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  • Rule 50(1)(i) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (hereinafter
  • Rule 32(4) of the Rules
  • Rule 49(e)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Rule 50(1)(i) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (hereinafter
  • Rule 32(4) of the Rules
  • Rule 49(e)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — A.S. Naidu, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an officer of the State Bank of India and then Branch Manager at Satkosia Branch, challenged before this Court the punishment imposed in departmental proceedings by means of a writ under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

A charge sheet was served on the petitioner on 25-5-1986 alleging, inter alia, that while functioning as Branch Manager (1982–83) he sanctioned loans under IRDP and ERRP schemes and retained amounts of 10%–20% as illegal gratification; debited total project costs to loan accounts without receiving permissible government subsidy (thus deviating from procedure and increasing borrowers' interest burden); and made certain account credits weeks after raising debits, suggesting misuse of signed forms and vouchers.

The petitioner submitted a show cause/explanation denying the charges. An Inquiry Officer was appointed; the Inquiry concluded on 30-10-1987. The Disciplinary Authority, by order dated 17-8-1988, held that the petitioner contravened Rule 32(4) and imposed punishment of "reduction of basic pay by one stage" under Rule 49(e), treating the period of suspension as not on duty. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on 11-6-1990 but directed that the period of suspension be treated as on duty and ordered payment of emoluments less suspension allowance; it otherwise confirmed the reduction of pay by one stage.

The petitioner sought a review before the Reviewing Committee of the State Bank of India. The Committee, by order dated 30-10-1991 (Annexure-6), dismissed the review. The petitioner challenged that order before this Court, alleging, among other contentions, that a member of the Reviewing Committee, Shri S. Solomon Raj (later Deputy Managing Director), had previously acted as the disciplinary authority who issued the charge sheet and therefore should not have been part of the Reviewing Committee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the participation of an officer (Mr. S. S. Raj) on the Reviewing Committee—who had previously acted as the disciplinary authority, issued the charge sheet and initiated the disciplinary proceedings—violated the principle nemo judex in causa sua (i.e., whether a person who set the proceedings in motion could sit in judgment on a review of those proceedings).
  2. Whether the Reviewing Committee's order dated 30-10-1991 (Annexure-6) is vitiated on the ground of apparent or real bias arising from Mr. Raj's prior involvement in initiating the disciplinary proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Enquiry Officer did not afford adequate opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself and based findings on surmise and conjecture.
  • The Disciplinary Authority accepted the inquiry report without serving a copy on the petitioner and, without affording an opportunity to show cause, suo motu modified a finding (Charge No. 5), thereby illegally concluding that the charge was proved.
  • Shri S. S. Raj, who issued the charge sheet and initiated the disciplinary proceedings, later sat as a member of the Reviewing Committee that heard the review petition; this created a situation where a person had effectively adjudicated his own earlier action, violating the principle that no man should be judge in his own cause.

Respondent's (State Bank of India) Arguments

  • The Bank filed a detailed counter-affidavit asserting that adequate opportunity was given and that there was no violation of principles of natural justice.
  • It was contended that, in accordance with the Bank's existing procedures and service rules, it was not incumbent upon the authority to serve a copy of the inquiry report or to accord an opportunity to submit a show cause.
  • The Bank relied on the decision in Managing Director, FCI & others v. Narendra Kumar Jaint ((1993) 2 S.C.C. 400) in support of its contentions regarding procedure and obligations under the service rules.
  • The Bank admitted that Mr. S. S. Raj had earlier acted as the disciplinary authority and had appointed the Inquiring Officer and Presenting Officer, but asserted that as a member of the Reviewing Committee he merely agreed with the decision of the majority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, paras 64 & 67 Articulation of the rules of natural justice: nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem; the need to avoid interest or likelihood of bias in adjudicating bodies. The Court quoted these paragraphs to emphasize the established principle that no person should be a judge in his own cause and that justice must be seen to be done; this formed a doctrinal foundation for quashing the Reviewing Committee's order where an interested person participated.
M/s J. Mohapatra & Co. & another v. State of Orissa & another, A I R 1984 S.C. 1572 Confirms that the rule that no man should be a judge of his own cause is a principle of natural justice applicable to quasi-judicial and administrative powers. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions should not adjudicate matters in which they have an interest, applying it to Mr. Raj's participation in the Reviewing Committee.
Baidyanath Mohapatra v. State of Orissa & another, 68 (1989) C.L.T. 640 (S.C.) Illustrates that even in the absence of personal bias allegations, the requirement of fair play and judicial discipline may require an interested official to abstain; orders may be set aside where an official sits in judgment of his own prior decision. The Court cited this decision by way of analogy: in Baidyanath the Supreme Court set aside an order because a person who had taken an initial decision later participated in adjudication; the present Court applied the same reasoning to conclude that Mr. Raj should not have been a member of the Reviewing Committee.
Managing Director, FCI & others v. Narendra Kumar Jaint, (1993) 2 S.C.C. 400 (Cited by the respondent) A decision relied on by the Bank in support of its procedural contentions regarding obligations under service rules. The Bank relied on this decision in its counter-affidavit. The Court's order records that the Bank relied upon it; the Court decided the matter on the ground of bias without making the case the primary basis of its ruling.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined its decision to a short point without delving into the broader inter se disputes or other allegations. The critical factual foundation for its analysis, as recorded in the pleadings and admitted in the counter-affidavit, was that:

  • Mr. S. S. Raj had acted as the Chief General Manager and as the disciplinary authority who issued the charge sheet on 28-5-1986 and had appointed the Inquiring Officer and Presenting Officer;
  • By 1991 Mr. Raj had been promoted and was a member of the Reviewing Committee which disposed of the petitioner's review on 30-10-1991.

Applying the well-settled doctrine nemo judex in causa sua, the Court observed that justice must not only be done but must also be manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done. The Court cited Halsbury and relevant Indian authorities to demonstrate that the presence of an interested person on a tribunal or adjudicatory body vitiates the proceedings because it creates a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court relied especially on the principle (as stated in M/s J. Mohapatra and in Baidyanath Mohapatra) that an authority which has taken an initial decision should not participate in determining an appeal or review arising from that decision. On this basis, the Court held that Mr. Raj—having initiated the disciplinary proceedings and issued the charge sheet—ought not to have sat as a Member of the Reviewing Committee adjudicating the legality of initiation and the punishment imposed.

Because the Court decided the writ on this narrow point of disqualifying interest and bias, it expressly refrained from addressing the other contentions on merits and left those to be considered afresh by the Reviewing Committee upon rehearing.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ application allowed; the order of the Reviewing Committee dated 30-10-1991 (Annexure-6) is quashed and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The impugned reviewing order (Annexure-6) is set aside on the ground that a member of the Reviewing Committee (Mr. S. S. Raj) had prior involvement as the disciplinary authority and therefore his participation created a disqualifying interest.
  • The matter is remitted to the Reviewing Committee with a direction that officers unconnected with the disciplinary proceeding rehear the review afresh and observe such legal formalities as are permissible under law.
  • The petitioner is permitted to urge all points available to him on the rehearing; the Court has not ruled on the merits of the other contentions and has left them open for adjudication by the Reviewing Committee.
  • No costs were awarded.

The Court's decision was narrowly disposed on the ground of apparent bias/disqualifying interest; the opinion does not purport to lay down any new, broader precedent beyond applying established principles of natural justice to the facts of this case.

Final Disposition: Writ application allowed.

    Arjuna Charan Mishra v. State Bank Of India And Others

    JUDGMENT A.S. Naidu, J.

    1. The petitioner, an officer of the State Bank of India, has approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, challenging the order of punishment imposed in a departmental proceeding initiated against him. Admittedly a charge sheet was served on the petitioner on 25-5-1986 while he was working as a Branch Manager at Satkosia Branch. The substratum of charges of misconduct evident from the memorandum issued in terms of Rule 50(1)(i) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (hereinafter refered to as 'the Rule') are as follows :

    (i) During 1982-83 while the petitioner was working as Branch Manager, he conducted himself in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Bank by sanctioning loans under the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and Economic Rehabilitation of the Rural Poor (ERRP) schemes and while disbursing the loans he had retained amounts ranging from 10% to 20% as illegal gratification in sanctioning the loans and recommending them for subsidy.

    (iv) The petitioner debited the total project cost to the loan accounts without receiving permissible subsidy from the concerned Government body. Therefore, he has deviated from the laid down procedure to collect the subsidy amount in advance, as a result, interest burden on the borrower increased.

    (v) Some loan accounts credits were made few weeks after raising the debits. It was therefore concluded that the petitioner had with him duly signed forms and deposit vouchers which he had been putting to use as and when requited.

    2. In consonance with the notice, the petitioner submitted a show cause/explanation denying all the charges. The Management not being satisfied with the explanation, appointed an Enquiring Officer to conduct an inquiry in consonance with the Rules. It is alleged by the petitioner that the enquiring officer did not afford adequate opportunity to the petitioner to properly defend his case and without appreciating the facts and circumstances in proper perspective, basing upon surmises and conjectures, submitted his report holding as follows .

    3. After taking into consideration the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority without serving a copy of the report on the petitioner and without affording an opportunity to show cause, suo motu accepted the report and illegally modified the finding with respect to Charge No. 5 holding that the said charge was totally proved. By order dated 17-8-88, the Disciplinary Authority held that the petitioner has contravened Rule 32(4) of the Rules and decided to inflict the penaly of "reduction of basic pay by one stage" in terms of Rule 49(e) with effect from the date of service of the order and further directed that the period of suspension of the petitioner may be treated as not on duty.

    Against the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal. The Appellate Authority by his order dated 11-6-90 dismissed the appeal, but, however, was pleased to direct that the period of suspension of the petitioner is to be treated to be as on duty and he should be paid emoluments during the period he was placed under suspension less the suspension allowance already paid to him. The Appellate Authority thereby confirmed the punishment to the effect of

    "reduction of pay by one stage"
    .

    4. The petitioner in consonance with the Rules preferred a review before the Reviewing Committee of the State Bank of India. The said review application was heard by a Committee consisting of Shri B.K. Mazumdar, Deputy Managing Director (Corporate Operations & Services), Dr. M.K. Sinha, Deputy Managing Director (Human Resourse and Organisation Development) and Shri S. Solomon Raj, Deputy Managing Director (Agriculture and Rural Banking). The Review Committee by its order dated 30-10-91 (Annexure-6) dismissed the review application. It is alleged by the petitioner that Sri Raj was the disciplinary authority and dealt with the matter earlier and also as a member of Reviewing Committee disposed of the Review. Thus, the order passed by the Reviewing Committee is vitiated.

    A detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State Bank of India repudiating the assertions made in different paragraphs of the writ application. It is specifically asserted in the counter affidavit that adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner and there was no violation of principle of Natural Justice. So far as supply of enquiry report is concerned, it is submitted that the inquiry commenced in the year 1986 and was concluded on 30-10-1987. In accordance with the existing procedure as well as service rules of the Bank, it was not incumbent upon the authority to serve a copy of the inquiry report. There is also no provision in the Service Rules of the Bank to accord any opportunity to the petitioner to submit a show cause. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the opp. party also relied upon the decision in the case of Managing Director, FCI & others v. Narendra Kumar Jaint (1993)2 S. C. C. 400 in support of his contention. It is emphatically submitted on behalf of the Bank that the conclusion arrived at and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority which was modified by the Appellate Authority, is just and proper.

    The allegation that Mr. S. Solomon Raj was the Chief General Manager and Disciplinary Authority of State Bank of India, Bhubaneswar Circle and had initiated the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and had issued charge sheet on 28-5-86 and had appointed the Inquiring Officer and the presenting officer, is admitted in paragraph-18 of the counter affidavit. It is, however, submitted that he was simply a member of the Review Committee consisting of three high ranking officers and agreed to the decision of the majority.

    I have heard the counsel for both the parties and perused the averments made in the pleadings. As I intend to dispose of this case on a short point, I am not delving into inter se disputes as well as the allegations and counter allegations advanced by the parties.

    Admittedly Mr. Raj was the Chief General Manager and acted as the disciplinary authority. He dealt with the allegations levelled against the petitioner and had signed and issued charge sheet on 28-5-86. It is also further admitted that the said Mr. Raj appointed Inquiring Officer and Presenting Officer on 8-8-86. By efflux of time, he was promoted and was holding the post of Deputy Managing Director (Agriculture and Rural Banking) in the year 1991 and was a Member of the Reviewing Committee which disposed of the review petition filed on behalf of the petitioner.

    5. Law is well settled that no man should be the judge of his own cause. The Latin maxim Nemo judex in causa sua is a principle firmly established law. Justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. It is on this principle that the judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings are conducted. Justice can never be seen to be done if a man acts as a Judge in his own cause or is himself interested in its outcome. The principle has been succinctly stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume I, paragraphs 64 & 67 follows :

    64. The rules of natural Justice, Implicit in the concept of fair adjudication lie two cardinal principles, namely, that no man shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo judex in causa sua), and that no man shall be condemned unheard (audi alteram pattern). These two principles, the rules of natural justice, must be observed by courts, tribunals, arbitrators and all persons and bodies having the duty to act judicially, save where their application is excluded expressly or by necessary implication.

    67. Interest and likelihood of bias. It is a fundamental principle that, in the absence of statutory authority or consensual agreement or the operation of necessity, no man can be a judge in his own cause. Hence, where persons having a direct interest in the subject matter of inquiry before an inferior tribunal take part in adjudicating upon it, the tribunal is improperly constituted and the court will grant an order of prohibition to prevent it from adjudicating, or an order of certiorari to quash a determination arrived at by it, or such other remedy (for instance, an injunction or a declaration) as may be appropriate. The principle extends not only to courts and tribunals; but also to other bodies, including public authorities, determining questions affecting the civil rights of individuals.

    6. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the case of M/s. J. Mohapatra & Co. and another v. State of Orissa and another, A I. R. 1984 S. C. 1572, where Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that no man should be a Judge of his own cause is the principle of natural justice and apply to the exercise of quasi-judicial as well as administrative powers.

    The Rule is of a wide application and mean that a judicial or quasi-judicial authority should not only himself be a party, but must also not be interested as a party in the subject matter of the dispute which he has to decide. Of course, Judges, like. CAESAR's wife should be above suspicion. But, then, a litigant should not have in his mind a reasonable apprehension that he would not get a fair trial. The decision of the authority is liable to be vitiated by the mere fact that an interested person sat at the hearing. The mere presence of the interested person who takes the initial decision while hearing an appeal/review from his own decision, violates the principle of Natural Justice and injuncts a stinch of bias.

    In the case of Baidyanath Mohapatra v. State of Orissa and another, 68 (1989) C. L. T 640 (S.C.), Shri Gian Chand, Chairman of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal who was the Ex-Chief Secretary of the State of Orissa, was a Member of the Reviewing Committee who made the recommendation against Baidyanath for premature retirement on the basis of which the impugned order was issued. Shri Gian Chand later was appointed as the Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal and was a party to the decision of the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that though there is no allegation of personal bias against Gian Chand, he may have acted bona fide, nonetheless the principles of natural justice, fair play and judicial discipline required that be should have abstained from hearing the appellant's case. While administering justice, an authority should not sit in judgment of his own decision. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order only on that ground.

    7. In the light of the ratio of the decisions cited above, it is a case where Mr. S. S. Raj at whose instance the disciplinary proceeding was: initiated and who was the officer who issued charge sheet and had set the ball to motion, should not have sat as a Member of the Reviewing Committee which was adjudicating the legality or otherwise of the initiation of the proceeding and punishment imposed. On this short ground, the order passed by the Reviewing Committee vide Annexure-6 is liable to be set aside.

    8. Accordingly, the writ application is allowed. The impugned order dated 30-10-91 passed by the Reviewing Committee (Annexure-6) is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Reviewing Committee with a direction that the officer who are unconnected with the disciplinary proceeding may re-heat the review afresh after observing such legal paraphernalia as permissible under law. I make it clear that it would be open for the petitioner to urge all the points available to him, specially in view of the fact that I have not dealt with any other point on merits and the same are left open to be adjudicated by the Reviewing Committee. No costs.

    9. Writ application allowed.

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    Arjuna Charan Mishra v. State Bank Of India And Others
    (Feb 23, 2001)