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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Narayan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit arose to enforce a simple mortgage bond dated 18 August 1934, executed by the defendants first party in favour of the defendant third party, which was later assigned to the plaintiff. The mortgaged properties comprised seven annas and odd share in a particular tauzi and three bighas of kast land. The defendant second party was a prior mortgagee in respect of four annas of the tauzi and one bigha of kast land.

The defendant second party instituted a suit on the footing of his prior mortgage and, in execution of his decree, became the auction-purchaser of the mortgaged property. The subsequent mortgagee (the plaintiff or the plaintiff's assignor) was not made a party to that suit. On 2 February 1939 the defendant second party, as auction-purchaser, was given possession of the property sold in execution.

The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 2 July 1943. The plaintiff sought to redeem the mortgage held by the defendant second party and, after redemption, to put the properties to sale. The defendant second party contested the suit; the trial court's record (per the judgment) shows he contended that the mortgage bond propounded by the plaintiff was not genuine and that, if genuine, he (the defendant second party) was entitled to redeem the plaintiff.

The Munsif of Darbhanga (trial court) held that the defendant second party had a right to redeem the subsequent mortgage and framed a staged sale procedure giving effect to that right. The plaintiff appealed only against the portion of the Munsif's order allowing redemption by the defendant second party. The fourth Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga allowed the appeal in part and set aside the portion permitting the defendant second party to redeem; he directed the defendants first party to pay the decretal amount within three months, failing which the plaintiff could sell sufficient property to satisfy the decree.

The defendant second party preferred this second appeal, seeking restoration of the trial court's decision allowing him to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant second party, having purchased the mortgaged property in execution of a decree founded on a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee, can be regarded as a purchaser of the equity of redemption and therefore be allowed to redeem the puisne (subsequent) mortgage.
  2. What legal position attaches to a prior mortgagee who, without impleading a subsequent mortgagee, purchases the property mortgaged to him in execution of his decree — specifically, whether such a purchaser acquires the rights of the mortgagor (including the equity of redemption) and whether he may redeem subsequent mortgages on the same property.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (original subsequent mortgagee / appellant in the first appeal)

  • The plaintiff's primary contention in the suit was that he was entitled to redeem the mortgage of the defendant second party and, after redemption, to put the properties to sale.
  • In the prior appeal from the trial court, the plaintiff attacked only the trial court's order that allowed redemption by the defendant second party.

Defendant Second Party (prior mortgagee / auction-purchaser / appellant in this second appeal)

  • At trial he contended that the mortgage bond propounded by the plaintiff was not genuine; alternatively, if it were genuine he contended that he (the defendant second party) was entitled to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage.
  • On this second appeal he sought restoration of the trial court's order allowing him to redeem the subsequent mortgage.
  • In argument before this Court, counsel for the respondents (Mr. Jha) relied upon two prior decisions of this Court (Musammat Sheoratan Kuer v. Kamta Prasad and Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer) to support the contention that the defendant second party had no right to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage; the Court found those authorities factually distinguishable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Musammat Dhanwanti v. Hargovind Prasad and Kurwant Sahay Expressed the view that an auction-purchaser in execution of a prior-mortgage decree acquires the rights of the mortgagor and can redeem the puisne mortgagee. The Court relied on the view expressed in this case as supportive of the proposition that an auction-purchaser occupies a double capacity (first mortgagee and owner of the equity of redemption) and hence can redeem subsequent mortgages.
Musammat Azizunnissa v. Kamal Singh Held that a purchaser at a sale under a prior mortgage acquires not only the mortgagee's interest but also the mortgagor's equity of redemption and is entitled to redeem other mortgages on the same property. The Court cited this case as a clear statement of the principle that supports the right of the auction-purchaser to redeem subsequent mortgages.
Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan (Privy Council) The Privy Council held that the purchaser who acquires the rights of a first mortgagee and of the original mortgagor at a sale under the first mortgage is entitled, against a subsequent mortgagee not bound by the decree, to set up the first mortgage as a "shield". The Court treated this Privy Council decision as approving the general principle; it emphasized the significance of the "shield" concept and relied on the decision to support the conclusion that the purchaser can redeem the puisne mortgagee.
Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) Considered whether an auction-purchaser in execution of a prior-mortgage decree, without impleading subsequent mortgagees, acquires the mortgagor's rights (including possession) where both mortgages are simple; the Full Bench answered in the affirmative. The Court quoted and relied on the Full Bench's affirmance (and its quotation of Nanhu Mal) to conclude auction-purchasers are not in a worse position than private transferees and therefore may redeem subsequent mortgages.
Nanhu Mal v. Ram Chandra Stated that although a decree on a prior mortgage is not binding on subsequent mortgagees not impleaded, the mortgagor's interest could still be validly sold; auction-purchasers obtain the mortgagor's interest and are not in worse position than private transferees. The Court quoted this passage (through the Full Bench) and used it to support the conclusion that auction-purchasers acquire the mortgagor's interest and thus can redeem subsequent mortgages.
Musammat Sheoratan Kuer v. Kamta Prasad Held that an assignee from a subsequent mortgagee (not impleaded in the prior suit) was entitled to redeem the prior mortgage, but that the prior mortgagee had no right "to redeem over" against that assignee; discussed lis pendens. The Court found the facts of that case distinguishable from the present matter and observed that the decision does not conflict with the principle relied upon here; it noted Wort, J.'s reference to Sukhi in that judgment.
Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer Held that where an equity of redemption is wholly or in part unrepresented, a sale in execution of a decree in a mortgage suit cannot affect the rights of the owner of the equity of redemption in possession (by transfer from the mortgagor or as auction-purchaser) and that such a person cannot be forced to redeem. The Court examined this authority and stated it was not of assistance to the respondents' case on the facts before the Court; the judgment was discussed and distinguished from the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified the sole question for decision as whether the defendant second party, having bought in execution of his decree founded on a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee, should be regarded as a purchaser of the equity of redemption and therefore entitled to redeem the subsequent mortgage held by the plaintiff.

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following logical lines (as set out in the opinion):

  1. If an auction-purchaser who buys under a decree obtained on a prior mortgage (and without impleading the subsequent mortgagee) acquires at least the rights of the mortgagor who was a party to that action, then he must have the right to redeem the puisne mortgagee. The Court stated there should be "no difficulty now" in reaching this conclusion.
  2. The auction-purchaser in such circumstances occupies a double capacity: (a) in his first capacity he stands in the position of the first mortgagee (and may use the prior mortgage as a shield), and (b) in his second capacity he stands in the position of the owner of the equity of redemption. In that second capacity he can redeem subsequent mortgages.
  3. The Court relied on and synthesized authorities (including Musammat Dhanwanti, Musammat Azizunnissa and the Privy Council in Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan) to support the twin propositions that (i) the purchaser acquires both the mortgagee's interest and the mortgagor's equity of redemption, and (ii) the purchaser may both set up the prior mortgage as a shield and redeem subsequent mortgages.
  4. The Judicial Committee's observation in Sukhi was invoked: where the original mortgagee bought the estate at the sale, he became owner of both mortgage and equity of redemption merged by the decree. The Court treated this as directly analogous to the present facts and as supporting the right to redeem.
  5. The Court recognized that the puisne mortgagee retains a lien because he was not a party to the earlier suit; this subsisting lien does not prevent the purchaser of the equity of redemption from exercising his right to redeem the puisne mortgage. The Court held that while the puisne mortgagee also has a right to redeem the prior mortgage, he cannot use that right to prevent the prior mortgagee (who has stepped into the mortgagor's shoes) from redeeming his own mortgage.
  6. The Full Bench decision in Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad (and its citation of Nanhu Mal v. Ram Chandra) was relied upon to dispel any contention that an auction-purchaser is in a worse position than a private transferee; the Court emphasized that the auction purchaser's position is not worse, and therefore he must be allowed to redeem subsequent mortgages.
  7. The Court considered the authorities relied on by respondents (Musammat Sheoratan Kuer and Ganga Prasad Singh) and distinguished their facts and holdings from the facts of the present case, explaining why they did not deny the right of the auction-purchaser to redeem here.
  8. On this basis of authorities and principle, the Court concluded that the defendant second party had the right to redeem the puisne mortgage, and therefore the trial court's order allowing redemption should be restored.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The Court set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court and restored the judgment of the trial court.

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED — the trial court's decision (permitting the defendant second party to exercise the rights of purchaser of the equity of redemption, including redemption of the puisne mortgage) is restored.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The defendant second party's position as purchaser in execution of a prior-mortgage decree is recognized as including the rights of the mortgagor (the equity of redemption), and he is entitled to redeem the plaintiff's (puisne) mortgage. The trial court's directions permitting redemption were restored.
  • The Court did not claim to introduce a new legal principle; it decided the matter by applying and synthesizing existing authorities (including decisions of this Court, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court and the Privy Council). No sweeping novel precedent is purportedly established by this short judgment beyond affirming the application of those established principles to the facts at hand.
Result: Appeal allowed; costs awarded; judgment and decree of the lower appellate court set aside; trial court's judgment restored.

    Abdul Gafoor v. Sagun

    Narayan, J.:— The suit out of which this second appeal arises was a suit to enforce a simple mortgage bond, dated the 18th August, 1934, which had been executed by the defendants first party in favour of the defendant third party and which was later assigned by the defendant third party to the plaintiff. The properties mortgaged under this bond are seven annas and odd share in a particular tauzi and three bighas of kast land. The defendant second party was the prior motgagee of four annas share out of this tauzi and of one bigha of kast land. He had instituted a suit on the foot of his mortgage, and in execution of his decree purchased the mortgaged property himself. To that suit the subsequent mortgagee was not made a party and on 2nd February, 1939, the defendant second party as the auction-purchaser was given possession over the property sold in execution of his decree. The present suit was instituted by the plaintiff on 2nd July, 1943, and the plaintiff's contention in this suit is that he is entitled to redeem the mortgage of the defendant second party and after redemption to put the properties to sale. The suit was contested by the defendant second party whose contention, as appears from the judgment of the trial court, was that the mortgage bond propounded by the plaintiff was not a genuine document and that if it be genuine he was entitled to redeem the plaintiff.

    The court of first instance, the Munsif of Darbhanga, held that the defendant second party had a right to redeem the subsequent mortgage of the plaintiff and he ordered that the plaintiff would at first put to sale that portion of the mortgaged property which was outside the mortgage of the defendant second party and that if the sale-proceeds of that property were not sufficient to satisfy his decree, he would, after depositing the amount payable to the defendant second party “under this mortgage and purchase”, put the remaining property to sale, and that only in case the defendant second party as the purchaser of the equity of redemption does not redeem him.

    An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against this decision of the learned Munsif, and it was directed only against the order of the learned Munsif allowing redemption by the defendant second party. The appeal was allowed in part by the fourth Additional Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga, who set aside that portion of the order of the learned Munsif by which the defendent second party had been given the right to redeem the plaintiff. The order portion of the learned Subordinate Judge shows that the defendants first party alone were directed to pay off the decretal amount within three months from the date of his order failing which the plaintiff could sell such portion of the mortgaged property as could satisfy his mortgage decree.

    This second appeal has been preferred by the defendant second party whose contention is that the decision of the trial court should be restored.

    The only point which we have to determine in this appeal is whether the defendant second party can be regarded as a purchaser of the equity of redemption and can, therefore, be allowed to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage. This gives rise to the question as to what is the position of a prior mortgagee who without impleading the subsequent mortgagee has purchased the property mortgaged to him in execution of his decree, and whether he is entitled to redeem the subsequent mortgagee after the sale in execution of his decree. There was a lot of discussion at the Bar over this question, but to my mind there should be no difficulty now in deciding this point. If the auction-purchaser in execution of a decree obtained on the foot of a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee acquires at least the rights of the mortgagor, who was a party to his action, then certainly he has got the right to redeem the puisne mortgagee. There can be no doubt that the auction purchaser in execution of the decree based on the prior mortgage occupies the double capacity of a first mortgagee as well as the owner of the equity of redemption, and while, in his first capacity he can use the prior mortgage as a shield against the puisne mortgage in his second capacity he can redeem all subsequent mortgages. Such an opinion was expressed by this Court in the case of Musammat Dhanwanti v. Hargovind Prasad and Kurwant Sahay, J. in this case relied on the view which had been expressed by Sir Rashbehari Ghosh in his famous book on mortgage. But it can be argued that whatever has been observed in this connection by Kulwant Sahay, J. should be regarded as obiter dictum inasmuch as the decision was also made on the basis that the rights put forward in that case had been determined by a decree which was binding on both the parties. But it Musammat Azizunnissa v. Kamal Singh it was distinctly pointed out that the purchaser of the mortgaged properties in execution of a mortgage decree acquires not only the interest of the mortgagee but also the equity of redemption of the mortgagor and that he is entitled to redeem other mortgages on the same property created by the mortgagor. The view taken in this case and certain cases of the Allahabad High Court is amply supported by the Privy Council decision in Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan in which their Lordships held that the owner of a property, who is in the rights of a first mortgagee and of the original mortgagor acquired at a sale under the first mortgage, is entitled at the suit of a subsequent mortgagee, who is not bound by the sale or the decree on which it proceeded, to set up the first mortgage as a shield. The use of the word ‘shield’ by their Lordships in this Case has got great significance, and it indicates that the first mortgagee has a right to redeem the second mortgage in such circumstance and that the other advantage he can have is that because of his purchase in execution of the decree based on the prior mortgage he can use the prior mortgage as a shield against the subsequent mortgagee. Their Lordships in the case approved of the general principle as it had been enunciated by the High Court. The High Court had observed as follows:—

    “The plaintiff is a puisne mortgagee seeking to enforce her mortgage, the prior mortgagee in his suit having failed to make a party, it is the duty of the court to give the plaintiff an opportunity of occupying the position which she would have occupied, if she had been a party to the former suit”.

    After quoting this observation of the High Court their Lordships of the Judicial Committee remarked that the original mortgagee having bought the estate at the sale in the suit was the owner of both the mortgage and the equity of redemption merged in one by the decree of the Court. This is precisely the point before us. As soon as it is held that the defendant second party has got a double capacity, it follows as a corollary that he has a right to redeem the puisne mortgagee. It is true that the puisne mortgagee has also got the right to redeem the prior mortgage. But this right has a corresponding obligation too and the puisne mortgagee cannot prevent the prior mortgagee, who has stepped into the shoes of the mortgagor, from redeeming his own mortgage. The lien of the puisne mortgagee subsists because he was not made a party to the suit of the prior mortgagee, and this position was not disputed before us by Mr. Jha, who appeared for the respondents, and if the lien of the puisne mortgagee subsists, it follows that the purchaser of the equity of redemption has the right to redeem him. This question has been discussed at very great length by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ram Sanehi Lal v. Janki Prasad. One of the questions that had been referred to the Full Bench was whether an auction-purchaser in execution of a decree obtained on a prior mortgage without impleading the subsequent mortgagee acquires at least the rights of the mortgagor, who was a party, including his rights of possession in cases where both the mortgages were simple. The answer of the Full Bench was in the affirmative. The following observation of his Lordship the Chief Justice appears to be important for our purposes in this case:—

    “I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in Nanhu Mal v. Ram Chandra:— ‘No doubt the decree on the previous mortgage is not binding on the subsequent mortgagees, who had not been impleaded to this extent that their rights under their mortgage have not been extinguished, as would have been the case if they had been impleaded and had not redeemed the prior mortgage. But it is not correct to say that the previous proceedings are totally a nullity. As between the prior mortgagee and the subsequent mortgagees the previous proceedings are ineffective, but that does not imply that the mortgagor's interest could not have been sold by the prior mortgagee behind the back of the subsequent mortgagees but subject to their subsequent mortgage. The mort gagor's interest in the property validly passed to the auction-purchasers no matter whether the subsequent mortgagees' were parties to the suit or not. The auction-purchasers cannot be in worse position than a private transferee from the mortgagor”.

    In my opinion, this observation of his Lordship the Chief Justice sets at rest the controversy which has' been, raised before us, and it has not been shown to us that this Court has ever taken any contrary view. It is inconceivable that the auction-purchaser in execution of the decree passed on the prior mortgage would be in a worse position than a private transferee from the mortgagor, and if his position is not worse than that of a private transferee from the mortgagor, then he has certainly the right to redeem the subsequent mortgages. Mr. Jha, who appeared for the respondents, relied on two cases of this Court in support of his contention that the defendant second party had no right to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage, and those cases are Musammat Sheoratan Kuer v. Kamta Prasad and Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer. The facts of both these cases are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the case before us.

    In Sheoratan Kuer's case, the plaintiff was the assignee from a subsequent mortgagee who had not been impleaded in the action on the foot of the prior mortgage until a certain date and from whom the assignment had been taken before he could be impleaded in the action. The main question which arose was whether the assignment was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens, and this question was answered in the negative. It was held that the assignee was entitled to redeem the prior mortgage, but that the prior mortgagee had no right “to redeem over” against him. I do not think it can be asserted that the view taken in this case in any way conflicts with the view which I have taken in the present case, or which was taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. On the other hand, Wort, J., referred to the Privy Council case of Sukhi v. Gulam Safdar Khan and observed that the law is now as it was prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act and that the defendant in the case before him could use his prior mortgage as a shield against the subsequent mortgagee with the result that the plaintiff in the action must redeem his mortgage before he could bring the property to sale.

    The decision that was arrived at in the case of Ganga Prasad Singh v. Musammat Ganeshi Kuer was that where an equity of redemption is wholly or in part unrepresented, the sale in execution of a decree on such mortgage suit cannot affect the right of the owner of the equity of redemption who is in possession either on a transfer from the mortgagor or as an auction-purchaser in the sale in execution of a decree against the mortgagor and that he cannot be forced to redeem. In order to understand the nature of the decision arrived at in this case, on which so much reliance was placed by Mr. Jha, I should like to quote the following passage from the judgment of Manohar Lall, J:—

    “The apparently contradictory decisions may be reconciled if it is kept in view that where an equity of redemption in wholly or in part unrepresented the sale in execution of a decree in such mortgage suit cannot affect the rights of the owner of the equity of redemption who is in possession either on a transfer from the mortgagor or as an auction-purchaser in the sale in execution of a decree against the mortgagor. But where all that had been left out is a simple encumbrancer who at the date of the mortgage suit was not in, or entitled to, possession then only the right of redemption must be given to him. Where an auction-purchaser in such a mortgage decree and sale is the plaintiff and has failed to obtain possession no difficulty in law or in equity can ever arise because it is he who is to blame himself if he has slept over his rights for a long time and has not enforced his possession on the foot of such a sale. He cannot complain if his suit for possession is converted into a suit for sale on the foot of the mortgage bond”.

    I fail to understand how this decision can be of any help to the respondents in this case.

    This appeal is, therefore, fit to succeed and is allowed with costs. The judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and that of the trial court restored.

    Agarwala, C.J:— I agree.

    S.H
    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Abdul Gafoor v. Sagun
    (Feb 16, 1948)