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Case Summary — Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The underlying dispute concerns a sequence of leases, sub-leases, assignments, compromises and subsequent transactions affecting leasehold mining rights in village Kusunda.

Chronology (as stated in the opinion):

  • Circa 1894: Ramdayal Mazumdar took a registered lease of underground rights (nine annas share) in village Kusunda from the proprietor (the Raja of Katras). Ramdayal is the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs.
  • 1905 (Chait 1311 B.S.): Ramdayal granted a sub-lease (the "head lease") in favour of Raja Durga Prasad Singh of Jharia. A term of that head lease fixed an annual minimum royalty of Rs. 900 payable in four instalments.
  • 1907 (Baisakh 1314 B.S.): Raja Durga Prasad Singh assigned his interest to C.J. Smith.
  • 1914: Ramdayal sued Raja Durga Prasad Singh and C.J. Smith for royalty due for a specified period. That suit was compromised; the compromise decreed that C.J. Smith would pay amounts in conformity with the kabuliat and execute a proper kabuliat creating the rent as a first charge on the leasehold. The decree fixed payment of Rs. 4,500 (including salami and registration) and required execution of a separate kabuliat within one month.
  • 27 April 1918: In execution of that decree, a document (kabuliat) was executed on behalf of Mr. Smith by the Court (Execution Case No. 94 of 1917).
  • 4 February 1920: C.J. Smith executed an English mortgage of the leasehold property in favour of the Jagadamba Loan Company, Ltd. to secure Rs. 3 lakhs; the mortgage stipulated the mortgagor remained liable to pay rents/royalties.
  • Subsequently the Loan Company came into possession of the leasehold; in 1929 plaintiffs (successors of Ramdayal) sued heirs/representatives of Mr. Smith for royalty up to 1338 B.S., enforcing the charge; the Loan Company was not a party. A decree followed and the leasehold was sold in execution; Saroj Basini Debi purchased it on 12 November 1931.
  • 1938: The Loan Company assigned interest to Smt. Umarani Debi (31 March 1938) who later transferred an interest to Smt. Gangamoni Debi (25 September 1938). The petitioner (appellant in the High Court) is Smt. Gangamoni Debi.
  • 1945: Plaintiffs sued Saroj Basini Debi (defendant 1) and Gangamoni Debi (defendant 2) for recovery of minimum royalty for years 1344 B.S. to Poos kist of 1351 B.S., enforcing the charge against the leasehold property. Suit valued at Rs. 9,469 and odd annas.
  • The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. Gangamoni Debi appealed to the High Court; the High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree. Gangamoni Debi applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under para. 3 of Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal involves a substantial question of law within the meaning of para. 3 of Section 110 of the CPC and therefore warrants leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
  2. Whether the 1914 compromise decree was void for want of consideration (i.e., whether there was good consideration for the compromise).
  3. Whether terms of the 1914 compromise (creating an additional burden by charging the leasehold property with rent) were beyond the scope of that suit and therefore could not be enforced by execution of the compromise decree but required a suit for specific performance.
  4. Whether the kabuliat of 1918 (executed on behalf of C.J. Smith) purported to create a fresh lease or, alternatively, purported to create a mortgage but was invalid for non-compliance with Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act; and if the kabuliat failed as lease or mortgage, whether it could nevertheless create no right in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents.
  5. Whether the suit should have been dismissed for non-joinder of Umarani Debi, who was alleged to have acquired interest from the Loan Company and thus might have had an equity of redemption.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Mr. R.S. Chatterji) Arguments

  • The compromise in the 1914 suit was void for lack of consideration.
  • The finding that the compromise operated as good consideration under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act was incorrect; Ramdayal Mazumdar was in law bound to recognize the transfer to C.J. Smith and so no new consideration arose.
  • The terms of the 1914 compromise that created a charge on the leasehold by way of an additional burden on the lessee were outside the scope of the 1914 suit and thus could not be enforced by execution of the compromise decree (should require a suit for specific performance instead).
  • The kabuliat of 1918 purported to create a fresh lease or, alternatively, a mortgage; if it failed as lease or mortgage because it was not signed by the lessor or not attested as required, then it could create no right for the plaintiffs.
  • The suit was vitiated by non-joinder of Umarani Debi, who had acquired from the Loan Company an interest that included the equity of redemption; that non-joinder should have led to dismissal.
  • The decision affected the rights of the petitioner as mortgagee and had a value exceeding Rs. 10,000, invoking para. 2 read with para. 3 of Section 110 CPC (argument for leave to appeal on value basis).

Respondents' / Court's Counterpoints (as recorded in the opinion)

  • Many of the appellant's points were not raised in the trial Court and therefore involved questions of fact that could not be raised for the first time on appeal or on an application for leave to appeal.
  • The Bench below treated the compromise as recognising C.J. Smith as lessee in place of the Raja of Jharia and held the compromise amounted to good consideration under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act.
  • The appellate Court held the kabuliat of 1918 did not operate as a lease (it lacked the lessor's signature) and did not transfer interest as a mortgage, but nevertheless created a charge on the leasehold property; the document in clear terms created a charge and could be treated as such.
  • The point on attestation under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act (relied upon from Shiva Rao v. Shanmughasundarswami) was not taken earlier and hence could not be raised for the first time on leave application.
  • The factual materials did not permit a satisfactory conclusion that Umarani Debi had acquired the lessee's interest; further, non-joinder of Umarani Debi was not pleaded in the trial Court and no issue on that was framed — hence too late to raise on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohamad Shadak v. Venkata Komaraju, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 810 (193 I.C. 353) That leave to appeal should not be used to raise a point for the first time after the litigation has been disposed of; a point not raised in trial or appellate Court cannot be entertained on leave application (raising such a point would be an abuse). The Court relied on this principle to reject contentions that were not raised in the trial Court or earlier on appeal, holding that new points of law or fact could not be introduced at the leave stage.
Shiva Rao v. Shanmughasundarswami, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 140; I.L.R. (1940) Mad. 306 Observations on attestation requirements (cited by the appellant in support of a contention that a document creating a charge requires attestation in the manner laid down in Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act). The Court noted the appellant relied on observations in this case but treated the point as not properly raised earlier and therefore declined to entertain it at the leave stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence addressing the appellant's contentions and the threshold question of whether a substantial question of law arose under para. 3 of Section 110 CPC.

  1. Threshold legal question: The single procedural/legal question before the Court was whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law to justify leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under para. 3 of Section 110 CPC.
  2. On the contention that the 1914 compromise was void for want of consideration, the Court held:
    • The contention involved a question of fact (whether there was good consideration) and was not raised in the first Court; since questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, the contention could not be entertained.
    • Because this was sufficient to dispose of the point, the Court did not find it necessary to decide whether Section 2(d) of the Contract Act applied or whether, as a matter of law, Ramdayal was bound to recognize the transfer to C.J. Smith.
  3. On the contention that the compromise terms (creating a charge on the leasehold) were outside the scope of the 1914 suit and thus unenforceable by execution (requiring specific performance instead):
    • The Court treated this as an entirely new point never taken at any previous stage, including in the leave application, and therefore barred by settled authorities (citing Mohamad Shadak v. Venkata Komaraju) which prohibit raising new points for the first time on leave to appeal.
  4. On the validity and character of the kabuliat of 1918:
    • The appellate Court had held the kabuliat could not be treated as a lease (not signed by the lessor) and did not transfer interest as a mortgage. Nevertheless, the appellate Court found that the kabuliat created a clear charge on the leasehold property.
    • The Court observed that no particular form of words is necessary to create a charge; the document's terms showed an intention to make the property security for payment. The appellant's reliance on attestation requirements under Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act (and on the judicial observations in Shiva Rao) represented a point not previously raised and thus could not be considered at the leave stage.
  5. On non-joinder of Umarani Debi:
    • The Court noted (i) the statement in paragraph 11 of the plaint that the plaintiffs believed defendant 2 acquired interest from defendant 1 did not amount to an admission that the lessee's interest had been transferred to the Loan Company and thence to Umarani Debi; (ii) the plea of non-joinder was not taken in the trial Court nor was any issue framed on it; and (iii) on the material available it was impossible to reach a satisfactory conclusion that any person interested in the equity of redemption had been omitted as a party.
    • Accordingly, the contention was barred as a point raised for the first time on appeal and was unsupported by the record.
  6. Value-based jurisdictional argument: The appellant argued the decision affected the rights of the petitioner as mortgagee and thus the subject-matter value exceeded Rs. 10,000, invoking para. 2 read with para. 3 of Section 110 CPC. The Court held no substantial question of law was involved; hence para. 3 did not apply notwithstanding the value contention.
  7. Conclusion of reasoning: For the reasons above — principally that the principal contentions either raised questions of fact not pleaded below or were new points raised for the first time — the Court concluded the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law warranting leave to appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and implications (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under para. 3 of Section 110 CPC was dismissed with costs.
  • The Court held that no substantial question of law was involved so as to attract para. 3 of Section 110 CPC; therefore the appellant is not entitled to leave to appeal on that basis.
  • The dismissal included an award of costs and a hearing fee specified as "three gold mohurs."
  • The opinion indicates no new precedent was laid down; the Court applied established rules (in particular that new factual points or issues not raised below cannot be introduced at the leave stage) to the facts of this case.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "The application accordingly fails, and is dismissed with costs." (Das, J.); Shearer, J. agreed and the application was dismissed.

    Gangamoni Devi v. Kumud Chandra Mazumdar

    Das, J.:— This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the main question for decision is whether the appeal involves some substantial question of law within the meaning of para. 3 of Section 110 of the CPC.

    2. the facts look, at first sight, somewhat complicated, but when stated clearly in chrono-logical order, do not present any serious difficulty with regard to the questions raised. One Ramdayal Mazumdar took a lease of underground rights in nine annas share of village Kusunda from the proprietor, the Raja of Katras, by a registered lease dated 1st Agrahayan 1301 B.S corresponding to the year 1894 This Ramdayal Mazumdar was the ancestor and predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs to the action, out of which this application has arisen. Ramdayal Mazumdar granted a sub-lease of his interest to Raja Durga Prasad Singh of Jharia by a registered dooument dated 26th chait 1311, B.S corresponding to 1905. For the sake of convenience, this lease of 1311 B.S in favour of Rata Durga Prasad Singh of Jharia will be called the head lease. One of the terms of this head lease was that the annual minimum royalty reserved viz., a sum of Rs. 900 would be paid in four equal instalments. Raja Durga Prasad Singh of Jharia, in his turn, assigned his interest to one C.J Smith by a deed of assignment dated 15th Baisakh 314 B.S which would correspond to 1907. In 1914, Ramdayal Mazumdar sued Raja Durga Prasad Singh and his assignee, C.J Smith, for royalty due for the period 1318 B.S to Aswin 1321 B.S This suit was compromised, and the terms of compromise, as embodied in the decree, stated:

    “The amount of tent for the year in suit is settled out of Court, and henceforward defendant 2 (that is, C.J Smith) shall continue to pay the amount of rent in conformity with the terms embodied in the kabuliat executed by Raja Durga Prasad Singh and the additional terms mentioned below. Defendant 2 further stipulates to execute within one month a proper kabuliat, creating the entire rent payable in respect of the land in suit first charge on the leasehold land. Under the terms cited above, the defendant shall pay the amount of claim and the salami for mutation and registration of name, i.e, in all, Rs. 4500 and get his own name registered. He (the defendant) shall execute a separate kabuliat within one month mentioning therein that the rent shall form ‘first charge’ on the leasehold property.”

    3. In accordance with the aforesaid compromise and in execution of the decree passed in terms of the compromise a document was executed on behalf of Mr. Smith by the Court on 27th April 1918, in Execution case no. 94 of 1917. On 4th February 1920, Mr. Smith executed an English mortgage in respect of the leasehold property in favour of a company known as the Jagadamba Loan Company, Limited (hereinafter to be referred to as the Loan Company), to secure a sum of Rs. 3 lacs advanced by the Loan Company to Mr. Smith. Thereafter, the Loan Company came in possession of the lease-hold property, but under the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagor remained liable to pay all rents, royalties, etc. for the leasehold property. In the year 1929, the plaintiffs, successors in-interest of Ramdayal Mazumdar, instituted a suit against the heirs and legal representatives of Mr. Smith for recovery of royalty up to 1338 B.S by enforcing the charge on the leasehold property for the payment of the said rent. The Loan Company was not made a party to this litigation a decree was obtained, and in execution of the decree the leasehold property was put up to sale, and purchased by one Saroj Basini Debi on 12th November 1931. This Saroj Basini Debi was defendant 1 to the action, out of which this application has arisen. On 31st March 1938, the Loan Company assigned their interest to one Smt. Umarani Debi on 25th September 1938, Smt. Umarani Debi transferred her interest to Smt. Gangamoni Debi, defendant 2 to the action and appellant in the High Court (now petitioner before us). On behalf of the petitioner it is stated that Smt. Umarani Debi acquired from the Loan Company the interest as mortgagee as well as the interest which the Loan Company had acquired by paying up Saroj Bisini Dabi and Smt. Umarani Debi transferred her mortgage interest to Smt. Gangamoni Debi, but not the other interest. In 1945, the plaintiffs brought the action, out of which this application has arisen, against Saroj Basini Debi, defendant 1, and Gangamoni Debi, defendant 2, for recovery of minimum royalty or rent for the years 1344 B.S to Poos kist of 1351 B.S by enforcing the charge against the leasehold property. This suit was valued at Rs. 9469 and odd annas, being the amount of royalty claimed with interest thereon. It was contested by the present petitioner, Gangamoni Debi, and her principal defence was that she held the property as a mortgagee, and was not, therefore, liable for rent or royalty there being neither privity of estate nor privity of contract between herself and the plaintiffs. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. Gangamoni Debi preferred an appeal to this Court. This appeal was dismissed and the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was affirmed. Gangamoni Debi has now made the present application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decree passed by this Court on appeal.

    4. When the appeal was heard in this Court, Mr. R.S Chatterji, appearing for the appellant, raised several contentions which were stated and dealt with under four heads in the judgment of the Bench which heard the appeal. The same contentions as also some others, which were not raised at any previous stage, have again been pressed before us in support of the submission that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. The first contention is that the compromise in the suit of 1914 was void by reason of the fact that it was without consideration. This contention was dealt with by the Bench which heard the appeal in the following way it was pointed out that such a plea was not raised in the first Court, and as the plea involved a question of fact, it could not be raised for the first time in appeal. Secondly it was pointed out that by the compromise C.J Smith was recognised as the lessee in place of the Raja of Jharia, and the liability of the Raja was deemed to have been paid up in accordance with the terms of the compromise: it was stated that this was good consideration under Section 2 sub-Section (d) of the Contract Act. Mr. R.S Chatterji has contended before us that the second ground mentioned above is not correct in law inasmuch as Ramdayal Mazumdar was, in law bound to recognize the transfer made in favour of C.J Smith, who was accordingly made a party defendant in the suit. He has also contended that s. 2(d) has no application. In my view, it is unnecessary to go into these questions. The first ground was itself sufficient to dispose of the contention of Mr. Chatterji. It is well settled that a question of fact cannot be raised for the first time in appeal. I do not think that there can be any doubt that the question whether there was good consideration for the compromise or not is a question of fact. The appellant should have raised such a plea in the first Court and joined issue thereon. Having failed to do that, it was not open to the appellant to raise the question for the first time in appeal. This, I think, is well settled, and no substantial question of law is involved therein.

    5. Secondly, it has been contended that the terms of compromise, so far as they imposed an additional burden on the lessee by the creation of a charge on the leasehold property for payment of rent, were outside the scope of the suit of 1914, therefore, such terms could not be enforced by way of execution of the compromise decree, but could only be enforced by obtaining a decree in a suit for specific performance. This is an entirely new point never taken at any previous stage. Even in the application for leave to appeal, no such ground has been taken. There are several decisions which state that the question of law must definitely and clearly arise and must not be one newly raised. In Mohamad Shadak v. Venkata Komaraju, A.I.R (27) 1940 Mad. 810 : (193 I.C 353), it was pointed out that leave to appeal could not be given for the purpose of raising for the first time a question which was not raised at any time while the litigation was pending, that is to say, either at the trial Court or in the appellate Court. Their Lordships observed:

    “The resort to the provisions which permit a party to apply for leave to appeal for raising a point for the first time after the whole case had been disposed of, would be in our opinion, an abuse which should not be encouraged.”

    If I may say so with respect, I entirely agree with the above observation.

    6. The third contention of Mr. Chatterji is that the kabuliat of 1918 executed on behalf of C.J Smith, purported to create a fresh lease, though in law it did not; alternatively, it purported to create a mortgage, but was not validly executed in accordance with the provisions of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contention is that if the document fails as a lease or a mortgage, it can create no right in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. The appellate Court fully dealt with this contention of Mr. Chatterji. It pointed out that the kabuliat could not be treated as a lease, because it had not been signed by the lessor. It further pointed out that by the kabuliat, there was no transfer of any interest in the property: therefore, the document was not a mortgage. Manohar Lall, J. with whom Mahabir Prasad, J. agreed, stated that the parties really intended to make a lease, but not a mortgage. There was no doubt, however, that the kabuliat of 1918 created a charge on the leasehold property, and the appellate Court held that there could be no valid objection to treating the document as such. The document in clear terms, creates a charge, and even if it fads as a lease, I see no good reason why it cannot be treated as creating a charge on the leasehold property. No particular form of words is necessary for the creation of a charge, and it is sufficient if, having regard to all the circumstances of the transaction, it shows an intention to make the property security for the payment of the money mentioned therein. It has been contended that a document creating a charge requires to be attested in the manner laid down in Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, and Mr. Chatterji has relied on certain observations made in Shiva Rao v. Shanmughasundarswami, A.I.R (27) 1940 Mad. 140 : (I.L.R (1940) Mad. 306). This again, is a point which was never raised at any previous stage of the litigation, and cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time on an application for leave to appeal.

    7. The last contention of Mr. Chatterji is that the suit should have been dismissed on the ground of non-joinder of Umarani Debi. It is contended that Umarani Debi was interested in the equity of redemption inasmuch as she acquired that interest of the Loan Company which the latter got by paying up Saroj Basini Debi, and which interest Umarani Debi had not parted with in favour of the petitioner, riaroj Basini Debi had purchased the leasehold property in execution of the mortgage decree obtained by the plaintiffs in the suit of 1929. Therefore, Saroj Basini Debi became the lessee, and was rightly impleaded as defendant 1 in the aotion. There is no document showing that the interest of Saroj Basini Debi as lessee was transferred to the Loan Company. It was, no doubt, stated that the Loan Company had redeemed or paid up Saroj Basini Debi. Mr. Chatterji has drawn our attention to para. 11 of the plaint where it was stated that:

    “The plaintiffs have been informed and believe that defendant 2 acquired interest in the leasehold property by transfer from defendant 1, hence she is also impleaded as defendant.”

    I do not think that this statement in the plaint amounts to an admission, as is contended by Mr. Chatterji, that the interest of a lessee which Saraoj Basini Debi had acquired was transferred to the Loan Company, and then to Umarani Debi. The appellate Court rightly pointed out that the plea that the suit could not proceed in the absence of Umarani Debi was not taken in the Court below and no issue was framed. In these circumstances, the point could not be raised for the first time in appeal. It was further pointed out that on the materials before Court, it was impossible to come to a satis, factory conclusion as to whether any person interested in the equity of redemption had not been made a party. In my view, both these are good and valid reasons for overruling the contention of Mr. Chatterji. Firstly, on the materials in the record it cannot be said that Umarani Debi had acquired the interest of a lessee; secondly such a plea not having been raised in the first Court could not be raised for the first time in appeal.

    8. For the reasons given above, I am unable to hold that the appeal involves any substantial question of law. The value of the suit, as I have already stated, was Rs. 9469-6-0. Mr. Chatterji has contended that the decision affected the right of the petitioner as mortgagee, the value of which was much more than Rs. 10,000, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to get leave to appeal under para. 2 read with para. 3 of Section 110 of the CPC. I have pointed out that no substantial question of law is involved, and para. 3 does not apply.

    9. The application accordingly fails, and is dismissed with costs.

    10. Hearing fee, three gold mohurs.

    11. Shearer, J.:— I agree.

    V.R.B

    12. Application dismissed.

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    Gangamoni Devi v. Kumud Chandra Mazumdar
    (May 3, 1950)