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  • section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act
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  • section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Manohar Lall, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellate Tribunal referred the following question to this Court under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act:

“Whether in the circumstances of the present case the assessee is entitled to set off of:— (a) the loss carried forward from the assessment year 1941-1942 against his profit for the assessment year 1942-1943 and (b) the loss carried forward from the assessment year 1942-1943 against his profit for the assessment year 1943-1944.”

The assessee was a nine annas partner in the registered firm of Jokhiram Jagernath, merchants dealing in hardware, cement, rice, wheat, yarn, salt, grain, hossian and other commodities, with head office at Ranchi and branches at Calcutta and Madras.

For assessment year 1941-1942 the firm sustained a considerable loss due to speculation in hessian, gunny, jute, silver, linseed, cotton and wheat. The Income-tax Officer initially disallowed the speculative loss because he considered the assessee did not carry on speculation as a business and because he was not satisfied that supporting accounts had been produced. The Assistant Commissioner set that order aside and remanded several factual matters to the Income-tax Officer, who on remand found the firm had entered into the transactions frequently and regularly with the object of making profits but that no separate capital could be ascertained because accounts were mixed; the Income-tax Officer treated the transactions as constituting a business, reduced the claimed loss by about Rs. 9,000 and apportioned the loss between partners under section 23(5)(a) — allocating Rs. 38,332 to the nine annas partner (the assessee) and Rs. 29,813 to the seven annas partner, Durgadas.

For the assessment year 1942-1943 the assessee's assessed income comprised Rs. 1,146 from house property and Rs. 29,998 as his share of profits from the firm (total Rs. 31,144). The assessee sought set off of the Rs. 38,332 loss carried forward from 1941-1942. The Income-tax Officer refused the set off under section 24(2) on the view that no part of the Rs. 29,998 was derived from speculation; this refusal was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (15 December 1944) and by the Appellate Tribunal (19 July 1945), leading to the present reference.

For the assessment year 1943-1944 the facts were stated to be “exactly the same” except that the assessee's share of partnership profit (Rs. 34,962) was said to be mostly composed of profits from military contracts and there was no speculation profit; the set off was again disallowed on the same ground and that disallowance was affirmed on appeal, prompting the second branch of the reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether section 24(2) of the Income-tax Act forbids the assessee from claiming set off of the loss apportioned to him (Rs. 38,332) carried forward from the assessment year 1941-1942 against his profits for assessment year 1942-1943.
  2. Whether section 24(2) forbids the assessee from claiming set off of any remaining loss carried forward from 1942-1943 against his profits for the assessment year 1943-1944.

Arguments of the Parties

Learned Standing Counsel (Department)

  • Contended that the loss due to speculation was a loss in a new business started by the registered firm in 1941-1942, wholly independent of their merchants' business.
  • Argued the loss could only be set off against income from speculation in subsequent years and, since there was no or negligible speculation income in those years, the assessee could not set it off against income from other businesses.
  • Maintained the question whether the speculation business is identical with the main business is a question of fact and therefore the factual findings should be treated as negative to the assessee's claim.
  • Relied on English authorities including Howden Boiler and Armaments Company, Scales v. Thompson, and the Nagpur case of Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath.

Learned Advocate-General (for the Assessee)

  • Contended there was no clear finding of fact that the speculation was a different business of the registered firm.
  • Argued that upon the facts found, in law the loss in speculation must be treated as a loss in the business of the registered firm (i.e., not a separate business).
  • Submitted the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal had a fundamental misconception of the legal position of a speculator, undermining finality of their purported findings of fact.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Howden Boiler and Armaments Company, Limited Invoked by the Department as support for the proposition that whether there are two distinct businesses is a question of fact. Referred to by the Court as one of the authorities relied on by the Standing Counsel; used to frame the factual-versus-legal-question debate but not treated as decisive given the Court's assessment of findings of fact.
Scales v. Thompson Quoted decision of Rowlatt, J.; relied on for the proposition that the question whether two businesses are separate or one is largely a question of degree and hence a question of fact. The Court noted this authority but found the Department had misdirected themselves in applying it to the present facts; the Court held that on the findings here the legal conclusion was that speculation formed part of the merchants' business.
Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath (Nagpur case) Held to be a case where the facts showed two separate businesses (here, manufacturer engaged in speculation) and thus supports separate-business treatment. Distinguished by the Court as factually different: there the assessee was a manufacturer (not a merchant) and the Court accepted that it was a clear case of two separate businesses; the Court held it had no application to the present case of merchants.
William Ransom (manufacturing chemists and herb-growers) One of several English cases cited illustrating that whether two branches are distinct is a question of degree and fact. Referred to as part of the body of English authority on the factual question of business identity; used to frame the analysis but not to alter the Court's conclusion given the factual findings.
Maxse Another English authority cited on the question whether distinct businesses exist and whether separation is possible. Mentioned among authorities that treat the question as largely factual; the Court used the general principles from such authorities in assessing the Tribunal's findings.
Birt, Potter and Huges (shipbroking company) Cited as an example where issues of distinctness of businesses were considered; illustrates factual inquiry into separability of businesses. Included among cited English cases informing the general legal background; the Court nevertheless assessed the present factual findings on their own terms.
Curries case (Master of the Rolls, Lord Sterndale) Stated that where the question is one of degree there is an intermediate stage, but sometimes the facts may be so clear that the legal result (e.g., carrying on of a trade) follows as a matter of law. The Court invoked this principle to explain that even when issues are often factual, there are circumstances where the legal conclusion follows inevitably from the facts; used to support overturning the Tribunal's conclusion where the legal effect of found facts was clear.
Copper v. Stubbs Applied Rowlatt, J.'s observation; involved refusing to accept a finding that dealings by way of speculation were not carrying on of a trade where the legal effect of the facts was otherwise. The Court relied on the reasoning in this case (as applied by Rowlatt, J.) to conclude that the Commissioners had given a wrong name to the state of facts; used analogously to hold that future-delivery speculative dealings by a merchant can amount to merchant business.
Thacker v. Hardy Explained that future delivery contracts on exchanges are real contracts and there is no distinction between contracts entered into for speculative dealings and those for real purposes of securing sale or purchase. Quoted and relied upon by the Court to show that entering into future delivery contracts did not necessarily constitute embarking on a new business distinct from merchanting; supported the conclusion that the firm's speculation fell within its merchants' business.
Ramgopal v. Shamskhaton (Privy Council) Held that appellate courts may reverse lower courts on the question whether conclusions drawn from facts are sound; "soundness of the conclusions from them is a matter of law." Invoked to support the proposition that appellate courts can reassess legal conclusions drawn from facts; used to justify scrutiny of the Tribunal's legal conclusions from their stated facts.
Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhury v. Shukur Sheik (Privy Council) Observed that the proper legal effect of a proved fact is a question of law, even though proving the fact is a question of fact. Referred to by the Court to distinguish between questions of fact and the legal effect of those facts; used to support the view that the legal consequence of the Tribunal's own findings could be re-examined.
Spiers and Son, Ltd. (Finlay, J.) Noted the difficulty in reconciling what constitutes a finding of fact in income-tax cases. Cited to underline the complexity of distinguishing fact from law in this area; used as context for the Court's scrutiny of the Tribunal's findings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on whether section 24(2) prohibits the claimed set off. The Judge first examined the Appellate Tribunal's order (paras. 6–11 as cited) and found no clear, conclusive findings of fact on the central issues. The Tribunal had described the firm's activities and had concluded the refusal to allow set off was correct, but the Court could not find in the Tribunal's reasoning the detailed factual findings necessary to sustain the Department's position.

The Court identified the Tribunal's actual findings: (1) the firm carried on merchants' businesses including hardware, cement, yarn, salt, grains and hessian and was carrying on speculation in various commodities; and (2) no amount of capital was set apart for speculation because accounts were mixed. The Court observed the Tribunal had not found the existence of a separate staff, office, or place of speculation, nor whether speculation was conducted at particular branch locations; indeed the assessee's statement that the different departments were only ramifications of the same staff was not challenged by any specific finding.

The Court then analysed the legal effect of the facts found. Relying on authorities cited in the judgment (including the Master of the Rolls' observations in Curries case and the reasoning in Thacker v. Hardy and Copper v. Stubbs), the Court noted that future delivery contracts are real contracts and that a merchant may lawfully buy and sell goods either for delivery or for speculative profit prior to delivery. Given that principle, the Court held that when a registered firm of merchants entered into future delivery contracts in relation to goods dealt in by the firm, it did not necessarily embark on a new business distinct from its merchant business.

The Court distinguished the Nagpur decision in Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath: there the assessee was a manufacturer, not a merchant, who engaged in forward cotton contracts, which made that case a clearer instance of two separate businesses. By contrast, the present factual findings showed shared capital, mixed accounts, interwoven expenditure items and common overheads — factors consistent with a single merchants' business that included speculative dealings.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the Income-tax Department had misdirected themselves in law by applying the principle of the Scales and Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath cases to the present facts. On the findings of fact actually arrived at, the legal conclusion followed that engaging in speculation did not constitute a different business for the registered firm.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference in the affirmative: the assessee is entitled to carry forward and set off the apportioned loss against his profits for the assessment years 1942-1943 and 1943-1944.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The assessee succeeds on the reference and is entitled to carry forward the loss of Rs. 38,332 (as apportioned to him) to set off against profits for 1942-1943 and any remaining balance to be set off against profits for 1943-1944.
  • The assessee is entitled to the costs of the reference; the hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 250.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any new rule of precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court; its effect described in the text is the direct relief to the assessee and the award of costs.

Disposition

Reference answered in the affirmative. The two-judge bench (Manohar Lall, J. with Agarwala, A.C.J. agreeing) allowed the reference and awarded costs and a hearing fee of Rs. 250 to the assessee.

    Rekhabchand Saraogi v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

    Manohar Lall, J.:— This is a reference under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act by the Appellate Tribunal to this Court for a decision on the following question:—

    “Whether in the circumstances of the present case the assessee is entitled to set off of:—

    “(a) the loss carried forward from the assessment year 1941-1942 against his profit for the assessment year 1942-1943 and

    (b) the loss carried forward from the assessment year 1942-1943 against his profit for the assessment year 1943-1944.”

    The facts may be shortly stated. The assessee is a nine annas partner in the registered firm of Jokhiram Jagernath who are merchants dealing in hardware, cement, rice, wheat, yarn, salt, grain, hossian and other commodities—they carry on business at Ranchi, which is the head office, with branches in Calcutta and Madras. For the assessment year 1941-1942 the registered fine, was found to have lost a considerable sum due to speculation in hessian, gunny, jute, silver, linseed, cotton and wheat. The Income-tax Officer originally disallowed the loss in speculation upon his view that the assessee does not carry on any business in speculation and also because he was not satisfied that all the accounts to support the figures of the loss claimed at Rs. 1,28,814 had been produced. This order was set aside by the Assistant Commissioner in appeal. The case was remanded to find out whether the assessee entered into these transactions with a view to make a profit and whether his activity in speculation was so continuous as to amount to carrying on of a business; the Income-tax Officer was also directed to ascertain whether any capital had been set apart for speculation purposes. The Income-tax Officer on remand after examining the relevant contract papers, bijaks and account, books came to the conclusion that the registered firm entered into these transactions frequently and regularly in almost all the months of the accounting year with the object of making profits, but the amount of capital set apart for speculation could not be ascertained as the firm had mixed up the accounts of this business with other businesses and the firm was found utilising the capital both for speculation business and for the other businesses to the extent that it was required in each of the businesses. These transactions having been found to constitute a business, the Income-tax Officer reduced the loss of speculation by about Rs. 9,000 and as enjoined by section 23, sub-clause (5)(a) of the Act apportioned the loss between the two partners — to the assessee, the nine annas partner, at Rs. 38,332 and the balance Rs. 29,813 to Durgadas, the seven annas partner.

    For the year 1942-1943 the assessee, the nine annas partner, was found to have an income of Rs. 1,146 from house property and a sum of Rs. 29,998 as his share from the profits of the registered firm, that is to say a total of Rs. 31,144. The assessee, however, contended that he was entitled to a set off of the loss of Rs. 38,332 which was his share of the loss in the year 1941-1942. The Income-tax Officer refused to allow this set off upon the view that no part of the income of Rs. 29,998 was derived from speculation, and, therefore under section 24(2) of the Act the assessee was debarred from claiming a set off. This view was upheld in appeal be the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the 15th of December, 1944. The assessee failed to convince the Appellate Tribunal who took the same view on the 19th of July, 1945; and hence at the instance of the assessee, the question already stated has been submitted to us.

    For the year 1943-1944 the facts are exactly the same, here also the assessee contended that he was entitled to set off the sum of Rs. 38,332 against the assessable income of that year which was found to be Rs. 1,146 from house property and Rs. 34,962 being his nine annas share in the profits of the registered firm. This set off was disallowed on the same ground as in the year of assessment 1942-1943, and the disallowance was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal and hence the second branch of the question already stated has been referred to us at the instance of the assessee.

    It will be noticed that the only question which arises for decision is whether section 24(2) forbids the claim of set off.

    Section 24(2) enacts that—so far as is relevant for the present purpose—where an assessee sustains a loss of profits or gains of business, and the loss cannot be wholly set off under sub-section (1), the portion not so set off shall be carried forward to the following year and set off against the profits and gains of the assessee, if any, from the same business, and if it cannot be wholly set off in that year, the portion not set off shall be parried forward in the next year and so on. The contention of the assessee is that the loss sustained by the registered firm was a loss in the carrying on of their business as merchants in 1941-1942, and as that business was also carried on in the next year and also in the following year, the assessee is entitled to claim that set off to the extent that it can be set off against his profits of the next year and the balance, if left, will be carried forward to be set off against the profits of the next year. The contention of the Department on the other hand is that the loss due to speculation was a loss in a new business started by the registered firm in 1941-1942 wholly independent of their business as merchants and therefore, this loss can only be set off against the income from speculation in the following year or years and as there was no income or negligible income only in the following years under this head, the assessee cannot be allowed to set off this loss against his income from another business. The learned Standing Counsel contends that the question whether the business in speculation is identical with the main business of the registered firm is a question of fact and, therefore, the answer to the question must be in the negative. The learned Advocate-General on the other hand contends that there is no clear finding of fact that the business in speculation is a different business of the registered firm and further contends that upon the facts found it must be inferred in law that the loss in speculation was a loss in the business of the registered firm. He also contends that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal disclose a fundamental misconception of the legal position of a speculator and thus there is no finality to these so called findings of fact.

    Both sides have referred us to a number of English decisions and decisions of the Indian Courts in support of their respective contentions.

    The learned Standing Counsel relies upon the case of the Howden Boiler and Armaments Company, Limited, and the of quoted decision of Rowlatt, J. in Scales v. Thompson and argues that the question whether the two businesses are separate or one is a question of fact. He also relies very strongly upon the Nagpur case of Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath where it is said the facts were somewhat similar. I have read several other English cases including William Ransom, a case of manufacturing chemists and herb-growers, Maxse, a case where the assessee was carrying on a profession, of a journalist as owner of a magazine and also by editing the magazine, Birt, Potter and Huges, a case of shipbroking company owning steamers jointly with others and also partner in other firms. In all these cases it has been held that the question whether there are two distinct businesses or the same business is largely a question of degree, and, therefore, a question of fact, but where it is possible to separate one business from the other, this should be done (12 T.C at page 58); that cases can be conceived where the two branches of a person's or company's business are so interlaced that it is quite impossible to separate them or disintegrate them and it will be impossible to separate one part of the business from another (12 T.C 30). see also, 13 T.C 83.

    On the other hand the Master of the Rolls, Lord Sterndale, said in Curries case: “Where it is a question of degree, there should be an intermediate stage where somebody must make up his mind whether or not it is a question of fact. But there does come a point at one end, where there is no evidence to support the proposition, that is, when the affirmative is quarrelled with, and, were the negative is quarrelled with, there may be cases where the facts are so completely all one way and the state of facts is so clear that the plain legal result can only be that what is established is, to take this present case, the carrying on of a trade.” Rowlatt, J. applied this observation in Copper v. Stubbs in refusing to accept the finding of the Commissioners that the dealings by way of speculation in buying and selling futures in cotton were not carrying on of a trade and thought that what the Commissioners had done was merely to give the wrong name to a state of fact which in law amounted to something else.

    I draw attention to two decisions of the Privy Council.

    In Ramgopal v. Shamskhaton it was held that the Second Appellate Court had not exceeded its powers by reversing the decision of the court below upon the question whether the defendant had accepted as a binding obligation upon him a mortgage executed by his mother. Sir Richard Couch observed at page 99: “The facts found need not be questioned. It is the soundness of the conclusions from them that is in question, and this is a matter of law.”

    In Nafar Chandra Pal Chowdhury v. Shukur Sheik, Lord Buckmaster observed at page 195: “Questions of law and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle. The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law, so also is the question of admissibility of evidence and the question of whether any evidence has been offered on one side or the other; but the question whether the fact has been proved, when, evidence for and against has been properly admitted, is necessarily a pure question of fact.”

    It is well-known how troublesome in income-tax case the question is whether a certain finding is a finding of fact. Finlay, J. in Spiers and Son, Ltd. observed: “That is a painfully familiar subject in these cases and it is impossible. I think, to reconcile all the various things that have been said on this question of what is a finding of fact.”

    Bearing this in mind I now turn to the order of the Appellate Tribunal. I have read and re-read the whole of the order from pages 17 to 20 and I am unable to discover any clear finding of fact in all the important paragraphs beginning with paragraph 6 and ending with paragraph 9. The Tribunal has merely discussed a number of cases which were cited before them, but their only finding is in paragraph 11 in which their conclusion is announced that they saw no difficulty in concluding that the refusal of the Income-tax authorities to allow a set off was quite correct and legal.

    Are there then any conclusive findings of fact? The findings are that (1) the registered firm is carrying on business in hard-ware, cement, yarn, salt, grains (see page 5, line 21) and also in hessian (page 7, line 20) and was carrying on speculation in hessian, jute, silver, cotton, linseed, wheat, etc., and (2) that no amount of capital was set apart for speculation, but all the accounts are mixed up (page 8, line 20). There is no finding that the assessee is maintaining a separate staff or a separate office or a separate building for carrying on speculation. It has not even been found whether the speculation is carried on in Calcutta or Madras or at Ranchi. In short, there is no challenge to the statement of the assessee at page 22 that these different departments were only ramifications of the same staff who controlled and managed the business at each centre in the same place.

    Now, how does a business man speculate? Take the case of a future delivery cotton contract. It is stated by high authority in the case of Thacker v. Hardy that “future delivery contracts which are made upon the Cotton Exchange or the contracts which are made upon the Stock Exchange in London are real contracts in the sense that the party with whom they are made is a real party, and if the dealer or broker making them should desire at any moment to have the contract implemented he can do so. There is no distinction between contracts which are made for the purpose of speculative dealings and contracts which are made for the real purpose of securing the sale or purchase of stock or cotton”—see the observations of the Master of the Rolls in Cooper v. Stubbs. This being the position, I am of the opinion that when the registered firm entered into future delivery contracts it did not embark upon a new kind of business or a new undertaking. It was still carrying on the business of merchants. A merchant may buy and sell goods on taking delivery or may buy these goods with the intention of taking delivery and finding that he can make a profit before taking delivery, he can sell his rights to obtain, delivery of those very goods. The matter would have been different if the future contracts related to securities or if the future contracts had been entered into by a registered firm who were not carrying on business as merchants.

    But it is argued very strongly by the Standing Counsel that the Nagpur case of Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath establishes the conclusion arrived at by the Income-tax Department. The facts in that case, however, were entirely different, namely that the assessee was not a merchant, but he was a manufacturer of biris and in the assessment year he also engaged in speculation dealing in forward cotton contracts. I respectfully agree with the learned Judges that it would be difficult to imagine a clearer case of two separate businesses conducted by the same person. I would draw attention to the observation at page 27 where in dealing with the argument that it may be possible to conduct two separate branches of trade or business under a common roof in which the items of expenditure are so inter woven or the overhead expenses are common that they must be taken to constitute one business, it was observed: “This may be so in the case of merchants (italicised by me), and for instance no one would imagine that in the case of a grocer dealing in matches and dealing in tinned foods, his business would be considered to be two or more separate businesses.” The findings in the present case already referred to may be recalled: the capital employed is the same, the accounts of the businesses are mixed up, the items of expenditure are interwoven and the overhead expenses are common, and the registered firm is carrying on business as merchants. This case, therefore, has no application to the present case where we are dealing with a registered firm of merchants.

    The Income-tax Department has clearly misdirected themselves in law in applying the principle in Scale's case and Seth Ramkrishna Ramnath's case to the facts of the present case and, therefore, I am free to conclude as a matter of law that upon the findings of fact arrived at the conclusion follows that the registered firm by engaging in speculation did not enter into any different business.

    For these reasons, I am of opinion that the assessee is entitled to succeed and is entitled to carry forward the loss against his profit for the year 1942-1943.

    With regard to the year 1943-1944 the facts are exactly the same except that it is stated at page 1 that the assessee's share of the partnership profit was mostly composed of profits from military contracts and the other businesses being the same, namely hardware, cement, rice, etc., and that there was no speculation profit at all.

    For the reasons already indicated, the assessee is also entitled to carry forward the loss which could not be completely set off against the profits of 1942-1943 and have it set off against the profits of 1943-1944.

    I would answer the question in the affirmative.

    The assessee having succeeded is entitled to the costs of reference. I would assess the hearing fee at Rs. 250.

    Agarwala, A.C.J:— I agree.

    K.D
    Reference answered.

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    Comments

    Rekhabchand Saraogi v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax
    (Sep 19, 1947)