Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment dated 20-12-1982 of the Sessions Judge, Balasore in S.T. No. 46 of 1982, which convicted the appellants for dacoity under Section 395, Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to seven years' rigorous imprisonment.

The prosecution case, as set out in the record, is that on 9-11-1981 at about 5–5:30 P.M., while several persons (P.W.s 1–6, 10 and others) were returning from the Raibania weekly market near the Dhanghera jungle, a group of about 15–25 persons armed with weapons attacked and assaulted them and carried away articles such as cycles and umbrellas. P.W.1 filed a report (treated as the FIR) and police investigated, leading to the appellants being sent up for trial.

The appellants denied involvement and claimed false implication; they did not call any witnesses in their defence. The trial court convicted them under Section 395 IPC and, finding Section 397 IPC applicable, sentenced each to seven years' imprisonment. The present appeal confirms the conviction but challenges aspects of sentencing and the application of Section 397.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants were personally involved in the occurrence of dacoity on 9-11-1981.
  2. Whether it was legally permissible to apply Section 397, I.P.C. (use of deadly weapons in dacoity) at the stage of sentencing when the charge was framed only under Section 395, I.P.C.
  3. Given the procedural defect in invoking Section 397 at sentencing, what is the appropriate quantum of sentence to be imposed on the appellants consistent with the law and the findings of conviction under Section 395 I.P.C.?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants pleaded that they were not involved in the dacoity and were falsely implicated.
  • They did not produce witnesses in support of their defence (no additional exculpatory evidence was led by them).

Prosecution's Case and Evidence

  • The prosecution examined 16 witnesses including P.W.s 1–6 and 10 (victims/eye-witnesses), medical witnesses (P.W.s 12 and 13), the magistrate who conducted the T.I. Parade (P.W.11), and police officers who effected recoveries (P.W.s 7 and 14).
  • P.W.1 and P.W.4 gave detailed identification evidence against the appellants; both identified the appellants at trial and in the T.I. parade (P.W.1 identified appellant Gaya in the T.I., P.W.4 identified both appellants in the T.I.).
  • Medical evidence corroborated injuries sustained by some victims.
  • Material objects said to have been taken during the dacoity (an umbrella, M.O.I) were recovered from appellant Gaya’s house; a bicycle was also recovered but the prosecution produced no evidence that that cycle was stolen in the dacoity, so the judge ignored that recovery for conviction purposes.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, applying fact evaluation and legal principle strictly as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Assessment of occurrence: The court accepted the prosecution evidence that a dacoity occurred on 9-11-1981 near Dhanghera jungle. The testimony of P.W.s 1–6 and 10 described a group armed with deadly weapons assaulting victims and carrying away articles; medical evidence (P.W.s 12 & 13) corroborated injuries.
  2. Identification of appellants: The court closely examined identification evidence. P.W.1 gave a detailed account of how, in the light of an oncoming truck headlight, he could observe and later identify appellant Gaya and narrated specific acts by Gaya (e.g., threatening with a bow and arrow). P.W.4 also identified both appellants at the scene and in court. The T.I. parade evidence (P.W.11) confirmed that P.W.1 identified Gaya and P.W.4 identified both appellants in the parade, and P.W.11's testimony showed procedural formalities were followed in conducting the parade.
  3. Consideration of possible pre-exposure/manipulation: The court examined the sequence of detention and production (detention at Jhadgram jail, production before C.J.M. Balasore, remand to Balasore Jail and then T.I. parade) and found no material to suggest that witnesses had an opportunity to see the appellants prior to the parade; the court also drew an inference from selective identifications (e.g., P.W.1 identified only Gaya in the parade) that clandestine manipulation was unlikely.
  4. Corroborative recoveries: The court evaluated recovery evidence. P.W.2 stated an umbrella (M.O.I) taken during the dacoity was his; P.W.7 and P.W.14 testified the umbrella was recovered from Gaya's house during search. The court treated this recovery as strong corroboration of P.W.1 and P.W.4’s identification of Gaya. A recovered bicycle was traced by cash memo to a relative of P.W.4/P.W.10, but because there was no prosecution evidence that the bicycle was stolen in the dacoity, the court excluded it from consideration in convicting the appellants.
  5. Assessment of individual culpability: Based on the combination of direct identification (P.W.1, P.W.4, P.W.10), T.I. parade corroboration (P.W.11), medical evidence, and the recovery of a stolen umbrella from Gaya’s house (P.W.s 2, 7, 14), the court concluded the prosecution proved the appellants’ participation in the dacoity beyond reasonable doubt.
  6. Legal analysis on charge versus sentencing: The court analysed the procedural and substantive law regarding Sections 395 and 397, I.P.C. It observed that the appellants had been charged only under Section 395 I.P.C., while the Sessions Judge invoked Section 397 I.P.C. at sentencing because the facts disclosed the use of deadly weapons. The court held that Section 397 does not create a substantive offence but operates as an enhancement (i.e., S.395 read with S.397); therefore the correct course would have been to frame charges under S.395 read with S.397. Applying S.397 at the sentencing stage for the first time when the charge was framed only under S.395 was found to be procedurally improper and "contrary to law".
  7. Adjustment of sentence: Because of the procedural defect in applying S.397 at sentencing, the court set aside that aspect of the Sessions Judge's order and reduced the sentence. While upholding the conviction under Section 395 I.P.C., the court imposed a sentence of 5 years' rigorous imprisonment on each appellant (reduced from seven years).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Conviction under Section 395, Indian Penal Code is confirmed, but the part of the Sessions Judge's order relying on Section 397 I.P.C. at the sentencing stage is set aside as procedurally improper. The appeals are dismissed except insofar as the quantum of sentence is reduced.

Specific orders given by the court (direct effects):

  • The conviction of the appellants under Section 395 I.P.C. is affirmed.
  • The application of Section 397 I.P.C. at the sentencing stage (when the charge was framed only under Section 395) was held to be contrary to law and that portion of the sentence was set aside.
  • Each appellant's sentence is reduced from seven years' rigorous imprisonment to five years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 395 I.P.C.

Implications: The decision's direct consequence is adjustment of the sentence imposed on the appellants while leaving the conviction intact. The opinion limits the remedial step to correcting the sentencing procedure followed (i.e., the necessity to charge under S.395 read with S.397 if Section 397 is to be invoked), and does not record any broader legal principle beyond the immediate correction of defective application of S.397 in this case. No new precedent beyond the case-specific application is articulated in the opinion.

Ordered accordingly.

    Gaya Bhakta And Another v. The State .

    1. The appellants preferred this appeal against the judgment dated 20-12-1982 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Balasore in S.T No. 46 of 1982 convicting them under S. 395, Indian Penal Code and sentencing each of them to seven years' R.I The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that on 9-11-1981 at about 5 to 5.30 P.M as P.Ws 1 to 6, 10 and others were returning from Raibania weekly market crossing the road by the side of the jungle near Dhanghera, the appellants along with several others numbering about 15 to 20 persons armed with deadly weapons like lathis, tangia, bows and arrows, attacked and assaulted the said P.Ws and others and carried away the various articles such as cycles etc., belonging to them and after the dacoits had left, P.W 1 reported about the occurrence at the Raibania P.S and the said report was treated as the FIR in the case and on the basis of that FIR police proceeded with the investigation of the case and ultimately sent up the appellants for trial.

    2. The appellants plead that they were in no way involved in the occurrence of dacoity said to have taken place on 9-11-1981 near the Raibania weekly market, but they were falsely implicated. They did not examine any witness in support of their case.

    3. The prosecution had examined in all 16 P.Ws to prove its case. P.Ws 1 to 6 and 10 claim to have suffered at the hands of the dacoits on the relevant evening. The evidence of P.Ws 1 to 6 and 10 shows that on the relevant evening as they along with others were returning from Raibania weekly market, several persons armed with deadly weapons attacked them and assaulting them carried away some of the articles belonging to them. P.Ws 12 and 13 are the doctors who examined some of the persons who received injuries in the course of the occurrence of dacoity. The evidence of the doctor, P.W 12, shows that he had examined P.Ws 3, 5 and 6 and found injuries on them. Likewise, the doctor, P.W 13, had examined P.W 2 and found injuries on his persoa so the medical evidence; in the case also lends corroboration to the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 6 and 10 that during the course of the occurrence of dacoity some of them were assaulted. Nothing substantial was elicited in the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses to the occurrence, to doubt their testimony that more than 5 persons armed with deadly weapons were involved in the occurrence of dacoity that took place on the relevant evening near the Dhanghera jungle. The appellants also do not seriously challenge the occurrence of dacoity, though they plead that they were in no way involved in the said occurrence.

    4. This is the proper stage to consider whether the prosecution has been able to prove that the appellants were also involved in the occurrence of dacoity. It is in the evidence of P.W 1 that the occurrence had taken place on 9-11-1981 at about 5.30 P.M near Dhanghera jungle, as he and others including P.Ws 2, 3, 4 and 10 were returning from the Raibania weekly market. He deposed that a truck was coming from the opposite direction with its headlight switched on at that time and in that light he could mark the features of 3 to 4 persons who were near him. It is in his evidence, that about 25 persons armed with lathis, bows and arrows attacked them and forcibly took away their properties after assaulting them and that the occurrence had taken place for about an hour. P.W 1 had stated that appellant Gaya with a bow and arrow threatened him, keeping the arrow near his chest for about 10 to 15 minutes, when he had to surrender his articles to him, and the later, while returning his comb and pen, stole away his other articles. From his: evidence it is seen that he has given a graphic picture of the part played by appellant Gaya so far as he is concerned and his testimony on this aspect could not be shaken in the cross-examination. P.W 1 promptly reported about the occurrence and it was his report which was treated as the FIR (Ext. 1) in the case.

    5. P.W 4 Paramartanda Das is another material witness for the prosecution and the substance of his, evidence is that on the relevant evening near Dhanghera jungle, 15 to 20 persons armed with deadly weapons attacked him and several others including P.Ws 1 to 3, and looted away their properties. His evidence shows that as motor vehicle was coming from the opposite direction with its headlight on he could see two persons who forcibly took away his articles and the appellants were the persons involved in the occurrence. There is nothing in the evidence of P.W 4 to doubt his competency to identify; the appellants to be amongst the culprits: involved in the occurrence of dacoity as his evidence discloses that he was in a position to identify them as they came near him. The nature of the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 4 is such that their testimony implicating the appellants in the occurrence of dacoity can be safely relied on even without independent corroboration.

    6. Apart from identifying appellant Gaya in Court as one of the culprits who were involved in the occurrence of dacoity, P.W 1 had identified him in the T.I Parade also. P.W 4 is the other eye-witness to the occurrence who identified in court the appellants as two of the culprits who had also taken part in the occurrence of the dacoity on the relevant evening. He identified them in the T.I Parade also. P.W 11 is the Magistrate who conducted the T.I Parade and his evidence shows that in the T.I Parade P.W 1 had identified appellant Gaya whereas P.W 4 had identified both the appellants, Thus, the evidence of P.W 11 corroborates: the version of P.Ws 1 and 4 regarding the identification of the appellants in the T.I I Parade. From the evidence of P.W 11 it is seen that he had conducted the T.I Parade after duly observing all the procedural formalities and nothing was elicited in his cross-examination to undermine the value of the T.I Parade. P.W 1 was a resident of Mauza-Maharaguna and P.W 4 was a resident of Mauza-Kanpur and both the villages are of Raibania Police Station. The appellants were detained in the first instance in Jhadgram jail, and from there they were produced before the C.J.M, Balasore, whereafter they were remanded to Balasore Jail, where the T.I Parade was held. So I agree with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that there was no opportunity for the identifying witnesses to see the appellants before the date of the T.I Parade. Even otherwise also there is no material on record to suggest that the, prosecution had made any attempt to show the appellants to P.Ws 1 and 4 at any time prior to the conducting of the T.I Parade. The very fact that P.W 1 could identify only appellant Gaya in T.I Parade reveals that no clandestine manipulation was made in the investigating agency in the matter of identification, as otherwise P.W 1 would have been in a position to identify both the appellants.

    7. The evidence of P.W 2 shows that during the course of the occurrence of dacoity the culprits had taken away his umbrella and he states on oath that M.O.I is the umbrella so taken away by them. The evidence of P.W 7 reveals that an umbrella was seized from the house of appellant Gaya. The, evidence of P.W 14 established that the umbrella, M.O.I was seized from the house; of Gaya during the course of his house-search. Nothing substantial was elicited in the cross-examination of P.W 14 to discredit his testimony regarding the recovery of the umbrella, M.O.I from the house of appellant Gaya. Hence, relying on the evidence of P.Ws 2, 7 and 14 it can be safely held that the umbrella M.O.I which was stolen during the course of the dacoity was recovered from the house of appellant Gaya and this is another circumstance which strongly corroborates the version of P.Ws 1 and 4 regarding the involvement of appellant Gaya in the occurrence of dacoity.

    8. The evidence of P.Ws 7 and 14 establishes that the green model Raleigh bicycle bearing No. 007020 was recovered from the house of accused Gaya. The evidence of P.Ws 4 and 10 stows that the said bicycle was purchased by one Nityananda Das, brother of P.W 4 and uncle of P.W 10, and Ext. 2/1 is the cash-memo relating to it. On a perusal of Ext. 2/1 it is seen that it is a cash memo for the green cycle bearing No. 007020 and from that it can be safely inferred that the cycle M.O.I I recovered from the house of appellant Gaya belongs to the said Nityananda Das. But then there is no evidence from the side of the prosecution that the said bicycle was also one of the articles stolen during the course of the occurrence of dacoity and so I have ignored the said recovery of the cycle from appellant Gaya's house while assessing the evidence against him in the present case. Even ignoring this, as earlier pointed out, there is sufficient reliable evidence to show that appellant Gaya was one of the culprits who took part in the occurrence of dacoity on the relevant evening.

    9. Apart from the convincing evidence of P.W 4 implicating appellant Suna Bhakta in the occurrence of dacoity, there is also the evidence of P.W 10 showing that he (appellant No. 2) was also involved in the occurrence of dacoity. P.W 10 identified appellant Suna in court as one of the persons who committed dacoity on the relevant evening. The defence suggestion to P.W 10 that he identified Suna as he happened to be in the dock was denied by him and the very fact, that he (P.W 10) did not identify both the appellants, as the culprits involved in the occurrence of dacoity, reveals that he is a truthful witness, who is prepared to identify on oath only that person whom he was actually in a position to identify. But then P.W 10 did not participate in the T.I Parade. But all the same his evidence identifying appellant No. 2 Suna as one of the culprits, corroborating the evidence of P.W 4 on the aspect of the identification of appellant Suna as one of the culprits involved in the occurrence of dacoity, cannot be ignored altogether.

    10. On a careful consideration of the entire material on record, as discussed above, I hold that the prosecution could successfully bring home to the appellants the charge under S. 395, I.P.C as found by the lower court. I confirm the order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge against the appellants under S. 395 I.P.C

    11. The learned Sessions Judge while convicting the appellants under S. 395, I.P.C finding that in the facts of the case S. 397, I.P.C is applicable, sentenced each of the appellants to 7 years' R.I holding that is the minimum sentence that can be awarded under S. 397, I.P.C On a perusal of the charge framed against the appellants, it is seen that they were charged only under S. 395, I.P.C I when the prosecution case discloses at the outset, as in the present case, that the accused persons had used deadly weapons in the course of the occurrence of dacoity, the application of S. 397, I.P.C is attracted. But then S. 397, I.P.C does not create a substantive offence and the court, therefore, should have framed a charge under S. 395, I.P.C read with S. 397 I.P.C So the framing of the charge only under S. 395, I.P.C is defective and it cannot be said that the same is not without prejudice to the appellants, in the facts of the present case, as they are ultimately sentenced under S. 397, I.P.C Likewise, before S. 397 I.P.C was invoked for sentencing the appellants, they should have been convicted under S. 395, I.P.C read with S. 397 I.P.C but not merely under S. 395, I.P.C as done by the learned Sessions Judge. In the circumstances, the application of S. 397, I.P.C by the learned Sessions Judge for the first time at the stage of sentencing them, is contrary to law and that part of his order is, therefore, liable to be set aside. So the appellants are liable to be sentenced only under S. 395, I.P.C as the learned Sessions Judge had convicted them thereunder, which is presently confirmed by me. While imposing the sentence of 7 years' imprisonment on the appellants, the learned Sessions Judge was prompted by the consideration that as S. 397, I.P.C is applicable, the minimum sentence of 7 years thereunder, ought to be imposed on them. But now that it is found that the appellants can be sentenced only under S. 395 I.P.C, I feel it is just and proper that the sentence imposed on them should be less than seven years. So I hold that sentencing each of them to 5 years' R.I would sufficiently meet the ends of justice. Hence, while upholding the conviction of the appellants under S. 395, I.P.C I sentence each of them, thereunder, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 5 years. In the result, I find no merit in the appeal except on the aspect of the quantum of sentence imposed and, therefore, the sentence is reduced as indicated above and accordingly, with the above reduction in the sentence imposed, the appeal is dismissed.

    12. Ordered accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Gaya Bhakta And Another v. The State .
    (Sep 11, 1987)