Citation Codes

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Case Number

Letters Patent Appeal No. 271 of 1963

Attorney(S)

N.S. Chhachhi and Jai Kishan Khosla
B.S. Chawla
for Respondent No. 1

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.S. Narula
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mehar Singh

Acts

provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Sub-section (1) of Section 92

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Source: the provided opinion text.

In village Cheema Khurd, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar, there is a Dharamsala known as "Baby Nanga." The manager of the Dharamsala was Sohan Singh (the defendant/appellant). In May 1954 Achhar Singh and four other persons (the plaintiffs) filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (after obtaining the Advocate-General of Punjab's sanction) seeking: (a) removal of Sohan Singh from management of the Dharamsala, (b) his eviction and dispossession from the shrine and attached property (buildings and agricultural land), and (c) rendition of accounts.

Paragraph 3 of the plaint (summarised in the opinion) alleged, inter alia, that Sohan Singh inadequately managed the Dharamsala, failed to keep the langar (free kitchen) running, misapplied income for the maintenance and profligacy of his family, and that members of his family induced women visiting the shrine to immoral acts. The plaint also alleged that the defendant did not render accounts, did not install Shri Guru Granth Sahib, and did not celebrate religious days and festivals.

The trial Court framed two issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs had locus standi; and (2) whether the grounds in paragraph 3 of the plaint existed entitling the plaintiffs to relief. By judgment dated 21 January 1956 the trial Court decreed removal and dispossession of Sohan Singh with costs, but declined to decree rendition of accounts.

On first appeal the Additional District Judge found that certain factual allegations had preponderant evidence (for example: the defendant's son abducted a barber's wife; the defendant's wife had illicit connections; an episode at a "yag" where the defendant's wife behaved indecently). However, the Additional District Judge held that many other allegations (such as diversion of income from the Dharamsala) were not proved and accepted the defendant's explanation that there was practically no income because tenants did not pay lagan. The first appellate Court set aside the trial Court's decree and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

The plaintiffs obtained relief in a subsequent appeal to a Single Judge of this Court: an ex parte allowance on 2 May (date in text: 1981) was given but later set aside on the defendant's application; on rehearing the Single Judge again allowed the plaintiffs' appeal on 16 May 1963. The defendant then brought a Letters Patent Appeal before the Court whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the allegations in paragraph 3 of the plaint and the findings of the Courts below brought the case within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the suit under Section 92 was maintainable in the absence of a proved breach of trust).
Whether the facts found by the trial and appellate Courts (misconduct and mismanagement by the defendant or his family, failure to recover rents, and inability to restrain immoral conduct within the shrine) justified removal of the defendant from management and the grant of relief under Section 92.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Achhar Singh and others) Arguments

The manager, Sohan Singh, grossly mismanaged the Dharamsala: he failed to run the langar and did not render accounts of income and expenditure.
The defendant allowed members of his family (wife and grown sons) to engage in immoral conduct which negatively affected worshippers and the reputation of the shrine.
Income of the property attached to the Dharamsala was being expended on the defendant's family and not for shrine purposes; thus the manager should be removed and ordered to render accounts.

Defendant / Appellant (Sohan Singh) Arguments

The defendant denied the allegations in the plaint generally.
In the Letters Patent Appeal the principal point argued by defendant's counsel was that the case did not fall within Section 92 because the plaintiffs had not proved a breach of trust; consequently, no relief under Section 92 could be granted.
At the lower appellate stage the defendant relied on evidence and explanation (including that tenants were not paying lagan) to show that allegations of diversion of income and mismanagement were not proved.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain, AIR 1948 Oudh 203	Supports the proposition that proof of breach of trust is not invariably required as a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 92; a direction by the Court may be sought where administration is necessary.	The Court relied on this Division Bench authority to support its view that Section 92 permits suits where a direction of the Court is necessary for administration even if a breach of trust is not fully proved; the authority buttressed the conclusion that jurisdiction can exist on the basis of plaint allegations showing maladministration or necessity for court direction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following lines (as stated in the opinion):

Statutory construction of Section 92(1):
- The Court set out the opening words of sub-section (1) of Section 92 and identified the two alternative bases for a Section 92 suit: (i) allegation of breach of an express or constructive trust created for public, charitable or religious purposes; or (ii) necessity of a Court direction for administration of such a trust.
- The Court emphasised that the two requirements are joined by the word "or" (not "and"), so proof of breach is not a precondition where a direction is shown to be necessary; allegation of either element in the plaint suffices to found jurisdiction.
Application to the plaint and evidence:
- The Court observed that paragraph 3 of the plaint contained allegations that could be read both as showing a breach of implied conditions of the trust and as showing the necessity for court direction (mismanagement, failure to run the langar, failure to render accounts, and immoral conduct within the shrine by family members).
- The Court accepted the material findings recorded by the trial and first appellate Courts (for example: the defendant's son abducted a barber's wife; the defendant's wife had illicit connections; and behaviour at a yag/”jag” was disgraceful). It declined to reopen pure findings of fact at the Letters Patent stage.
- Even where the defendant contended there was practically no income because tenants did not pay lagan, the Court held that the fact the manager was not recovering rents regularly and had allowed them to accumulate amounted to maladministration of the trust.
Conclusion on fitness to manage:
- The Court reasoned that the manager's inability to restrain or prevent the immoral conduct of his own family within a religious institution made him unfit to continue as its manager, because such conduct would have an adverse moral influence on worshippers, including adolescents.
- Accordingly, whether or not the defendant was personally civilly or criminally liable for the misconduct of family members, the practical consequence (inability to ensure proper management and moral environment) was a ground for removal and for suitable direction by the Court under Section 92.
Reliance on precedent:
- The Court cited Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain (AIR 1948 Oudh 203) to support the proposition that once the plaint makes out facts showing a breach or the necessity for direction, jurisdiction exists and proof of a breach is not invariably a condition precedent for relief.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge (which allowed the plaintiffs' appeal) is upheld.

Direct consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

The findings of misconduct, maladministration and the manager's inability to restrain immoral conduct by his family justify his removal from management of the Dharamsala and dispossession from properties attached to it (these were the forms of relief sought and earlier granted by the trial Court and ultimately sustained).
The Court held that the plaint and the facts found placed the case within Section 92: either as a breach of an implied condition of the trust or as a case where Court direction for administration was necessary; proof of breach of trust in every respect is not an absolute prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 92.
Costs: The Court ordered that costs of this appeal would be borne by the parties as incurred (i.e., no different direction from the Single Judge was adopted).

Note: The opinion relied upon an existing appellate authority (Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain) for the legal proposition that jurisdiction under Section 92 may be founded on the necessity for judicial direction even if a breach of trust is not proved as a condition precedent. The opinion does not purport to create or announce a novel precedent beyond applying Section 92 principles to the facts before the Court.

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Sohan Singh v. Achhar Singh And Ors

1. In village Cheema Khurd, Tehsil Patti, District Amritsar, there is a Dharamsala by the name of Baby Nanga. Sohan Singh appellant was its manager Achhar Singh and four others respondents before us, claiming to be worshippers of the said shrine, filed a suit in May, 1954, under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (after having obtained the requisite sanction of the Advocate-General, Pun-jab) for the removal of the appellant, for his eviction from the shrine and the property attach-ed thereto, as well as for rendition of accounts The grounds on which the said relief was claim ed were enumerated in paragraph 3 of the plaint, which would, on being translated into English, read as follows:--

(i) The behaviour of Sohan Singh manager, the defendant mentioned in the heading of this plaint, has considerably worsened for some time and he does not properly look after the affairs of the said Dharamsala, nor does he properly behave with the persons who visit the aforesaid Dhararnsala lor purposes of worship, nor he keeps the langar (free kitchen), etc., running for the visitors for which purpose the said agricultural land was donated and the income thereof was to be spent. On the other hand, he expends the income thereof to meet his personal unlawful expenditure on the profligacy of his three major sons, who are extremely licentious, and to meet the unlawful expenditure of his wife, who is of loose character and is a licentious woman of extremely doubtful character.

(ii) All the members of his family induce the young women, who visit the said Dharamsala, to immoral act. He does not allow the common visitors to stay in the said Dhararnsala, nor they get meals from the langar (free kitchen). His voting sons induce the women visitors to immoral acts, and on their refusal to submit, they are harassed a lot. He does not show or render the accounts of income and expenditure of the property attached with the said Dhararnsala, nor he ever makes Parkash (instals and opens for recitation) of Shri Guru Granth Sahib, nor he celebrates any religious day or festival. On the other hand, he causes party faction in the village in order to derive undue advantage, fOR The above reasons it is necessary that Sohan Singh aforesaid defendant, in the interest of justice, be removed from the management of Dharamsala and dispossessed from the entire property relating to Dharamsala such as buildings and agricultural land, etc.. and that he be directed to render accounts of income and ex-penditure.

2. The suit was resisted by Sohan Singh, who denied the allegations of the plaintiffs. From the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following issues:

1. Whether the plaintiffs have a locus standi to sue?

2. Whether the grounds alleged in paragraph 3 of the plaint exist and the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief asked for?

3. By his judgment, dated January 21, 1956, Shri Des Raj Dhameja. Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Amritsar, decreed the suit for the removal of Sohan Singh from the management of the shrine and for his dispossession therefrom as well as from the properties attached to the shrine with costs, but declined to grant a decree for rendition of accounts. On appeal issue No 1 was not seriously contested before the lower appellate Court at the time of arguments. On issue No. 2 the learned Additional District Judge found that there was preponderance of evidence on the side of the plaintiffs from which it stood sufficiently proved -

(i) that the son of the defendant abducted the wife of a barber:

(ii) that the wife of the defendant had illicit connections with one or two persons in the village.

(iii) that on the occasion of the yag ceremony (described as 'jag' by the witness) the wife of the defendant behaved in a very disgusting manner in the presence of the gathering by allowing herself to be taken away by one Kartar Singh, who had come to the Dharam-sala, in the presence oi huge gathering and by being taken by him inside a roam for some time;

(iv) that the statement of the witnesses of the defendant to the effect that no such incident as is referred to above took place and to the effect that neither the defendant's wife nor his grown-up sons were living with the defendant in the village had not impressed the learned Additional District Judge, but these were no grounds for directing the removal of the defendant or for decreeing the claim of the plaintiffs. The learned Additional District Judge further held that the allegations made in Paragraph 3 of the plaint to the effect that the defendant spent the whole income on himself and his wife and not for purposes connected with the Dharamsala and that he does not behave properly with the people who go there for worship had not been proved by any evidence and further that there was no rebuttal of the defendant's statement to the effect that there was

"practically no income as the tenants of the land do not pay him (the defendant) any lagan as a result of which he had to bring a suit against them"

. The first appellate Court further proceeded to observe as follows: --

"A perusal of paragraph No. 3 of the plaint would show that even by implication it did not contain allegations to the effect that the family members of the defendant behave in such a scandalous manner that the people of the village were ashamed to visit the Dharamsala. A party can succeed only upon the cause ot action alleged in the plaint and not on a claim that was never put forward in the plaint or written statement, as the case may be. A case should not be decided on grounds not taken up in the plaint"

On the above findings the learned Additional District Judge accepted the appeal of the defendant, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of Achhar Singh and others, leaving the parties to bear their own costs throughout

4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of reversal passed by the first appellate Court, the plaintiffs came up in second appeal to this Court. When the second appeal came up for hearing before P. C. Pandit, J., on May 2, 1981, no one appeared for the defendant-respondent. By an ex parte judgment of that date the appeal was allowed and it was held thai the observation of the learned Additional District fudge to the effect that the evidence led by the plaintiffs in support of their case was not related to any specific plea in the plaint was not correct and that the points covered by the evidence led by the plaintiffs were fully covered by the pleas taken in paragraph 3 of the plaint. In the opinion of the learned Judge the misconduct and incompetency of the defendant had been fully established in this case. Subsequently, on the application ot the defendant, the ex parte judgment and order ot this Court was set aside and the learned Single Judge reheard the appeal. After the rehearing, the appeal was again allowed by the learned Single Judge on May 16, 1963. The judgment of the Additional District Judge was sought to be supported before Pandit, J., on two grounds, viz:

(i) that the case was not covered by the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently no relief could have been granted to the plaintiffs; and

(ii) that the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court were not covered by the pleas taken by the plaintiffs in their plaint. The learned Judge held that the first out of the abovesaid two points had not been taken by the defendant in any of the Courts below and that even if the said point could be allowed to be raised, the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint fully brought the case within the ambit of section 92 of the code. As regards the second contention, it was held that the findings of both the Courts below about the family members of the defendant leading immoral life and about the defendant's wife having illicit connections with one or two persons in tha village and her conduct on the occasion of the yag being shameful were themselves sufficient to show that the defendant was not managing the institution in a proper manner. The learned Judge observed that if the defendant's own family members indulged in such like acts in a religious institution, it was bound to have a very bad influence on the worshippers who visited the place. It was further hefa that even if the defendant was not spending the income of the institution on his family members, the mere fact that he was allowing such things to happen in the institution, especially by the members of his own household, disentitled him to remain the mahant of the sacred place.

5. In this Letters Patent Appeal against the abovesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the only point that has been argued by Mr. N. S. Chhachhi, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, is that the allegations made by the plaintiff-respondents in paragraph 3 of the plaint and the facts found by the Courts below do not bring this case within the ambit of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the plaintiffs have failed to prove any breach of trust by the defendant.

6. The relevant opening part of Sub-section (1) of Section 92 is in the following terms:

"In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, may institute a suit * * *"

. In order to entitle qualified persons to invoke the jurisdiction of a civil Court under Section 92, they must allege in the plaint at least one or the two things, viz.--

(i) that there has been a breach of an express or constructive trust; or

(ii) that there is necessity of a direction of the Court.

If none of the 2 allegations is made in the plaint either expressly or by necessary implication, the foundation for a suit under Section 92 is not laid. It is, however, not necessary that both the conditions should co-exist. It is entirely erroneous for the appellant to contend that a direction of the Court can be asked for only if there is proof of breach of trust. The two requirements have been joined with the word 'or' and not with the word 'and'. Allegation of any one of them in the plaint is enough to satisfy the statutory requirement in this behalf. A suit without any allegation of breach of trust will be competent under Section 92 if it is made out that a direction of the Court for administration of the trust is necessary. The allegations made in paragraph 3 of the plaint of this suit (already reproduced) make out a good case on both the counts. The question or jurisdiction of the Court is normally determined on the basis of allegations in the plaint. If facts showing breach of trust are alleged in the plaint, it is enough to give jurisdiction to the Court. If once Court has jurisdiction, it is not always necessary that a breach of trust must be proved as a condition precedent for the grant of any relief contemplated by Section 92. I am supported in this view by a Division Bench judgment of the Oudh Court in Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain, AIR 1948 Oudh 203.

7. The facts stated in the plaint of the case in hand bring it fairly and fully within the ambit of Section 92. The facts found completely justify the removal of the defendant. Defendant's own case was that the tenants were not paying him any rent. The fact that the defendant was not recovering rents regularly and had allowed them to accumulate would by itself amount to maladministration of the trust. In any event defendant's inability to stop what has been proved to have been happening in the shrine (according to the find-tags of tact recorded by both the Courts below) would also necessitate direction of the Court for the administration of the trust. Halfhearted argument of Mr Chhachhi to show that the 'yag' incident did not take place inside the shrine cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage as this matter relates to a pure finding of fact. In any event, I would go to the length of holding that though the defendant may not be personally liable either civilly or criminally for the misconduct of his wife and son, he is certainly not a person qualified to continue as the manager of a religious shrine if he is not able to keep his family members living in the shrine under restraint and permits them to lead immoral life which is bound to have adverse moral influence on the visitors to the shrine. More so, when in the nature of things, visitors to the shrine must include not only adults but persons of adolescent age who may belong to either sex. We are in full agreement with the observations of P. C. Pandit J., that the facts found by the trial Court and me first Appellate Court would by themselves be sufficient to show that the defendant was not managing the institution in a proper manner, which could amount to breach of the implied conditions of the trust and would in any case necessitate suitable direction of the Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation at all in upholding the judgment of the learned Single Judge.

8. No other point having been argued before us, this appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed. In the matter of direction for payment of costs, we would not like to adopt any course different from that adopted by the learned Single Judge. Costs of this appeal would, therefore, be borne by the parties as incurred.

Mehar Singh, J.

9. I agree.

Sohan Singh v. Achhar Singh And Ors

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Achhar Singh and others) Arguments

Defendant / Appellant (Sohan Singh) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Sohan Singh v. Achhar Singh And Ors

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