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citation codes
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  • provisions of section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
  • section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • adopted.8. Section 6 of the Adoption Act
  • suit.5. Section 16 of the Adoption Act
  • section 11 of the Adoption Act. P.W 8
  • section 11 (iv) of the Adoption Act
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act
  • section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • adopted.8. Section 6 of the Adoption Act
  • suit.5. Section 16 of the Adoption Act
  • section 11 of the Adoption Act. P.W 8
  • section 11 (iv) of the Adoption Act
Smart Summary

Case Summary — R.N. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed against the dismissal of his suit seeking a declaration of title and recovery of possession of 4.45 acres (the 'B' schedule) or, alternatively, a partition of 9.951 acres (the 'A' schedule) and allotment of half share to him. The dispute arose from competing claims of title among members and heirs of the family of one Sukadeva. Sukadeva had two sons, Krutibas (defendant no.1) and Bhaskar (deceased 1951). Bhaskar's widow Golap is the second defendant. The plaintiff claimed he was adopted by Golap on 18-12-1959 and sued on 27-2-1965.

Defendants filed separate written statements denying the adoption and pleaded that Bhaskar had died in a state of jointness, making defendant no.1 the owner of the entire property on Golap's death. The Trial Judge focused on whether the adoption had been proved. The plaintiff produced a registered deed of adoption (Ext. 15), a photograph, and oral evidence; the Trial Judge applied section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act but treated the burden of proof as resting on the plaintiff (relying on Kishori Lal v. Mst Chaltibai) and held adoption not proved, also accepting the defendants' contention that the age-gap requirement under section 11(iv) was not satisfied. The suit was dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the adoption claimed by the plaintiff on 18-12-1959 was established in fact and in law.
  2. What is the effect of a duly registered adoption deed under section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and on whom does the burden of proof lie in the presence of such a document.
  3. Whether the statutory age-gap requirement in section 11(iv) of the Adoption Act (that the adoptive mother be at least 21 years older than the adopted male) was satisfied, and if not, whether that would render the adoption invalid under section 6 and section 11.
  4. Whether evidence (documentary and oral) relied upon by the plaintiff was fabricated or otherwise insufficient to sustain the presumption arising under section 16.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed to have been adopted by Golap on 18-12-1959 and relied on Ext. 15 (the registered deed of adoption) to create the statutory presumption under section 16 of the Adoption Act.
  • The plaintiff produced a photograph and oral testimony asserting that giving-and-taking and other ceremonies of adoption had taken place contemporaneously with the deed.
  • The plaintiff attempted to explain discrepancies in age records by asserting that his age had been enhanced to meet schooling or examination requirements (a contention the courts rejected).

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Adoption was denied. Defendants contended Bhaskar died in a state of jointness and that defendant no.1 therefore became owner of the property upon Golap's death.
  • Defendants challenged the validity of the adoption on the ground that the age gap between the adoptive mother (Golap) and the plaintiff was less than 21 years, contrary to section 11(iv) of the Adoption Act, rendering the adoption invalid under section 6.
  • They relied on documentary evidence (school admission register showing the plaintiff's date of birth 15-4-1959 entry indicating birth 15-4-1954) and a horoscope (Ext. R) indicating Golap's birth in 1938, arguing that Ext. 15's ages had been tailored to satisfy the statutory requirement.
  • They also argued that the purported adoption was not contemporaneous with the deed and that the adoption ceremony was fabricated after the fact to create a registered document and supporting oral evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kishori Lal v. Mst Chaltibai (AIR 1959 S.C. 504) Authority relied on by the Trial Judge indicating the burden to prove an adoption lay on the propounder (as understood by the Trial Judge). The appellate court noted the Trial Judge had examined evidence on the footing of this case; the Court held that applying that approach to a registered adoption document was erroneous in view of section 16 and subsequent decisions. The Court accepted respondents' concession that the Trial Judge erred in placing the burden on the plaintiff in respect of a registered document.
Shyama Sundar Padhi v. Dharanidhar Padhi (1971 1 C.W.R. 784) One in a series of decisions regarding the effect of section 16 of the Adoption Act (tending to settle the legal effect of a registered adoption document). The Court cited this decision as part of settled law that a registered adoption deed attracts the presumption under section 16 and shifts the initial burden to those who challenge the adoption; it relied on the series of cases to conclude the Trial Judge misapplied the burden of proof.
Manishi Krishna Murty v. Manishi Ohinne Yerrayya (1971 2 C.W.R. 36) Another decision cited in relation to the effect of section 16 of the Adoption Act. Used with the other cited decisions to demonstrate that the statutory presumption under section 16 has been clarified by prior authority; supported the concession that the Trial Judge should have treated the burden as on the defendants to disprove adoption.
Konchada Laxminarayan Subudhi v. Konchada Padmanav Subudhi (A.I.R. 1973 Orissa 3) Authority contributing to the settled position on the effect of a registered adoption document under section 16. Relied upon to show that where a registered document is produced the court will presume compliance with the Act unless disproved; supported the proposition that the defendants bore the onus of disproving the alleged adoption.
Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Singh (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 282) Used to take judicial notice that in India false ages are often recorded at the time of school admission (to lower age), affecting reliability of some age entries. The Court invoked this authority to explain the broader tendency of false ages being given at school admission in India; nevertheless, on the facts, the Trial Judge rightly disbelieved the plaintiff's attempt to claim age enhancement for the school register entry.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, staying strictly within the evidence and law recited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory Presumption Under Section 16: The Court explained that section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act creates a statutory presumption that a duly registered adoption document signed by the giver and taker records an adoption made in compliance with the Act, "unless and until it is disproved." The Court noted that the parties and prior decisions have settled the legal effect of section 16.
  2. Burden of Proof: The appellate Court found that the Trial Judge erred in treating the burden of proving adoption as resting on the plaintiff (propounder), referencing Kishori Lal as the basis for that approach. The Court accepted respondents' concession, based on later decisions of the Court, that when a registered adoption document is produced the burden or onus shifts to the defendants challenging the adoption to disprove it. However, the Court clarified that defendants could rely on existing materials on record rather than necessarily leading independent evidence.
  3. Relevant Statutory Requirement (Section 11(iv) and Section 6): The Court identified section 11(iv) as prescribing that where adoption is by a female of a male child, the adoptive mother must be at least twenty-one years older than the adopted person. Section 6 makes compliance with section 11 conditions integral to a valid adoption; violation renders the adoption invalid.
  4. Examination of Documentary Evidence on Ages: The deed of adoption (Ext. 15) gave the adoptive mother's age as 27 and the plaintiff's age as 3 (a 24-year gap). Defendants produced the school admission register (Ext. G) showing plaintiff's admission on 15-4-1959 with the natural father's signature and a proved date of birth (15-4-1954). The Court accepted the Trial Judge's rejection of the plaintiff's explanation that his age had been artificially increased later; on the evidence accepted, the plaintiff was about 5 years and 8 months old at the time of the alleged adoption.
  5. Competing Evidence on Adoptive Mother's Age: Two horoscopes were produced: Ext. 14 (plaintiff's side) giving Golap's birth as 13-7-1932 and Ext. R (defendants') showing 3-7-1938. Testimony (P.W.10 and others) indicated inconsistencies in ages across documents and statements; the Trial Judge treated Ext. R as genuine on the evidence. The Court explained how the ages and witness testimony made it more probable that Golap's age had been misrepresented in Ext. 15 to meet the statutory requirement.
  6. Evidence of Collusion/Manipulation to Satisfy Statutory Requirement: The Court relied on admissions in evidence that the lawyer who drafted the deed (P.W.6) and witnesses had discussed the ages to be stated to satisfy the Adoption Act. Witnesses (e.g., P.W.7 and P.W.8) had given evidence to the effect that ages had been discussed prior to drafting, and some witnesses were inconsistent. The Court found this conduct supported the defence contention that ages in Ext.15 were tailored to meet the legal requirement rather than reflecting true ages.
  7. Chronology and Contemporaneity: The Court noted contradictions on whether the adoption took place on 18-12-1959. P.W.7 and P.W.10 were cited as stating that the plaintiff was admitted to school before or shortly after the adoption and that, on the evidence, the adoption ceremony had not actually occurred on the claimed date. The Court accepted the Trial Judge's conclusion that the adoption was fabricated and that the presumption under section 16 was rebutted by the evidence.
  8. Legal Conclusion: Combining the evidential findings (plaintiff older than shown in Ext.15, adoptive mother younger than claimed in Ext.15, contemporaneity of the adoption doubtful, and evidence of deliberate age-statement manipulation), the Court concluded both factually and legally that the adoption had not occurred as claimed and, in any event, violated section 11(iv). Therefore, the adoption was invalid under the Adoption Act. Because the adoption could not be sustained, the plaintiff's claim to title predicated on adoption failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the Trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit is affirmed. The Court expressly held that the alleged adoption was both not proved as a fact and invalid in law because it failed to comply with the age-gap requirement of section 11(iv) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act; the presumption arising under section 16 was rebutted by the evidence.

Implications: The direct consequence of the decision is that the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession, and alternative reliefs based on the alleged adoption fails. The appellate Court found no merit in the appeal and affirmed the Trial Judge's dismissal. The Court also ordered that there would be no order as to costs in the appellate Court. The opinion does not state that any new legal precedent was laid down; it applies existing statutory provisions and precedents to the facts and upholds the Trial Court's factual and legal findings.

Appeal dismissed.

    Golak Chandra Rath v. Krutibas Rath And Another

    R.N Misra, J.:— Plaintiff is in appeal challenging the dismissal of his suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of 4. 45 acres of land shown in ‘B’ schedule of the plaint or in the alternative for partition of the total area of 9.951 acres of land described in the ‘A’ schedule and allotment of half share therein to him.

    2. One Sukadeva had two sons - Krutibas and Bhaskar. Suka's widow is the second defendant. Krutibas is defendant no. 1. Bhaskar died in 1951 leaving behind a widow Golap. Plaintiff laid claim in the suit on the basis of having been adopted by Golap on 18-12-1959. According to the plaintiff, defendant no. 1 was a political worker and taking advantage of his position wanted to deprive Golap of her title to the property. There was a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which terminated in favour of the defendant no. 1. Golap having died during that proceeding, plaintiff filled the suit on 27-2-1965 for the reliefs indicated above on the basis of adoption.

    3. Separate written statements were filed by defendants 1 and 2. Adoption of plaintiff was denied by both and it was pleaded that Bhaskar having died in a State of jointness, defendant no. 1 became owner of the entire property upon Golap's death.

    4. The main question that fell for consideration of the learned Subordinate Judge was adoption of the plaintiff. In support of the claim of adoption, plaintiff placed reliance on Ext. 15, the deed executed by Golap on 18/19-12-1959. A photograph was produced in support of the plea of giving and taking and other requisite ceremonies. Apart from these oral evidence was given in support of the factum of adoption. The learned Trial Judge took into consideration the provisions of section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act but failed to appreciate its bearing on the litigation. He examined the evidence on the footing that the burden to prove an adoption lay on the propounder as indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of Kishori Lal v. Mst Chaltibai . AIR. 1959 S.C 504., and held that adoption had not been established. Simultaneously he examined the contention advanced by the defendants that the adoption was invalid as there was not a gap of 21 clear years between the adoptive mother and the plaintiff and, therefore, he found against the plaintiff on the question of adoption and dismissed the suit.

    5. Section 16 of the Adoption Act provides:—

    “Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.”

    6. The statutory provision lays down a rule of presumption which requires that where there is a duly registered document of the nature indicated, the Court shall presume that the adoption was in compliance with the provisions of the Act unless and until it is disproved. It is unnecessary to deal with this aspect of the matter at length as Counsel for both sides agree that by a series of decisions of this Court, the effect of section 16 of the Adoption Act has been set at rest. See Shyama Sundar Padhi v. Dharanidhar Padhi . 1971 1 C.W.R 784.; Manishi Krishna Murty v. Manishi Ohinne Yerrayya . 1971 2 C.W.R 36. & Konchada Laxminarayan Subudhi v. Konchada Padmanav Subudhi . A.I.R 1973 Orissa 3.. In view of the clear position indicated in these cases, Mr. Mohapatra for the respondents concedes that the learned Trial Judge fell into an error in saying that the burden lay on the plaintiff who was propounding adoption to prove the same as in an ordinary case where there is no document satisfying the requirements of section 16 of the Adoption Act. It is conceded by the respondents that the burden lay on the defendants who were challenging the adoption to disprove it But for such disproof, it was not necessary for the defendants to lead independent evidence on their side. It was open to them to demonstrate from the materials on the record that the adoption as claimed did not take place as a fact or that the adoption was otherwise invalid in law and, therefore, could not be accepted. The stand taken by Mr. Mohapatra is unexceptionable.

    7. In the instant case, defendants have taken the stand that the age gap between the plaintiff and his adoptive mother on the date of adoption was less than 21 years. Section 11 of the Adoption Act provides conditions to be complied with for valid adoptions. Clause (iv) thereof runs thus:—

    “if the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted is a male, the adoptive mother is at least twentyone years older than the person to be adopted.”

    8. Section 6 of the Adoption Act makes provision that no adoption shall be valid unless it be made in accordance with the other conditions mentioned in the chapter and the conditions prescribed in section 11 are included. Therefore, violation of condition no. (iv) of section 11 would render the adoption invalid.

    9. In Ext. 15 the deed of adoption the adoptive mother's age has been given as 27 and of the plaintiff the alleged adopted son - as 3. The difference in the stated ages is 24 years. According to the defendants, plaintiff was born in April, 1954 and thus by the date of adoption, he was more than five years old. Plaintiff's date of birth has been proved from the entry in the School Admission Register. D.W 2, the Head Pandit of the Government U.P School, where the plaintiff was admitted by his natural father on 15-4-1959 has been duly proved as Ext. G. The natural father Jadunath signed in the register and his signature has also been proved. The attempt made by the plaintiff to prove that though he was 3 years' old by then, his age had been enhanced to 5 has been rightly disbelieved by the learned Trial Judge. There was no rule, as pleaded by the plaintiff, that no one below the age of 16 would be allowed to take the matriculation examination and, therefore, there could be no motive in enhancing the age. In India, as judicial notice was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Singh . A.I.R 1965 S.C 282., often a false age is disclosed at the time of admission into the School by lowering it with a view to seeking public service in later life. The learned Trial Judge, in our opinion, rightly negatived the explanation offered from the plaintiff's side that his age had been enhanced by two years at the time of his taking admission into the School. Accepting the plaintiff's date of birth to be 15th April, 1954, he was 5 years and 8 months' old by the time of adoption.

    10. In order to find out the age of the adoptive mother by the time of the deed of adoption, the learned Subordinate Judge referred to two horoscopes, one produced by plaintiff's side being Ext. 14 where the date of birth was disclosed as 13-7-1932 and the other produced by the defendants vide Ext. R where her date of birth was shown as 3-7-1938 On the basis of the evidence placed before the Court, the trial Court came to hold that Ext. R and not Ext. 14 was the genuine horoscope. Pw. 10 is the natural brother of Golap. He stated that the sister was three years' younger to him. P.W 10's age in 1963 has been disclosed as 34, but in the verification, it has been described as 30. P.W 10 has stated his age to be 30 the verification of the pauper application. Considering P.W 10's age to be 30 in 1963, it must be held that he was borne in 1933 and since Golap was 3 years younger to him, she could not have been born prior to 1936. An attempt has been made by the plaintiff and his witnesses to shift the age of Golap. In different documents age has been described differently and witnesses have also deposed differently in the Court. P.W 6, the lawyer, who drafted the deed of adoption (Ext. J5) has stated that he bad in mind the provisions of the Adoption Act while drafting the document and as P.W 7, the natural father of the plaintiff has admitted, there was discussion with P.W 6 prior to adoption as to what should be the age of the adopted boy and of the adoptive mother. P.W 8 has also stated that it had been discussed with the lawyer and ascertained that unless the age-gap was 21 years between the adopter and the adoptee there would be no valid adoption. There is force in the defence contention that the age disclosed in Ext. 15 was not with reference to actual age of the two but it had been so stated keeping in view the legal requirements in section 11 of the Adoption Act. P.W 8 is a co-villager and a distant relation of the parties. In his evidence-in-chief, he bad stated that Golap was aged about 20 or 21 at the time of adoption. It is true that the witness has been declared hostile, but nothing has been brought out in cross-examination as to why he would depose falsely to support the defendant no. 1.

    11. The conduct of the persons interested in the upholding of adoption in the matter of enhancing the age of the adoptive child (plaintiff) which has been proved from the material already ???s with leads support to the position that an attempt had been made -to widen the gap age between the adoptive mother and the adopted son with a view to satisfying the legal requirement and that again is a feature which probabilises the defence stand that Golap's age was also wrongly described. The conclusion of the learned Trial Judge that the legal requirement in section 11 (iv) of the Adoption Act had not been satisfied, in our opinion, has been clearly proved and, therefore, the alleged adoption is invalid in law.

    12. Plaintiff came with a positive case that adoption took place on 18-12-1959. As we have already found, plaintiff was admitted into the School on 15-4-1959. Thus, adoption was an event about 8 months after the admission of the plaintiff into the School. P.W 7, the natural father, has categorically stated in his evidence in Court that -

    “By the time of adoption, Golak (plaintiff) was not admitted into School. He was admitted into School 3 months thereafter. Somanath Ratha (d.w) was the School teacher when the plaintiff was admitted………….”

    13. P.W 10 also stated :—

    “……..The plaintiff is now reading in Janguli. The plaintiff went to the School about 20 days after his adoption ceremony………….”

    14. From the depositions of these two witnesses, it is thus clear that there was actually no adoption on 18-12-1959 and an attempt was made to create the document and give oral evidence of a contemporaneous adoption. As a fact, it has, therefore, rightly been held by the learned Trial Judge that no adoption took place as alleged. The presumption arising under section 16 of the Adoption Act has thus been disproved on the basis of the evidence, The claim of adoption stands negatived being not correct as a fact also being invalid in law. Plaintiff's suit had been rightly dismissed by the trial Court.

    15. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. There would be no order for costs in this Court.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Golak Chandra Rath v. Krutibas Rath And Another
    (Aug 27, 1979)