Misra, J.:— These two appeals, which have been heard together, arise out of a judgment in M.J.C Nos. 1338 and 1371 of 1962. Appellants Haro Mahton, Mathura Singh, Ramji Mahton, Bankey Mahton, Siasaran Prasad and Kailajh Mahton were petitioners in M.J.C No. 1388 of 1962 and Ashiq Hasan Khan was petitioner in M.J.C No. 1371 of 1962. The appellants in L.P.A No. 40 of 1963 claim to be Punch member of the Executive Committee and voters, respectively, of the Gobai Gram Panchayat in the district of Monghyr. Appellant Ashiq Hasan Khan of L.P.A No. 89 of 1968 claims to be the Mukhiya of the same Gram Panchayat. The election of new office-bearers of this Gram Panchayat was held on the 16th and 17th of October, 1962, respectively, in which respondents Gangasaran Singh and Shahabuddin Khan were elected as Mukhla and Sarpanch, respectively, The Punches and members of the Executive Committee also have been arrayed as respondents to the appeal. The appellants challenged the legality of the election in which the respondents were declared elected as new office bearers, mainly, on the ground that Shri Ramadhar Sharma, the Block Development Officer of Sheikhpura (respondent No. 2), who acted as the Elections Officer and supervised the elections of the Gram Panchayat, was not competent to act in that capacity. It was alleged that he was appointed to act as the Elections Officer by the Sub-divisional Officer, Sadar, Monghyr, within whose jurisdiction this Gram Panchayat falls, under Rule 2(g) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959. Hence, the elections held by him were illegal, void and with-put jurisdiction. It may be stated that, apart from M.J.C Nos. 1338 and 1371 of 1962, there was yet another petition bearing M.J.C No. 1337 of 1962 filed by one Ramadhar Singh.

2. Kamla Sahai, J. heard the three applications and dismissed them holding that Shri Ramadhar Sarma, Block-Development Officer, Sheikhpura, was duly authorised by the Sub-divisional Officer, Sadar, Monghyr, in terms of Rule 2(g) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules referred to above, and as such there was no illegality of any kind in his capacity to act as the Elections Officer. The two appeals, as I have already stated, arise out of these two applications. Mr. B.C Ghose, who appears in support of the appeals, has reiterated the argument which he advanced before the learned single Judge and has urged that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is erroneous, in that, he did not interpret correctly Rule 2(g) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules in terms of which Shri Ramadhar Sharma was authorised to act as the Elections Officer. Before I proceed to deal with this argument in detail, I may set out here Rule 2(g) on the proper interpretation of which depends the worth of the argument of the learned Counsel.

3. That rule runs thus:

“2. In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context—

(g) ‘Elections Officer’ means the Sub-divisional Magistrate exercising jurisdiction over the Sub-division within the local limits of which the Gram Panchayat in which the election or the bye-election is to be held is situated, and includes any other officer who may be specially appointed by the Elections Officer to discharge any of his functions under these rules.”

4. It appears to me unnecessary to refer to Rule 2(q) which defines “Sub-divisional Magistrates” Inasmuch as that question has not been raised before me by the learned counsel, if Rule 2(g) is read in a general way, particular the words occurring at the end of the rule “and includes any other officer who may be specially appointed by the Elections Officer to discharge any of his functions under these rules”, there can be no doubt that Shri Ramadhar Sharma was duly authorised. It is not disputed that the Sharma purported to act as the Elections Officer in accordance with the notification issued by Shri Sushil Jha, dated the 2nd January, 1960, who happended to hold the office of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Monghyr, on the relevant date. The argument of Mr. Ghose, therefore, is confined to this much only that although the Sub-divisional Officer could make the appointment of the Elections Officer for conducting the elections of the Gram Panchayat within his jurisdiction, but he could exercise that power only with reference to the persons by name and not in a general way. The notification of the 2nd January, 1960, is in general terms saying that all the Block Development Officers and Anchal Adhikaris would act as the Elections Officers in respect of the Gram Panchayat within their jurisdictions. The notification is in these terms:

“In exercise of powers conferred upon by me by definition 2(g) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules, 1959, I Sushil Jha, Sub-divisional Magistrate, do hereby appoint all the Anchal Adhikaris and Block Development Officers and project executive officers under Sadar Sub-division, Monghyr to discharge any or all 1 unctions of an Elections Officer.’

5. The learned single Judge on examination of the various provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and the parallel provisions of section 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also decisions of the various High Courts, has held that the meaning of the words “specially appointed by the Elections Officer” do not mean appointment by name but refer to the functions of the officers who in the normal course of their duties are otherwise engaged but who may be specially required, to act as Elections Officer in place of the Sub-divisional Officer. “Specially appointed”, therefore, lays stress upon this particular kind of duty and not upon any office by name. The correct interpretation of these two words “specially appointed” would thus be taken to refer to appointment for the specific purpose and nothing more. On a consideration of the argument of Mr. B.C Ghose, I am satisfied that the view expressed by the learned single Judge is correct.

6. Mr. Ghose in support of his argument, has referred to the cases upon which he put reliance before the learned single Judge. In the case of Mohamad Kasim v. Emperor, AIR 1915 Mad 1159 the words “specially empowered” occurred in section 3 of the Opium Act, 1878. In that case, the petitioners were convicted by a Second Class Magistrate of Negepatam purporting to act under the authority of a notification issued by the Government of Madras empowering all Second Class Magistrates to lake cognizance of offences under the Opium Act, 1878. The High Court of Madras having been moved in revision, however, quashed the conviction on the ground that the notification giving power to all Second Class Magistrates to try such offences was not in conformity with section 3 of the Opium Act, because the words “specially empowered” would mean conferment of power by name of the particular officer and not generally empowering all officers of a particular category to try offences in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Their Lordships had occasion to consider in that connection the use of the words “special” and “general” in Section 39 of the Cr PC. One of the two learned Judges relying upon the analogy of section 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure held that “specially empowered” would necessarily mean by name in contrast with the general conferment of power, since the two words were used in that section to refer to different kinds of empowerment of an official. In my opinion, however, the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, with great respect, were not correct in construing section 39 in the mode in which they construed that section. That section stands thus:

“39. (1) In conferring powers under this Code the State Government may, by order, empower persons specially by name or in virtue of their office, or classes of officials generally by their official titles.

(2) Every such order shall take effect from the date on which it is communicated to the person so empowered”.

7. In my opinion, the legislature in that section has not used the word “specially” by itself but in conjunction with the two words “by name” so that the Legislature contemplated conferment of power upon the official by name or by virtue of the office or classes to which he belonged in general terms. There is no dichotomy between special power and general power, but special power by name and general power by official title. That section cannot be construed to mean that whenever the Legislature or, for the matter of that, any rule-making authority has used the expression that certain classes of officials may be empowered that would necessarily cannot be authorisation by name. In any case, S. 39 cannot be invoked to lend support to such a contention and, in my opinion, the learned single Judge rightly did not attach any importance to it; and more so, this decision was not followed in that very High Court in the case of Allaga Pillai v. Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad 256. That was a case in which Second Class Magistrates were empowered by notification of Government to try cases under the Opium Act and their Lordships held it to be a case of special empowering the Magistrates and the petition was dismissed.

8. The learned single Judge also referred to certain other decisions such as the State v. Judhabir Chetri, AIR 1953 Assam 35 (FB) and Public Prosecutor (AP) v. Srirambhadrayya, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 282 which have interpreted section 39(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a manner different from the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above. The learned single Judge, in the next place, referred to section 18 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act which provides as follows:

“Where, by a Bihar and Orissa Act or Bihar Act, a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment may be made either by’ name or by virtue of office.”

9. This section puts the matter beyond doubt and, approaching this case even from this angle, the conclusion is clear that there was nothing wrong in the manner of appointment of the Block Development Officer to act as the Elections Officer in terms of the notification issued by the Sadar Sub-divisional Officer, Monghyr, in question, in accordance with Rule 2(g) of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules referred to above.

10. Mr. Ghose has further reiterated his argument which he advanced before the learned single judge that the notification of Sjiri S.K Jha (Sub-divisional Officer) was in November 1960, whereas the present election was held in 1962, and as such Shri Ramadhar Sharma cannot be taken to have been validly authorised to work as the Elections Officer. The notification may be valid for one particular election only and not for all elections. Assuming that it is so, the learned single Judge has rightly pointed out that since there was no other election between November 1960 and the present election, the argument does not arise in the present case, because the authorisation of the Block Development Officer and the Anchal Adhikari of 1960 to act as the Elections Officer could be valid during the ensuing elections which is the position in the present case.

11. Mr. B.C Ghose has further contended that Rule 2(g) refers to the conferment of any power whereas the Elections Officers in the present case having been authorised under the notification assumed all the powers. The learned single Judge also scrutinised this argument and referred to certain decisions to the effect that the use of the expression “empowered” would mean conferment of all connected powers. In my opinion, the view expressed by the learned single Judge is correct, because it is clear that the use of the expression “any” would be equal to the word “all” in certain contexts and as has been referred to in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (3rd Edition, page 150), the word “any” excludes limitation or qualification. Referring to Liddy v. Kennedy, (1871) 5 HL 134 Stroud has quoted the following passage “So, a power in a lease, enabling the lessor to resume possession of any portion of the premises demised; enables film to resume all.’

12. Even in the Oxford Dictionary ‘any’ has been taken to mean ‘all’. In the result, therefore, there is no substance in these appeals which must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rupees 250/-.

G.N Prasad, J.:— I agree.

II/R.G.D

13. Appeals dismissed.