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  • SECTION 22 HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • 1989 Calcutta 35.7. Section 4(1) of the Partition Act read thus:4. Partition
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Article 97
  • SECTION 4 PARTITION ACT
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Partition Act
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citation codes
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  • SECTION 22 HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • 1989 Calcutta 35.7. Section 4(1) of the Partition Act read thus:4. Partition
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Article 97
  • SECTION 4 PARTITION ACT
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Article 97 of the Limitation Act
  • Section 4(1) of the Partition Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit arose when respondent No. 1 (the plaintiff) filed Title Suit No. 89 of 1987 seeking partition of joint family properties described in Schedules 'A' and 'B', asserting those were joint family properties shared by the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1–11. The plaint alleged that Sebati (wife of Birakishore) sold a part of the dwelling house (Schedule 'C') to defendants 12 and 13 without legal necessity and without the plaintiff's consent, and that defendants 12 and 13, as strangers, were not entitled to joint possession. The plaintiff sought partition, allotment of his share, and a liberty to repurchase the Schedule 'C' property under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act from those stranger purchasers.

Defendants contested, alleging there had been a prior partition between Narahari and sons of Lokanath in which the sold portion fell to Narahari's share; that Sebati, as daughter-in-law and heir of Narahari, sold the house for legal necessity; that defendants 12 and 13 had constructed and were in possession; and that Schedule 'B' land was purchased by Narahari alone and was not joint family property.

The trial court (Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Jagatsinghpur) framed nine issues and, after evidence, held there was a prior partition, that Schedule 'B' was not joint family property, that the purchased house and Plot No. 502 were not joint property, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to repurchase under Section 4 of the Partition Act. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

The plaintiff appealed. The First Additional District Judge, Cuttack (first appellate Court) in Title Appeal No. 66 of 1994 reversed the trial court: it found the 1935 partition was not complete or by metes and bounds, held several sabik plots (Nos. 431, 502, 504, 505, 506 and 510) were liable for partition, and allowed the plaintiff to enforce pre-emption in respect of those plots; it directed defendants 12 and 13 to resell the land purchased under Exts. H & J to the plaintiff. Defendants 12 and 13 appealed to this Court; the plaintiff filed a cross-objection seeking declaration that Schedule 'B' was liable for partition and that he was entitled to pre-emption over the suit property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit to exercise a right under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act was barred by limitation because it was filed more than one year after the sale (i.e., whether Article 97 of the Limitation Act applied).
  2. Whether the lower appellate Court committed illegality in decreeing the suit without calling upon the plaintiff to deposit the consideration money along with costs (this point was not pressed at argument).
  3. Whether the plaintiff's prayer to repurchase part of the dwelling house from defendants 12 and 13 was maintainable when the stranger purchasers had not filed any suit for partition to carve out their share (raised at argument by appellant's counsel).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant Nos. 12 & 13)

  • The plaintiff's claim for repurchase/pre-emption was barred by limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 because defendants 12 & 13 had been in possession since their purchase in 1977 and the plaintiff sued on 13-7-1987 (beyond one year).
  • Right of pre-emption under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act can be exercised by a coparcener only when the stranger purchaser files a suit for partition or takes active steps to carve out his share; since defendants 12 & 13 neither filed such a suit nor a counterclaim, the plaintiff's pre-emption claim was not maintainable. The appellant relied on Babulal v. Habibnoor Khan (AIR 2000 SC 2684) in support.
  • Counsel also cited Tarak Das Ghosh v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh (AIR 1980 Calcutta 53) in relation to Article 97 (on limitation for pre-emption rights).

Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The suit was essentially one for partition, and Article 97 would not apply to bar the suit; thus limitation under Article 97 was not applicable to the partition-plus-repurchase relief sought.
  • A coparcener can exercise the right of pre-emption under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act where a coparcener files a suit for partition and arrayed the stranger purchasers as defendants—because in a partition suit defendants stand on par with the plaintiff. To support this, counsel cited several decisions including Ghantesher Ghos v. Madan Mohan Ghosh (AIR 1997 SC 471), Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden (AIR 1990 SC 867), Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandu Mantri (AIR 1971 Orissa 127), Bhagirathi Jena v. Parsuram Jena (AIR 1985 Orissa 137), Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malak v. Dulhanbibi (AIR 1980 Gujarat 110) and Siba Prosad Bhattachaiyya v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhattachaiyya (AIR 1989 Calcutta 35).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tarak Das Ghosh v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh, AIR 1980 Calcutta 53 That the remedy under Section 22 (a pre-emption right) is a right of pre-emption and Article 97 of the Limitation Act applies to pre-emption actions. The Court accepted this observation as legally sound and applied Article 97 to the plaintiff's pre-emption claim, concluding it was barred by limitation where purchasers took possession in 1977 and suit was filed in 1987.
Babulal v. Habibnoor Khan (LRs), AIR 2000 SC 2684 That the ratio of Alekha Mantri is not good law to the extent it subjects a stranger purchaser who did not move for partition to Section 4 proceedings; limits applicability of Alekha Mantri in view of Ghantesher Ghosh. The Court relied on the observation to clarify the limits of Alekha Mantri's ratio—i.e., that Alekha Mantri does not apply where the stranger purchaser does not move for partition or execution of a decree.
Ghantesher Ghosh v. Madan Mohan Ghosh, AIR 1997 SC 471 That a shareholder's right under Section 4 accrues when a stranger transferee sues for partition and subsists during pendency until termination by effective final decree; also that "suing for partition" may include steps to execute a final decree. The Court used this decision to interpret the scope of "suing for partition" and to delimit situations in which Section 4 applies. It treated Ghantesher Ghosh as authoritative on the continuity and commencement of the right under Section 4.
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867 Cited by respondent to support the proposition that a coparcener can exercise Section 4 rights when a partition suit is filed by a family member arraying stranger purchasers as defendants. The Court noted this authority among others relied on by respondent to support the conclusion that Section 4 relief is available in a partition suit where stranger purchasers are defendants.
Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandu Mantri, AIR 1971 Orissa 127 Held that Section 4 of the Partition Act would apply where a suit for partition is brought by a family member against a stranger transferee arrayed as a defendant (suggesting it is not necessary that the stranger purchaser should file the suit). The Court explained Alekha Mantri's position but treated its ratio as limited by later Supreme Court authority (Ghantesher Ghosh and Babulal). It concluded Alekha Mantri's ratio cannot be extended where the stranger purchaser has not moved for partition or execution of a decree.
Bhagirathi Jena v. Parsuram Jena, AIR 1985 Orissa 137 Earlier decision of the Court relevant to application of Section 4 in partition suits involving stranger purchasers as defendants. The Court took note of this decision as part of the body of state-court authorities supporting the proposition that a plaintiff in a partition suit may seek repurchase under Section 4 against a stranger purchaser who has been made a defendant.
Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malak v. Dulhanbibi, AIR 1980 Gujarat 110 (Full Bench) Held that a member of an undivided family can avail Section 4 benefits even if the suit is instituted by a family member who arrays the stranger transferee as defendant, and even if the stranger does not claim separation of his share. The Court relied on this ratio to hold that where a partition suit was filed by a family member and the stranger purchasers were arrayed as defendants, the plaintiff could seek repurchase under Section 4.
Siba Prosad Bhattachaiyya v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhattachaiyya, AIR 1989 Calcutta 35 Cited by respondent counsel alongside other authorities in support of the position that Section 4 relief can be sought in partition suits where stranger purchasers are defendants. The Court noted this authority among those relied upon by respondent in support of allowing Section 4 relief in the present procedural posture.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) the availability of relief under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act when a partition suit is filed by a family member who has made stranger purchasers defendants, and (B) the applicability of Article 97 of the Limitation Act to the claim for repurchase (pre-emption).

Step A — Applicability of Section 4(1) of the Partition Act:

  1. The Court examined the language of Section 4(1) and noted that the right of a shareholder-member accrues when a stranger transferee "sues for partition" and subsists during the pendency of such suit until final decree.
  2. The Court considered competing authorities. It explained that Ghantesher Ghosh (AIR 1997 SC 471) extended the notion of "suing for partition" to include a transferee's steps to execute a final decree; that Alekha Mantri (AIR 1971 Orissa 127) had held Section 4 could apply even where the alienee was a defendant; and that Babulal (AIR 2000 SC 2684) later held that Alekha Mantri's broad ratio could not be sustained where the stranger purchaser did not move for partition or decree execution.
  3. The Court also relied on the Gujarat Full Bench decision in Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malak and earlier state decisions (including Bhagirathi Jena) to accept that when a member of the joint family files a partition suit and arrays the stranger purchasers as defendants, the plaintiff can seek repurchase under Section 4 even if the stranger purchaser has not in terms claimed separation of his share.
  4. Applying those authorities to the admitted facts — that the partition suit was filed by one of the members of the joint family naming defendants 12 & 13 (stranger purchasers) — the Court held that the plaintiff had the right of pre-emption under Section 4 available in the suit.

Step B — Applicability of Article 97 (Limitation) to the Pre-emption Claim:

  1. The Court set out Article 97, which prescribes one year to enforce a right of pre-emption and specifies that the period begins when the purchaser takes physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold.
  2. The Court accepted the principle in Tarak Das Ghosh (AIR 1980 Calcutta 53) that rights under Section 22 (and by analogy pre-emption rights) are governed by Article 97.
  3. Here the courts below had concurrently found that defendants 12 & 13 had been in possession of the purchased part of the house since the date of purchase in 1977. The suit (which contained the prayer for repurchase under Section 4) was filed in 1987.
  4. Because the purchaser's possession began in 1977 and the suit for pre-emption component was filed in 1987, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's prayer for liberty to repurchase the Schedule 'C' property from defendants 12 & 13 was barred by the one-year limitation of Article 97.

The Court therefore harmonized the two strands: while Section 4 relief was conceptually available to the plaintiff in a partition suit that named stranger purchasers as defendants, the plaintiff's specific remedy to repurchase from defendants 12 & 13 could not be granted because it was time-barred.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the substantial questions of law by holding that (a) the plaintiff's right to seek repurchase (pre-emption) in respect of the portion sold to defendants 12 & 13 was barred by limitation under Article 97 of the Limitation Act; and (b) the partition decree of the first appellate Court carving out the respective parties' shares is confirmed, but the decree granting the plaintiff liberty to enforce the right of pre-emption against defendants 12 & 13 is set aside. The appeal is therefore partly allowed, and the cross-objection is dismissed on contest, without costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The partition decree (as to division of the joint family properties identified by the first appellate Court) stands confirmed; however, the specific relief permitting the plaintiff to repurchase the portion sold to defendants 12 & 13 has been set aside as barred by limitation. The plaintiff cannot now enforce the pre-emption remedy against those purchasers.
  • No broader or novel precedent was asserted to be created by the Court beyond its application and reconciliation of existing authorities (the Court relied on and reconciled prior decisions, including those of the Supreme Court and state benches, to reach the result). The decision clarifies the coexistence of the substantive availability of Section 4 relief in a partition suit and the separate limitation bar under Article 97 to a pre-emption remedy when possession commenced long before suit.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to materials and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion text. No information has been added beyond that source.

    Prahallad Ch. Mohanty & Anr. v. Surendra Nath Mohanty & Ors.

    A.K Parichha, J.:— Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree of learned 1st Additional District Judge, Cuttack in Title Appeal No. 66 of 1994 reversing the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Jagatsinghpur in Title Suit No. 89 of 1987.

    2. The present respondent No. 1 as plaintiff filed the above noted suit with a pleading that suit Schedules ‘A’ & ‘B’ properties are the joint family properties of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 to 11, but Sebati, the wife of Birakishore, sold a part of the dwelling house of joint family described in Schedule ‘C’ of the plaint to defendants 12 & 13 without any legal necessity and without the consent of the plaintiff, although defendants 12 & 13 being strangers to the family were not entitled to joint possession of the dwelling house. He prayed for partition of properties of the joint family, allotment of his share and a liberty to repurchase the Schedule ‘C’ property as per Section 4(1) of the Partition Act from the stranger-purchasers. The defendants contested the suit pleading inter alia that there was a prior partition between Narahari and sons of Lokanath and the house sold by Sebati to defendants 12 & 13 fell to the share of Narahari in that partition. Sebati being the daughter-in-law and the sole heir of Narahari sold the suit house to defendants 12 & 13 for legal necessity and those purchasers constructed house and lived there. It was also pleaded by the defendants that Narahari had alone purchased schedule ‘B’ land and the plaintiff has no right over the same. They specifically pleaded that as there had been a prior partition the plaintiff is not entitled to claim partition.

    3. From the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed as many as 9 issues and on consideration of the evidence of the parties concluded that there was a prior partition between Narahari and sons of Lokanath, that Schedule ‘B’ property was not acquired out of joint family income, that the Plot No. 502 and the house there on was not the joint property and the purchasers are in possession of the same; that plaintiff is not entitled to decree of repurchase of the house under the provision of Section 4 of the Partition Act; that the plaintiff having not challenged the validity of the sale deed cannot maintain his right of preemption. With such findings learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff carried appeal and the first appellate Court in the above noted title appeal reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court with the findings that though there was a partition in the year 1935 in the family, the same was not complete one and that there was no previous partition by metes and bounds; that Sabik Plot Nos. 431, 502, 504, 505, 506 and 510 are liable for partition; that there was no right of preemption of the plaintiff over Plot No. 509. In consequence, plaintiff was allowed to enforce his right of preemption only in respect of Sabik Plot Nos. 431, 502, 504, 505, 506 and 510 and defendants 12 and 13 were directed to resell the land purchased under Exts. H & J to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree defendants 12 and 13 have preferred the present appeal and plaintiff-respondent No. 1 has also filed the cross-objection praying for declaration that Schedule ‘B’ property is liable for partition and the plaintiff is entitled to pre-emption in respect of the suit property.

    4. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration:—

    (i) Whether the suit for exercise of right under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act was barred by limitation, as the same was filed beyond one year of the sale? and;

    (ii) Whether the lower appellate Court has committed an illegality in decreeing the suit without calling upon the plaintiff to deposit the consideration money along with cost?

    But at the time of argument the second point noted above was not seriously pressed. On the contrary learned counsel for the appellant raised the following question of law:

    Whether the prayer of the plaintiff for repurchase of the part of the suit dwelling house from defendant Nos. 12 and 13 was maintainable when the stranger purchasers had not filed any suit for partition to carve out their share?

    5. Mr. Ashok Mukharji, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable as it was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963. According to him, the Courts below concurrently held that defendant Nos. 12 and 13 were in possession of the suit dwelling house after their purchase in the year 1977, so when the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 13-7-1987 which was beyond the period of limitation of one year, it was hit under Article 97 of the Limitation Act. On this score he cited the case of Tarak Das Ghosh v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh, AIR 1980 Calcutta 53. He also contended that right of preemption under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act can be availed by a coparcener only when the stranger purchaser files suit for partition or takes steps for carving out his share in the joint family dwelling house, but in the present case, neither defendant Nos. 12 and 13 had filed any suit for partition nor they had filed counter claim as defendants to carve out their share and therefore, the claim of pre-emption by the plaintiff was not maintainable. In support of such contention, Mr. Mukharji relied on the case of Babulal v. Habibnoor Khan (dead) by L.Rs, AIR 2000 SC 2684.

    6. Mr. C.R Nanda, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand maintained that the suit of the plaintiff was not barred by limitation. According to him, the suit being one for partition, the limitation provided under Article 97 would not apply. Mr. Nanda also argued that a coparcener can exercise his right of pre-emption under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act, when one of the coparceners files a suit for partition arraying the other coparcener and stranger purchasers as defendants, as in a partition suit the defendants also stand at par with the plaintiff. In support of this contention, he relied on the cases of Ghantesher Ghos v. Madan Mohan Ghosh, AIR 1997 SC 471; Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867; Alekha Mantri v. Jagabandu Mantri, AIR 1971 Orissa 127; Bhagirathi Jena v. Parsuram Jena, AIR 1985 Orissa 137; Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malak v. Dulhanbibi, AIR 1980 Gujarat 110 and Siba Prosad Bhattachaiyya v. Bibhuti Bhusan Bhattachaijee, AIR 1989 Calcutta 35.

    7. Section 4(1) of the Partition Act read thus:—

    “4. Partition suit by transferee of share in dwelling house—(1) Where a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such family and such transferee sues for partition, the court shall, if any member of the family being a shareholder shall undertake to buy the share of such transferee, make a valuation of such share in such manner as it thinks fit and direct the sale of such share to such shareholder, and may give all necessary and proper directions in that behalf.

    From the language of this section it is clear that the right of a member of the family who is a share holder accrues under the section as soon as a suit for partition is filed by a stranger to the family and subsists during the pendency of the suit until it is terminated by an effective final decree of partition. Extending the scope, the Apex Court in the case of Ghantesher Ghosh (AIR 1997 SC 471) (supra) observed that the right of share holder-member of the family continues to subsist even after the final decree proceeding till the final decree is fully executed by an executive Court. In that case, the Apex Court further observed that “suing for partition” would not necessarily mean filing of a suit in the first instance by the stranger transferee, but if a transferee seeks to execute any final decree of partition in favour of his transferor co-owner, he can be said to have initiated a legal action for redressal of his decretal right as a stranger transferee. In Alekha Mantri's case (AIR 1971 Orissa 127) (supra) the alienee of undivided share of a co-owner in a joint family house was arrayed as defendant No. 1 in the suit filed by one of the co-owners of the family for partition and separate possession of his undivided share. The question arose whether an alienee from the co-owner who was already defendant No. 1 could be subjected to proceeding under Section 4 of the Partition Act by the plaintiff. This Court held that Section 4 of the Partition Act would also be applicable where the suit for partition was brought by a member of the undivided family against the stranger transferee and that it is not necessary that the latter should file the suit. This observation was given on the principle that a defendant in a partition suit stands on the same footing as that of plaintiff and can also claim his specific share. In the case of Babulal (AIR 2000 SC 2684) (supra), the Apex Court however, ruled that the ratio noted in Alekha Mantri's case (AIR 1971 Orissa 127) is not good law in view of Ghantesher Ghosh's case (AIR 1997 SC 471) (supra). The observation of the Apex Court is extracted hereunder:—

    “If the ratio of the aforesaid decision is held to take the view that a stranger purchaser who does not move for partition of joint property against the remaining co-owners either as a plaintiff or even as a defendant in the partition suit claiming to be as good as the plaintiff nor even as a successor of the decree-holder seeks execution of partition decree, can still be subjected to Section 4 of the Partition Act proceedings, then the said view would directly conflict with the decision of this Court in Ghantesher Ghosh's case (supra) and to that extent it must be treated to be overruled.”

    (Emphasis provided)

    This observation thus essentially propagates that ratio of Alekha Mantri's case will not apply to the cases, where the stranger purchaser does not move for partition of the joint family property against the remaining co-owners either as plaintiff or even as a defendant in the partition suit claiming to be as good as the plaintiff nor even as a successor of the decree holder seeks execution of partition decree.

    8. In Gulamrasool Sarfuddin Malak's case (AIR 1980 Guj 110) the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court ruled that a member of an undivided family can avail the benefit of Section 4 of the Partition Act, even if the suit has been instituted by a member of that undivided family as plaintiff arraying the stranger transferee, as a defendant and even if such stranger transferee does not in terms claim the separation of his share in the property. This Court taking note of the above noted ratio and some previous decisions of this Court in the case of Bhagirathi Jena (AIR 1985 Orissa 137) (supra) also ruled that even if a stranger purchaser has not filed a suit for partition to carve out his share and having been arrayed as a defendant in a suit for partition filed by one of the members of the joint family has not specifically asked for carving out his share, yet the plaintiff can avail the right of pre-emption contemplated under Section 4 of the Partition Act. A close reading of the above noted decision leads to an irresistible conclusion that in a suit filed by one of the members of the joint family for partition where the stranger purchaser has been arrayed as defendant, the plaintiff can ask for relief of repurchase of the property from the stranger purchaser. Such inference is legally acceptable as it is in consonance with the benevolent legislative scheme behind enactment of Section 4 of the Partition Act, which is for insulating the domestic peace of members of undivided family occupying a common dwelling house from the encroachment of a stranger transferee of the share of one undivided co-owner as a stranger-outsider to the family may obviously be having different outlook and mode of life than the members of the joint family. In the present case, admittedly the suit for partition was filed by one of the members of the joint family arraying stranger purchasers as defendant Nos. 12 and 13. In such situation, the right of pre-emption noted in Section 4 of the Partition Act was available to the plaintiff in the suit.

    9. Admittedly, the land was purchased by defendant Nos. 12 and 13 under registered sale deed in the year 1977 and the suit for partition was filed in the year 1987. The Courts below concurrently held that after the purchase defendant Nos. 12 and 13 are in possession of the portion of the suit dwelling house although learned first appellate Court held such possession to be illegal. In the suit, the plaintiff besides praying for partition of the suit property asked for a decree under Section 4 of the Partition Act for repurchase of the sold part of the house from defendant Nos. 12 and 13. The question is whether the limitation noted in Article 97 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Article 97 reads thus:—

    Description of Suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 97 To enforce a right of pre-emption whether the right is founded on low or general usage or on special contract. One year When the purchaser takes under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold, or, where the subject-matter of the sale does not admit of physical possession of the whole or part of the property, when the instrument of sale is registered.

    This Article says that when a purchaser takes under the sale sought to be impeached, physical possession of the whole or part of the property sold, then the suit to enforce right of pre-emption should be filed within one year from the date of such physical possession.

    10. In the case of Tarak Das Ghosh (AIR 1980 Cal 53) (supra) the meaning of right of pre-emption, the scope and ambit of Section 22 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the applicability of Article 97 of the Limitation Act was considered and the following observation was noted as follows:—

    “The dictionary meaning of the word “right of pre-emption” is the right of purchasing properly before or in preference to other persons. Further the word “pre-emption” is derived from “pre-emption” and pre-emption is thus an act of buying before another. Hence, it must be held that the right which is conferred by Section 22 of the Act is a right of pre-emption, for, here when one or several persons on whom an interest in any immovable property devolves on the death of a person dying intestate as heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and when one of such heirs proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property, the other heirs are given a preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred. Here the right in question is one enabling a person to purchase the property in preference to others. When one of the heirs proposes to sell his interest in the property, which interest he got along with others as heirs belonging to Class-I, the other heirs will have a right to purchase the same in exclusion to stranger purchasers. The right is obviously, therefore, a right of pre-emption. Therefore, Article 97 applies to applications under Section 22. In the circumstances of the case the application was barred by limitation as it was made at a time beyond the period prescribed by Article 97.”

    11. This observation is legally sound and is acceptable. So in a suit for pre-emption, Article 97 of the Limitation Act would apply. In the present case, evidence is available and the Courts below have also concurrently held that the defendant Nos. 12 and 13 are in possession of the purchased part of the house since the date of purchase, i.e, from the year 1977, but the suit containing a prayer for repurchase was filed in the year 1987, which was clearly beyond the period of limitation prescribed in Article 97. That being so, the prayer of the plaintiff for liberty to repurchase the part of the dwelling house from defendant Nos. 12 and 13 described in Schedule ‘C’ of the plaint, was barred by limitation.

    12. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered. In consequence, the decree of partition granted by first appellate Court carving out the shares of the respective parties is confirmed, but the decree giving liberty to the plaintiff to enforce the right of pre-emption in respect of the properties sold to defendant Nos. 12 and 13 is set aside.

    13. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part and the cross-objection is dismissed on contest, but without any cost.

    Appeal partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Prahallad Ch. Mohanty & Anr. v. Surendra Nath Mohanty & Ors.
    (Mar 17, 2008)