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  • Sections 195, 209, 211, 403, 405, 415, 417, 418, 420, 424, 463, 464, 468, 470 and 471, IPC.
  • point". (Section 561A of the old Code is Identical to Section 482 of the Code).
  • Section 482 of the Code of Griminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • Section 418 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred
  • Sections 395, 468, 465, 471, 412 and 120B/34, IPC. Of)
  • Section 197(1) of the Code.
  • Section 202 of the Code. 2)
  • Section 197(1), an act
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citation codes
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  • Sections 195, 209, 211, 403, 405, 415, 417, 418, 420, 424, 463, 464, 468, 470 and 471, IPC.
  • point". (Section 561A of the old Code is Identical to Section 482 of the Code).
  • Section 482 of the Code of Griminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • Section 418 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred
  • Sections 395, 468, 465, 471, 412 and 120B/34, IPC. Of)
  • Section 197(1) of the Code.
  • Section 202 of the Code. 2)
  • Section 197(1), an act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the Managing Director of Konark Television Limited. The opposite party is a transport company which, through its Branch Manager at Cuttack, filed a complaint alleging that goods were transported and delivered to the petitioner under several consignment notes (No. 4447 dated 4.1.1983 and Nos. 3694, 3695 and 3696 dated 8.3.1983) for which transport charges of Rs. 15,700/- were not immediately paid. The petitioner purportedly promised payment later, but allegedly did not pay despite demands; the petitioner is said to have replied that the transport charges had been paid to another transporter who had no authority to receive them. A subsequent consignment in July 1983 for which delivery required payment of Rs. 15,000/- was not released due to the earlier experience; the goods were stored in the transporter's godown and a later bill of Rs. 24,000/- (including godown rent) was not accepted by the petitioner. The opposite party alleges that the petitioner filed a false report at Madbupatna Police Station against the Branch Manager and an employee, leading to G.R. Case No. 2391 of 1983 and their arrest, and that the petitioner obtained release of the goods by fraudulent means and by creating/using false documents. The complaint listed multiple IPC sections (including Sections 195, 209, 211, 403, 405, 415, 417, 418, 420, 424, 463, 464, 468, 470 and 471).

Procedurally, on 3.10.1983 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), after examining the Branch Manager, directed a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Judicial Magistrate submitted a report, and by order dated 4.1.1984 the CJM, on consideration of that inquiry report, took cognisance of an offence under Section 418, IPC, and directed issuance of process. The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings (ICC Case No. 275 of 1983).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate wrongly exercised jurisdiction in taking cognisance under Section 418, IPC, on the basis of an inquiry conducted by a Judicial Magistrate under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
  2. Whether the allegations in the complaint, even if taken at face value, constitute an offence under Section 418, IPC.
  3. Whether prior sanction under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. was required to prosecute the petitioner (a public servant) for an offence alleged to have been committed while acting in the discharge of official duty.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented through Mr. Jayant Das)

  • The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate acted in wrongful exercise of jurisdiction by taking cognisance under Section 418 on the basis of an inquiry conducted by a Judicial Magistrate under Section 202 Cr.P.C.; such procedure is impermissible.
  • Even assuming all allegations are true, the facts disclose no offence under Section 418, IPC; the dispute is essentially civil (breach of contract/breach of promise to pay transport charges) and not criminal.
  • The petitioner is a gazetted public servant not removable except by sanction of the State Government; because the alleged acts were done in discharge of official duty, prior sanction under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. was necessary before taking cognisance.

Opposite Party's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The opinion records that learned counsel for the opposite party (Mr. Ashok Mohanty) did not dispute the legal proposition regarding the illegality of taking cognisance on the basis of an inquiry under Section 202 made by another magistrate; beyond that, detailed contrary legal argumentation is not set out in the text of the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1960 S.C. 866, R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab Scope of High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A (identical to Section 482 Cr.P.C.): categories where quashing is appropriate (prevent abuse of process, legal bar to institution/continuance such as absence of sanction, allegations not constituting an offence even if accepted, or absence of legal evidence). The court relied on this settled principle as foundational guidance for exercising Section 482 powers to quash the criminal proceedings in appropriate cases.
AIR 1976 S.C. 1947, Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others Guidelines on circumstances in which the High Court should quash criminal proceedings under its inherent jurisdiction. The court treated these guidelines as identical/consistent with R.P. Kapur and as being followed in the High Court's practice; they supported the Court's exercise of inherent jurisdiction here.
55 (1983) CLT 24, M/s. Lord Match Industries v. M. S. Salvasekaran Illustrates that mere breach of contract or a promise not fulfilled does not, without more, amount to cheating; dishonest intention must exist at the time of promise. The court cited this case to support the conclusion that the facts here amounted to a civil dispute (breach of contract) and did not prima facie disclose cheating under Section 418 IPC.
56 (1983) CLT 105, Prafulla Mohanty v. Ashok Kumar Das Relied on M/s. Lord Match Industries to hold that no prima facie case under Section 420 IPC was made out where the dispute was civil in nature. The court used this decision as additional authority for quashing criminal proceedings which are essentially civil disputes.
57 (1984) CLT 355, Omprakash Sahu v. Manmohan Mohanty and another Held that an order under Section 102 (as applied in the cited case) cannot validly entrust a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry such that the report of that inquiry would form the basis for summoning; such a procedure is illegal and the summons based on it are liable to be quashed. The court applied this principle directly: because the CJM's order took cognisance on the basis of an inquiry under Section 202 conducted by another Judicial Magistrate pursuant to a direction, the impugned order was held to be invalid and quashed on that ground alone.
AIR 1979 S.C. 850, Trilok Singh and Ors. v. Satya Deo Tripathi Where disputes are essentially civil (e.g., arising out of hire-purchase/default), criminal proceedings instituted are an abuse of process and may be quashed. The court relied on this precedent to reinforce that the present dispute — over transport charges and alleged repudiation — is civil in nature and that criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process.
AIR 1973 S.C. 326, State of Kerala v. Pareed Pillai and another To convict for cheating it must be shown that dishonest intention existed at time of making the promise; inability later to fulfil a promise does not alone establish dishonest intention. The court cited this principle (via Lord Match Industries) to support the position that mere non-payment or failure to perform a promise does not amount to prima facie evidence of cheating under Section 418 IPC.
AIR 1955 S.C. 309, Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu Not every offence by a public servant requires prior sanction under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C.; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with official duties and could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, sanction is necessary. The court applied this precedent to conclude that the petitioner's acts were directly connected with his official duties as Managing Director and therefore prosecutorial sanction under Section 197(1) was required before instituting proceedings.
AIR 1979 S.C. 1841, S.B. Sana and Ors. v. M.S. Kochar Interpretation of "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" in Section 197(1) — the words admit narrow and wide construction; an act directly and reasonably connected with official duty requires sanction. The court used this authority to determine that the petitioner's actions were inextricably connected with his office and therefore attracted the protection of Section 197(1), requiring prior sanction which had not been obtained.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court structured its analysis in three principal stages, applying settled law and the facts recorded in the complaint and inquiry report.

  1. Scope of inherent jurisdiction (Section 482): The Court began by stating the settled principles governing the High Court's inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings, relying on R.P. Kapur and allied authorities. The Court recognized categories where quashing is appropriate: to prevent abuse of process, where there is a legal bar (e.g., absence of sanction), where allegations do not constitute an offence even when taken at face value, and where there is no legal evidence supporting the charge.
  2. Validity of the procedure leading to cognisance: The Court examined the procedural path: the CJM examined the Branch Manager and directed a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry under Section 202; that Judicial Magistrate submitted a report; and the CJM took cognisance under Section 418 and issued process. The Court relied on Omprakash Sahu (57 (1984) CLT 355) which held that an order under the analogous provision (Section 102 in that context) cannot validly entrust another Magistrate to conduct an inquiry such that the inquiry report would be the basis for summoning; such an arrangement renders the subsequent order invalid. The opinion records that learned counsel for the opposite party did not dispute this legal proposition. Accordingly, the Court concluded that on this procedural ground alone the impugned order was liable to be quashed.
  3. Whether the allegations disclose an offence under Section 418 IPC: The Court next considered the substance of the allegations. It summarized the factual matrix: there was a contract for carriage; the opposite party performed by transporting and delivering goods; the petitioner did not pay and asserted payment had been made to another transporter; demands were made by letters; no civil suit was pursued but a criminal complaint was filed. Applying the legal tests for cheating (Sections 415 and 418 IPC) — which require fraudulent/dishonest intention and inducement causing wrongful loss — the Court concluded that the facts at best established a civil dispute (breach of contract or breach of promise). It referred to precedents (Trilok Singh; M/s. Lord Match Industries; State of Kerala v. Pareed Pillai; Prafulla Mohanty) holding that dishonest intention cannot be presumed from mere non-fulfilment of a promise and that such disputes are civil in nature. The Court thus found that even assuming the allegations true, a prima facie case under Section 418 IPC was not made out.
  4. Requirement of sanction under Section 197(1) Cr.P.C.: Finally, the Court analyzed whether prior sanction was necessary. It accepted the uncontested factual position that the petitioner was a gazetted public servant (member of Orissa Industrial Service) deputed as Managing Director of Konark Television Limited. The Court reasoned that acceptance of consignments and repudiation of the transporter's claim were acts performed in the discharge of official functions and were inextricably linked to the office. Citing Amrik Singh and S.B. Sana, the Court held that where an act is directly and reasonably connected to official duty, sanction under Section 197(1) is required before prosecution. Since no sanction had been obtained, the absence of sanction furnished an independent legal bar to the institution/continuance of the criminal proceedings.
  5. Conclusion of analysis: For the cumulative reasons — (a) procedural invalidity in taking cognisance on the basis of an inquiry conducted by another magistrate; (b) absence of a prima facie offence under Section 418 (the matter being essentially civil); and (c) lack of mandatory sanction under Section 197(1) — the Court held that the criminal proceedings constituted an abuse of the process and warranted quashing by exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final order was to quash the criminal proceedings. Specifically, the court QUASHED the criminal proceeding arising out of ICC Case No. 275 of 1983 in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack, against the petitioner.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the criminal prosecution commenced by the opposite party (as per ICC Case No. 275 of 1983) against the petitioner is terminated by quashing of the proceedings.
  • The Court relied on established precedent rather than laying down a new legal principle; the decision applies those precedents to the facts and bars the prosecution on procedural, substantive (no prima facie offence under Section 418 IPC), and sanction grounds (absence of Section 197(1) sanction).
  • This opinion does not purport to resolve any civil claim the opposite party may have for recovery of the transport charges; the Court noted the opposite party remained free to pursue civil remedies for recovery of the claimed amount.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not provide extended detail (for example, a full account of the opposite party's legal submissions), the summary reflects only what is stated in the opinion.

    Sarat Kumar Patnaik v. New Haryana Transport Co.

    1. In this petition Under Section 482 of the Code of Griminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'Code) the petitioner has assailed the order passed by the (earned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack, taking cognisance of an offence Under Section 418 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC'), and has prayed for quashing the entire criminal proceeding.

    2. The petitioner is the Managing Director of; Konark television Limited, whereas, the opp. party is a transport company. The oppt party through its Branch Manager of the branch office at Cuttack filed the complaint petition' against the petitioner and alleged that it had transported and delivered goods to the petitioner vide consignment note No. 4447 dated 4.1. '1983' and consignment note Nos. 3694, 3695 and 3696 dated 8.3. 1983. The transport charge amounting to Rs. 15,700/- was not immediately paid for delivery of the goods, but the petitioner promised that the amount shall be paid later. But despite requests and correspondences, the petitioner did not make payment of the transport charge, but on the other hand intimated the opp. party by, letter that the transport charge for the aforesaid consignments had been paid to M/s. Konark Transport Co. which, however, had no authority to receive such payment. On 29. 7. 1983 another consignment of goods was ready for delivery by the opp. party on payment of the transport charge of Rs. 15,000/-. But the petitioner as on the previous occasion wanted to take delivery of the goods, but deferred payment of the transport charge. The opp. party, earlier having had the bitter experience with the petitioner, did not agree to the proposition, did not deliver the goods and stored the same in its godown at Cuttack. Later the opp. party sent the bill of Rs. 24,000/- which included the transport charge, as well as, godown rent, but the petitioner did not take delivery of the goods on making the payment. On the other hand, he submitted a false report at Madbupatna Police Station against the Branch Manager and an employee of the opp. party for offences Under Sections 204, 407 and 420. IPC, on the basis of which, G R. Case No. 2391 of 1983 was initiated and got them arrested. He also got the goods released in his favour. For doing so, the petitioner acted fraudulently and dishonestly. He also created false documents and used them as genuine. Therefore, the petitioner had committed offences Under Sections 195, 209, 211, 403, 405, 415, 417, 418, 420, 424, 463, 464, 468, 470 and 471, IPC.

    3. On 3. 10. 1983 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate examined the Branch Manager of the opp. party and directed a Judicial Magistrate to conduct inquiry under 5ec. 202 of the Code. The learned Judicial Magistrate conducted the inquiry and submitted his report to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. By the impugned order dated 4. 1. I984, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, on consideration of the report of the inquiry, took cognisance of art offence Under Section 418, IPC, and directed issuance of process.

    4. Mr. Jayant Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised the following contentions :

    1) The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate acted in wrongful exercise of jurisdiction in taking cognigance of an offence Under Section 418, IPC, against the petitioner on the basis of an inquiry conducted by a judicial Magistrate Under section 202 of the code.

    2) Even assuming that all the allegations made by the opp. party in the complaint petition are true, no offence Under Section 418, IPC, has been made out

    3) The petitioner being a public servant not removable from his office save-by or with the sanction of the Government and is accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting in discharge of his official duty, cognisance of an offence Under Section 418, IPC, should not have been taken without the previous sanction of the State Government as contemplated in Section 197(1) of the Code.

    5. Before embarking upon discussion on the contentions raised, it would be useful to state the settled-principle of law with regard to exercise of inherent powers of the Court Under section 482 of the code for quashing criminal proceedings. In AIR 1960 S. C. 866, R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, p. B. Gajendragadhar, J. (as His Lordship then was) spoke for the Court thus :

    "...It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings, in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable on expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged, in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises, it is a matter merely of looking at complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclose 'or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the high Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the Criminal Court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise -In. cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there. is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced dearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence, which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its juridiction Under Section 561-A, the High Court would not embark - upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is rellable or not that "is the" function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not fee open to any party to Invoke the 'High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend ' that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the acquisition made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated "that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the" High Court Under Section 561-A to the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that Is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point".

    (Section 561A of the old Code is Identical to section 482 of the code).

    6. In AIR 1976 S. C. 1947, Smt Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and others, identical guidelines were given as to the circumstances in which the High Court shall quash a criminal proceeding. These guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court have been followed in this Court in several decisions. I will cite only two of them reported in 55 (1983) CIT 24 M/s. Lord Match Industries, through its partner A. Pugalarrihi and Ors. v. M. S. Salvasekaran and 56(1983) CLT 105, Prafulla Mohanty . Ashok Kumar Das.

    7. Mr. jayant Das placed reliance on 57 (1984) CLT 355, Omprakash Sahu v. Manmohan Mohanty and another, and urged that as the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate based on a report of inquiry Under section 202 of the code by a judicial Magistrate is illegal, so on this ground alone the Impugned order is liable to be quashed.

    8. It is indisputed that on 3. 10. 1983 after examination of the Branch Manager of the opp. party, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed a Judicial Magistrate to conduct inquiry Under section 202 of the code. The learned Judicial Magistrate conducted the inquiry and submitted his report, whereupon, on 4.1, 1984 the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the impugned order taking cognisance of an offence Under Section 418, IPC, against the petitioner In the case of Omprakash Sahu (supra) this Court held that an order Under Section 102 cannot be passed entrusting a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry and such an inquiry report made by another Magistrate on the basis of an "order passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate would be invalid and the accused persons cannot be summoned on the basis thereof and as'such the impugned order summoning the accused persons is illegal and against the provisions of the Code. Such an order is liable to be quashed; The principle laid down in this decision has been consistently followed by this Court. Learned counsel appearing for the opp. party, Mr. Ashok Mohanty, did not dispute the legal proposition. Therefore, on this ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be quashed.

    9. The second contention of Mr. Das js that the allegations made in the complaint petition taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the petitioner Under Section 418, IPC. On the other hand, it seems to be a case of civil nature for breach of contract or breach of promise to pay the transport charge. Therefore, subject to law of limitation and proof, the opposite party should approach the civil Court for recovery for a sum of Rs. 15,700/- from the petitioner.

    10. According to the allegations made in the complaint petition supported by the statements of two witnesses examined in the inquiry Under section 202 of the code, the petitioner received goods from the opposite party sent by consignment No. 4447 dated 4. 1. 1983 and consignment Nos, 3694, 3695 and 3696 dated 8. 1. 1983, on 8. 1. 1983 and 13. 1 1983 respectively. At the time of delivering the consignments, according to normal practice of business between the parties, the petitioner should have paid the transport charge of Rs. 15,700/- to the opposite party then and there. But on the plea that there was no cash, the petitioner deferred the payment. Besides making oral requests for payment of the transport charge, two letters were sent by the opposite party to the petitioner on 12. 4 1983 and on 20. 4. 1983 making demand of the same. The petitioner gave reply by letter dated 19. 7. 1984, inter alia stating therein that the transport charge relating to the disputed consignments had already been paid to M/s. Konark Transport Corporation which submitted (he bills therefor. After repudiation of the claim of the opposite party civil action was not taken but, on the other hand, the complaint petition was filed.

    11. From the aforesaid facts it appears that there was a contract for carriage of goods between the parties. The opposite party performed his part of the contract by transporting and delivering the goods, but the petitioner did not perform his part of the contract by making payment of the transport charge and repudiated, the claim on the ground that the transport charge claimed by the opposite party had been paid to another .transporter. These being the facts it was either a case of breach of contract or breach of promise creating a civil liability for which the opposite party should have approached the civil Court for recovery of the transport, charge of Rs. 15,700/-, instead of taking recouise to criminal action.

    12. According to Section 418, IPC, whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to a person who was interest in the transaction to which the cheating relates, he was bound, either by law, or by a legal contract, to protect, shall be punished. In order to attract the provision of section 418 there must first be cheating which according to Section 415, IPC, means fraudulent or dishonest deception and inducement to a person so deceived to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induced the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he was not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.

    13. In AIR 1979 S. C. 850, Trilok Singh and Ors. v. Satya Deo Tripathi, the dispute arose out of the hire purchase agreement of a truck by instalments. On the ground that there was default of instalment on the part of the hire purchaser and the accused forcibly removed the truck from the possession of the complainant despite protest, the complainant filed a complaint petition for offences Under Sections 395, 468, 465, 471, 412 and 120B/34, IPC. Of) these facts it was held that the criminal proceeding was clearly an abuse of the process of Court and was liable to be quashed. The dispute raised was puiely of civil nature even assuming the facts stated in the complaint petition were substantially correct.

    In 55(1983) CLT 24, M/s. Lord Match Industries v. M. S. Salvasekaran, reliance was placed on AIR 1973 S C 326, State of Kerala v. Pareed Pillai and another, where it was observed as follows :

    "To hold a person guilty of the offence of cheating, it has to be shown that his intention was dishonest at the time of making the promise. Such a dishonest intention cannot be inferred from the mere fact that he could not subsequently fulfil the promise"

    It was, therefore, held that the case was one of mere breach of contract without prima facie materials to make but an offence of cheating and so the order of cognisance was quashed. In o 56(1983) CLT 105, Praful'a Mohanty v. Ashok Kumar Das, reliance was placed on M/s. Lord Match Industries case (supra) and it was held that a pritna facie case Under Section 420, IPC, had not been made out. The dispute was one for cognisarce by the civil Court. Therefore, the criminal proceeding was quashed;

    14. On consideration of the facts and the settled-position of law elucidated above, I am clearly of the view that the petitioner had no dishonest nor criminal intention in acting in the manner he did in his official capacity as the Managing Director of Konark Television Limited. So, even though it is assumed that all the facts alleged in the complaint petition are. true, yet a case of cheating Under Section 418, IPC, cannot be made out against him. His liability, if any, is purely of a civil nature and the opposite party had the freedom to take recourse to a civil action according to law.

    15. The last contention relates to the bar of sanction Under Section 197(1) of the Code. The petitioner is a member of Orissa Industry Service, Class I (Junior) and, thus, a gazetted office* of the State Government. He was deputed by the State Government to function as the Managing Director of Konark Television Limited. He is thus, a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government as contemplated in section 197 of the code. This fact was not disputed at the time of hearing.

    16. The petitioner as the Managing Director of Konark Television Limited accepted goods sent vide consignment Nos. 4447, 169,4, 3695 and 36%. According to the opposite party the transport charge of Rs. 15,700/-. should have been paid to it. The amount was demanded by letters addressed to the petitioner on 12.4.1983. and 20. 4. 1983. The petitioner by his letter dated 19.7.1983 repudiated the claim saying that the transport charge of Rs. 15,700 bad been paid to the transporter M/s. Konark Transport Corporation Acceptance of goods as per the cognsignments and repudiation of the opposite party's claim for the transport charge substantially gave rise to the complaint petition. If the petitioner would not have been the Managing Director of Konark Television Limited, he would have no occasion to accept the goods as per the consignments and repudiate the claim or the opposite party saying that the transport charge amounting to Rs. 15,700/- had been paid to another transporter. In other words, the alleged actions of the petitioner were performed as a public servant in course of discharge of his official functions. He could not perform such functions in his individual capacity. Therefore, the actions of the petitioner were inextricably connected with his office as a public servant.

    17. In AIR 1955 S. C. 309, Amrik Singh -. State of Pepsu, it was held that it is not every offence committed by a public servant that required sanction for prosecution Under Section 197(1) of the Code nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties ; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary, and that would be so irrespective of whether it was, in fact, a proper discharge of his duties, because that would really be a matter of defence on the merits, which would have to be investigated at the trial, and could not arise at the stage of the grant of sanction, which must precede the institution of the prosecution. In AIR 1979 S. C. 1841, S. B, Sana and Ors. v. M.S. Kochar, it was held that the words "any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty "employed in Section 197(1) are capable of a narrow, as well as, a wide interpretation. If these words ere construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, "it is no-part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be". In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction In which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while, engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will equire sanction for prosecution under the said provision. it is the quality" of the act that is important, and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated by Section 197 will be attracted.

    18. From the facts and the settled position of Jaw, no position is conceivable except that before launching. prosecution against the petitioner sanction Under Section 197(1) of the Code was essential and necessary. Manifestly, the opposite party did not obtain such sanction. Therefore, this is another ground for which the entire criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed.

    19. For the reasons stated above, this is a fit case in which, in order to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, inherent powers Under Section 482 should be exercised for quashing the criminal proceeding against the petitioner. Accordingly, the criminal proceeding arising out of ICC Case No. 275 of 1983 against the petitioner in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack, is quashed.

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    Sarat Kumar Patnaik v. New Haryana Transport Co.
    (Jul 29, 1986)