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Case Number

Criminal Revn. No. 1115 of 1962

Attorney(S)

Bisheshwar Prasad Sinha No. 1
T.K. Prasad
Madhusudan Singh
for Complainant

Judges

S.N.P Singh, J.

Acts

Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.2.
Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.3.
Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.5.
Section 173 of the Code

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Smart Summary

Written Summary of the Opinion (based exclusively on the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision application challenged an order dated 20 December 1961 of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr, Sadar, by which the Magistrate took cognizance of offences under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners.

The sequence of events in the record is as follows:

An FIR was filed by Parmeshwari Singh on 2 April 1961 and the Barahiya police station registered and investigated the case.
After investigation, the police initially submitted a final report dated 21 September 1961 under Section 173 CrPC.
Subsequently, on 1 November 1961 the police submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioners under Sections 144 and 379 IPC; the charge-sheet was later described as having been submitted by the officer in charge of Barahiya police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police.
The Sub‑Divisional Magistrate's order-sheet records that the final report only reached the Magistrate on 15 November 1961; the Magistrate adjourned the matter and on 1 December 1961 noted that a final report had been submitted and that a petition by the accused sought acceptance of the final report and discharge, while a protest petition by the informant had been filed; the matter was posted to 20 December 1961.
On 20 December 1961 the Magistrate passed the impugned order taking cognizance under Sections 144 and 379 IPC.
The petitioners challenged the Magistrate's order in revision on the ground that the police had no authority to submit a charge-sheet after the investigation had been closed and a final report had already been submitted.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Superintendent of Police had the authority to direct the submission of a charge-sheet after the officer in charge of the police station had already submitted a final report under Section 173 CrPC.
Whether the submission by the police of a subsequent charge-sheet (after a prior final report) was legally competent or barred by law.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by their counsel)

The order of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate taking cognizance was bad in law because the police had no authority to submit a charge-sheet when a final report had already been submitted and the investigation was thus completed.
After the police submitted a final report dated 21 September 1961 under Section 173 CrPC, the police had no power to submit any subsequent charge-sheet forming the basis for cognizance.
The charge-sheet in the present case was submitted only because the Superintendent of Police directed its submission; the Superintendent, it was contended, had no power to direct such a submission after a final report had been filed by the officer in charge pursuant to directions of the Divisional Inspector of Police.
To support this contention, counsel cited several authorities including Umesh Chunder Hoy v. Satish Chundra Roy (22 Cal WN 69 : AIR 1918 Cal 485), Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Miyan (AIR 1928 Pat 585), Hanuman v. Raj (AIR 1951 Raj 131), Emperor v. All (AIR 1932 Lah 611) and referred to observations in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi (AIR 1955 SC 196).

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separately articulated set of arguments advanced on behalf of the State or other respondents; the court instead analyses the legal authorities and statutory provisions relevant to the dispute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Umesh Chunder Hoy v. Satish Chundra Roy, 22 Cal WN 69 : (AIR 1918 Cal 485)	Contains an observation casting doubt on whether the Superintendent of Police could control the discretion vested in the investigating officer under Section 170 CrPC; on facts there the Public Prosecutor's application to withdraw was allowed and the High Court found that the Superintendent's involvement was not a valid reason for withdrawal.	The court found this case not directly on the point relied upon and held it did not lend direct support to the petitioners' contention that an SP could not direct a charge-sheet after a final report.
Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Miyan, AIR 1928 Pat 585	Held that a District Magistrate had no power under the CrPC to call for a charge-sheet after a final report was put up before, and disposed of by, a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 173 CrPC; described the report as final in the sense that investigation had been "completed".	The court distinguished this authority: the Patna case concerned the power of the District Magistrate to call for a charge-sheet after a Magistrate had disposed of the final report. It did not establish the absolute principle that no subsequent police action or charge-sheet could ever follow a final report in other circumstances.
Emperor v. All, AIR 1932 Lah 611 (Lahore case)	Held that when a case has been put up before a Magistrate under Section 173 and is pending before him, the District Magistrate cannot direct the police to make further inquiries resulting in withdrawal; it was also observed that police had no power to institute further investigation to find evidence favouring the accused (observation which the present court respectfully disagreed with).	The court considered this not directly on the point because in that case there was no question of submission of another report after the final report. The court expressly disagreed with the absolute proposition that police cannot institute further investigation to find evidence for the accused.
Hanuman v. Raj, AIR 1951 Raj 131 (Rajasthan case)	Held that police action in resuming investigation and putting up a new challan against the accused as a result of further investigation was unauthorised and unlawful (following the Lahore decision).	The court noted this authority but did not treat it as controlling; it rejected the view that further investigation or subsequent charge-sheeting is in every case prohibited.
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196	Described the components of "investigation" under the CrPC, listing steps including proceeding to the spot, ascertaining facts, collection of evidence (including examination and statement-taking), search and seizure, and the formation of an opinion whether there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate and, if so, taking steps for the same by filing a charge-sheet under Section 173.	The court relied on this Supreme Court description to hold that formation of opinion and filing of a charge-sheet are steps in investigation; therefore, submission of a charge-sheet can be part of the investigative process even where a prior final report exists, supporting the legality of the subsequent charge-sheet submitted on SP direction.
State of Bihar v. Sher Bahadur (Div. Bench, disposed 2 Feb 1960) (Patna)	Stated that further investigation subsequent to the submission of a charge-sheet is not prohibited by the CrPC and that the possibility of further inquiry depends upon information the investigating officer may get after submitting a charge-sheet.	The court invoked this Division Bench observation to reject an absolute bar on further investigation or subsequent prosecutorial steps after a prior report/charge-sheet.
Shri Rama Shanker v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 525	Held that no illegality was committed by an investigating officer in submitting a charge-sheet after previously submitting a final report.	The court treated this Allahabad High Court decision as supportive authority for the proposition that submission of a charge-sheet after a previous final report is not per se illegal, and relied on it to reinforce the conclusion reached in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the dispute narrowly around whether the Superintendent of Police had authority to direct submission of a charge-sheet after the officer in charge had already submitted a final report under Section 173 CrPC. The court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as reflected in the text):

The court examined the authorities cited by petitioners and found that none of them was directly on the precise point in issue. Several decisions were distinguished on their facts or scope:

The Calcutta decision (Umesh Chunder Hoy) contained only an observation and did not directly support the proposition relied on by petitioners.
The Patna decision (Shukadeva Sahay) held that a District Magistrate could not call for a charge-sheet after a Magistrate empowered under Section 173 had disposed of the final report; the court read this as addressing the particular procedural posture in that case rather than laying down a general prohibition against any subsequent police action.
The Lahore and Rajasthan decisions (Emperor v. All and Hanuman v. Raj) were also found not to be directly on point; the court expressly disagreed with the broad proposition in the Lahore decision that police could never institute further investigation to find evidence in favour of the accused.

The court relied on the Supreme Court's exposition in H.N. Rishbud which identified the filing of a charge-sheet as one of the steps of investigation and emphasized that formation of opinion and taking steps to file a charge-sheet are part of investigation. On that basis the court reasoned that filing a charge-sheet can legitimately form part of the investigative process.
The court then considered the statutory provision, Section 551 CrPC, which authorizes police-officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station to exercise the same powers throughout the local area as the officer in charge may exercise within his station. The court concluded that the Superintendent of Police was competent to supervise the investigation and to give directions to the officer in charge regarding the investigation, including directing the submission of a charge-sheet.
Given that the charge-sheet was, in the court's view, a step in the investigation and that Section 551 permitted the SP to give directions to the officer in charge, the court held that the submission of the subsequent charge-sheet on the SP's direction was not illegal.
The court also noted that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate had not passed any order on the basis of the earlier final report and that, on the date of the impugned order, three materials were before the Magistrate — the final report, the charge-sheet and the protest petition of the complainant — and that it was within the Magistrate's jurisdiction to act on the charge-sheet.
Finally, the court referenced a supportive Division Bench decision (Shri Rama Shanker … v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 525) that held that an investigating officer committing a charge-sheet after a previously submitted final report did not render the action illegal, reinforcing the court's conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application in revision was dismissed. The court held that the submission of the charge-sheet by the officer in charge of the police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police was not illegal, and that the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate was within his jurisdiction to act on the subsequently submitted charge-sheet.

Implications (as directly observable from the opinion):

The court accepted that the formation of an opinion and the filing of a charge-sheet are steps of investigation under the CrPC (following H.N. Rishbud), and therefore a charge-sheet submitted after an earlier final report can, in appropriate circumstances, be a lawful investigative step.
Under Section 551 CrPC, a Superintendent of Police has the statutory competence to supervise investigations and to give directions to an officer in charge of a police station; a direction by the SP to submit a charge-sheet does not, per se, render that submission invalid where it is a step in investigation.
The direct effect of the decision on the parties is that the petitioners' challenge to the Magistrate's cognizance (on the ground that the charge-sheet was incompetent because a final report had already been submitted) was rejected; the Magistrate's order taking cognizance stands.

Note: This summary is prepared solely from the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the text of the opinion.

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Raghunath Sharma And Others v. The State Opposite Party.

1. This application in revision is directed against the order dated the 20th of December, 1961 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Monghyr, Sadar, taking cognizance of a case against the petitioners under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. It appears that, on a first information report filed by one Parmeshwari Singh on the 2nd of April, 1961 the, police officer of Barahiya police station registered a case and took up investigation. It is not necessary to state in any detail the allegations made in the first information report. After completing the investigation, the police, at the first instance, submitted final report false. That final report is dated the 21st of September, 1961. On the 1st of November 1961, the police, however, submitted a charge-sheet against the petitioners under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. It appears from the order sheet of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the final report which had been submitted by the police did not reach him till the 15th of November, 1961, and, on that date, the Magistrate adjourned the case for the 1st of December, 1961. On the 1st of December 1961, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order:

“Three accused filed hazri and 19 accused are represented through their lawyer. Final report — civil dispute — under S. 144/379, I.P.C has been submitted by the I.O in this case. But from office notes of the D.I it appears that under orders of the S.P, 1.0 has been directed to submit C.S

A petition has been filed on behalf of the accused stating that F.R has been received in this case and pray that it may be accepted and they may be discharged.

A protest petition on behalf of the informant has already been filed in this case. Put up on 20-12-61. Accused as before.”

4. On the next date, that is the 20th of December, 1961, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the impugned order, taking cognizance of the case under Sections 144 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised only one contention, namely, that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate taking cognizance is bad in law because the police had no authority to submit a charge-sheet when the investigation had been closed and a final report had already been submitted. It was submitted that after that, after completing the investigation, the police has submitted the final report on the 21st of September, 1961 under Section 173 of the Cr PC. Thereafter, the police had absolutely no power to submit the charge sheet on the basis of which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance in the case. It appears that the charge-sheet was subsequently submitted by the officer in charge of Barahyia police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration is whether the Superintendent of Police, who was an officer superior in rank to the officer in charge of the police station, had the authority to direct the submission of a charge-sheet when the officer in charge of the police station had already submitted the final report as directed by the Divisional Inspector of Police. In sup-port of his contention that the Superintendent of Police had no such power, Mr. Sinha cited the cases of Umesh Chunder Hoy v. Satish Chundra Roy, 22 Cal WN 69 : (AIR 1918 Cal 485), Shukadeva Sahay v. Hamid Miyan, AIR 1928 Pat 585, Hanuman v. Raj, AIR 1951 Raj 131 and Emperor v. All, AIR 1932 Lah 611. Mr. Sinha also relied on certain observations in the case of H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi. (S) AIR 1955 SC 196. In my opinion, none of the cases cited for learned counsel is directly on the point. In the Calcutta case, 22 Cal WN 69 : (AIR 1918 Cal 485), there was only an observation that it was doubtful whether the discretion vested in the investigating officer by the provisions of Section 170 of the Cr PC could be controlled by the Superintendent of Police, or could be controlled after the discretion had been exercised, in that case, after the submission of the charge-sheet by the Police, cognizance was taken. Subsequently on an application filed by the Public Prosecutor, the prosecution was allowed to be withdrawn under Section 494(a) of the Cr PC. Probably, one of the reasons which the Magistrate gave for allowing the prayer of the Public Prosecutor was that the Superintendent of Police had moved in the matter. Certainly, the High Court, on the facts of that case, rightly took the view that was not a valid reason for allowing the prayer for withdrawal. In the Patna case, AIR 1928 Pat 585, referred to above, it was held that the District Magistrate had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for a charge-sheet after the final report was put up before a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence under Section 173 of the Cr PC and was disposed of by him. Reference was made to the following observation made in that case:

“The report in question was submitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in the usual and legal way. It was the final report in the case, final in the sense that the investigation had been ‘completed’, to use the word of Section 173. That section requires that the police officer shall submit his final report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report.”

6. Learned counsel, on the above observation, contended that, in the instant case also, as the investigation had been “completed”, the subsequent charge-sheet by the police was incompetent. In my opinion the observation made in that case does not in any way lend support to the contention raised by learned counsel. As I have already indicated, what was held in that case was that once the Magistrate who was competent to take cognizance of the offence under Section 173 of the Cr PC had disposed of the final report submitted by the Police, the District Magistrate had no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for a charge-sheet. In that connection, Jawala Prasad, J. referred to the provisions of Section 173 of the Cr PC. In the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611, it was held that, when a case had been put up before a Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code and was pending before him, the District Magistrate could not, from Information received from outsiders or otherwise direct the police to make further inquiries and, as a result of those inquiries, direct the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the case. It was further observed that the police had no power to Institute further investigation with a view to find evidence in favour of accused. With due respect, I do not agree with the observation made in that case that the police had no power to institute further investigation even with a vie?/to find evidence in favour of accused. Apart from that, the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611 is not at all directly on the point, as there was no question of submission of another report by the police after the submission of the final report. Following the decision of the Lahore case, AIR 1932 Lah 611, it was held in the Rajasthan case, AIR 1951 Raj 131, also that the action of police in resuming Investigation and putting up a new challan against the accused as a result of further investigation was unauthorised and unlawful. In the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of the State of Bihar v. Sher Bahadur, (Criminal Revn. Nos. 673 and 675 of 1957, disposed of on the 2nd February 1960) (Pat), it was observed as follows:

“Further investigation, subsequent to the submission of charge-sheet has nowhere been prohibited in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and there are several authorities to support such a course. It depends upon the information that the investigating police officer may get after he submits a charge-sheet.”

7. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the view of the Lahore High Court and the Rajasthan High Court that, in no case, after the submission of the report under Section 173 of the Code, there can be further investigation. Mr. Sinha, however, submitted before me that, in the instant case, the charge-sheet was submitted not as a result of further investigation but simply because the Superintendent of Police directed the submission of a charge-sheet. In the case of AIR 1955 SC 196, it was held that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, investigation consists generally of the following steps: (1) Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under Section 173. On the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court, it must, therefore, be held that the formation of the opinion on the materials already collected and taking steps for the filing of a charge-sheet are also steps towards the investigation of a case. If the police officer was competent to investigate the case even after the submission of the final report and if the formation of opinion on the materials available and the filing of a charge-sheet are nothing but steps towards the investigation of the case, I find no justification to hold that the officer in charge of the police station had no power to submit the charge-sheet. Section 551 of the Cr PC reads as follows:

“Police-officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.”

8. It cannot be doubted that, under the provisions of this section, the Superintendent of Police was competent to supervise the Investigation and to give any direction to the officer in charge of the police station regarding the investigation of the case. In the instant case, the Superintendent of Police has done nothing but to give a direction to the officer in charge of the police station for submission of a charge-sheet which was nothing but a step towards the investigation of the case. In my opinion, therefore, the submission of the charge-sheet by the officer in charge of the police station on the direction of the Superintendent of Police was not Illegal.

9. I may mention here that the Magistrate had not passed any order on the basis of the final report. On the date the Magistrate passed the impugned order, there were three materials before him, namely, the final report, the charge-sheet and the protest petition filed by the complainant. In his order, however, he only mentioned about the charge-sheet. My considered view is that it was within the Jurisdiction of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to act on the basis of the charge-sheet submitted by the Police. I have already given my reason for holding that the charge-sheet which was subsequently submitted by the police was no-illegal. In the view which I have taken, I am fortified b) a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shri Rama Shanker… v. The State Of Uttar Pradesh…Opposite Party., AIR 1956 All 525. It was held in that case that no illegality was committed by an investigating officer in submitting a charge-sheet after previously submitting a final report.

10. For the reasons stated above, I do not find am; substance in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. This application is, accordingly, dismissed.

CG/O/D.V.C

11. Petition dismissed.

Raghunath Sharma And Others v. The State Opposite Party.

Written Summary of the Opinion (based exclusively on the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by their counsel)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Raghunath Sharma And Others v. The State Opposite Party.

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