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  • provisions contained in Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act.
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.7.
  • Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act
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  • provisions contained in Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act.
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.7.
  • Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — P.K. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This civil revision challenges an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Bolangir, which set aside the Subordinate Judge's rejection and directed the grant of a Succession Certificate in favour of Opposite Party No. 1. Opposite Party No. 1 applied under Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act for a Succession Certificate based on a Will allegedly executed by Braja Bihari Bohidar, who was a bachelor and died on 2-9-1987. Opposite Party No. 1 is a nephew of the deceased. The petitioners are members of the deceased's family (the widow and two sons of the deceased's brother, and the brother of the deceased).

The petitioners objected, denying execution of the Will and alleging undue influence, lack of proper attestation and other suspicious circumstances. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application, finding that due execution and attestation had not been proved and certain suspicious circumstances remained unexplained. On appeal, the appellate court reversed that decision, holding that due execution and attestation had been proved and that the suspicious circumstances had not been properly pleaded or established. The present civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure followed, seeking to impugn the appellate court's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Will purportedly executed by Braja Bihari Bohidar was duly executed and duly attested, in particular whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator.
  2. Whether the suspicious circumstances relied upon by the trial court (time of execution, differences in ink, conduct of Opposite Party No. 1, non-registration of the Will, alleged undue influence) were sufficiently established to invalidate the Will.
  3. Whether an application for a Succession Certificate under Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable in the face of the provisions of Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act (and decisions cited by petitioners).
  4. Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to receive and decide the application for Succession Certificate.
  5. Whether the appellate court committed a jurisdictional error or exercised its revisionary jurisdiction with material irregularity such that interference under Section 115, CPC, was warranted.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Will was not duly executed and attested; attesting witnesses did not properly attest in the presence of the testator.
  • There were several suspicious circumstances (execution at 2:00 A.M., attesting witnesses signing in different ink, contradictions in witness testimony) which were not satisfactorily explained and thereby undermined the genuineness of the Will.
  • The Will was unnatural because other relatives of the same degree (including the mother of the deceased) were excluded without explanation.
  • Non-registration of the Will and the fact that Opposite Party No. 1 took an active role in securing attesting witnesses made the Will suspicious.
  • An application under Section 317 was not maintainable in view of Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act, relying on certain local decisions.
  • The application before the Subordinate Judge was not maintainable (though this point had not been raised earlier in the lower courts).

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • The appellate court correctly assessed the evidence and concluded on facts that the executant signed the Will in the presence of the attesting witnesses who in turn signed in his presence.
  • The suspicious circumstances relied upon by the trial court were either not truly suspicious (e.g., execution at 2:00 A.M.), not pleaded, or not proved.
  • Non-registration of the Will is not, by itself, a suspicious circumstance.
  • The Subordinate Judge was authorised by notification to receive applications for Succession Certificates, and the point of maintainability of the forum was not raised below.
  • Interference under Section 115, CPC, is not warranted merely because another court might have taken a different view of the evidence; wrong appreciation of evidence is not a ground for interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1955 SC 363, Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that absence of an express statement by witnesses that they signed in the presence of the testator means there was no due attestation; this is a question of fact depending on the evidence as a whole. The appellate court relied on this principle to treat the question of attestation as one of fact and, considering the evidence as a whole, concluded that the executant and attesting witnesses signed in each other's presence; the revising court accepted that conclusion as a factual finding not amenable to interference under Section 115, CPC.
(1986) 62 Cut LT 360, Srimati Bewa v. Kasinath Chandra Behera Cited by petitioners for the proposition that absent specific evidence of signing in presence, due execution cannot be presumed. The court noted the reliance but treated the factual matrix differently, holding that the totality of the two attesting witnesses' evidence left no room for doubt that the Will was signed in presence and therefore the Srimati Bewa line did not mandate rejection here.
(1972) 2 Cut WR 1451, Amrutlal Majhi v. Japi Sahuani Authorities relied upon by petitioners relating to the treatment of unprobated Wills and the effect of Section 213 in local contexts. The court observed these decisions were rendered in the context of Section 213 (unprobated Will in evidence) and held they do not lay down that an application for Succession Certificate cannot be filed on the basis of an unprobated Will.
ILR (1978) 1 Cut 24, (Mst.) Pratima Padhanei v. Narayan Padhan Local decision relied upon regarding probate/registration issues and admissibility. The court treated this decision similarly to Amrutlal Majhi, concluding it did not support the proposition that a Succession Certificate application is barred by the absence of probate.
AIR 1971 SC 2324, D.L.F. Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh Principle that the scope of interference in a civil revision under Section 115, CPC, is very restricted; wrong appreciation of evidence is not a ground to interfere. The court relied on this and related Supreme Court decisions to justify refusal to interfere with the appellate court's factual conclusion, even if another court might have come to a different view.
AIR 1966 SC 153, Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav Illustrative Supreme Court authority on limits of interference in revisionary jurisdiction and deference to factual findings. Used by the court to support the restricted scope of review under Section 115, CPC.
AIR 1973 SC 76 Referred to among Supreme Court authorities establishing restricted scope of interference with findings of fact in revision proceedings. Cited as part of the body of authority supporting non-interference with appellate factual findings in a civil revision.
Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar v. Ajit Prasad Tarway (citation included) Referred to among authorities on the limited scope of revision and interference with factual findings. Invoked to reinforce the court's view that wrong appreciation of evidence alone does not justify interference under Section 115, CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step analysis of the trial court's findings and the appellate court's reversal, focusing on evidentiary and procedural points expressly discussed in the opinion:

  • Time of execution (2:00 A.M.): The trial court regarded execution at 2:00 A.M. as suspicious. The revising court observed that execution at an odd hour "does not appear to be a suspicious circumstance" as personal habits vary and one of the witnesses (O.P.W. No. 3) had stated the executant himself mentioned signing at that hour. The court therefore refused to treat timing alone as undermining the Will.
  • Difference in ink used by attesting witnesses: The trial court noted apparent differences in ink. The appellate court declined to accept that comparison without expert assistance, observing it is risky to rely on the court's own comparison without expert aid. The revising court found that, while courts do sometimes make such comparisons, refusal to discard attestation on this basis did not amount to jurisdictional error.
  • Contradictions in attesting witnesses' testimony: The trial court pointed to discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.3 (e.g., P.W.1 not categorically stating he saw the executant sign, and sequence of arrival). The appellate court, guided by AIR 1955 SC 363 (Naresh Charan Das Gupta), considered the evidence as a whole and concluded that the executant signed in the presence of the attesting witnesses and the witnesses signed in his presence. The revising court treated that as a pure conclusion of fact and not a ground for interference under Section 115.
  • Unnatural Will / exclusion of near relatives (including mother): Petitioners argued that omission of equally-degreed relatives and the mother rendered the Will unnatural. The appellate court relied on evidence the beneficiary (Opposite Party No. 1) lived with and looked after the deceased, while others lived separately, indicating a closer relationship. The court also noted lack of pleading and proof that the mother was alive at the time of execution; genealogical material and statements suggested she might have died prior to 1979. A stray statement that she was alive was insufficient to treat omission as suspicious, particularly as the objection did not plead unnaturalness on that ground.
  • Non-registration of the Will: The court accepted the appellate finding that non-registration by itself cannot be treated as a suspicious circumstance.
  • Role of Opposite Party No. 1 in execution: Trial court suspected OP1 had taken a leading part (fetching an attesting witness). The appellate court concluded that fetching a witness who lived with the executant and executing the Will in the executant's own house did not show that OP1 had unduly influenced or dominated the execution. The revising court found no jurisdictional error in that assessment.
  • Maintainability under Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act: Counsel for petitioners relied on local decisions to argue Section 317 applications were not maintainable. The court observed those earlier decisions were decided in the context of Section 213 and the admissibility of unprobated Wills in evidence; they did not hold that a Succession Certificate could not be sought on the basis of an unprobated Will. Thus, the court rejected the argument that the application was barred.
  • Jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge: The revising court noted a notification authorising the Subordinate Judge to receive applications for grant of probate, letters of administration or Succession Certificate; the maintainability before that forum had not been raised below.
  • Standard of interference under Section 115, CPC: The court emphasized established Supreme Court authorities that the scope of interference in a civil revision is very restricted and that mere wrong appreciation of evidence is not a ground to set aside the finding of another court. Applying that standard, the court found no jurisdictional error or material irregularity in the appellate court's evaluation and reversal of the trial court's conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision is dismissed. The revising court found no merit in the petitioners' challenge to the appellate court's reversal and made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The appellate court's order directing grant of the Succession Certificate in favour of Opposite Party No. 1 stands.
  • The revising court declined to interfere with the appellate court's factual findings on attestation, suspicious circumstances, the naturalness of the Will, non-registration, and alleged leading role of the beneficiary, treating these as matters of fact properly resolved by the appellate court.
  • The opinion does not announce or identify any new legal precedent; its principal effect is to uphold the appellate court's factual conclusion and to reiterate the limited scope of interference in civil revision under Section 115, CPC.

Revision dismissed. No order as to costs.

    Janaki Bohidar And Others v. Pradeep Kumar Bohidar And Others

    P.K Misra, J.:— This civil revision is directed against the reversing order passed by the Addl. District Judge, Bolangir, directing grant of Succession Certificate in favour of opposite party No. 1. Opposite Party No. 1 filed application under Section 317 of the Indian Succession Act before the Subordinate Judge, Bolangir, for grant of Succession Certificate on the basis of a will allegedly executed by Braja Bihari Bohidar. There is no dispute that the aforesaid Braja Bihari Bohidar was a bachelor. Opposite Party No. 1 is a nephew of Braja Bihari, being son of one brother. The petitioners who were arrayed as opposite parties are respectively the widow and two sons of deceased's brother and the brother of Braja Bihari. There is no dispute that Braja Bihari died on 2-9-1987. Opposite Party No. 1 claims that Braja Bihari had executed the Will on 4-5-1979 and bequeathed all his property in favour of opposite party No. 1. The present petitioners have filed objection denying the execution of the Will by the deceased. It was also pleaded that the Will had been obtained by exercise of undue influence and had not been duly attested by the attesting witnesses.

    2. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application for grant of Succession Certificate on the ground that due execution of the Will including the due attestation had not been proved and many suspicious circumstances had not been explained. The present opposite party No. 1 filed appeal which has been allowed by the appellate authority on the finding that due execution of the Will including the attestation had been proved and the alleged suspicious circumstances had neither been pleaded nor proved properly.

    3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the oral evidence adduced on behalf of present opposite party No. 1 and has tried to assail the findings of the lower appellate Court particularly, the finding regarding the due attestation of the Will. He has submitted that various suspicious circumstances which had been noticed by the trial Court, having not been explained, the genuineness of the Will should have been disbelieved.

    4. The trial Court had observed that the Will was said to have been executed at 2.00 A.M and there was no satisfactory explanation as to why it was executed at an odd hour of the night. This by itself does not appear to be a suspicious circumstance. Every person has got his own peculiar habit. Even O.P.W No. 3, who is a relation of the deceased and an Advocate has stated that the executant had disclosed before him that the Will had been prepared and signed by the executant at 2.00 A.M

    5. The trial Court also observed that the attesting witnesses appear to have signed in a different ink. The lower appellate Court has not accepted this reasoning of the trial Court on the ground that without the aid of an expert, it is always risky to rely upon the comparison by the Court itself. Though such reasoning of the lower appellate Court may not be considered as sacrosanct as in many cases such comparisons are made by the Court itself, it cannot be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed by the lower appellate Court by refusing to discard the attestation on the ground of alleged difference in the inks used.

    6. The trial Court had also referred to the evidence of the attesting witnesses, namely P.Ws 1 and 3 and found certain contradictions in their evidence and had disbelieved about the attestation of the document. It is, of course, true that P.W 1 had not categorically stated that the executant had signed the Will in his presence and he himself had signed the Will in presence of the executant. Similarly, there is some discrepancy in the evidence relating to sequence of arrival of P.Ws 1 and 3 at the place of execution. The lower appellate Court has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1955 SC 363, Naresh Charan Das Gupta v. Paresh Charan Das Gupta. and come to a conclusion that the entire evidence considered as a whole indicates that the executant had signed in presence of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had signed in presence of the executant. The learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision reported in (1986) 62 Cut LT 360, Srimati Bewa v. Kasinath Chandra Behera, and contended that in the absence of specific evidence to the effect that the executant had signed in presence of the attesting witnesses and the attesting witnesses had signed in presence of the executant, it cannot be said that there was due execution of the Will. In AIR 1955 SC 363 (supra), it had been observed:—

    “It cannot be laid down as a matter of law that because the witnesses did not state in examination-in-chief that they signed the Will in the presence of the testator, there was no due attestation. It will depend on the circumstances elicited in evidence whether the attesting witnesses signed in the presence of the testator. This is a pure question of fact depending on appreciation of evidence.”

    In the present case, though it has not been stated so by the witnesses in so many words, a perusal of the evidence of the two witnesses, namely P.Ws 1 and 3 leaves no room for doubt that the executant who himself had scribed the Will had signed it in presence of the witnesses and thereafter the witnesses had signed in his presence. The conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court is a pure conclusion of fact as observed in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision and even though the higher Court might be inclined to take a different view of the evidence that by itself is not a ground to interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Will is unnatural as there is no reason as to why the other relatives of the same degree have been excluded. It is also contended that there is no reason as to why the mother of Braja Bihari who was alive at the time of execution of the Will had not been given any property. The lower appellate Court has relied upon the fact that the present opposite party No. 1 was staying with the deceased who was a bachelor and was looking after him whereas the other relations, like brother and nephew were living separately. It is, thus, quite evident that opposite party No. 1 was having more cordial relationship with the executant. The lower appellate Court has observed that there is no definite evidence before the Court as to when the mother of the deceased had died. In fact, in the objection filed by the present petitioners, it was not indicated that the Will was unnatural and nothing had been left in favour of the mother of the executant. Even, nothing has been indicated in the objection that the mother was alive in 1979 when the Will was executed. On the other hand, the genealogy furnished by the present petitioners indicates as if the mother of Braja Bihari, the executant, had died prior to 1979. It is significant to note that in the written submission filed by the petitioners in this Court, the date of death of the mother of the deceased, Braja Bihari has been indicated to be 1976. A witness, on behalf of present opposite party No. 1 has stated as if the mother of Braja Bihari had died about twenty five years back. It is, of course, true that there is a stray statement indicating as if the mother of Braja Bihari was alive on the date of execution of the Will. But merely on the basis of such a stray statement, it is not possible to come to a conclusion that in fact, the mother of Braja Bihari was alive on the date of execution of the Will so that non-giving of any property to the mother can be considered as a suspicious circumstance, particularly in the absence of any plea whatsoever on this aspect. Apart from the pleading that the Will was forged and obtained by fraud, coercion and the executant was not in sound disposing state of mind and there was suspicion regarding the execution of the Will as the same was not registered, it was never indicated that the Will was unnatural on the ground that the mother and other relations of the executant had not been given any property. In aforesaid view of the matter, the conclusion of the lower appellate Court cannot be characterised as perverse or without basis.

    8. Non-registration of the Will by itself cannot be considered as a suspicious circumstance, as has been rightly observed by the lower appellate Court. The trial Court had observed that opposite party No. 1 had taken a leading part in execution of the Will and as such the Will must be viewed suspiciously. It appears that opposite party No. 1 who was staying with the executant, was deputed for calling P.W 1, one of the attesting witnesses. The Will was executed in the own residential house of the executant. Merely because the opposite party No. 1 was deputed to fetch an attesting witness, it cannot be said that he had taken a leading part in the execution of the Will. This aspect has been considered by the lower appellate Court and even though there may be scope for coming to a different conclusion, it can hardly be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed by the lower appellate Court.

    9. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that application for Succession Certificate under Section 317, CPC, is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in Sections 57, 58 and 218 of the Succession Act. For the aforesaid purpose he has relied upon the decisions reported in (1972) 2 Cut WR 1451, Amrutlal Majhi v. Japi Sahuani and ILR (1978) 1 Cut 24 (Mst.) Pratima Padhanei v. Narayan Padhan. These decisions had been rendered in the context of Section 213 which provides that an unprobated Will cannot be utilised in the evidence in Court of law and in the aforesaid context it was held that a Will is not required to be probated in Bolangir district or some other place. The decisions nowhere lay down that even though it is not mandatory to get such Will probated, no application can be filed for obtaining Succession Certificate on the basis of the Will.

    10. It was also submitted that the application filed before the Subordinate Judge was not maintainable. Such a point was not raised before any of the Courts below. It is apparent that a notification has been issued authorising the Subordinate Judge to receive applications for grant of probate or letters administration or Succession Certificate.

    11. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has rightly contended that the lower appellate Court has reversed the decision of the trial Court after discussing the various facts and circumstances of the case and even though another Court could have come to a different conclusion on the basis of the evidence on record and possibly could have agreed with the view of the trial Court, it cannot be said that any jurisdictional error has been committed nor it can be said that jurisdiction has been exercised with any material irregularily. Law is well settled that wrong appreciation of evidence is not a ground to interfere with the finding rendered by the Court below, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC. The scope of interference in a civil revision is very much restricted, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1971 SC 2324, D.L.F Housing and Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, AIR 1966 SC 153 Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1973 SC 76. The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanagar, Hyderabad, and several other decisions. Even though the discussion of the lower appellate Court may not appear to be satisfactory, there is hardly any scope for interference with the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court.

    12. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the civil revision, which is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost of the present civil revision.

    Revision dismissed.

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    Janaki Bohidar And Others v. Pradeep Kumar Bohidar And Others
    (Apr 6, 2001)