the court examined the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Section 13(a) and (c) as discussed). The Act vests power in the Central Government to require railways to provide and maintain fences or crossings; it does not by its own terms impose an imperative duty on the Railway unless the Central Government issues an appropriate requirement. No evidence was produced that the Central Government had required fencing or maintenance at the locus.
  4. The court considered whether, apart from statute, common law required the Railway to fence the line, especially where residential development had occurred more than 20 years after the track was laid. It concluded (relying on Cliff v. Midland) that absent statute, there is no such general obligation.
  5. The opinion examined parallel and distinguishing authorities. Jenkins was treated as a close parallel in which no negligence was found where children played on railway property but permission or license was not established. Williams (where a statutory duty existed) was distinguished because it involved a statutory mandate to erect gates or stiles, and there the child had been found on a level crossing.
  6. As to the contention that there existed a foot-way (level) crossing in the vicinity: the court found no reliable evidence that such a crossing existed at the accident site. Several witnesses, including the train driver and station master, did not notice a foot-path; a site plan prepared days later by one witness asserted an "authorised pagadandi" but that assertion was discredited by other evidence. Even assuming such a crossing existed, no material showed it had been provided and maintained by statutory requisition under Section 13(c), and if voluntarily provided the obligation to maintain gates or a watchman would depend on circumstances — none of which were established here (per Stubley and Lush J.'s observations).
  7. Finally, the court considered the argument that a railway train is a "dangerous thing" attracting a heightened duty. The court rejected that characterization for present purposes, holding that a train is not inherently or essentially a "dangerous thing" in the sense required to impose greater liability against a railway for injuries to trespassers, unless the railway had set a trap or wilfully intended injury.

Based on this stepwise application of statutory analysis and the authorities, the court concluded that no breach of a positive duty by the Railway had been shown and that the case did not fall within categories imposing actionable negligence on the Railway.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The appellant's appeal against dismissal of the suit fails and is dismissed; no damages are awarded to the plaintiff by this court.
  • The parties are left to bear their own costs in the appeal; the court expressly declined to award costs against either party.
  • The decision rests on established statutory interpretation and common-law authorities limiting occupier liability to trespassers; the opinion does not purport to create new legal precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts. The court emphasized that absent a statutory requirement (from the Central Government under the Indian Railways Act) or facts showing the Railway created a trap or wilfully injured the trespasser, no liability for failure to fence was established.

Judge(s) noted in the opinion: Falshaw, J. delivered the reasons and the concluding endorsement "I agree" appears (indicating concurrence).

    Vijay Shanker, v. Union Of India .

    1. The plaintiff, Vijay Shanker, who is the appellant, was on January, 19, 1947, about two years and two months old, when, at about 3 p.m., on that day, he was crossing the Railway line between Hardinge Bridge and New Delhi Railway stations, opposite residential locality of Mahabat Khan Road, New Delhi, and was run over by a Parcel Express coming from Agra to Delhi. His legs were injured and later on had to be amputated.

    2. The Railway track, on which the accident took place, was laid some time in 1902. Between Hardinge Bridge and New Delhi Railway stations, on both sides of the track, residential buildings and quarters have sprung up since about 1938 and 1939. Mahabat Khan Road quarters are on one side of the track and the plaintiff was residing with his father in No. 26-E of that Road. On the afternoon of the accident he was playing near the track. He along with a few other children, tried to cross the track, when the Parcel Express was approaching in the direction of New Delhi Railway station.

    The other children crossed the track. The plaintiff was crawling while crossing the track. According to the driver of the Parcel Express, T.D. Bose D. W. 3, when he saw the plaintiff, he whistled and applied vacuum brakes succeeding in pulling up the train at a distance of 50 to 70 yards, but before he could pull up the train the plaintiff had not been able to clear himself off the track and was run over by the train causing serious injuries to both of his legs, which as stated, had later on to be amputated near the knee joints. The plaintiff has suffered permanent and complete disability.

    3. The claim by the plaintiff is for a damage of one lakh rupees for the injuries sustained and for expenses of artificial limbs that he must use, but has to keep on changing at intervals as he grows up. No negligence on the part of the driver of the train has been alleged nor is there any evidence of any negligence by him. The claim is based on the negligence of the Railway of the defendant, now Union of India, in not fencing the track in front of the residential houses and quarters so as to be a barrier and prevention for the children and the public in general from crossing over the Railway track.

    The main defence of the defendant is that there is no such duty in law to fence the track imposed upon the defendant. This defence has found favour with the learned trial Judge, who has, though finding that the cost of the artificial limbs, during the expected life time of about 60 years of the plaintiff, approximates to about Rs. 20,000/- and damages, because of the injuries having regard to the status of the family, should be about Rs. 30,000/-, the total coming to Rs. 50,000/-, dismissed the suit, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The decree is dated 13-12-1951, and the plaintiff appeals against the decree.

    4. No negligence on the part of the driver of the train is either pleaded or proved. To bring the case within the category of actionable negligence, some wrongful act must be shown, or a breach of some positive duty: per Willes J., as cited at P. 405 of Latham v. B. Johnson and Nephew, Ltd., (1913) 1 KB 398 (A). The question then is what breach of positive duty has been committed by the Railway or wrongful act done by it in so far as this case is concerned? There is no evidence that children were permitted to be on the track by the Railway or not stopped from being there thus implying permission on its part and bring them in the category of licensees.

    The plaintiff was a trespasser on the Railway track. An owner or occupier of land or premises owes no obligation or duty to a trespasser, but he must not set up a trap for him or cause wilful injury to him. In (1913) 1 KB 398 (A), at page 410, Hamilton L. J., observed:

    "Where a question arises, not between parties who are both present in the exercise of equal rights inter se. but between parties of Whom one is the owner or occupier of the place and the other, the party injured, is not there as of right, but must justify his presence there if he can, the law has long recognised three categories of obligation. In these the duty of the owner or occupier to use care, if it exists at all, is graduated distinctly, though never very definitely measured.

    The cases down to 1864 are collected in Sullivan v. Waters, (1864) 14 ICLR 460 (B). Contractual obligations of course stand apart. The lowest is the duty towards a trespasser. More care, though not much, is owed to a licensee more again to an invitee. The latter term is reserved for those who are invited into the premises by the owner or occupier for some purpose of business or of material interest. Those who are invited as guests, whether from benevolence or for social reasons, are not in law invitees but licensees.. ......... ...........

    The rule as to trespassers is most recently indicated in Lowery v. Walker (1911) AC 10 (C) and is stated and discussed in Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Barnett (1911) AC 361 (D). The owner of the property is under the duty not to injure the trespasser wilfully; "not to do a wilful act in reckless disregard of ordinary humanity towards him"; but otherwise a man "trespasses at his own risk".

    This was approved by the House of Lords in Robert Addie and Sons Ltd. v. Dumbreck, 1929 AC 358 (E). This being the law with regard to trespassers, the question then arises whether there is any difference in the case of a child trespasser as compared to an adult trespasser? The law draws no distinction in the duty of the owner or occupier of the premises towards either category of trespasser. At page 407 of (1913) 1 KB 398 (A), Farwell L. J. said--

    "I am not aware of any case that imposes any greater liability on the owner towards children than towards adults: the exceptions apply to all alike and the adult is as much entitled to protection as the child. If the child is too young to understand danger, the license ought not to be held to extend to such a child unless accompanied by a competent guardian."

    In 1929 AC 358 (E) is referred to, with approval by Viscount Dunedin, the following dictum of Scrutton L. J,:

    "If the children were trespassers, the land owner was not entitled intentionally to injure them, or to put dangerous traps for them, in-

    tending to injure them, but was under no liability if, in trespassing, they injured themselves on objects legitimately on his land in the course of his business. Against those he was under no obligation to guard trespassers."

    5. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has pressed the claim of the plaintiff on the ground, as has been averred in the plaint, that as the Railway track runs between residential houses and quarters on its both sides, it was the duty of the defendant to provide adequate and effective fence to protect and prevent the householders and the children of the house-holders from trespassing or crossing over the Railway track and thus sustaining injury. Section 13(a) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (Act No. IX of 1890), provides :

    Unlike Section 68 of the English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 and 9 Vict., c. 20) 1845, the Indian statute does not impose any imperative obligation on the Railway to fence a line, but it gives power to the Central Government to require the Railway to, among other matters, provide fences and to maintain the same. In this case there is no material to say that any such requirement has been made by the Central Government for a fence on both sides of the Railway track for the benefit of the residents of the adjoining houses and quarters, where the accident took place.

    There is evidence that a few accidents did take place earlier and once the matter was a question of interpellation in the Central Assembly, but then the Central Government did not move to require the Railway to put up fence on either side of the track in the particular locality. There was no statutory obligation on the Part of the Railway to maintain fence on either side of the track at or about that place.

    The question then is whether under the general law there is any such obligation on the Railway to fence the Railway track and particularly if more than 20 years, as in this case, after the track was laid residential houses and quarters have sprung up on either side of the track near and about the particular place where the accident occurred. There appears to be no such obligation, apart from statute, under the general law. In Cliff v. Midland Rly. Co. (1870) 5 QB 258 (P), at p. 264, Lush J. observes thus:

    "Now, it seems to me that the company would have no obligation to do either" the one thing of the other, no obligation to divert the road, because the Act authorizing them to do so is merely permissive, and no obligation to fence off the road, or to employ any one there to warn persons coming on the road, because no such obligation is imposed by the legislature; and I do not see in this case, supposing anything a railway company could do would create an obligation, - that the company have done anything here to create that obligation".

    In 1929 A C 358 (E) at P. 372, Viscount Dune-din said:

    Something has been said about fencing. There is no duty on a proprietor to fence his land against the world under sanction that, if he does not, those who come over it become licensees.

    In this connection Jenkins v. Great Western. Railway, (1912) 1 K. B. 525 (G) is a somewhat parallel case. In that case, the plaintiff, a child, was 2 1/2 years old. The child's parents lived in a house close by a branch of one of the main lines of the Great Western Railway Company. On the northern side of the main line there was what is called a relief line, or an avoiding line. Beyond that there was a siding with some carriages on it. Beyond that in one particular place there were some stacks of timber which were within a distance of two and a half inches from the fence, that space was, of course, obviously, insufficient for a child of 2 1/2 years to get through.

    The fence was in perfectly good repair. It was a fence with rails three inches thick, narrower at the bottom-four inches at the bottom, next four and a half, next five, next nine, and next ten. On the north side of the fence there was a public road. The child got on to the main line of the railway and was knocked down and seriously injured, and in respect of that a claim for damage was brought.

    Cozens Hardy, M.R., at page 531, said that the findings most favourable to the plaintiff amount to this, that the railway authorities must be taken to have known that children did get on to the stacks of timber, which were, in fact, adjacent to the fence-- two and a half inches off is, of course, nothing -- and they must be taken to have given permission or leave and license to go there and get over the fence on to the stacks of timber, and to play there.

    But the jury negatived expressly that the railway authorities had any knowledge at all of leave or license to any children to go on to the main line. Upon these findings the argument advanced on behalf of the plaintiff was that the negligence was in this that if anybody got on to the stacks of timber, the leave and license which the railway company gave imposed upon them a duty to fence off that stack of timber from every thing to the south, to prevent children going to this place and getting into danger zone where trains might be passing.

    This argument was not accepted and It was held not to be a case of negligence on the part of the railway not to have fenced the main line from a place within its yard where children played as licencees. The learned Master of Rolls observes--

    Even apart from that, can it be said that a child, who was permitted to go to the stacks of timber, and play on the stacks of timber is entitled to say against the railway company. You ought to have fenced off that stack; you ought to have been aware that the invitation to children to trespass is irresistible and to go on to the railway to play in the zone of danger and meet with an accident'? I cannot follow that.

    So that on authority too the plaintiff has no case of negligence against the defendant because the Railway did not fence the track for the benefit of the adjoining house-holders.

    6. Some half-hearted argument has been addressed that at or near the place of accident there is a foot-way crossing on the railway track and that places the Railway under an obligation and duty to maintain a gate or stile there, with fences, and also a gate-keeper. It is not stated in the plaint that the accident took place on any such foot-way level crossing. Of the plaintiff's witnesses Kharaiti Ram P. W. 8 and Nathu Ram P. W. 9, both witnesses to the accident, say that there is no level crossing at the place where the accident occurred.

    The driver of the train, D. T. Bose D. W. 3, did not notice any foot-path on the track near-about the place of accident. Station Master Hans Raj Bhandari D. W. 2, who visited the place of the accident a few days later, also says that he did not notice any foot-path crossing the track. Some days after the accident Sant Ram D. W., D. I. T., prepared a site plan of the place of accident and it is he who says that

    "an authorised pagadandi (foot-path) existed which crosses the Railway track at the place of accident"
    . The evidence on both sides discredits the observation of this witness.

    There is no satisfactory proof that any footway crossing on the level existed near or about the place of the accident. Assuming for the moment that there is such an authorised foot-way level crossing at the place, there is no material on the basis of which it can be found that that level crossing was provided and maintained by the Railway in consequence of the requisition of the Central Government according to Section 13(c) of Act No. IX of 1890. It means that no such foot-way level crossing was being maintained under a statutory obligation by the Railway.

    The only other position for consideration can be that the Railway voluntarily provided such a foot-way level crossing, and then the question is what is the duty of the Railway with regard to the same? In Stubley v. London and North Western Rly. Co., (1865) 1 Ex. 13 (H), it has been held that

    "there is no general duty on the railway companies to place watchmen at public footways crossing the railway on a level; but it depends upon the circumstances of each case whether the omission of such a precaution amounts to negligence on the part of the railway."

    In that case the railway line could be seen for 300 yards each way from the foot-way crossing and it was held that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company when a woman crossing the line was run down and killed by a train. In the present case, there is some evidence of a curve at some distance from the place where the accident occurred but there is no evidence that the view of a person on the track is obstructed by anything on either side and if so from what distance. In (1870) 5 Q. B. 258 (F), at p. 264, Lush J., observed:

    "I think that where the legislature authorises a railway to cross a way, public or private, upon a level, and does not require from the company any precaution to avoid danger, the legislature intends that the persons who have to cross that line should take the risk incident to that state of things. But, it may be, and I am inclined to think that it is, a sound principle that if the railway company, in the construction of the works so authorised, in the exercise of the discretion which the legislature has vested in them, do anything which prevents persons passing over the line from taking care of themselves, and exposes them to greater peril than is ordinarily incident to a level crossing, the company thereby impose upon themselves an obligation to take other than the usual precautions for the protection of persons who have a right to pass there, and, as it were, to make up to the public for that which they have taken away from them."

    In the present case the railway has done nothing in the shape of construction work which has prevented persons crossing over the line from taking care of themselves and has exposed them to greater peril than is ordinarily incident to a level crossing. It thus appears that, though it is not the case here, even if it is accepted that there is a level foot-way crossing near where! the accident occurred, no duty, apart from the statute, is placed upon the Railway administration to either keep a gate or stile there with a fence, or to keep a watchman for the benefit of those using the same.

    Reference must, however, be made to Williams v. Great Western Rly. Co. (1874) 9 Ex 157 (I), in which case the English Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, S. 61, required the railway company to erect a gate or a stile at a public foot-path on the level but the railway company did not do so. A child of four-and a half years old having been sent on an errand, was shortly afterwards found lying on the level crossing, a foot having been cut off by a passing train. It was held that there was evidence to go to the jury that the accident was caused by the neglect of the defendants to fence.

    There was no evidence to show how the child came on the foot-way ]evel crossing. In the first place, in that case there was a statutory duty of which there was breach, which is not the case here. And secondly, in that case the child was found lying on the level crossing, but here the evidence is definite that the child was not found lying on any level crossing and in fact the preponderance of evidence is that at or near the place of the accident there is no such thing as a foot path crossing on the level. This argument is, therefore, devoid of substance.

    7. It has been said lastly on behalf of the plaintiff that the railway or rather a railway train is a 'dangerous thing' but for a thing to be a 'dangerous thing' it has to be dangerous in itself, or, in other words, inherently or essentially dangerous. This can hardly, in these days, be said either of railway or of a railway train. If such a thing could be said to be 'a dangerous thing', it was only then that the question of any obligation or duty, to persons coming on a railway track, on the part of the railway administration could be said to arise, but even then in the case of a trespaser there could hardly be any obligation or duty unless it could at the same time be found to be either a trap or something set up by the railway administration wilfully to injure persons coming on the railway track.

    8. In consequence, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but this is not a case for the award of costs and so the parties are left to their own costs in this appeal.

    Falshaw, J.

    9. I agree.

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    Comments

    Vijay Shanker, v. Union Of India .
    (Dec 23, 1957)