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  • clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 283 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • section 283(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act.6.
  • section 283(1)(c) of the Succession Act
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  • clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 283 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • section 283(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act.6.
  • section 283(1)(c) of the Succession Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Revision by Objector in Probate Proceeding (S.K. Choudhri, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision arises from an order dated 26-6-1975 of the Additional District Judge, First Court, Muzaffarpur, which held that the objector (referred to in the opinion as the petitioner) had no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration.

The core facts as stated in the opinion: Dhanraj Sah died leaving two widows, Anurago Kuer and Inder Kuer. Anurago Kuer purportedly executed a will dated 29-10-1958 in favour of the opposite party (referred to as Deoki Devi and alternatively as Devaki Devi in the opinion) in respect of her half share in her husband's estate. After Anurago Kuer's death on 13-1-1966, the original will could not be located and an informative petition was filed. Devaki/Deoki Devi applied for probate on 12-4-1966 (probate case no. 11 of 1966).

Inder Kuer, the other widow, filed an objection on 21-7-1966 challenging the grant of probate to Devaki/Deoki Devi on various grounds including forgery and invalid execution. Inder Kuer died on 2-2-1971. On 9-11-1971 the petitioner (the objector) filed a caveat, claiming that upon Anurago Kuer's death her half-share devolved by survivorship to Inder Kuer, and that Inder Kuer had subsequently executed a will in favour of the petitioner dated 6-5-1970 (and had earlier executed a deed of gift). The petitioner also challenged the genuineness of the will executed by Anurago Kuer.

The court below held that the petitioner had no locus standi because he had no chance of succeeding to the estate of Dhanraj Sah. A miscellaneous appeal was filed but was converted into the present civil revision application after a Stamp Report indicated an appeal did not lie and a revision was maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (objector) had locus standi / the right to enter a caveat and oppose the grant of probate under clause (c) of sub‑section (1) of section 283 of the Indian Succession Act.
  2. If so, whether the lower court erred in holding that the petitioner had "no chance of succeeding to the Estate of Dhanraj Sah" and therefore no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Bishwanath Prasad no. II)

  • The court below acted illegally and with material irregularity by concluding the petitioner had no chance of succeeding to the estate and therefore no locus standi to file caveat.
  • The petitioner is "highly interested" in the probate proceeding because he claimed the whole property under the will purportedly executed by Inder Kuer (dated 6-5-1970) and had already applied for probate of that will in probate case no. 23 of 1973, which was pending.
  • If Anurago Kuer died intestate, Inder Kuer would have succeeded to her half by survivorship and could validly dispose of that whole property by will in favour of the petitioner; hence the petitioner has a real and substantial interest (and at least a bare possibility of interest) in the outcome of the present probate proceeding.
  • Relied on decisions (including Draupadi Dasya v. Rajkumari Dasya) that a person entitled to greater benefit under an earlier will has sufficient interest to oppose a later probate, and that it is not necessary to have probate of the earlier will before opposing the later one.

Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. Sachidanand Jha)

  • A caveat can be filed only by a person who claims to have an interest in the estate of the deceased, and the petitioner did not claim such an interest at the relevant time.
  • Relied upon clause (c) of section 283(1) of the Indian Succession Act to support a narrower interpretation of "claiming to have any interest in the Estate of the deceased" — i.e., interest at the time of the testator's death.
  • Relied upon a bench decision (Kashi Nath Singh v. Dulhin Gulzari Kuer, A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 475) for the proposition that a person who claims outside and independently of a will or claims adversely to the testator, disputing the testator's right to deal with the property, cannot be deemed to claim an interest in the estate within the meaning of section 283.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Draupadi Dasya v. Rajkumari Dasya, 22 C.W.N. 564 Held that a person entitled to a greater benefit under an earlier will has sufficient interest to oppose the grant of probate of a later will; it is not necessary to obtain probate of the earlier will before applying for revocation of the later grant. The court relied on this authority to support the petitioner's contention that a person who stands to gain under another instrument need not have probate of that instrument before opposing the grant of probate to a rival instrument.
Mutukdhari Singh v. Smt. Prem Devi, 1959 B.L.J.R. 281 Recognized that a person (here, a step‑sister) who has an interest as contemplated by section 283(1)(c) is entitled to apply for revocation and to call upon the propounder to prove the will in solemn form. The court noted this decision had been relied upon by both parties and treated it as endorsing a broad interpretation of "interest" under section 283(1)(c).
Priya Nath Bhattacharji v. Saila Bala Debi, 11 P.L.T. 353 Established the principle that "any interest, however slight and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper"; a reversioner has substantial interest in the protection/devolution of the estate. The court cited paragraph 38 of Mutukdhari's case discussing this authority to support the proposition that a bare possibility of interest grounded on existing facts suffices for locus standi to enter caveat.
Hart Pada Sha v. Ganashyam Sha, 49 C.W.N. 713 Affirmed the principle that any interest, however slight, and even a bare possibility of interest, is sufficient to entitle a person to enter caveat in a probate proceeding. The court cited this decision as further support for the petitioner's argument about the sufficiency of a bare possibility of interest.
Kashi Nath Singh v. Dulhin Gulzari Kuer, A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 475 Held that a person who claims outside and independently of a will, or claims adversely to the testator and disputes the testator's right to deal with the property, cannot be regarded as claiming an interest in the estate within the meaning of section 283. The respondent relied on this bench decision, but the court held that the principle in that case did not apply to the present facts and therefore it did not assist the respondent's contention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the central statutory provision at issue: clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 283 of the Indian Succession Act, which empowers the District Judge to "issue citations calling upon all the persons claiming to have any interest in the Estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of administration."

The parties' dispute turned on how to interpret the phrase "claiming to have any interest in the Estate of the deceased." The petitioner argued for a broad reading — that any interest, however slight or even a bare possibility, suffices to enter caveat. The opposite party argued for a narrower reading — that only persons who had an interest in the estate at the relevant time (as of the date of death) could enter caveat.

The court reviewed authoritative decisions relied upon by the parties. It considered the Mutukdhari Singh decision (which surveyed various High Court authorities) and the principle drawn from Priya Nath Bhattacharji that "any interest, however slight and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper." The court emphasized that the possibility of obtaining an interest must be grounded in existing facts and not mere conjecture.

The court rejected the relevance of Kashi Nath Singh (A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 475) to the present case; that case holds that a person who claims outside and independently of a will, or claims adversely to the testator, cannot be deemed to claim an interest under section 283, but the court found the proposition inapplicable to the facts before it.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the court observed:

  • The petitioner had asserted a concrete claim to the whole property under the will executed by Inder Kuer (dated 6-5-1970) and had already applied for probate of that will (probate case no. 23 of 1973), which was pending.
  • It was not disputed that if Anurago Kuer had died intestate, Inder Kuer (as co‑widow) would have succeeded to Anurago's half share by right of survivorship and thus could validly dispose of that interest by will in favour of the petitioner.
  • Given those facts, the petitioner had more than speculative grounds: he had a real, legally grounded possibility of benefiting from the setting aside of the will propounded by Devaki/Deoki Devi. This amounted to an interest, at least a "bare possibility of an interest" rooted in existing facts.

Consequently, the court concluded the petitioner had the right to enter a caveat and to oppose the grant of probate under section 283(1)(c). The lower court's conclusion that the petitioner had "no chance of succeeding to the Estate" and hence no locus standi was characterized as illegal and a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The court also observed that allowing the impugned order to stand would cause irreparable injury to the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision application was allowed and the impugned order of 26-6-1975 was set aside.

Consequential directions and effects on the parties:

  • The court directed that the probate case before the court below (the case in which Devaki/Deoki Devi sought probate of the will of Anurago Kuer) be disposed of in accordance with law.
  • The court ordered that, in the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion resolves the parties' dispute in favour of a broad reading of "interest" under section 283(1)(c) for the facts of this case, reaffirming that a person with a legally grounded possibility of benefiting from setting aside a will is entitled to enter caveat. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying established principles in the cited authorities.

    Sri Niranjan Sah v. Smt. Devaki

    S.K Choudhri, J.:— This revision by the objector in a proceeding for grant of probate is directed against the order dated 26-6-1975, passed by the Additional District Judge, First Court, Muzaffarpur, holding that the objector has no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate or letters of administration.

    2. It is not disputed that one Dhanraj Sah died leaving two widows, namely, Anurago Kuer and Inder Kuer. It is said that Anurago Kuer executed a will on 29-10-1958, in favour of the opposite party Deoki Devi with respect to her half share in her husband's estate. The aforesaid Devaki Devi claimed herself to be grand-daughter-in-law of Kapur Chand who was the brother of the testator. Anurago Kuer died on 13-1-1966. According to the opposite party the original will was in possession of the testator and inspite of search it was not available after her death and accordingly an informative petition was filed before the Sub-divisional Officer to that effect. On 12-4-1966, the aforesaid Devaki Devi filed an application for grant of probate which was registered as probate case no. 11 of 1966. Inder Kuer, the second wife of Dhanraj Sah (deceased) filed a case at on 21-7-1966. In the said objection various grounds were raised against the grant of probate. It was alleged that the will was fraudulent forged, fabricated and concocted and that the will purported to have been executed on 29-10-1958, was not validly executed by Anugar Kuer. It was also stated that the names of all the relations were not disclosed and, accordingly, a genewlogy was given showing all the relations of Dhanraj Sah. It is not necessary to mention other objections which were stated in the petition of objection. However, Inder Kuer died on 2-2-1971. After her death, on 9-11-1971 the petitioner entered caveat alleging threat after the death of Dhanraj Sah both the co-widows succeeded to his properties half and half and after Anurago's death the property was held absolutely by Inder Kuer who was the full owner. It was further stated that on 6-5-1970, the aforesaid Inder Kuer executed a will in favour of the petitioner in respect of all the properties possessed by her. It has also been mentioned that previous to the execution of the will all the properties were gifted by the aforesaid Inder Kuer in favour of the petitioner, but, it was thought that the said deed of gift was void as permission of the consolidation officer was not taken and accordingly she executed the aforesaid will in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner also challenged the genuineness of the will executed by Anurago Kuer in favour of Devoki Devi. It was further stated that the will was forged and did not contain the thumb-impressions and the signature of the deceased nor was it drafted, written, signed, witnesses and scribed at Anurago Kuer's instance or in her presence. It was also stated that the will was not presented before the Sub-Registrar nor admitted by the said Anurago Kuer.

    3. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the court below decided by the impugned order that the petitioner has no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate as he has no chance of succeeding to the Estate of Dhanraj Sah.

    4. It appears that as against the impugned order, originally a miscellaneous appeal was filed before this court. The Stamp Reporter by his further report pointed out that miscellaneous appeal did not lie but a revision was maintainable. The learned Judge who heard the matter held by his order dated 21-10-1976, that the miscellaneous appeal was not maintainable and accordingly with the permission of the court the memo of appeal was Converted into the present civil revision application.

    5. Mr. Bishwanath Prasad no. II, in support of this application contended that the court below acted illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the petitioner had no chance of succeeding to the estate of Dhanraj Sah and therefore, had no locus standi to file caveat. According to the learned counsel, the petitioner is highly, interested in the proceeding in question as he has claimed the whole of the property under the will executed by the co-widow, Inder Kuer, upon whom, according to the petitioner, on the death of Anurago Kuer, who died intestate, her half interest devolved upon Inder Kuer by survivorship aria therefore, under the will executed by Inder Kuer all the properties of Dhanraj Sah would come to the petitioner after the death of Inder Kuer. Mr. Sachidanand Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, on the other hand contended that caveat can be filed by such person who claims to have an interest in the estate of the deceased and as the petitioner could not be said to be a person claiming interest in the estate of the deceased, he had no right to file a caveat. For this proposition, learned counsel relied upon section 283(1)(c) of the Indian Succession Act.

    6. In support of the contention raised by Mr. Bishwanath Prasad no. 11, he placed reliance in Draupadi Dasya v. Rajkumari Dasya . 22 C.W.N 564., in that case an application for revocation of the grant of probatee of a latter will was filed by a person who was entitled to much greater benefit under an earlier will alleged to have been executed by the same person. White dealing with the question as to whether such a person had a right to apply for revocation of the grant of probate it was held that the said person who claimed a greater benefit under the first will would not get such benefit if the probate is granted of the latter will and it, must, therefore, be held that the said person had sufficient interest to oppose the grant of probate of the latter will and to apply for revocation. It has also been held in that case that it was not necessary for the person claiming under the first will to obtain a probate of that will Before he could apply for revocation. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, as both sides relied upon clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 283 of the Indian Succession Act. It is necessary to quote the said clause here:

    “283(1) In all cases the District Judge or District Delegate may, if he thinks proper:—……………………(c) issue citations calling upon all the persons claiming to have any interest in the Estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probatee or letters of administration”.

    7. The controversy between the learned counsel for the parties was with regard to the interpretation, “of the words” claiming to have any interest in the Estate of the deceased” used in the clause aforesaid. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner a person having any interest however slight and even a bare possibility of interest is sufficient to entitle a person to enter caveat whereas, according to the learned counsel for the opposite party only such person has right to enter caveat who claims interest in the estate of the deceased at the relevant time which according to the learned counsel is the date of death of the teacher.

    8. At this stage, I will refer to a Single Judge decision of this court in Mutukdhari Singh v. Smt. Prem Devi . 1959 B.L.J.R 281., upon which both parties placed reliance. This decision has taken notice of various decisions of the other High Courts including previous decisions of the Patna High Court. In that case a step-sister of the deceased testator applied for revocation of the probate of the will. It appears that her identity as step-sister of the deceased testator was challenged but it was found on evidence that she was actually the step-sister of the deceased testator. The main question which was canvassed in that case was as to whether the step-sister of the testator had right to apply for revocation of the letters of administration granted to the appellant of that case without citing the step-sister as a party in that letters of administration case. After discussion various authorities on that point the learned Judge held that the said step-sister had an interest in the estate of the deceased as contemplated by section 283(1)(c) of the Succession Act which entitled her to apply for revocation of the grant and to call upon the appellant of that case. The propounder of the will to prove the same in solemn form in her presence.

    9. It is not necessary to discuss several authorities which have been discussed in Mutukdhari's case (supra) as learned counsel for both sides relied, upon different Paragraphs in Mutukdhari's case where these decisions have been discussed. I may state here that neither party challenged the aforesaid decision in Matukdhari' case, rather they relied upon the principle, laid down in that case. Reference was made by Mr. Prasad to paragraph 38 of the judgment in Matukdhari's case wherein the case of Priya Nath Bhattacharji v. Saila Bala Debi . 11 P.L.T 353., a Bench decision of this court has been discussed. The principle that has been laid down in that case is:

    “It is, however, well established now that any interest, however slight and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. It has been held in several decisions that although a reversioner under the Hindu Law has no present “alienable interest in the property left by the deceased still he has substantial interest in the protection or devolution of the estate, and as such is entitled to appear and be heard in a probate proceeding”.

    10. The principle that the possibility of filling a character which would give the party concerned an interest was not sufficient, but that there must be a possibility of having an interest in the result of setting aside the will has not been disputed. Thus it appears clear that a bare possibility of an interest which rests on the existing facts and not on mere conjecture give a person right to enter caveat.

    11. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Hart Pada Sha v. Ganashyam Sha . 49 C.W.N 713., but that the decision also lays down the same principle namely that “any interest, however, slight and even a bare possibility of an interest is sufficient to entitle a person to enter caveat in a probate proceeding”.

    12. Mr. Jha in support of his contention noted above strongly relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Kashi Nath Singh…Defendant v. Dulhin Gulzari Kuer…Plaintiff . . A.I.R 1941 Pat. 475., but in my opinion the principle laid down in that case has no application to the present case. There it has been held that a person who claims outside and independently of a will or claims adversely to the testator and disputes his right to deal with the property, can in no sense be deemed to claim an interest in the estate of the deceased within the meaning of section 283. The proposition, in my opinion, that a person who claims adversely to the testator and disputes latter's right to deal with the property, has no right or locus standi to enter caveat and such person would not be deemed to claim an interest in the estate of the deceased in letters of administration case has no application to the present case. Thus, in my opinion, this case does not at all help the contention of Mr. Jha.

    13. Keeping in my mind the aforesaid principle laid down in different cases discussed above let me examine as to whether in the present case it can be said that the petitioner has any right to enter caveat. I have already given in detail the claim of the petitioner. He has actually claimed interest in the whole property under the will executed by Inder Kuer. It is also not in dispute at the far that if Anurago Kuer the testator would have died intestate then the property would have come to Inder Kuer as the co-widow by the right of survivorship and the latter would have become entitled to the whole of the property. If that be, so, it cannot be disputed that the said Inder Kuer could make a will with regard to the whole property, in favour of the petitioner who is her sister's sons. It is stated at the far and which fact is not disputed that the petitioner has already applied for grant of a probate of the will executed by Inder Kuer in his favour which is pending in the court of the District Judge, Muzaffarpur in probate case no. 23 of 1973. Inder Kuer, in fact entered caveat in the probate case filed by the opposite party, but unfortunately she died during the pendency of that case. In the facts and circumstances discussed above, therefore, it is clear that the petitioner is certainly interested to safeguard his interest which he has got under the will which has given rise to probate case no. 23 of 1973 and which is pending. It cannot, therefore, by any stretch of imagination be said that, the petitioner has no interest within the meaning of section 283(1)(c) of the Succession Act nor could it be said that he has not even a bare possibility of interest which given sufficient right to the petitioner to enter caveat. My conclusion, therefore, is that the petitioner has right to enter caveat in the present probate case filed by the opposite party. The court below therefore acted illegally and with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction in holding that the petitioner has no locus standi to oppose the grant of probate or the letters of the will executed by Anurago Kuer. It is further held that the impugned order if allowed to stand would cause irreparable injury to the petitioner.

    14. In the result, the application is allowed, the impugned order is set aside but in the circumstances of the I would make no order as to costs. The court below is now directed to dispose of the probate case in accordance with law.

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    Comments

    Sri Niranjan Sah v. Smt. Devaki
    (Dec 23, 1977)