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  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
  • upon,3. Section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
  • section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act.5.
  • section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
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  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
  • upon,3. Section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
  • section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947,
  • section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act.5.
  • section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — P.C. Misra, J. (with V. Gopalaswamy, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are proprietors of a new oil industry who sought quashing of an assessment order issued by the Sales Tax Officer under section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (annexure-1 to the writ petition).

Relying on the Industrial Policy Resolution of the Government of Orissa for 1979–83 (annexure-2), the petitioners applied to set up an industry at Betnoti, Mayurbhanj. They obtained a provisional registration certificate from the District Industries Centre on 28 November 1979, were granted a permanent registration certificate as a small-scale industrial unit on 10 April 1980, and a production certificate showing production started on 19 March 1980. A certificate of registration under section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act was issued with effect from 25 September 1980 and subsequently renewed.

Clause 8 of the 1979–83 Industrial Policy Resolution provided exemption from purchase/sales tax for five years on construction materials, raw materials, machinery and packing materials for certain classes of industries. The petitioners purchased raw materials (groundnut, mustard seed, etc.) and claimed purchase tax exemption under that policy clause. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the exemption claim on the ground that there was no notification under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act; that rejection appears in annexure-1 and is challenged in the present writ petition.

The petitioners also challenged a notification dated 9 September 1977 (specifically the words "before 1st April, 1977" appearing in column 2) as ultra vires section 6 and article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution; however, before this Court they confined their principal relief to claiming exemption under the Industrial Policy by virtue of promissory estoppel.

Procedurally, this writ petition was originally presented and dismissed by this Court in December 1980. The petitioners obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court which set aside this Court's dismissal, directed admission of the writ petition and remitted it to this Court to be decided on merits with regard to entitlement under the Industrial Policy Resolution dated 18 July 1979. Pursuant to that direction this Court heard the matter on merit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State can resile from its representation of granting exemption from purchase/sales tax to new small-scale industries after that representation has been acted upon by the prospective beneficiary (i.e., whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked against the State in these circumstances).
  2. Whether, in the particular factual matrix of this case, the petitioners are entitled to exemption under clause 8 of the Industrial Policy Resolution dated 18 July 1979 (1979–83) by application of promissory estoppel.
  3. Whether (as pleaded) the words "before 1st April, 1977" appearing in the notification dated 9 September 1977 are ultra vires section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution — although the petitioners' counsel indicated he was not pursuing that relief if the Industrial Policy resolution point succeeded.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners relied on clause 8 of the Industrial Policy Resolution (1979–83) which, they asserted, promised a five-year purchase/sales tax exemption for small-scale industries; they acted upon that representation by setting up the unit and incurring loans.
  • The petitioners' principal legal contention was that the State Government is bound by that representation under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and therefore they are entitled to the exemption despite absence of a specific notification under section 6 in the form argued by the Sales Tax Officer.
  • Because of their reliance on the Industrial Policy Resolution, the petitioners sought relief awarding them the benefit of the exemption; they indicated they were not pursuing the separate relief of declaring a portion of the 1977 notification ultra vires if the promissory estoppel claim succeeded.

Opposite Party No. 1 (Sales Tax Officer / State) Arguments

  • Learned Standing Counsel contended that the Industrial Policy Resolution is ineffective and unenforceable insofar as it purports to grant tax exemption because there was no corresponding, operative notification issued under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act.
  • The Sales Tax Officer relied upon the principle (invoking Mathra Parshad v. State of Punjab) that there can be no estoppel against a statute and that assurances not backed by the statutory scheme cannot bind the State when the law requires collection of tax.
  • It was also argued that the writ petition was incompetent because an alternative statutory remedy (presumably an appeal or revision) against the assessment order was available — a point the Court did not decide finally because of the Supreme Court's directions to decide the matter on merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 Established that where a party acts on a Government representation the Government may be bound by that representation even though the promise was not recorded as a formal contract under Article 299. The Court relied on this decision as authority that a promise made by the Government and acted upon can bind the State notwithstanding absence of formal contractual formality.
Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., (1972) 1 SCC 857; AIR 1972 SC 1311 Followed in support of the principle of promissory estoppel as applied by courts in appropriate cases. Cited as part of the chain of authority recognising promissory estoppel and its equitable purpose; the Court treated it as supporting application of promissory estoppel.
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 2 SCC 409; AIR 1979 SC 621 Held that promissory estoppel is an equitable principle which can apply against the Government and that executive necessity cannot be invoked to defeat promissory estoppel. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the doctrine can be applied against the State, negating the defence of executive necessity.
Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369; AIR 1986 SC 806 (also cited in conjunction: Union of India v. India Tobacco Co. Ltd.; Union of India v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd.) Held that promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity cannot defeat promissory estoppel. The Court cited these grouped authorities to reinforce that promissory estoppel applies against the Government and that executive necessity is not a valid answer to prevent enforcement of the Government's promise.
Sri fagannath Roller Flour Mills v. State of Orissa, [1987] 65 STC 384 Applied promissory estoppel to hold petitioners entitled to exemption (octroi and sales tax) under an Industrial Policy Resolution dated 18 July 1979; the subsequent denial by policy was held to be hit by promissory estoppel. The Court followed this decision and applied the same principle: since the petitioners here started production pursuant to the 1979 policy representations and were registered, the policy exemption would be operative against the State.
Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala, [1987] 65 STC 1 Held that small-scale units set up in response to a governmental order between specified dates were entitled to the promised exemption for the full five-year period from commencement of production. The Court treated this as corroborative authority and applied the same principle to hold that the petitioners are entitled to the policy exemption for the appropriate period from their date of production.
Mathra Parshad v. State of Punjab, [1962] 13 STC 180; AIR 1962 SC 745 Held that there can be no estoppel against a statute — if the law requires a tax to be collected, an assurance that it would not be collected would not bind the State when it chooses to collect it. Opposite party relied on this decision. The Court noted the reliance but distinguished the facts of Mathra Parshad from the present case and therefore did not accept it as decisive against the petitioners' promissory estoppel claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the facts disclosed in the writ petition.

  1. The Court explained the essence of promissory estoppel: where one party makes a promise intended to be relied upon and the other party does act upon it, equity may prevent the promisor from acting inconsistently with that promise.
  2. The Court surveyed authoritative decisions (including Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies; Turner Morrison; Motilal Padampat; the cluster of Union of India decisions including Godfrey Philips; and local decisions such as Sri fagannath and Pournami Oil Mills) recognizing that promissory estoppel can bind the Government where the Government makes a promise knowing it will be acted upon and the promisee so acts, altering his position.
  3. The Court noted that the Industrial Policy Resolution (1979–83) contained a clear representation (clause 8) of tax exemption for small-scale industries. The petitioners relied on that representation, obtained registration, commenced production on 19 March 1980 and incurred financial obligations in consequence.
  4. Applying the cited authorities, the Court concluded that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is available to the petitioners against the State and that the denial of exemption by the Sales Tax Officer on the ground of absence of a specific notification under section 6 could not prevail in the face of the petitioners' demonstrable reliance on the policy representation.
  5. The Court addressed the Mathra Parshad line of authority (no estoppel against statute) observed by the Sales Tax Officer's counsel but held that the facts of Mathra Parshad were distinguishable from the present case and therefore that authority did not preclude application of promissory estoppel here.
  6. The Court also recorded that it would not decide the procedural objection (availability of alternative remedy) because the Supreme Court had already directed this Court to admit and decide the writ petition on merits; accordingly, the matter had to be resolved on substantive grounds.
  7. On these bases the Court held that exemption contemplated in the Industrial Policy Resolution for 1979–83 would be operative against the State as regards these petitioners, who had acted on the representation and were registered and in production from 19 March 1980.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ application is allowed and the assessment order in annexure-1 is quashed. The petitioners are held entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Policy Resolution dated 18 July 1979 (1979–83) and their tax liability is to be computed accordingly. The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the judgment is that these petitioners receive the benefit of the tax exemption promised in the Industrial Policy Resolution and the impugned assessment is set aside; their tax liability will be recalculated on that basis.
  • The Court based its decision on established principles of promissory estoppel as applied against the State in prior authorities; the opinion follows existing precedents rather than announcing a new legal principle.

This summary is limited to the information expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or holdings beyond that text.

    Shree Durga Oil Mills And Another v. Sales Tax Officer And Others

    P.C Misra, J.:— The petitioner No. 1, a new oil industry has prayed for quashing the assessment order under section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, a copy of which is annexed to the writ application as annexure-1.

    2. It has been alleged in the writ application that relying on the Industrial Policy Resolution of the Government of Orissa for the period ‘1979-83 (annexure-2) the petitioners’ firm applied for setting up an industry at Betnoti in the district of Mayurbhanj and obtained a provisional registration certificate from the District Industries Centre, Mayurbhanj, on 28th November, 1979 (annexure-3). The petitioners' firm was granted a permanent registration certificate as a small-scale industrial unit by the Director of Industries, Orissa, on 10th April, 1980 vide annexure-4. The industrial unit was granted a production certificate (annexure-5) certifying that it started production on 19th March, 1980. The certificate of registration granted under section 9 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act was issued with effect from 25th September, 1980 and has been thereafter renewed from time to time as would be evident from annexure-7 series. Clause 8 of the Industrial Policy Resolution effective for the period 1979-83 provides that village cottage and tiny industries certified as such by the State Government and small-scale industries shall be exempted from purchase/sales tax for five years on construction materials, raw materials, machinery and packing materials. S.S.I units in non-backward areas will, however, be entitled to this exemption for four years. The petitioners allege that relying on the representation made in the Industrial Policy Resolution of the Government of Orissa for the period 1979-83 it proceeded to set up an industry and incurred a heavy loan from the United Bank of India for the purpose. Raw materials for the industry, namely, groundnut, mustard seed, etc., were purchased by the petitioners and exemption from levy of purchase tax was claimed by the petitioners on the basis of the aforesaid clause contained in the Industrial Policy Resolution referred to above. The Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 1) rejected the said claim of exemption on the ground that there is no notification under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, by his order in annexure-1 which has been impugned in this writ application. Thus the main question that arises for consideration in this writ application is whether the State can rescind from its representation of granting exemption from purchase/sales tax to new small-scale industries after the representation was acted upon,

    3. Section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act provides that the State may by notification, subject to such conditions and exceptions, if any, exempt from tax the sale or purchase of any goods or class of goods and likewise withdraw any such exemption. Pursuant to the said powers the State Government in Finance Department have issued notifications providing for exemption of tax and amending the said provision from time to time. In the notification dated 11th November, 1969 the raw materials, i.e, goods which directly go into the composition of the finished products, when sold to a registered dealer who is a manufacturer inside the State and who has started production after the 1st April, 1969 were exempted from tax for a period of five years from the date from which such registered dealer has started production, provided that he or his authorised agent furnishes a true declaration in form D which was appended to the notification. The said notification took effect from 1st January, 1970. In a similar notification dated 23rd February, 1976 under section 6 of the Act purchase or sale of raw materials, i.e, goods which directly go into the composition of the finished products, were exempted from tax for a period of five years from the date from which the registered dealer has started production subject to furnishing a similar declaration. The exemption so granted was abrogated by a notification dated 20th May, 1977, but the State Government again restored the same by another notification dated 9th September, 1977. In the notification dated 9th September, 1977 the State Government while allowing exemption for five years limited its application to the new industries which started production from 1st April, 1977 whereas clause 8 of the new Industrial Policy Resolution effective for the period 1979-83 does not put any such restriction. In this writ application it has also been prayed that the words “before 1st April, 1977” appearing in column 2 of the notification dated 9th September, 1977 should be declared ultra vires section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act and article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. It has also been alleged that denial of exemption to the petitioners on account of the restriction spelt out in the notification dated 9th September, 1977 are against the principles of equity and social justice for which the same is liable to be quashed.

    4. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Sales Tax Officer (opposite party No. 1) in answer to the claim in the writ application submitted that the industrial policy in annexure-2 is ineffective and unenforceable as there has been no corresponding notification under section 6 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act.

    5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that irrespective of the restrictions and limitations in the earlier notification dated 9th September, 1977 the petitioners are entitled to the tax exemption by virtue of clause 8 of the latter Industrial Policy which would be effective for the period 1979-83 and in that view of the matter, the petitioners are not interested in the relief prayed for declaring a portion of the notification of 1977 as ultra vires. His main contention is that the State Government is bound to fulfil the promise made out by it in the policy resolution in annexure-2 by application of the principle of promissory estoppel. He, therefore, confined his argument for a consideration by this Court as to whether the petitioners are entitled to tax exemption by-virtue of clause 8 of the Industrial Policy Resolution, 1983 by applying the principle of promissory estoppel.

    6. Promissory estoppel has come to be recognised by all the courts in this country since long. It means that where parties enter into an agreement which is intended to create a legal relation between them and in pursuance of such agreement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted upon, by the promisee, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it. In a decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 718 (Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies) their Lordships held that even though the case did not fall within the terms of the Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by article 299 of the Constitution. The said principle has been followed in several cases out of which special reference may be made to the decision reported in (1972) 1 SCC 857 : AIR 1972 SC 1311 (Turner Morrison and Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd.) and [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) : (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh). In the decision reported in [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) : (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh) their Lordships held that promissory estoppel is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. True principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. Their Lordships further observed that it is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. Their Lordships further held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of formal contract as required by article 299 of the Constitution. The above principle was also followed by the same court in the decision reported in (1985) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1986 SC 806 (Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.), (2) (Union of India v. India Tobacco Co. Ltd.) and (3) (Union of India v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd.) where their Lordships observed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This Court in the case of Sri fagannath Roller Flour Mills v. State of Orissa, [1987] 65 STC 384, considered the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and held that it is applicable against the Government. The tax exemption announced in the Industrial Policy Resolution dated 18th July, 1979 operating during the period 1979-83 was the subject-matter for consideration in the said case in which their Lordships held that the petitioners in that case were entitled to exemption, of levy of octroi and sales tax by virtue of the promise made in the policy resolution applicable for the period 1979-83, and subsequent policy resolution denying exemption to the flour mills was hit by the principle of promissory estoppel. On identical facts the Supreme Court in a decision reported in, [1987] 65 STC 1 (Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala), held that those units of small-scale industries which were set up in Kerala in response to the order dated April 11, 1979, and prior to October 21, 1980, were entitled to the exemption extended and/or promised thereunder: such exemption would continue for the full period of five years from the date they started production. We would, therefore, follow the same principle in this case and hold that the exemption contemplated in the Industrial Policy Resolution for the period 1979-83 would be operative as against the State by virtue of the application of doctrine of promissory estoppel so far as the petitioners are concerned, as admittedly the petitioners' oil mill was started pursuant to the representations held out in the said resolution and it, has been registered and recognised as a small-scale industry which went into production with effect from 19th March, 1980.

    7. Learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 1 relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in [1962] 13 STC 180 : AIR 1962 SC 745 (Mathra Parshad v. State of Punjab) and the other decisions which followed the same. Their Lordships in the said case were concerned with a press note of the Government dated 2nd August, 1954 exempting sales tax for the current financial year in respect of manufacture of tobacco which fall under the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act. In that connection their Lordships held that there can be no estoppel against a statute. If the law requires that a certain tax be collected, it cannot be given up, and any assurance that it would not be collected, would not bind the State Government whenever it chose to collect it. The facts of the said case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for opposite party No. 1 next argued that the writ application is incompetent as ultimate remedy is available to the petitioners against the order of assessment in annexure-1. We need not discuss the merits of this point in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. This case was presented on 19th December, 1980 in this Court and came up for admission on 22nd December, 1980.

    8. At that stage the case was dismissed against which the petitioners went up to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while disposing of the special leave petition set aside the order passed by this Court and directed to admit the writ application to its file and dispose it of on merits on the question as to whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Policy Resolution dated July 18, 1979. In view of the directions of the Supreme Court the writ application has to be disposed of on merits and cannot be dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. We would, therefore, refrain from discussing the point of law on the subject. In the conclusion, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Policy Resolution dated July 18, 1979 and on that basis tax liability of the petitioners has to be computed.

    9. In the result, the writ application is allowed and the assessment order in annexure-1 is accordingly quashed. We, however, make no order as to costs.

    V. Gopalaswamy, J.:— I agree.

    11. Writ application allowed.

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    Comments

    Shree Durga Oil Mills And Another v. Sales Tax Officer And Others
    (Sep 15, 1987)