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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • S. 56 of the Orissa Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of S. 49-F of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882.
  • S. 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951
  • S. 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972
  • Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act
  • S. 56(2-a) of the forests Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 56 of the Orissa Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
  • provisions of S. 49-F of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882.
  • S. 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951
  • S. 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972
  • Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act
  • S. 56(2-a) of the forests Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges an order of confiscation made by the Authorised Officer, Keonjhar under Section 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 in O.R. Case No. 5 SK/90-91 which was confirmed on appeal (Appeal No. 77 of 1999 dated 10 August 2001).

The material facts are: Ranjan Kumar Jena purchased a truck (No. OSU 4661) in 1987 with a loan from the petitioner, Orissa State Financial Corporation (O.S.F.C.). The borrower defaulted on instalments. The truck was allegedly used to transport illegal forest produce and was seized under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act. The Authorised Officer refused to direct release of the truck and ultimately confiscated it. The O.S.F.C. appealed to the District Judge, Cuttack but the appeal was dismissed. The O.S.F.C. then filed this writ petition challenging the confiscation order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the truck, purchased with a loan from the Orissa State Financial Corporation and subsequently confiscated under Section 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, could be released in favour of the petitioner (O.S.F.C.).
  2. Whether a confiscation under Section 56(2-a) of the Act is subject to an existing charge in favour of a financing institution (i.e., whether the financing institution may claim the sale proceeds or have an overriding right).

Arguments of the Parties

Writ Petitioner (Orissa State Financial Corporation) — Appellant's Arguments

  • The O.S.F.C. is an instrumentality/creature of the State; therefore, any order of confiscation should be subject to payment of the Corporation's dues.
  • As long as the loan remains unpaid, the O.S.F.C. is deemed to be the owner; since there was no proceeding against the O.S.F.C., the vehicle should not have been confiscated or, at least, the O.S.F.C. should be allowed to realize its dues from sale proceeds.
  • If the petitioner is not permitted to realize its dues from the sale proceeds of the truck, it will suffer financial loss because recovery from the original loanee or guarantor may not be possible.

Respondent (State / Authorised Officer) — Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Addl. Govt. Advocate)

  • Proceedings under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act are independent, intended to punish forest offences; if a vehicle is used in illegal transportation of forest produce, the Authorised Officer may order its confiscation.
  • Both forums (Authorised Officer and appellate forum) held the truck liable for confiscation. If the O.S.F.C. has any remedy, it is at common law — e.g., a suit for recovery of the loan amount or realization against collateral or guarantor — but it cannot claim release of the truck as a right.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gurudev Singh Rai v. Authorised Officer cum Asst. Conservator of Forests, Rairakhol Division, AIR 1992 Orissa 287 (reported also as 1993 76 Cut L.T. 671) Interpreted Section 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act as permitting confiscation alone; while the section uses the word "may", the Division Bench read it effectively as a mandate to confiscate when the Authorised Officer is satisfied a forest offence has been committed; the section does not provide for imposition of fine as a substitute for confiscation (though discretion must consider all circumstances). The court relied on this decision to hold that the Authorised Officer correctly passed an order of confiscation after being satisfied the truck was used for illegal transportation of forest produce; the "may" in the section was treated in the same way as in that precedent.
State of Orissa v. Santosh Kumar, (1983) 56 Cut L.T. 469 Held that before ordering confiscation all the circumstances of the case must be borne in mind; referenced in the context of exercising discretion under Section 56(2-a). Referred to as an authority for the proposition that circumstances must be considered prior to confiscation; used to explain prior instances where fine was imposed in lieu of confiscation in particular facts.
Jogender Singh v. State of Orissa, (1990) 70 Cut L.T. 613 Raised the question whether an order of confiscation under Section 56(2-a) can be made subject to discharge of a loan advanced by a financing bank. The court noted that in that case the question was left open/undecided because the financing bank was not the writ petitioner; the present court therefore treated the issue as unresolved by that precedent.
S. Dhanasekaran v. Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., AIR 1996 Madras 334 Addressed a situation where, after confiscation and auction, the State Financial Corporation sought rights; held that the State Financial Corporation does not have an overriding effect over provisions of S.49-F of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882, but permitted the corporation to approach the State Government for consideration of return of sale proceeds after deducting auction-related costs. The petitioner relied on this decision. The court observed the facts were different here but referenced the case when considering the possibility of a State instrumentality seeking recovery of sale proceeds or governmental consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the sole question as whether the confiscated truck could be released in favour of the petitioner (O.S.F.C.). The facts that the truck was bought with a loan from O.S.F.C. and that the truck was used for illegal transportation of forest produce were accepted by the court.

The court analyzed the scope of Section 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, reproducing the provision which authorises confiscation of seized forest produce and "all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle used in committing such offence" where the Authorised Officer is satisfied a forest offence has been committed.

The court relied on the Division Bench decision in Gurudev Singh Rai (AIR 1992 Orissa 287) which had interpreted Section 56(2-a) to permit confiscation alone and treated the discretionary word "may" as effectively requiring confiscation when the Authorised Officer is satisfied of the offence; that decision also referenced State of Orissa v. Santosh Kumar to underscore that all circumstances should be borne in mind before confiscation. Applying this reasoning, the court found the Authorised Officer had correctly confiscated the truck after being satisfied it was used for illegal transport without permit.

The court noted that in Jogender Singh v. State of Orissa the question whether confiscation can be made subject to discharge of a financing bank's loan had been raised but left undecided; thus that authority did not foreclose the issue.

Turning to the petitioner's contention that, as a State instrumentality, O.S.F.C. should have priority, the court examined whether loan advances can amount to a charge over the financed vehicle. The court observed that the petitioner did not produce documents showing any collateral security or express charge created at the time the loan was advanced.

The court reasoned that if the O.S.F.C. can satisfy the Authorised Officer that the vehicle was kept as a charge for the loan, the amount advanced can be treated as a public demand under the Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act and therefore can be treated as a charge on the vehicle. In that event, confiscation would be subject to that charge and the O.S.F.C. would have a right to recover from the consideration obtained after public auction of the vehicle.

The court also observed that if collateral securities existed, the petitioner could proceed to realize outstanding dues against such securities. The court emphasized that the language of Section 56(2-a) is silent as to encumbrances and therefore confiscation is not necessarily free from pre-existing charges.

Based on this analysis the court modified the order of the learned District Judge to the extent indicated and disposed of the writ petition accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is disposed of with the following core outcomes: (i) the Authorised Officer correctly confiscated the truck under Section 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act after being satisfied it was used in committing a forest offence; and (ii) if the petitioner (O.S.F.C.) can establish that the vehicle was kept as a charge for the loan (or that there are collateral securities), the petitioner is entitled to claim the loan amount from the proceeds obtained after the vehicle was put to auction, treating such amount as a public demand under the Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The confiscation stands as correctly made by the Authorised Officer; the O.S.F.C. does not obtain automatic release of the truck but may recover its dues from auction proceeds if it proves a charge or collateral security in its favour.
  • Remedies available to O.S.F.C.: If collateral securities exist, the petitioner may proceed to realize dues against those securities; alternatively, if it can show an express charge over the vehicle, it may claim the sale consideration subject to costs and statutory processes.
  • Scope of precedent/precedential effect: The court applied and followed existing case law interpreting Section 56(2-a) (notably Gurudev Singh Rai) and clarified that confiscation under the provision is not necessarily free from encumbrances when a financing institution can demonstrate a charge; the opinion modifies the District Judge's order to permit recovery in those limited circumstances rather than ordering release of the vehicle.
Order accordingly.

    Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Range Officer, Sukinda And Others

    B. Panigrahi, J.:— This writ petition assails the order of confiscation passed by the Authorised Officer, Keonjhar in a proceeding under S. 56(2-a) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 in O.R Case No. 5 SK/90-91 which has been confirmed in appeal No. 77 of 1999 dated 10th August, 2001.

    2. The case narrated in the writ petition has suffered a chequered history. One Ranjan Kumar Jena had availed a loan for purchase of a truck bearing No. OSU 4661 some time in the year 1987. The loanee Ranjan Kumar Jena had, however, paid some instalmonts, but committed defaults thereafter. The truck was allegedly employed for the purpose of transporting illegal forest produce as a reason whereof it was seized under S. 56 of the Orissa Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The original loanee filed an application before the Authorised Officer-cum-A.C.F, Keonjhar for release of the truck, but the Authorised Officer did not direct release of the same. Therefore, the proceeding continued and final order was, however, recorded against the owner Ranjan Kumar Jena by confiscating the above truck. Since the owner had purchased the truck by availing a loan from the writ petitioner, Orissa State Financial Corporation, on hypothecation and there were defaults committed, therefore, the writ petitioner filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Cuttack seeking a direction for release of the truck. Since the appeal was dismissed, the writ petitioner has filed this petition challenging the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid order of confiscation.

    3. Mr. Routray, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner has, at the outset, invited our attention that the Orissa State Financial Corporation is a creature of the State under a Statute, therefore, the order of confiscation, if any, passed by the Authorised Officer should be subject to payment of the dues of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. It has been further submitted that the Orissa State Financial Corporation, as long as its loan is not discharged, is deemed to be the owner and since there was no proceeding against the petitioner-O.S.F.C, the vehicle in question should not have been directed to be confiscated. In case the petitioner-O.S.F.C is not given liberty to realise its dues from the sale proceeds of the truck, it would sustain heavy financial loss since it cannot recover either from the loanee or from the guarantor.

    4. Mr. Mohanty, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate while repolling the aforesaid submissions has raised the following contentions:

    i) The proceeding initiated under S. 56 of the Act is an independent proceeding and it was enacted with a view to punish the person who commits forest offence. In case it is found that the vehicle, machinery, tools or cattle are used for the purpose of illegal transportation of forest produce, the Authorised Officer empowered under the Statute is entitled to pass orders of confiscation of those machineries, tools, vehicles or cattle, if any;

    ii) In this case both the forums have held that the truck in question was liable for confiscation and in that event, if any remedy is available to the writ petitioner, it is under common law that they can file a suit for recovery of the loan amount or can fall back upon any other property offered as co-lateral security or against the guarantor/surety, but cannot claim release of the truck.

    6. After hearing the rival contentions raised at the Bar, we find that the sole question to be decided in this case is whether the truck in question which was directed to be confiscated could be released in favour of the petitioner. There is no dispute that the vehicle was purchased after availing loan from they petitioner-O.S.F.C by Ranjan Kumar Jena. It is also proved that the said truck was employed for the purpose of illegally transporting forest produce. In this background let us examine the ambit and scope of S. 56(2-A) of the Act. While appreciating the said contention we feel it relevant to quote S. 56(2-a) of the Act which reads as follows:

    “Where an authorised officer seizes any forest produce under Sub-sec. (1) or where any such forest produce is produced before him under Sub-sec. (2) and he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect thereof, he may order confiscation of the forest produce so seized or produced together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle used in committing such offence.”

    The interpretation of S. 56(2-a) had appeared for consideration before a Division Bench of this court reported in 1993 76 Cut L.T 671 : (AIR 1992 Orissa 287) (Gurudev singh Rai v. Authorised Officer cum Asst. Conservator of Forests, Rairakhol Division). In the aforesaid judgment the Division Bench held in the following manner (Para 8 of AIR)

    “We shall now examine the all important question posed at the there should. Now, there is no dispute that S. 56(2-a) of the forests Act permits confiscation alone, on the Authorised Officer being satisfied that a forest offence has been committed; it does not speak of imposition of fine as a substitute for confiscation. Of course, that section has conferred a discretion in the matter, which would appear from the use of the word ‘may’ in this connection. It is because of the use of this word that it was held in State of Orissa v. Santosh Kumar, (1983) 56 Cut L.T 469 that before ordering confiscation, all the circumstances of the case have to be borne in mind. It is by referring to this decision that in the aforesaid O.J.Cs fine was imposed in lieu of confiscation as it was felt that the facts of the case did not call for confiscation of the vehicle.”

    On a plain reading of the provisions as well as the judgments cited supra a trite position has emerged that there has been no third option left to an Authorised Officer but to confiscate or not to confiscate the vehicle tools, machineries etc. in a proceeding under S. 56(2-a) of the Act. Since the word “may” has been used in the Section previously, there were some doubts with regard to the aforesaid import of the word “may” which was clarified in the aforesaid decision and the Division Bench held that the word “may” used in the Section shall be read as “shall”, therefore, in that view of the matter, the Authorised Officer had correctly passed an order of confiscation of the truck after he being satisfied that it was utilised for illegal transportation of the forest produce without any permit.

    6. We find, in another division Bench case reported in (1990) 70 Cut L.T 613 (Jogender Singh v. State of Orissa) a question has been raised as to whether the order of confiscation passed under S. 56(2-a) of the Act can be subject to discharge of loan advanced by a financing bank. But since the financing bank was not the writ petitioner in that case, therefore, that question was left open and remained undecided.

    7. Mr. Routray, learned advocate appearing for the writ petitioner, has relied upon a decision of Madras High Court reported in AIR 1996 Madras 334 S. Dhanasekaran v. Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd.. The facts of that case are somewhat different from the present case. In the above decision after the confiscation an auction purchaser purchased the vehicle and thereafter the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation in exercise of its power under S. 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 seized the vehicle. Therefore, the auction purchaser had approached the Court for appropriate direction. The learned Judge in the above case has held that the State Financial Corporation does not have an over-riding effect over the provisions of S. 49-F of the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882. But, however, it had permitted the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State to approach the State Government to consider the Corporation's prayer for return of the sale proceeds after deducting the cost incurred for bringing the vehicle for sale in public auction.

    8. In this case a quandary situation has emerged as to whether the State Financial Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State would be deprived of getting their money, which was advanced to the principal loanee for the purpose of purchasing the vehicle. The writ petitioner has not produced any document before us to show whether at the time of advancing the loan any property was either offered by the loanee or by the guarantor/surety as co-lateral security. In case such co-lateral securities were offered, it is open to the petitioner O.S.F.C to proceed for realisation of the outstanding dues against those co-lateral securities. It is further to be considered whether the amount advanced to the loanee should be treated as a charge over the property against which the loan was sanctioned. In the event the petitioner O.S.F.C satisfied that the vehicle in question was kept as a charge for the loan, then, it is open to them to approach the Authorised Officer claiming the loan amount from the consideration obtained after the vehicle put to auction. Since all such money advanced by the petitioner O.S.F.C can be treated as a public demand as envisaged in Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act and is being treated as a charge, in that event, any confiscation of the vehicle shall be subject to the charge of the O.S.F.C The language employed in S. 56(2-a) of the Act is lucidly clear that the order of confiscation is not free from encumbrances and to that extent it is silent. Therefore, it is understood that since the loan was advanced by the O.S.F.C petitioner by keeping the vehicle as a charge, they have a right to recover the same treating it as public demand.

    9. With the above observation/modification of the order of the learned District Judge, the writ application is disposed of.

    M. Papanna, J.:— 10. I agree.

    Order accordingly.

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    Orissa State Financial Corporation v. Range Officer, Sukinda And Others
    (Feb 6, 2002)