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  • provisions of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of Order 1 of the Code
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision Nos. 337 & 839 of 1961

Factual and Procedural Background

The two applications in revision arise from Title Suit No. 3 of 1959 pending before the 1st Court of Munsif at Dhanbad. The plaintiff, a Private Limited Company, sued the District Board, Dhanbad and another, claiming reliefs concerning survey plots 575 and 612 of village Kirkend which were used as a lane (lying within 150 bighas of coal land belonging to the plaintiff). The plaintiff alleged that, as owner of the lane and the person maintaining it, the defendants had no right to cut earth and make a pucca road on parts of those plots. The suit was instituted on 3-1-1959; written statement was filed and issues were settled on 4-8-1959.

About two years after institution of the suit, on 4-2-1961, a petition was filed (by Rameshwarlal Agarwala, described initially in the opinion as "Hameshwar Lal Agarwala" at one place) seeking to be added as a party (opposite party 6). The plaintiff strongly opposed this joinder. By order dated 1-3-1961 the learned Additional Munsif added Rameshwarlal Agarwala (opposite party 6) as a defendant; the plaintiff challenged that order in Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961.

Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961 was admitted on 3-5-1961 and this Court stayed further proceedings in the suit pending the revision. The subordinate Court recorded a stay on 19-5-1961. Despite the stay, defendants 2 to 5 filed on 19-7-1961 a petition seeking an order directing the plaintiff to repair the road or, failing that, directing the District Board to repair it. On 2-8-1961 the plaintiff pointed to the existing stay and argued the petition should be rejected; nevertheless the Court below directed that "necessary orders will be passed on 12-8-1961" and allowed the defendants to take out a commission. Pursuant to that direction, on 5-8-1961 a petition for appointment of a pleader-commissioner was filed and the court issued the necessary writ appointing a commissioner to inspect and report by 12-8-1961. The plaintiff moved this Court against the appointment of the pleader-commissioner and obtained a rule in Civil Revision No. 839 of 1961.

Both revisions were heard together because they arose out of the same suit and between largely the same parties, though they raise separate legal questions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Hameshwar Lal Agarwala / Rameshwarlal Agarwala (referred to as opposite party 6 in the opinion) had been rightly added as a party-defendant to Title Suit No. 3 of 1959 against the wishes of the plaintiff (Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961).
  2. Whether the Court below acted illegally or without jurisdiction in issuing a commission (appointing a pleader-commissioner for local inspection) on 5-8-1961 after this Court had stayed further proceedings in the subordinate Court (Civil Revision No. 839 of 1961).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff objected strongly to the joinder of opposite party 6 on the ground that he had no right to be joined as a defendant and that the plaintiff did not desire to litigate against him.
  • When defendants 2 to 5 moved for a commission and other reliefs after the stay by this Court, the plaintiff pointed out the stay and contended that the petition seeking further proceedings (including appointment of a commissioner) ought to be rejected as proceedings were stayed.

Opposite Party 6's (Intervenor's) Position

  • Opposite party 6 (Rameshwarlal Agarwala) applied to be added as a defendant and, as recorded in the opinion, asserted (or it was contended on his behalf) that he was a proper party and should be impleaded. The court below accepted this contention implicitly by adding him, but the opinion records that it was not suggested that he was a person who "ought to have been joined" or that his presence was necessary to adjudicate all questions in the suit.

Defendants 2 to 5

  • Defendants 2 to 5 petitioned on 19-7-1961 to direct the plaintiff to repair the road and, failing that, to direct the District Board to get it repaired. They sought the appointment of a commissioner (a pleader-commissioner) to hold a local inspection and report on the road's condition and construction; they deposited the costs and procured issuance of the writ appointing the commissioner on 5-8-1961.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, ILR 50 Mad 34 : AIR 1926 Mad 836 Principle that a plaintiff (dominus litis) should not be compelled to litigate against an additional party not of his choice unless required by law; judgments are generally inter partes and persons should not be forced to be joined except where necessary or proper. The Court adopted and applied this principle to hold that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a defendant against his wishes and that joinder under Order I, rule 10(2) requires necessity or propriety; the opinion expresses "cordial assent" to the approach in this case.
Norris v. Beazley, (1877) 2 C.P.D 80 Authority for the view that a person should not be added as defendant unless his joinder is required for justice; supports narrow construction of joinder powers. The Court relied on this authority (as relied upon in the Prayaga decision) to support the proposition that courts should not use Order I, rule 10(2) to force plaintiffs to include persons as defendants who they do not wish to litigate against.
Ramnandan Singh v. Bineswari Singh, Civil Revn. No. 880 of 1947 (Pat) — decision by Reuben, J., Dated 7-9-1948 Applied the same reasoning as in the Prayaga case: consideration of whether a petitioner could insist on being added as a defendant and that plaintiff should not be compelled to accept such joinder. The opinion notes that Reuben, J.'s decision followed the Srinivasa Ayyangar J. reasoning in the Prayaga case and that it supports the conclusion in the present matter that the petitioner cannot be compelled to add opposite party 6.
Jugal Singh v. Mahabir Tewari, Civil Revn. No. 158 of 1953 (Pat), decided 6-12-1956 Subsequent application/following of the reasoning that limits joinder where not necessary; cited as following Reuben, J.'s approach. The opinion mentions this case as one of the subsequent authorities following Reuben, J.'s reasoning; it is used to demonstrate consistent judicial authority supporting restrictive use of Order I, rule 10(2).
Bhurunga Uraon v. Mosstt. Somri Urain, Civil Revn. No. 698 of 1954 (Pat), decided 25-9-1957 Another later authority cited as following the restrictive approach to impleading parties where not necessary. The Court referred to this case as further supportive of the view that a person who is neither a necessary nor a proper party should not be added as a party defendant under Order I, rule 10(2).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two distinct strands corresponding to the two revisions.

On the joinder issue (Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961), the Court began with the statutory text: Order I, rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the Court, at any stage, to add "the name of any person who ought to have been joined" or "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit." The Court emphasized the proper construction of that sub-rule: the necessity contemplated is only such necessity as makes the person's presence indispensable to enable the Court to adjudicate the questions between the actual parties. The Court rejected any expansive reading which would require joinder of all persons having any interest in the subject-matter.

The opinion explains the underlying principle that judgments in civil suits are generally inter partes (not in rem) and hence joinder should be confined to persons who are necessary or proper parties in relation to the plaintiff's claimed reliefs. The Court invoked authority (Prayaga, Norris v. Beazley and subsequent Patna decisions) to show that forcing plaintiffs to litigate against persons not of their choice would be contrary to the purpose of rule 10(2). The Court concluded that the trial Judge's approach — permitting joinder simply because "there is no harm" in adding the petitioner — was incorrect and legally impermissible.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that:

  • It was not suggested that Rameshwarlal Agarwala was a person who ought to have been joined, nor that his presence was necessary to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate the suit.
  • Impleading him would compel the plaintiff to litigate against a party it did not wish to oppose and would risk involving the Court in adjudicating title disputes in which the original parties were not interested.
  • The application to be added came about two years after institution of the suit; and a decree in the suit would not bind the subsequently added party if he was not originally a party.
For these reasons the Court held that the trial Judge lacked jurisdiction to add opposite party 6 as a defendant against the plaintiff's wishes.

On the commission issue (Civil Revision No. 839 of 1961), the Court proceeded from the well-settled legal principle that an order of a superior Court staying further proceedings in a subordinate Court becomes operative immediately upon its making, not only upon communication to the subordinate Court. Consequently, while such a stay is in effect the subordinate Court's power to continue proceedings in the matter is suspended. The Court below, with knowledge of the stay order, nevertheless issued a commission on 5-8-1961; the opinion held that such an act, being in violation of the stay then in operation, was without jurisdiction and therefore liable to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

The Court made the following final determinations:

  • On Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961: The order of the Court below dated 1-3-1961 adding opposite party 6 (Rameshwarlal Agarwala) as a defendant to Title Suit No. 3 of 1959, against the wishes of the plaintiff, was set aside. The petition challenging that joinder succeeded and the rule was made absolute. The petitioner (plaintiff in the underlying suit) was awarded costs against Rameshwarlal Agarwala (the only respondent who contested the application in that revision). Hearing fee: Rs. 32/-.
  • On Civil Revision No. 839 of 1961: The order of the Court below dated 5-8-1961 appointing a pleader-commissioner (issuing a commission) despite this Court's stay of further proceedings was held to be without jurisdiction and was set aside. The revision succeeded, the rule was made absolute, and the petitioner was entitled to costs against defendants 2 to 5 (Opposite parties 2 to 5). Hearing fee: Rs. 32/-.

Implications: The direct effects are (1) removal of opposite party 6 as a co-defendant added against the plaintiff's wish and (2) annulment of the subordinate Court's appointment of a commissioner made during the effective stay. The opinion applies existing authorities and principles (cited above) and does not purport to establish a new or broader precedent beyond affirming the settled limits on adding parties and the immediate operation of superior-court stays.

Disposition: Rules in both Civil Revision Nos. 337 and 839 of 1961 were made absolute; the impugned orders of the Court below (1-3-1961 joinder order and 5-8-1961 commission appointment) were set aside. Costs and hearing fees were directed as stated above.

    Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. v. District Committee

    1. These two applications in revision by the plaintiff arise out of one and the same suit,—Title Suit 3 of 1959—which is pending before the 1st Court of Munsif at Dhanbad. In Civil Revision 337 of 1961, the sole question for determination is as to whether Hameshwar Lal Agarwala, opposite party 6, had rightly been added as a party to the suit against the wishes of the plaintiff. In Civil Revision No. 839 of 1961, the single question for determination is whether the Court below had acted illegally in issuing a commission after further proceedings in the suit had been stayed by this Court.

    2. The circumstances leading up to the two cases may briefly be stated as below:

    3. The plaintiff, which is a Private Limited Company, brought a suit against the District Board, Dhanbad and another, claiming certain reliefs against the defendants. Its case was that survey plots 575 and 612 of village Kirkend lying within 150 bighas of coal land belonging to the plaintiff were used as a lane by the people of Kirkend Bazar, but as the plaintiff was the Owner of the said lane and was maintaining and repairing the same at its own cost, the defendants had no right to cut earth to make a pucca road on portions of the said plots. This suit was instituted on 3-1-8959. After the filing of the written statement, issues were settled on 4-8-1959. About two years after the institution of the suit, a petition was filed by Rameshwarlal Agarwala, opposite party 6, on 4-2-1961 for being added as a party. This petition was stoutly opposed by the plaintiff on the ground that he had no right to be joined as a defendant in the suit. The learned Additional Munsif, however, in spite of the protest and strong objection of the plaintiff, added Rameshwarlal Agarwala, opposite party 6, as a defendant to the suit by his order dated 1-3-1961. Against the said order, the plaintiff has come up in revision in Civil Revision 337 of 1961.

    4. Civil Revision 337 of 1961 was admitted on 3-5-1961, and pending the final hearing of the application further proceedings in Title Suit 3 of 1959 in the Court below were stayed. The Court below, on receipt of the order of stay from this Court, recorded an order on 19-5-1961 to the effect that the further proceedings of the suit were stayed till the disposal of Civil Revision 337 of 1961. On 19-7-1961, defendants 2 to 5 filed a petition to direct the plaintiff to repair the road in question, and, on its failure to do so, the District Board should be directed to get it repaired, as the road had become useless owing to heavy rains. When this matter was taken up on 2-8-1961 it was pointed out on behalf of the plaintiff that in view of the stay granted by this Court staying further proceedings, the petition of the defendants should be rejected. In spite of this, the Court ordered that necessary orders will be passed on 12-8-1961, but, meanwhile, the defendants should take out a commission for the purpose wanted by them. In pursuance of the said direction, defendants 2 to 5 filed a petition for appointment of a commissioner on 5-8-1961 and also deposited the necessary cost, whereupon the Court below appointed a pleader commissioner for holding local inspection and to report the construction of the road in question by 12-8-1961 positively, and, accordingly, the necessary writ was issued. The plaintiff, thereafter, moved this Court against the aforesaid order of 5-8-1961 appointing a pleader commissioner and obtained a rule in Civil Revision 839 of 1961.

    5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the two cases arising between the same parties are being heard together, and, therefore, this judgment will govern them both. J will, however, take up these cases separately, as they deal with separate matters.

    Civil Revision No. 337 of 1961:

    6. Order I of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure lays down the rules regulating the joinder of parties. Sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order I empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, inter alia, that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit, be added. It is not suggested in this Court, nor was it suggested in the Court below, that Rameshwarlal Agarwala was a person who ought to have been added as party defendant to the suit, or that his presence before the Court below was necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon all the questions involved in the suit. The Court below itself only says that “there is no harm if petitioner (i.e Rameshwarlal Agarwala) is added as defendant in the suit”. This, in my opinion, is not the correct approach.

    7. The necessity referred to in Sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code is for the purpose of enabling the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in a suit. It is obvious, therefore, that this sub-rule cannot be read as requiring that all persons who have or claim to have or who are likely to have any sort of right, title or interest in respect of any portion of the subject-matter of a suit should all be made parties. If it be borne in mind that the suit is by the plaintiff for certain reliefs against certain persons as defendants and that the judgments of Civil Courts, in such suits, are not judgments in them, then it follows that the questions involved in the suit are only questions with regard to the right set up and the relief claimed on the one side and denied or withheld on the other. The expression all the questions involved in the suit, therefore, can only be questions as between the parties to the litigation. It should be remembered that the application made in the Court below was one for joinder of a third party as a party defendant in the action. It is the plaintiff that comes to Court alleging a cause of action as against a particular defendant and asking for reliefs against him. The very basic principle of judgment inter parties is that the judgments are not judgments in rem but declaratory and operative only as between them. The plaintiff being generally dominus litus, I fail to see on what principle of justice he can be compelled to fight against some other litigant not of his own choice unless such a process is required by a positive rule of law — per Srinivasa Ayyangar. J., in Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, ILR 50 Mad 34 : (AIR 1926 Mad 836).

    8. The question thus resolves itself Into this: Should the plaintiff in this case be compelled to litigate against not only the defendants of its choice, against whom it has prayed for reliefs consequent on certain declarations, but also against Rameshwarlal Agarwala (opposite party 6). against its wishes?

    9. The only two cases in which a person may be added as a party to a suit under Sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code are (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not so joined, Or, (2) when, without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided. There is, therefore, no jurisdiction to add a party to a suit in any other case. Therefore, a person should not be added as a defendant merely because he would be incidentally affected by the judgment in the suit. There, however, even that is not the view of the trial judge.

    10. The whole scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure seems to me to point to a suit being regarded as a suit for relief as against definite defendants, as a trial being one only as between the parties and an adjudication as one only binding them. The defendant to be added must be a defendant against whom the plaintiff has some cause of complaint, which ought to be, determined in the action, and, Rule 10(2) of Order 1 of the Code never intended to apply where the person to be added as defendant is a person against whom the plaintiff has no claim, and does not desire to prosecute any. It is obvious, therefore, that, in many cases, if the contention, put forward on behalf of Rameshwarlal, opposite party 6, the newly added defendant, that he was a proper party, and, as such, he has rightly been added, is right, then the provisions of sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of Order 1 of the Code might be used in a manner exceedingly harassing to plaintiffs; by forcing them to include in their actions persons against whom they do not seek to proceed and to mix up their rights as against one person, with questions of a highly complicated nature arising between themselves and the others. It is quite clear, therefore, that the court ought not to bring in any person as defendant against whom the plaintiff does not desire to proceed unless a very strong case is made out, showing that in the particular case justice cannot be done without his being brought in: Norris v. Beazley, (1877) 2 C.P.D 80, which was relied upon in Prayaga Poss Jee Varu's case, ILR 50 Mad 34 : (AIR 1926 Mad 836) (supra), with which I express my cordial assent.

    11. On a proper construction of Sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code, therefore, I feel constrained to hold that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a person as a party defendant against his wishes and such a person cannot be added as a party defendant, and he cannot be compelled, in spite of his protest, to fight the litigation against such a person against his choice. Where a person is neither a necessary nor a proper party, the Court has no jurisdiction to add him as a party under Sub-rule (2) of rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code. A person who is even only indirectly or remotely interested is not a necessary party.

    12. The above view was taken also by Reuben, J., sitting singly, in Civil Revn. No. 880 of 1947, Ramnandan Singh v. Bineswari Singh, D/- 7-9-1948 (Pat). In, that case also, His Lordship was considering, inter alia, the question whether the petitioner there could insist on being added as a defendant. The decision of Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. in Prayaga Poss Jee Varu's case, ILR 50 Mad 34 : (AIR 1926 Mad 836) (supra), was followed.

    13. The above decision of Reuben, J. was followed, subsequently, first, in Jugal Singh v. Mahabir Tewari, Civil Revn. No. 158 of 1953, decided by R.K Choudhary and Payal, JJ. on 6-12-1956 (Pat), in which case, however, the question was of impleading a person, who claimed a paramount title, in a mortgage suit, and, next in Bhurunga Uraon v. Mosstt. Somri Urain, Civil Revn. No. 698 of 1954, decided by C.P Sinha and Payal, JJ. on 25-9-1957 (Pat).

    14. On a review of the above authorities, it is manifestly clear that the petitioner here cannot be compelled to add opposite party 6 as a defendant to its suit against its choice and wishes.

    15. Tested in the light of the above cardinal principles, therefore, the result of impleading Rameshwarlal Agarwala would be that the Court may be called upon to decide the question between the plaintiff and the intervenor defendant, although the original parties to the suit do not want such an adjudication. The result would be far from avoiding litigation, to involve the Court in deciding a dispute regarding title of the intervenor, in which the plaintiff and the original defendants are not at all interested. If Rameshwarlal Agarwala wishes to get an adjudication as to the title between himself and present plaintiff, he has his own right and it is open to him to institute a suit therefor. Put there is no reason why he should be impleaded as a co-defendant, particularly when he is not wanted by the plaintiff. Here, the trial Judge does not say that Rajneshwarlal Agarwala, opposite party 6, is either a necessary or proper party to the suit. There seems, therefore, to be no reason why he should be impleaded as a co-defendant.

    16. Each case has to be decided on its own merit. On the facts of the present case, in my view, it would not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction to add opposite party 6, at his request, as defendant to the suit, and, thereby unnecessarily to prolong the investigation in the case about till and possession. Further, the application for being added as a party was made nearly about two years after the institution of the suit. The decree in the suit of the plaintiff will not bind opposite party 6, when be is not a party to the suit. For these reasons, the order of the Court below dated 1-3-1961, adding opposite party 6, Rameshwarlal Agarwala, as a defendant to the suit, against the wishes of the plaintiff, must be set aside.

    17. The application, therefore, succeeds and, is allowed, and, the rule is made absolute.

    Civil Revision 839 of 1961.

    18. It is well-settled that an order by a superior Court staying further proceedings in the Court below becomes operative the moment it is made and not after its communication to the subordinate Court. Where, therefore, an order is made by the superior Court, be it the appellate Court or the revisonal Court, staying further proceedings in a case in the Court below, subordinate to it, it suspends the power of the lower Court to continue the proceedings in such a case. If, in spite of file stay of further proceedings in the Court below by the superior Court, some order is passed by the Court below, in violation of the stay order in operation, such an order is without jurisdiction.

    19. In the instant case, on the facts stated before, the Court below knew of the stay Order passed by this Court and its attention was also drawn to that fact, but, in spite of having knowledge of the same, it issued a commission, as prayed for by defendants 2 to 5, which obviously it could not do when the stay order was in force. For these reasons, the order of the Court below issuing commission on 5-8-1961 must be set aside. This application also, therefore, succeeds and is allowed, and the rule is made absolute, and the impugned order of the Court below is set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs in Civil Revision No. 837 of 1901 against Rameshwarlal Agarwala, opposite party 6, who alone has contested this application. In Civil Revision 839 of 1961, the petitioner will be entitled to costs of this application against defendants 2 to 5, who are Opposite party 2 to 5 of this application. Hearing fee in each case will be Rs. 32/-.

    DF/D.R.R

    20. Rules made absolute.

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    Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P.) Ltd. v. District Committee
    (Nov 24, 1961)