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  • S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • provisions of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act
  • S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act of 187
  • S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
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citation codes
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Acts
  • S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • provisions of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act
  • S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act of 187
  • S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are members of a joint Hindu Mitakshara family; petitioner No. 1, Kumar Kalyan Prasad, is the Karta and manager. In 1956 the petitioners filed Title Suit No. 130 seeking eviction of the opposite party and recovery of possession of the suit property. The suit was dismissed at trial and on first appeal, but the High Court allowed the second appeal (Second Appeal No. 125 of 1961) on 5 April 1963, decreeing recovery of possession and arrears of rental in favour of the petitioners. The High Court decree was executed (Execution Case No. 113 of 1963) and actual possession was recorded as secured on 10 November 1965.

The petitioners allege that on the night of 10 November 1965 the opposite party forcibly re-entered and took possession of the house, ousted and assaulted the petitioners' servants, and thereafter refused to relinquish possession, even erecting new structures over the suit property. A criminal prosecution arising out of the incident resulted in convictions that were upheld on appeal. The petitioners then instituted a suit under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act (the Act) for recovery of possession, giving rise to this civil revision.

The defendants contested the suit on various grounds; eight issues were framed at trial (two material ones being: (5) whether the Nazir's delivery of possession to the plaintiffs was a mere paper transaction; and (6) whether the plaintiffs were dispossessed as alleged). After a protracted trial of about 15 years, the trial court found that the plaintiffs had title but that only symbolic possession had been delivered by the Nazir in execution proceedings, and hence held that the plaintiffs were not actually dispossessed and had no cause of action under S.6. The plaintiffs challenged that conclusion in this civil revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the word "dispossessed" in section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, includes within its scope a flagrant and contumacious violation of symbolical (symbolic) possession of immovable property that was duly delivered in the course of law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Assertions

  • The petitioners relied on the High Court decree and subsequent execution which, according to the petitioners, resulted in possession being secured on 10 November 1965.
  • They claim that the opposite party forcibly re-entered the property on that night, ousted their servants, assaulted them, and remained in illegal possession thereafter, even erecting new constructions.
  • A criminal prosecution arising from the forcible entry resulted in convictions of the accused, which were maintained on appeal — a fact relied upon to show the flagrant nature of the respondents' conduct.
  • On these facts they instituted the suit under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act for recovery of possession.

Respondents' / Defendants' Contentions (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The defendants contested the suit on a variety of grounds and contended (as an important strand of defence) that the delivery of possession by the Nazir was only a symbolic or "paper" transaction and that actual physical delivery of possession was not established.
  • Counsel for the respondents (referred to in the opinion) relied on certain precedents by way of support for the narrower interpretation that S.6 requires deprivation of actual physical possession — notably by referring to the decision in Sona Mia v. Prokash Chandra and also citing Hindustan Aeronautics v. Ajit Prasad (though the court found these authorities distinguishable or not helpful for the respondents' case).
  • The opinion notes the parties' counsel described the central question as res integra (no directly on-point precedent), and judgments were cited largely by way of analogy.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jayagopal Mundra v. Gulab Chand Agarwalla, AIR 1974 Orissa 173 (Full Bench) Held, after analysis of O.21 Rrs. 35 & 36 Civil P.C., that symbolic delivery of possession against a judgment-debtor where actual possession could have been delivered amounts to actual delivery of possession. The court described this Full Bench decision as providing "massive support" for the proposition that symbolical delivery amounts to actual delivery and relied on it to show symbolical possession falls within the ambit of S.6.
Juggobundhu Mukherjee v. Ram Chunder Bysack (1880) ILR 5 Cal 584 (Full Bench) Authority relied upon in the analysis of delivery of possession (cited in Jayagopal Mundra). Relied upon indirectly via Jayagopal Mundra to support the proposition that symbolic delivery may amount to actual delivery.
Sri Radha Krishan Chanderjee v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1917 PC 197 Affirmed the principle in Juggobundhu Mukherjee (as cited in Jayagopal Mundra). Used as part of the chain of authorities that support equating symbolic delivery (when lawfully effected) with actual delivery.
Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo v. Sunderbans Koer, AIR 1923 Pat 76 One of a string of earlier judgments relied upon in the line of authority concerning delivery of possession. Referred to as part of the body of cases reinforcing that symbolic delivery may amount to actual delivery in law.
Ramamanemma v. Basavayya, AIR 1934 Mad 558 Observation that, where a remedy is clear under the Specific Relief Act, parties should not be driven to another onerous remedy (analogy invoked). Cited by way of analogy to support the view that the Specific Relief Act provides a suitable remedy for interference with possessory rights including symbolic possession.
Manikayala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 Held (para 12) that delivery of symbolic possession under O.21 R.35(2) would amount to an interruption of a respondent's adverse possession. Relied upon to show that symbolic delivery is recognized in law as interrupting adverse possession and hence is not outside the scope of dispossession remedied by S.6.
Sona Mia v. Prokash Chandra, AIR 1940 Cal 464 Contains a passing observation (on its peculiar facts) that S.9 of the older Specific Relief Act operates only if defendants have deprived plaintiffs of actual physical possession. The court found the case distinguishable on its facts, noted the solitary observation was not debated or adjudicated on the precise issue now before the court, and expressly recorded a respectful dissent if that observation is read to exclude symbolic possession from S.6.
Hindustan Aeronautics v. Ajit Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 76 Contains general observations about the scope of interference under S.115 Civil P.C. The court noted that the general observation in that case did not aid the respondents' position on the specific question under S.6 of the Specific Relief Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded as follows (stating only what is in the opinion):

  1. The court accepted the trial court's specific finding for the purposes of the legal question addressed in the revision: that symbolical possession had been duly delivered by the Nazir in execution proceedings (the trial court had found the delivery to be symbolical rather than actual).
  2. The central legal question identified was whether a flagrant and contumacious dislodging of symbolical possession lawfully delivered falls within the meaning of "dispossessed" in section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
  3. The court examined the plain language of S.6(1), noting that the statute uses the ordinary term "dispossessed" and speaks of dispossession of immovable property "otherwise than in due course of law" and without consent. The court reasoned that if the Legislature had intended to confine "dispossessed" to actual physical possession it could have said so expressly.
  4. On principle and statutory construction the court rejected a hyper-technical or narrow construction that would limit "dispossessed" to only actual physical possession. The court emphasized the legislative aim of S.6 to provide early and expeditious possessory relief irrespective of title, which militates in favour of a broader construction that includes violation of symbolical possession lawfully delivered.
  5. The court surveyed authorities by way of analogy and direct support: it regarded the Full Bench decision in Jayagopal Mundra (and its antecedent authorities) and Manikayala Rao as pointing to the view that symbolic delivery can amount to actual delivery or at least interrupt adverse possession; Ramamanemma was cited to show the preference for remedies under the Specific Relief Act; Sona Mia was treated as distinguishable and not persuasive on the point; Hindustan Aeronautics was said to be of no assistance for the respondents' case.
  6. Applying the foregoing statutory construction and precedents, the court concluded that "dispossessed" in S.6 includes flagrant and contumacious violations of symbolical possession lawfully delivered.
  7. On that legal basis the court held the trial court's primary reason for non-suiting the plaintiffs (that they had no cause of action because only symbolic possession had been delivered) to be erroneous: even accepting the trial court's finding of symbolic delivery, the plaintiffs had a right and cause of action under S.6.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court held in the affirmative that the word "dispossessed" in section 6 of the Specific Relief Act includes within its sweep any flagrant and contumacious violation of symbolical possession duly delivered in the course of law.

Consequences and immediate effects (as stated in the opinion):

  • The trial court's finding that the plaintiffs had no cause of action under S.6 (on the basis that only symbolic possession had been delivered) was reversed.
  • The civil revision was allowed; the plaintiff-petitioners' suit under S.6 of the Act was decreed with all consequential reliefs, and the petitioners were awarded costs.

The opinion does not include an explicit statement that it is laying down a novel precedent; it frames its conclusion in statutory construction terms and relies on existing authorities to support the inclusive interpretation of "dispossessed."

    Kumar Kalyan Prasad And Another v. Kulanand Vaidik And Others

    S.S Sandhawalia, C.J:—Whether the dispossession envisaged in S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, includes within its sweep the flagrant and contumacious violation of symbolical possession of immovable property duly delivered in the course of law — has come to be the spinal issue in this civil revision.

    2. The facts herein call for a somewhat brief notice and indeed highlight how the vagaries of law can lead to grave delays and thus virtual injustice for a suitor seeking relief through its processes. The petitioners herein are members of a joint Hindu Mitakshara family of which Kumar Kalyan Prasad (petitioner No. 1) is the Karta and manager and the suit under S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for the recovery of possession of the suit property had been filed in a representative capacity. It is unnecessary to recount the somewhat tangled facts and it suffices to mention that way back in the year 1956 the petitioners had filed Title Suit No. 130 seeking eviction of the opposite party and securing the possession of the suit property. Though the suit was dismissed by the Munsif, 1st Court, Darbhanga, and the lower appellate Court upheld the dismissal the High Court in Second Appeal No. 125 of 1961, decided on the 5th April, 1963, decreed the suit in favour of the petitioners for recovery of possession with regard to the suit land by ejecting the defendants as also for recovery of arrears of rental. The decree of the High Court was duly executed in Execution Case No. 113 of 1963 actual possession was secured on the 10th Nov. 1965.

    3. It is the petitioners' case that having go delivery of possession they locked the house and deputed two of the servants to keep a watch over the same. However, on the very night of the 10th Nov. 1965, the opposite party with the help of other associates forcibly entered the house and took possession of the same by ousting the plaintiffs' servants and also assaulted them. A criminal case was then filed by Jageshwar Bhandari, one of the petitioner's servants, under Ss. 147, 448, 452 and 323 of the Penal Code in which the accused persons were convicted and sentenced by the trial Court. The conviction had beer maintained up to the highest level by the High Court. The opposite party, however, clung to the property and despite repeated demands refused to give up their illegal possession and Indeed started erecting new structures over the suit property and putting down the old ones. The petitioners then instituted the suit under S. 6 of the Act giving rise to the present revision.

    4. The suit was contested by the defendants on a variety of grounds and on the pleadings of the parties as many as eight issues were framed of which the material ones are issue Nos. 5 and 6 in the terms following:

    “5. Is the delivery of possession given by Nazir to the plaintiffs over the disputed land a mere paper transaction?

    6. Are the plaintiffs dispossessed of the disputed land as alleged?”

    5. In a prolonged trial, which seems to have extended to the inordinate length of 15 years, the Additional Munsif, Darbhanga, came to the categoric conclusion that the plaintiff-petitioners had acquired clear title over 2 kathas and 19 dhurs of land which was the suit property but held that in the execution proceedings the Nazir had only delivered symbolical possession of the property and the recording of the delivery of actual physical possession was not established. Taking a narrowly constricted view of the matter that the plaintiff-petitioners were not given physical delivery of possession over the suit land, he held that the question of their actual dispossession therefrom could not arise and, therefore, they had no cause of action under S. 6 of the Act to file the suit. Consequently the same was dismissed and the petitioners pointedly assailed this finding in the present civil revision.

    6. Though the finding of the Court below that the actual recording of delivery of possession of the suit property by the Nazir was a paper transaction was seriously and forcefully assailed before us as resting on no evidence whatsoever, yet in this revision application it is wholly unnecessary to go behind that finding or to enter the thicket of facts. I intend, therefore, to proceed on the firm finding arrived at by the trial Court itself that symbolical possession of the suit land had been duly delivered to the plaintiff-petitioners in the execution proceedings by the Nazir in accordance with law. This finding in categoric terms is as under:

    “….I find that actually Nazir visited the spot but he was not allowed to deliver possession so he submitted a report showing actual physical possession but in fact no such delivery was done rather the same was a symbolical delivery of possession.”

    7. Now on the aforesaid finding the legal issue that now squarely arises is whether a flagrant and contumacious dislodging of symbolical possession duly delivered in accordance with law would come within the ambit of dispossession envisaged under S. 6 of the Act and entitled the aggrieved party to maintain the suit.

    8. The learned counsel for the parties took the stand that on the direct and narrow question aforesaid the matter seems to be res integra and no precedent covering the issue on all fours could be cited. Judgments were referred to only by way of analogy. That being so, it is first necessary to examine the matter on principle and on the language of the statute. The relevant part of S. 6 of the Act is in the following terms:

    “6(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.

    (2) to (4) …………………………………..”

    9. In the first instance, a mere reference to the plain language of the provision aforesaid would indicate that the word “dispossessed” has not been used in the narrowly constricted sense of the actual physical possession of immoveable property. Indeed, it talks somewhat widely of dispossession of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law without the person's consent. If the Legislature intended to narrowly limit the word “dispossessed” there could have been no difficulty by specifying in terms the actuality of physical possession as its necessary and vital ingredient. The word employed is the ordinary word ‘dispossess’. Plainly enough it would include within its sweep actual physical dispossession also but this is no warrant for holding that it necessarily excludes the violation of other forms of possession including a symbolical possession duly delivered by law and contumaciously violated by an aggressive trespasser. On principle I am not inclined to construe the word “dispossessed” in S. 6 in any hypertechnical sense and to push it into the procrustean bed of actual physical possession only. Indeed the intent of the Legislature in S. 6 to provide early and expeditious relief against the violation of possessory right, irrespective of title, would be equally, if not more, relevant where symbolical possession delivered by due process of law is sought to be set at naught forthwith. On a larger and liberal construction, therefore, it seems wholly unnecessary to limit or constrict the ordinary and plain meaning of the word “dispossessed”, which is obviously wide enough to include both actual physical possession and equally a symbolical possession of immoveable property which is well recognised in the eye of law. The view that I am inclined to take would receive massive support from the observations in the Full Bench judgment in Jayagopal Mundra v. Gulab Chand Agarwalla, AIR 1974 Orissa 173. Therein after a close analysis of Rr. 35 and 36 of O. 21 of the Civil P.C and relying on Juggobundhu Mukherjee v. Ram Chunder Bysack (1880) ILR 5 Cal 584 (FB), which was affirmed in Sri Radha Krishan Chanderjee v. Ram Bahadur, AIR 1917 PC 197 (2), and equally on a string of the judgment of this Court beginning with Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo v. Sunderbans Koer, AIR 1923 Pat 76 it has been concluded as under:

    “Thus, the legal position is well settled that symbolical delivery of possession against the judgment-debtor where even actual possession could have been delivered amounts to actual delivery of possession.”

    Equally reference may also instructively be made to Ramamanemma v. Basavayya, AIR 1934 Mad 558, whilst keeping in mind that the provisions of S. 6 of the Specific Relief Act are virtually in pari materia with the old S. 9 of the repealed Act of 1877. It was observed in the aforesaid case that if the remedy is clear under the Specific Relief Act the parties should not be driven to the onerous remedy of another suit. By way of analogy in Manikayala Rao v. Narasimhaswami, AIR 1966 SC 470 it was observed in para 12 that the delivery of symbolical possession under O. 21, R. 35(2) would amount to an interruption of the respondent's adverse possession. It seems to follow from the aforesaid precedents that the weight of authority seems to be a pointer to the view that symbolical possession is in no way out of the ambit of dispossession envisaged and sought to be remedied by S. 6 of the Act.

    10. In fairness to Mr. S.C Ghose reference must be made to a passin observation in Sona Mia v. Prokash Chandra AIR 1940 Cal 464. This case is, however plainly distinguishable. Therein the plaintiff had continued to be in physical possession of the land and the grievance raised was that the defendants had allegedly dispossessed then only by realising tolls from shop-keepers on the martket days of Mondays and Fridays. I was on those peculiar facts that it was observed that S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act of 187 comes into operation only if the defendant have deprived the plaintiffs of actual physical possession. A close reading of the judgment would show that the issue before us, namely, whether symbolical possession comes within the sweep of S. 6 of the Act, did not even remotely arise for consideration. Consequently it was neither debated upon nor adjudicates by the Bench. However, if the solitary observation therein is sought to be construed as a warrant for the proposition that symbolics possession would be excluded from the scope of S. 6, I would respectfully wish to record a dissent therefrom Mr. Ghose had also referred to Hindustan Aeronautics v. Ajit Prasad, AIR 1973 SC 76 but the general observation therein with regard to the scope of interference under S. 115 of the Civil P.C would in no way aid or advance the case of the respondents.

    11. To conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that the word “dispossessed” in S. 6 of the Act will equally include within its sweep any flagrant and contumacious violation of symbolical possession duly delivered in the course of law.

    12. Once it is held as above, it is plain the petitioners herein must succeed. The trial Court had non-suited them primarily on the ground that they had no cause of action to file the suit under S. 6 of the Act. This was on the ground that they had secured only symbolics possession of the property in dispute and Nazir actual physical delivery thereof from the Nazir Even on that finding, the petitioners would be entitled to maintain the suit and the finding on Issue No. 2, therefore, must be reversed the hold that the plaintiffs had a right and sound cause of action against the defendants.

    13. The civil revision application is therefore, allowed and the plaintiff-petitioners' suit under S. 6 of the Act is hereby decreed with all consequential reliefs. The petitioners shall also have their costs.

    B.P Jha, J.:— I agree.

    Petition allowed.

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    Kumar Kalyan Prasad And Another v. Kulanand Vaidik And Others
    (Jan 3, 1981)