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Case Number

O.J.C Nos. 1658, 1659 and 1707 of 1987

Attorney(S)

M.R.Mohanty
A.Pasayat
A.B.Mishra

Judges

H.L Agrawal, C.J
K.P Mohapatra, J.

Acts

Ss. 147/148/149/341/307, I.P.C read with S. 9-B of the Indian Explosives Act
S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short the Act).2.
PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACT 1950
Act by Act 60 of 1984 inserting S. 5-A
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Three writ applications in the nature of habeas corpus challenged orders of detention made under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 by the District Magistrate, Cuttack. The three petitioners were arrested on 19-3-1987. Grounds of detention dated 22-3-1987 were served on the petitioners in Cuttack Jail on 22-3-1987. The grounds alleged that on 22-1-1987 the petitioners, with others and armed with weapons including swords, a Bhujali and bombs, attacked one Sudhakar Behera, causing him gravely serious injuries; bombs were allegedly shown and one was exploded while the culprits fled, creating panic and disturbing public peace and order. A criminal case under Ss. 147/148/149/341/307 IPC read with S. 9-B of the Indian Explosives Act was registered on the same day with the Malgodown Police. The detention orders were approved by the State Government on 28-3-1987 and forwarded to the Central Government on 29-3-1987. Each petitioner made representations to the Chief Minister of Orissa and to the Central Government on 3-4-1987 denying involvement and claiming false implication. The petitioners' representations were rejected by the State Government on 28-4-1987 and by the Central Government on 4-5-1987; communication of rejection to the petitioners occurred thereafter by the official channels described in the record.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the grounds of detention were legally valid and whether they were "in existence" (i.e., contemporaneous with) at the time the detention order was passed.
Whether the grounds of detention were impermissibly vague.
Whether there was unreasonable and unexplained delay in the consideration and disposal of the petitioners' representations by the State Government and the Central Government, including the meaning and compliance with the requirement in S. 3(5) to report the fact of detention to the Central Government within seven days.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (reproduced from the opinion)

The grounds of detention were vague and, in any event, were not in existence before the detaining authority at the time the order of detention was passed (i.e., they were prepared after the detention order and therefore the detention was ultra vires).
There was great delay in disposing of the petitioners' representations by both the State Government and the Central Government.

Opposite Party's Arguments / State's Case (reproduced from the opinion)

Counter-affidavits deny the allegations and infirmities raised by the petitioners.
The total time for disposal of the representations was 27 days, but that included 9 public holidays and 5 days in postal transit; thus the effective time taken was 13 days, which was reasonable given required steps at different levels.
Detailed chronology and movement of files and the administrative process were set out to explain the time taken at various stages, including sending and receiving comments, placement before the Chief Minister, and communication of orders to prison authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Krishna Murari Aggarwala v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 481 (AIR 1975 SC 1877)	Observation that since the order is based on grounds to be served on the detenu, the order of detention can be passed only if the grounds are in existence and are prepared contemporaneously; otherwise detention becomes illusory.	The court considered the observation but explained that "contemporaneous" cannot be construed to require signing the grounds and the detention order as the same instantaneous transaction; the court refused to accept a strict simultaneous-signing rule in this case.
Mithalal Maganlal Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 1 Crimes 811 (Bombay HC)	Bombay High Court view that grounds of detention prepared, signed two days after the detention order were void ab initio.	The court noted this view but declined to follow it, expressing disagreement with the strict approach reflected in that short judgment.
Amendment: Act 60 of 1984 inserting S. 5-A (to the Act)	Provision that the Government or Officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.	The court observed that this statutory amendment weakens the submission that grounds must be simultaneously signed; it supports a construction that does not require literal simultaneity.
K. N. Joglekar v. Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 228	Interpretation that the word "forthwith" means the act should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition and any delay should be satisfactorily explained.	The court relied on this interpretation to support the view that statutory time-phrases require reasonable expedition rather than an impossible rigidity (applied to the meaning of forwarding/reporting with due speed).
Vinayak Ramchandra Sakhalkar v. D. Ramchandran (Bombay), 1985 Cri LJ 1257 (Bombay view)	Held that unless the report sent by the State Government under S. 3(5) is received by the Central Government within seven days, communication to the Central Government is not satisfied.	The court expressly disagreed with this narrow construction, finding forwarding by known modes of communication within seven days suffices; it rejected the requirement that the Central Government must have physically received the report within seven days in all cases.
Guru Charan Singh v. Superintendent, Central Jail, 1986 (1) Crimes 124 (1986 All LJ 1172)	Allahabad High Court followed the Bombay decision: report should not only be despatched but must be received by Central Government within seven days.	The court declined to adopt this stringent view for reasons of practical administrative impossibility in some States and adopted a construction that the State's obligation is discharged by forwarding by known modes within the prescribed period.
Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 295	Supreme Court held that the Central Government, being empowered to pass an order of revocation, has a duty to consider communications or petitions received from detenu with "reasonable expedition."	The court cited this authority to support the proposition that the Central Government must consider representations with reasonable expedition, and then assessed whether that standard was met on the facts.
Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 481	Supreme Court observed that Central Government has duty to consider representations; on the facts of that case there was a complete failure to forward the representations to the Central Government.	The court referenced this case as one where there was complete failure; in the present case, by contrast, the court found the representations were forwarded and considered within acceptable time given the circumstances.
Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 710 (AIR 1981 SC 1126)	Supreme Court commented on impermissible delay where representations are allowed to lie and successive departments are consulted ("seeking the opinion of the Secretary after Secretary").	The court considered these observations but concluded that, on the facts before it, the petitioners' representations were not subjected to such administrative red tape and were dealt with within a reasonable period.
Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 480 (AIR 1981 SC 1077)	Observes that the right and obligation to consider representations at the earliest opportunity is a constitutional imperative; circumlocutory procedures that cause inevitable delay contravene the mandate.	The court cited this authority to reinforce the principle of expeditious consideration but held that, on these facts, the State's procedures did not result in impermissible delay and the representations were considered adequately promptly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in structured steps, addressing each principal challenge presented by the petitioners:

Contemporaneousness of Grounds:
- The petitioners argued the grounds of detention were prepared on 22-3-1987 whereas the order of detention was passed on 19-3-1987, and hence the grounds were not in existence when the order was passed.
- The court examined the Supreme Court's observation in Krishna Murari Aggarwala that detention should be based on grounds that are "in existence" and prepared contemporaneously but interpreted "contemporaneous" in a practical manner.
- The court concluded the expression "contemporaneous" cannot be read to require simultaneous preparation, signing and service of the grounds at the exact moment the detention order is signed; such a narrow construction would nullify the statutory grace period for serving grounds under Section 8.
- The court further relied on the Act's amendment (Act 60 of 1984 inserting S. 5-A) as undermining the strict simultaneity argument, and observed that the connected file disclosed that the detaining authority had the Superintendent of Police's report and had applied his mind and recorded satisfaction when passing the order.
- Accordingly the court rejected the contention that the grounds were not in existence when the order was passed and found no substance in the vagueness plea either (not seriously argued and no merit found).
Meaning and Compliance with S. 3(5) ("report" to Central Government within seven days):
- The petitioners urged that the State must ensure the Central Government received
- The court considered dictionary meaning of "report" and the practical difficulties that strict receipt-based construction would impose (particularly for geographically distant States), and relied on K.N. Joglekar's interpretation that words like "forthwith" require reasonable speed and satisfactory explanation for any delay.
- The court held that the State's obligation is discharged if the report is forwarded by known modes of communication within seven days; in the present case the report was forwarded to the Central Government on 29-3-1987, which the court found sufficient under the statutory scheme.
Alleged Delay in Disposal of Representations by State and Central Governments:
- The court set out a detailed chronology of events and dates supplied in the record to analyse alleged delays at both State and Central levels.
- At the State level, the court accepted the additional counter-affidavit's account of file movements, the role of public holidays, and routine internal endorsements (dates provided in the record, and specified holidays). The court concluded these facts provided an adequate explanation for time taken and that the State's disposal did not involve unreasonable delay.
- At the Central level the court recognised there is no statutory provision prescribing consideration of representations by the Central Government but relied on Supreme Court authorities (Sabir Ahmed, Rattan Singh) that the Central Government, being empowered to revoke, must consider such communications with "reasonable expedition".
- The court found that the processing at the Central Government in this case (including obtaining comments and using wireless messages to communicate decisions) did not amount to "administrative red tape" or such delay as to be unreasonable. It specifically distinguished cases in which representations were entirely not forwarded or were left to lie while multiple secretarial consultations were made (citing Rattan Singh and Harish Pahwa) from the facts before it.
- On the whole, applying the standards of reasonable expedition and examining the specific administrative timeline (including holidays and postal transit), the court held the representations were considered and disposed of without unreasonable or unexplained delay.
Conclusion of Legal Analysis:
- Having rejected the contention that grounds were not in existence when the detention order was made, having found the grounds were not impermissibly vague, and having concluded there was no unreasonable delay in considering representations by either Government, the court found the challenges to the detention orders to be devoid of merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ applications are DISMISSED; the court dismissed the petitions and upheld the impugned detention orders.

Implications:

Direct effect: The detention orders impugned in the three habeas corpus petitions remain legally valid and operative as the challenges raised by the petitioners were rejected on the merits.
Broader implications: The court articulated a practical construction of the requirement that grounds be "in existence" (refusing to adopt a rigid rule of literal simultaneity) and rejected a strict receipt-based interpretation of the State's duty to "report" to the Central Government within seven days; however, the opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Application dismissed by the court (order recorded by H.L. Agrawal, C.J.; concurrence and additional observation by K.P. Mohapatra, J.).

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Ullas Sahu v. District Magistrate

H.L Agrawal, C.J:— All the three writ applications which are in the nature of Habeas Corpus arise out of the same incident leading to the passing of the impugned orders of detention (Annexure-1 to each of the writ applications) by the District Magistrate, Cuttack, under S. 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 (for short ‘the Act’).

2. All the three petitioners were arrested on 19-3-1987 and a copy of the grounds of detention dt. 22-3-1987 (Annexure-2) was served on each of them on 22-3-1987 itself in the Cuttack Jail. It is alleged in the grounds of detention (Annexure-2) that on 22-1-1987 at about 8.30 A.M while one Sudhakar Behera was taking tea at the tea-stall of one Madhusudan Behera, the three petitioners along with a few others armed with various deadly weapons like sword, Bhujali, Bombs, etc. appeared there. Petitioner Bichi alias Prakash is said to be holding two bombs in his hand. Petitioner Nali alias Nilambar was holding a sword and a Bhujali and petitioner Ullash a sword. It is said that petitioners Nali and Ullash along with their associate Babuni forcibly dragged Sudhakar up to the pond situated at the backside of the Gumti of Kahnu Charan Das and dealt blows on him with Bhujali and sword. Petitioner Bichi and others were hurling swords and showing bombs and shouting that they would kill any one who would interfere. Sudhakar Behera became senseless on account of the injuries sustained by him. The culprits thinking him to be dead fled away. When the culprits were fleeing, Bijay Kumar Sethi and others chased them when petitioner Bichi is alleged to have exploded the bombs due to which they had to retreat out of fear. On account of the above anti-social and violent activities of the detenus and their associates, a panic was created in the locality and the shop-keepers closed their shops and the inhabitants shut themselves inside their houses. The vehicular traffic on the road is also said to have stopped and “peace and tranquillity of the area was completely jeopardised” as the detenus and their associates were “openly announcing to murder anybody who intervened” for which a sense of panic prevailed in the area and the even tempo of life of the community and public peace and order was disturbed.

3. A case under Ss. 147/148/149/341/307, I.P.C read with S. 9-B of the Indian Explosives Act was also registered on the same day with the Malgodown Police.

4. The order of detention (Annexure-1) was approved by the State Government on 28-3-1987 and on 29-3-87 a copy thereof was forwarded to the Central Government. On 3-4-1987, each of the petitioners addressed representations to the Chief Minister of Orissa through the Jailor and also sent a copy thereof to the Central Government through the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi in which they denied their involvement in the occurrence and pleaded, inter alia, that they were falsely implicated in the case.

5. The representations of the petitioners were rejected by the State Government on 28-4-1987 and by the Central Government on 4-5-1987, the fact of rejection being communicated to them on 4-5-1987 and 11-5-1987 wide Annexures 5 and 6 respectively.

6. Shri Pasayat, learned counsel for the petitioners, challenged the impugned order of detention inter alia on the following grounds:—

(i) The grounds of detention were vague and, in any event, were not in existence before the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention; and

(ii) Great delay was caused in disposing of the representations of the petitioners by the State Government as well as the Central Government.

7. Two counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of opposite party No. 2 denying the allegations and infirmities pointed out by the petitioners in the writ petitions. Besides giving details about the movement of the representations from stage to stage, which I shall presently refer, it has been stated that the total time taken for disposal of the representations was 27 days out of which 9 days were public holidays and 5 days were spent in postal transit. It has, therefore, been contended that the actual effective time taken for disposal of the representations was 13 days which in the very nature of things was very reasonable, for some time was bound to be spent at different levels and thus there was no delay.

8. From the materials brought on record, some material dates which are relevant to appreciate the question of delay urged by Shri Pasayat are enumerated hereunder:—

1. 22-1-1987 Date of Occurrence. 2. 19-3-1987 Detention order passed and petitioners detained. 3. (a) 22-3-1987 Grounds of detention dt. 22-3-1987 served on the petitioners. (b) 28-3-1987 Detention approved by the State Government. (c) 29-3-1987 Detention order forwarded to the Central Government. (d) 31-3-1987 Report of the District Magistrate, order of detention and the grounds of detention forwarded to the Advisory Board. 4. 3-4-1987 Representation made by the petitioners both to the Central Government and the State Government. 5. 6-4-1987 Comments of the Superintendent of Police called for. 6. 13-4-1987 Comments received from the Superintendent of Police. 7. (a) 14-4-1987 Representation placed before the Advisory Board. (b) 18-4-1987 Representation forwarded by the District Magistrate received in the Home Department. (c) 21-4-1987 Representation forwarded by the State Government to the Central Government. (d) 25-4-1987 Representation placed before the Chief Minister. (e) 28-4-1987 Representation rejected by the Chief Minister. 8. 1-5-1987 Order of rejection of the petitioners' representation communicated by the State Government to the District Magistrate. 9. 1-5-1987 Petitioners' representation rejected by the Central Government. 10. (a) 4-5-1987 Rejection order communicated by the State Government to the petitioners. (b) 8-5-1987 Rejection order communicated by the Central Government to the petitioners in jail.

9. Let me now consider the first question.

10. Shri Pasayat submitted that the grounds of detention having been drawn up by the detaining authority on 22-3-1987 and the order of detention having been passed on 19-3-1987, the grounds could not be said to be in existence at the time the detention order ??? passed. Counsel contended that unless the grounds of detention were contemporaneous, the order of detention must be held to be ultra vires. He sought support for the contention from the case of Krishna Murari Aggarwala v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 481 : AIR 1975 SC 1877 : (1975 Cri LJ 1648), a case under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act where the provisions for detention are almost identical with the provisions of the National Security Act.

11. In this case, the relevant observation which is sought to be relied upon reads thus:—

“…… Furthermore, since the order is based on grounds to be served on the detenu, the order of detention can be passed only if the grounds are in existence and are prepared contemporaneously. Otherwise, the order of detention becomes purely illusory.

12. In the case before the Supreme Court, the main question which was being considered was as to “who passed the order of detention and who was satisfied regarding the sufficiency of the grounds. However, in order to satisfy ourselves as to whether the detaining authority had any material with him before the impugned orders were passed, we had looked into the original records produced by the State Counsel and found that the detaining authority was already in possession of the relevant report of the Superintendent of Police, the basis for passing the impugned orders which were served on the detenus within the prescribed period of 5 days under S. 8 of the Act. Section 8 lays down that the authority making the order as soon as may be but ordinarily not later than 5 days and, in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 10 days from the date of detention, should communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made affording the detenu an earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government.

13. The legislature has advisedly given a minimum 5 days' time to the executive authority. There may be cases where the order of detention has to be issued and served at once. The obligation of drawing up the grounds etc. and actual service of the same on the detenu may take some time for which a reasonable limit has been fixed.

14. Following Krishna Murari's case (supra), the Bombay High Court in Mithalal Maganlal Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1987) 1 Crimes 811, took the view that the grounds of detention formulated, prepared and signed two days after the issue of the order of detention was void ab initio. There is not much discussion in the short judgment, and with great respect to the learned Judges, I do not feel inclined to accept the above view. The law does not enjoin upon the authority that the grounds of detention must also be prepared, signed and served simultaneously: otherwise the detention would be void.

15. The recent amendment of the Act by Act 60 of 1984 inserting S. 5-A also weakens this submission by making the following provision:—

“(b). ‘The Government or Officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds.

16. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of Shri Pasayat that the law mandates the detaining authority to sign the grounds in support of the order of detention simultaneously.

17. The expresssion ‘contemporaneous’ used in the Supreme Court decision does not and cannot be construed to mean that the signing of the order of detention and the ‘grounds’ must be part of the same transaction, otherwise it will make the grace period provided for serving a copy of grounds on the detenu redundant. The plea of vagueness of the grounds was not seriously argued nor do I find any substance in the same.

18. An ancillary submission made by Mr. Pasayat was that under sub-sec. (5) of S. 3 of the Act, the State Government should have “reported the fact within seven days to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order had been passed.”

19. We have seen that the report was sent to the Central Government on 29-3-1987, i.e the day following the order of detention was approved by the State Government. It was submitted by Mr. Pasayat that according to this provision, the fact of detention of the petitioners should have reached the Central Government within seven days. In other words, the submission is that the expression ‘report’ should not mean that the fact of detention was merely forwarded to the Central Government but it/must be received within the prescribed period of seven days. In support of this contention, he relied upon two decisions, namely, 1985 Cri LJ 1257 (Bom) (Vinayak Ramchandra Sakhalkar v. D. Ramchandran) and 1986 (1) Crimes 124 : (1986 All LJ 1172) (Guru Charan Singh v. Superintendent, Central Jail).

20. The Bombay view supports the submission of Mr. Pasayat. It has been held in that case that “unless the report sent by the State Government under S. 3(5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government”. The Allahabad High Court following the Bombay decision has taken the same view that the report should not only be despatched by the State Government, but it must also be received by the Central Government within a period of seven days.

21. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the expressions ‘forthwith’ and ‘as soon as may be’ in the case of K.N Joglekar v. Commr. of Police, Greater Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 228 : (1957 Cri LJ 10) arising out of a case under the Public Safety Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and it was observed as follows:—

“Hence the word ‘forthwith’ means only that the act should be performed with reasonable speed and expedition and that any delay in the matter should be satisfactorily explained.”

22. It was held that the former expression was more peremptory than the latter. On the basis of the above authority, what I want to emphasise is that even to the expression ‘forthwith’ which is so peremptory in nature, the meaning given was that the act must be performed with reasonable speed and expedition.

23. Having given my anxious consideration to theaforesaid decisions and the scheme and purport of the provision, I am unable to concur in the view expressed by the learned Judges of the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts. In my opinion, bearing in mind the rule of harmonious construction so that it may not frustrate the object and purpose of the Statute, giving such a narrow construction in many cases may render the provision unworkable. The office of the Central Government being situated at Delhi, States situated in the extreme south or in the north-eastern region may find it absolutely impracticable to comply with such a rigour even by the fastest mode of communication.

24. The meaning of the word ‘report’ given in the Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary is “to transmit as having been said, done or observed: to write down or take notes of”. The obligation of a State Government is fully discharged if the report is forwarded by the known modes of communication within the prescribed time of seven days, and in the facts of the case, that having been done, the impugned orders cannot be struck down on this account.

25. Now, I shall proceed to deal with the main ground of attack, namely, as to whether there was any unreasonable and unexplained delay in disposing of the petitioners' representations either by the State Government or the Central Government.

26. Counsel submitted that delay had been caused at the State Government level between, (i) 18th April and 26th April, 1987 and (ii) between 28th April and 5th May, 1987 and similarly at the Central Government level (a) between 30th March and 21st April, 1987 and (b) between the 4th May and 11th May, 1987.

27. I shall first take up the period between 18th and 26th April. From the date chart it would appear that the representations of the petitioners were forwarded by the District Magistrate to the State Government on 13-4-1987 and were received on 18-4-1987. After the comments of the Superintendent of Police were received, the representations were placed before the Chief Minister on 26-4-, 1987 and the order of rejection was passed by him on 28-4-1987.

28. In the first counter filed by opposite party No. 2, there is no detailed explanation, but in the additional counter-affidavit, the following statements regarding the movement of the petitioners' representations have been made:—

19th April being a Sunday, the representations were put up before the Home Department on 20-4-1987 and it was thereafter submitted to the Deputy Secretary on 23-4-1987. The Deputy Secretary in his turn submitted the same to the Chief Secretary on 25-4-1987 for placing it before the Chief Minister. It was endorsed to the Chief Minister on 26-4-1987 and was disposed of by him on 28-4-1987. The file then travelled back from the office of the Chief Minister to the Home Department, and the order was issued to the detenus on 1-5-1987 which was received by them on 4-5-1987. In the intervening period, the following holidays had also occurred:—

5-4-1987 Sunday. 6-4-1987 Asokasthami 7-4-1987 Sri Ram Navami 11-4-1987 Second Saturday 12-4-1987 Sunday. 14-4-1987 Maha Visuba Sankaranti. 17-4-1987 Good Friday. 19-4-1987 Sunday. 26-4-1987 Sunday.

29. In my view, the above facts and circumstances give adequate explanation for the time consumed by the State Government in disposing of the petitioners' representation.

30. There is no provision in the Act regarding consideration of the representations by the Central Government. But the Supreme Court in the case of Sabir Ahmed v. Union Of India., (1980) 3 SCC 295, and Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 481 : AIR 1982 SC 1 : (1982 Cri LJ 146) has held that the Central Government also being empowered to pass an order of revocation, a duty was cast upon it to see that the report received under S. 3 or any communication or petition received from the detenu was considered with ‘reasonable expedition’.

31. The reasons which were offered in the counter-affidavit for the alleged delay at the State Government level also explain the delay in the disposal of the matter by the Central Government. It was, however, submitted by Shri Pasayat that delay was committed by the State Government in transmitting the petitioners' representations to the Central Government which took about three weeks' time.

32. It was rightly submitted by the counsel for the State that as a matter of prudence and propriety, no useful purpose could have been served by merely forwarding the bare representations to the Central Government. The Central Government obviously would have called for comments from the State Government to appreciate and meet the points and pleas raised by the detenus in their representations. So the representations were forwarded on receipt of the comments of the Superintendent of Police.

33. With regard to the communication of the order of the Central Government, it is stated in the additional counter-affidavit that wireless messages were received on 1-5-1987 and 4-5-1987 by the State Government in respect of the petitioners in OJC No. 1685/87 and OJC No. 1659/87 respectively and on 2-5-1987 in respect of the petitioner in O.J.C No. 1707/87 which were forthwith despatched to the jail authorities and communicated to the detenus without causing any delay in serving the order of rejection of the representations of the petitioners.

34. I would now refer to some of the decisions cited by Shri Pasayat on the question of delay.

35. Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab (1982 Cri LJ 146) (supra) was a case where there was a complete failure on the part of the State authorities to forward the detenu's representations to the Central Government.

36. Shri Pasayat, however, placed strong reliance on the observations in the case of Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P, (1981) 2 SCC 710 : AIR 1981 SC 1126 : (1981 Cri LJ 750) where the Supreme Court commented upon the delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu by calling for comments from other departments, i.e, “seeking the opinion of the Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to”. The situation in this case was as follows:—

“…….. the representation was with the Customs authorities who were formulating their comments from 7th June, 1980 to the 12th of June, 1980 and that the representation was under the consideration of the Government for four days from 13th June, 1980 to 16th June, 1980, of its Law Department from 17th June, 1980 to 18th June, 1980 and then again under its own consideration for six days from 19th June, 1980 to 24th June, 1980.

37. In Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, (1981) 2 SCC 480 : AIR 1981 SC 1077 : (1981 Cri LJ 606), the Supreme Court has observed that “the right and obligation to make and to consider the representation at the earliest opportunity is a constitutional imperative which cannot be curtailed or abridged. If the Parliament or the State legislature making the law providing for preventive detention devises a circumlocutory procedure for considering the representation or if the inter-departmental consultative procedures are such that delay becomes inevitable, the law and the procedures will contravene the constitutional mandate. It is essential that any law providing for preventive detention and any authority obliged to make orders for preventive detention should adopt procedures calculated towards expeditious consideration of representations made by detenus.”

38. On the facts presented before us, however, I feel satisfied that the representations of the detenus were considered and disposed of without any unreasonable delay and the representations were not subjected to the vagaries of “administrative red tape” and the time consumed in their reaching the official authorities from the jail authorities on the facts and circumstances disclosed in the affidavits was inevitable having due regard to the procedure and the rule of business of the State Government which does not appear to be circumlocutory.

39. Thus, all the points raised by Shri Pasayat in challenge of the orders of detention having been found to be devoid of merit, the writ applications must fail and they are accordingly dismissed.

40. K.P Mohapatra, J.:— I agree and would like to add with reference to the first contention of Mr. Pasayat that the connected file disclosed that on consideration of the report of the Superintendent of Police, the District Magistrate being the detaining authority had applied his mind and recorded his satisfaction of existence of the grounds of detention. So, on the date the detention order was passed, the grounds of detention were in existence.

41. Application dismissed.