Narayan, J.:— The suit out of which this second appeal arises was a suit to enforce a simple mortgage bond, dated the 18th August, 1934, which had been executed by the defendants first party in favour of the defendant third party and which was later assigned by the defendant third party to the plaintiff. The properties mortgaged under this bond are seven annas and odd share in a particular tauzi and three bighas of kast land. The defendant second party was the prior motgagee of four annas share out of this tauzi and of one bigha of kast land. He had instituted a suit on the foot of his mortgage, and in execution of his decree purchased the mortgaged property himself. To that suit the subsequent mortgagee was not made a party and on 2nd February, 1939, the defendant second party as the auction-purchaser was given possession over the property sold in execution of his decree. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 2nd July, 1943, and the plaintiff's contention in this suit is that he is entitled to redeem the mortgage of the defendant second party and after redemption to put the properties to sale. The suit was contested by the defendant second party whose contention, as appears from the judgment of the trial court, was that the mortgage bond propounded by the plaintiff was not a genuine document and that if it be genuine he was entitled to redeem the plaintiff.
The court of first instance, the Munsif of Darbhanga, held that the defendant second party had a right to redeem the subsequent mortgage of the plaintiff and he ordered that the plaintiff would at first put to sale that portion of the mortgaged property which was outside the mortgage of the defendant second party and that if the sale-proceeds of that property were not sufficient to satisfy his decree, he would, after depositing the amount payable to the defendant second party “under this mortgage and purchase”, put the remaining property to sale, and that only in case the defendant second party as the purchaser of the equity of redemption does not redeem him.
An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against this decision of the learned Munsif, and it was directed only against the order of the learned Munsif allowing redemption by the defendant second party. The appeal was allowed in part by the fourth Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga, who set aside that portion of the order of the learned Munsif by which the defendent second party had been given the right to redeem the plaintiff. The order portion of the learned Subordinate Judge shows that the defendants first party alone were directed to pay off the decretal amount within three months from the date of his order failing which the plaintiff could sell such portion of the mortgaged property as could satisfy his mortgage decree.
This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant second party whose contention is that the decision of the trial court should be restored.
The only point which we have to determine in this appeal is whether the defendant second party can be regarded as a purchaser of the equity of redemption and can, therefore, be allowed to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage. This gives rise to the question as to what is the position of a prior mortgagee who without impleading the subsequent mortgagee has purchased the property mortgaged to him in execution of his decree, and whether he is entitled to redeem the subsequent mortgagee after the sale in execution of his decree. There was a lot of discussion at the Bar over this question, but to my mind there should be no difficulty now in deciding this point. If the auction-purchaser in execution of a decree obtained on the foot of a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee acquires at least the rights of the mortgagor, who was a party to his action, then certainly he has got the right to redeem the puisne mortgagee. There can be no doubt that the auction purchaser in execution of the decree based on the prior mortgage occupies the double capacity of a first mortgagee as well as the owner of the equity of redemption, and while, in his first capacity he can use the prior mortgage as a shield against the puisne mortgage in his second capacity he can redeem all subsequent mortgages. Such an opinion was expressed by this Court in the case of Musammat Dhanwanti v. Hargovind Prasad and Kurwant Sahay, J. in this case relied on the view which had been expressed by Sir Rashbehari Ghosh in his famous book on mortgage. But it can be argued that whatever has been observed in this connection by Kulwant Sahay, J. should be regarded as obiter dictum inasmuch as the decision was also made on the basis that the rights put forward in that case had been determined by a decree which was binding on both the parties. But it Musammat Azizunnissa v. Kamal Singh it was distinctly pointed out that the purchaser of the mortgaged properties in execution of a mortgage decree acquires not only the interest of the mortgagee but also the equity of redemption of the mortgagor and that he is entitled to redeem other mortgages on the same property created by the mortgagor. The view taken in this case and certain cases of the Allahabad High Court is amply supported by the Privy Council decision in Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan in which their Lordships held that the owner of a property, who is in the rights of a first mortgagee and of the original mortgagor acquired at a sale under the first mortgage, is entitled at the suit of a subsequent mortgagee, who is not bound by the sale or the decree on which it proceeded, to set up the first mortgage as a shield. The use of the word ‘shield’ by their Lordships in this Case has got great significance, and it indicates that the first mortgagee has a right to redeem the second mortgage in such circumstance and that the other advantage he can have is that because of his purchase in execution of the decree based on the prior mortgage he can use the prior mortgage as a shield against the subsequent mortgagee. Their Lordships in the case approved of the general principle as it had been enunciated by the High Court. The High Court had observed as follows:—
“The plaintiff is a puisne mortgagee seeking to enforce her mortgage, the prior mortgagee in his suit having failed to make a party, it is the duty of the court to give the plaintiff an opportunity of occupying the position which she would have occupied, if she had been a party to the former suit”.
After quoting this observation of the High Court their Lordships of the Judicial Committee remarked that the original mortgagee having bought the estate at the sale in the suit was the owner of both the mortgage and the equity of redemption merged in one by the decree of the Court. This is precisely the point before us. As soon as it is held that the defendant second party has got a double capacity, it follows as a corollary that he has a right to redeem the puisne mortgagee. It is true that the puisne mortgagee has also got the right to redeem the prior mortgage. But this right has a corresponding obligation too and the puisne mortgagee cannot prevent the prior mortgagee, who has stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor, from redeeming his own mortgage. The lien of the puisne mortgagee subsists because he was not made a party to the suit of the prior mortgagee, and this position was not disputed before us by Mr. Jha, who appeared for the respondents, and if the lien of the puisne mortgagee subsists, it follows that the purchaser of the equity of redemption has the right to redeem him. This question has been discussed at very great length by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad. One of the questions that had been referred to the Full Bench was whether an auction-purchaser in execution of a decree obtained on a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee acquires at least the rights of the mortgagor, who was a party, including his rights of possession in cases where both the mortgages were simple. The answer of the Full Bench was in the affirmative. The following observation of his Lordship the Chief Justice appears to be important for our purposes in this case:—
“I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in Nanhu Mal v. Ram Chandra:— ‘No doubt the decree on the previous mortgage is not binding on the subsequent mortgagees, who had not been impleaded to this extent that their rights under their mortgage have not been extinguished, as would have been the case if they had been impleaded and had not redeemed the prior mortgage. But it is not correct to say that the previous proceedings are totally a nullity. As between the prior mortgagee and the subsequent mortgagees the previous proceedings are ineffective, but that does not imply that the mortgagor's interest could not have been sold by the prior mortgagee behind the back of the subsequent mortgagees but subject to their subsequent mortgage. The mort gagor's interest in the property validly passed to the auction-purchasers no matter whether the subsequent mortgagees' were parties to the suit or not. The auction-purchasers cannot be in worse position than a private transferee from the mortgagor”.
In my opinion, this observation of his Lordship the Chief Justice sets at rest the controversy which has' been, raised before us, and it has not been shown to us that this Court has ever taken any contrary view. It is inconceivable that the auction-purchaser in execution of the decree passed on the prior mortgage would be in a worse position than a private transferee from the mortgagor, and if his position is not worse than that of a private transferee from the mortgagor, then he has certainly the right to redeem the subsequent mortgages. Mr. Jha, who appeared for the respondents, relied on two cases of this Court in support of his contention that the defendant second party had no right to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage, and those cases are Musammat Sheoratan Kuer v. Kamta Prasad and Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer. The facts of both these cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case before us.
In Sheoratan Kuer's case, the plaintiff was the assignee from a subsequent mortgagee who had not been impleaded in the action on the foot of the prior mortgage until a certain date and from whom the assignment had been taken before he could be impleaded in the action. The main question which arose was whether the assignment was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens, and this question was answered in the negative. It was held that the assignee was entitled to redeem the prior mortgage, but that the prior mortgagee had no right “to redeem over” against him. I do not think it can be asserted that the view taken in this case in any way conflicts with the view which I have taken in the present case, or which was taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. On the other hand, Wort, J., referred to the Privy Council case of Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan and observed that the law is now as it was prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act and that the defendant in the case before him could use his prior mortgage as a shield against the subsequent mortgagee with the result that the plaintiff in the action must redeem his mortgage before he could bring the property to sale.
The decision that was arrived at in the case of Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer was that where an equity of redemption is wholly or in part unrepresented, the sale in execution of a decree on such mortgage suit cannot affect the right of the owner of the equity of redemption who is in possession either on a transfer from the mortgagor or as an auction-purchaser in the sale in execution of a decree against the mortgagor and that he cannot be forced to redeem. In order to understand the nature of the decision arrived at in this case, on which so much reliance was placed by Mr. Jha, I should like to quote the following passage from the judgment of Manohar Lall, J:—
“The apparently contradictory decisions may be reconciled if it is kept in view that where an equity of redemption in wholly or in part unrepresented the sale in execution of a decree in such mortgage suit cannot affect the rights of the owner of the equity of redemption who is in possession either on a transfer from the mortgagor or as an auction-purchaser in the sale in execution of a decree against the mortgagor. But where all that had been left out is a simple encumbrancer who at the date of the mortgage suit was not in, or entitled to, possession then only the right of redemption must be given to him. Where an auction-purchaser in such a mortgage decree and sale is the plaintiff and has failed to obtain possession no difficulty in law or in equity can ever arise because it is he who is to blame himself if he has slept over his rights for a long time and has not enforced his possession on the foot of such a sale. He cannot complain if his suit for possession is converted into a suit for sale on the foot of the mortgage bond”.
I fail to understand how this decision can be of any help to the respondents in this case.
This appeal is, therefore, fit to succeed and is allowed with costs. The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court restored.
Agarwala, C.J:— I agree.
S.H
Appeal allowed.