Hari Lal Agrawal and S. Shamsul Hasan, JJ.:— When this writ application was taken up for admission the counsel for the Union of India raised a preliminary objection of maintainability of the application in this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. We, therefore, heard the learned counsel for both the parties on this question at some length and are accordingly disposing of the question.

2. The petitioner Nand Kishore Singh was working as a security guard in the Central Industrial Security Force at Farakka Barrage Project Unit (West Bengal). From there he was transferred to Naya Nangal Unit in the State of Punjab in the year 1980. At that place he was served with a charge sheet on 4.4.81 by respondent no. 4, Commandant of Central Industrial Security Force who passed a final order dated 30.11.81 which is annexure-20 to this writ application. Respondent no. 4 held the petitioner guilty of the charges and passed an order of his dismissal from the service with a liberty to the petitioner to prefer an appeal to the higher authority within the stipulated period if he so desired. Undisputedly this order was served upon the petitioner at Naya Nangil and he was released from the Unit on the same day. Thereafter he returned to his village home in the district of Aurangabad in this State. From that place he filed an appeal in the form of a representation on 9.12.81 before the respondent no. 3 namely the D.I.G (North West Region), Central Industrial Security Force, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, who dismissed the same by his order dated 30.1.82 (Annexure-1). Earlier to the present application the petitioner had filed a writ application in the Punjab and Haryana High Court (C.W no. 5028 of 1981) against the show cause notice dated 19.10.81 (Annexure-17). That writ application was, however, dismissed in limine as being premature by the order dated 6.11.81 (Annexure-18) with a direction to the petitioner to file a reply to the show cause notice.

3. Mr. R.K Sinha contends that this Court has jurisdiction in as much as part of the cause of action accrued within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court also within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. No doubt according to the provisions as contained in the said Article “the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue direction, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories, the crucial question is as to whether on the facts as stated above it can be said that any part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

4. We have stated that the petitioner was posted at Naya Nangal in the State of Punjab where the departmental proceeding had been initiated and the impugned order of this dismissal was passed. It is also clear that the order was served upon the petitioner at that very place and he was released from his service. The transaction of termination of the petitioner's employment was, in our opinion, fully complete far away in the State of Punjab. It may well be, that if the effect of the impugned order would have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court then this Court certainly would have got the jurisdiction. But it has been argued that notwithstanding those facts, the incidence of the preference of the appeal by the petitioner from his village home and the communication of the result of the appeal at the same address would constitute a part of the cause of action within the meaning of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution.

5. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on several decisions. First of all he placed reliance on the case of W.W Joshi v. State Of Bombay*, (AIR 1959 Bombay 363). In that case the petitioner had been terminated while he was serving in the State of Madhya Pradesh. That place, however, on account of the reorganization of the Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra under the provision of the State Reorganization Act 1956 fell within the territorial limits of the State of Maharashtra where the order of termination was served. In the writ application which was filed in the Bombay High Court a question of territorial jurisdiction was raised and it was rightly held that the effects of the impugned order had taken place on account of the reorganization of the State, within the territorial limits of the State of Maharashtra in as much as “the consequence of the termination of the service of the petitioner fell on him within the State of Maharashtra. The facts of this case are entirely distinguishable and do not support the petitioner.

6. Reliance was next placed by him on the case of Damomal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Bombay 355). “The petitioner of that case was a resident of Ullasnagar, a place situated in the District or Thana in Maharashtra. The impugned order itself shows that the case was heard in Bombay, but it was not clear as to where the order was passed by the third respondent who was residing in New Delhi. But it was clear that the effect of that order fell on the petitioner at Ullasnagar where he resided. It is also not in dispute that the proceedings that would be taken against the petitioner in consequence of the impugned order would be by officers located within the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction.” It is, therefore, clear that the same principle was applied to this case also i.e the cities for jurisdictional purpose would be also a place where the consequences of the order are to fall or to have effect.

7. Reference was next placed on the case of Verri Chettiar v. S.T Officer, Bombay, AIR 1971 Mad 155. This was a case under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The petitioner, the seller of the articles was a business man of Madras who had sold certain goods to a person in Bombay. Notices were issued to the seller from the authorities of the Bombay Sales-Tax Department demanding certain taxes on the transaction. On this ground the writ application was filed by the petitioner in Madras in which it was held that “the impact on the addressee caused by a notice of a taxing authority and his proposal to assess relate to that bundle and is thus cause of action in part, for issue of a writ against taxing authority”.

8. The last case relied upon by the learned counsel was the case of Orissa Mining Corporation v. The Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, (AIR 1973 Orissa 96). That was a case for refund of excess custom duty paid by the firm stituated in the State of Orissa, which was assessed by the authorities in Calcutta where the contracts were registered. When the writ application was filed in the Orissa High Court a question was raised that in as much as the contracts were registered at Calcutta, orders of the Customs authorities were passed at Calcutta and Central Government's order was passed at New Delhi, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Orissa High Court. The Orissa High Court however, observed by applying the doctrine “the debtor must find his creditor”, and held that on this ground “the excess custom duty was refundable to the petitioner who paid it under a misconception, and when it was not refunded it became an amount payable by debtor to his creditor”. In our opinion this decision also is of no assistance to the petitioner.

9. Reliance on behalf of the counsel for the Union of India was, however, placed upon an order of this Court, dated 19-7-82 in C.W.J.C no. 1945 of 1982 where a direct question was answered by the learned Judges that service of notice on the petitioner by registered post at his village address would not constitute any cause of action within the meaning of Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution. We, however, have got our own reservations in following this decision as a binding precedent, inasmuch as in our opinion in view of the discussions made above and the authorities cited at the Bar, the service of notice might also constitute the accrual of the part of the cause of action in a given case where the effect of the order, or to quote the language of the Bombay High Court where the consequence of the order are to fall. The learned Judges have them selve said that no authority was cited before them, nor it is a reasoned order. Examining the facts of the present case, however, it is clear that consequence of the order of dismissal of the petitioner and his removal from the service took place at Niya Nangal itself and the petitioner when returned to his village home, came as dismissed employee, having no claim whatsoever in the service, except a right to prefer an appeal. Simply, therefore, the filling of an appeal from his village home where the petitioner might have chosen to proceed after his dismissal in our opinion did not or should not furnish any part of the cause of action to clothe the High Court of that place the territorial jurisdiction to exercise any of the powers under Clause (1) of Article 226. Such a view in our considered opinion appears quite reasonable and proper. As otherwise it would expose the authority or a Government to the vagaries of a disgruntled employee to compel them to defend the action that he may choose to bring at a place far away from its seat or place of residence. Such an interpretation in our opinion instead of serving the intention and spirit of Clause (2) of Article 226 may lead to great injustice and hardship to them. Be that as it may we feel our inability to accept the contention that the act of merely filing an appeal against an adverse order, which has been already carried out, should be deemed to be a part of the cause of action for choosing the forum for filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

10. For these reasons we would accept the preliminary objection and hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order in this case. The application therefore fails on this ground.