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Case Number

O.J.C No. 99 of 1971

Attorney(S)

S.Mohanty
S.C.Parija
S.C.Mohapatra
R.S.Mohanty
G.P.Mohanti
B.Nayak

Judges

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kunja Behari Panda
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Gati Krushna Misra

Acts

same.7. Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules
SECTION 45 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules
sub-section (2) of S. 45
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.N. Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner and opposite party No. 3 are stage carriage operators. The petitioner held a permit, originally granted in 1960 by the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) of Sambalpur and countersigned by the RTA of Bolangir, to operate a stage carriage on the route from Bargarh to Rampur with extension to Pinka. A second bus previously operated by the State Transport Service on the route was withdrawn, and because of public need the petitioner was permitted to run a second bus from August 1969. The RTA granted that (second-bus) permit with a condition that it would remain until the State Transport Authority (STA) issued a permit for a second bus.

The STA subsequently invited applications for the route. The petitioner, opposite party No. 3 and six others applied. On 28 October 1970 the STA granted the second-bus permit to opposite party No. 3. The petitioner appealed and lost the appeal. The present writ petition challenges the STA's grant of the permit and the appellate order upholding it, principally on the ground that the STA lacked statutory jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the State Transport Authority had statutory jurisdiction to invite applications for and grant the permit for the second bus on the route that covered areas in two separate districts (Sambalpur and Bolangir) within the same State, in light of Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules conflicts with Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, if so, whether that affects the validity of the STA's action.
Whether the petitioner is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the STA because he had earlier applied to and thereby submitted to the STA's jurisdiction (i.e., the maintainability/estoppel preliminary objection).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The State Transport Authority had no statutory jurisdiction to grant the permit for the route in question; under Section 45(1) (first proviso) the application should have been made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the route lay.
Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules (purporting to allow the STA to dispose of matters relating to the business of more than one RTA) is inconsistent with Section 45 and therefore ultra vires the Act.
The petitioner's prior acceptance of a temporary permission to ply a second bus until the STA filled the vacancy does not bar him from challenging the STA's jurisdiction to finally grant the permit.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

Opposite party No. 3 contends that the State Transport Authority did have jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
The opposite parties contend that Rule 52-A is permissible because the statute does not expressly prescribe that only a Regional Transport Authority must dispose of matters relating to more than one region; thus Rule 52-A does not directly contravene a statutory provision.
They raised a preliminary objection of estoppel/maintainability: the petitioner submitted to the STA's jurisdiction in August 1969 (by accepting permission and later applying to the STA for the formal permit), and having lost in the STA appeal, he should be precluded from challenging the STA's jurisdiction in the writ petition. They relied on the principle, supported by Pannalal Binjrai v. Union of India, that submission to an authority's jurisdiction may disentitle a party to relief from the courts under extraordinary jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ratanlal v. Chairman, R.T.A. Bikaner Region, AIR 1970 Raj 125	Illustrates that a State Transport Authority may, by resolution/decision, assume and exercise the duties of Regional Transport Authorities under Section 44(3)(b) in respect of routes common to two or more regions.	The court noted the case as indicating that the STA could assume jurisdiction by a deliberate resolution; but it found no material showing any prior resolution by the STA here and therefore could not treat the STA as having assumed RTA duties in this matter.
Pannalal Binjrai v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397	Principle relied upon by opposite parties: submission to the jurisdiction of an authority may disentitle a party to relief from the courts under extraordinary jurisdiction.	The court acknowledged the precedent but distinguished it because this case involved a want of jurisdiction. The court held that where jurisdiction is absent, submission cannot confer jurisdiction and the principle urged by the opposite parties did not bar relief.
United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230	Consent or appearance cannot confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal if a jurisdictional condition has not been fulfilled; consent cannot give jurisdiction where none exists.	The court relied on the principle to support its conclusion that absence of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the party's conduct; hence the petitioner's submission could not validate an exercise of jurisdiction that did not exist.
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340	Affirms the fundamental principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and such invalidity can be set up whenever enforcement is sought.	The court used the principle to hold that a defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the decision maker and cannot be cured by consent; therefore the STA's grant, if without jurisdiction, is null and open to challenge.
Sheik Hussain and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 36	A Full Bench decision holding a similar view regarding the constitution of authority and jurisdictional limits under the Motor Vehicles Act.	The court cited this case as corroborating the conclusion that absence of jurisdiction cannot be cured by parties' conduct and used it to support rejection of the estoppel argument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise statutory and factual examination:

Statutory framework: The court examined Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly sub-section (1) with its first proviso and sub-section (2) (introduced by amending Act 56 of 1969 effective 2 March 1970). It explained that:
- The first proviso to S.45(1) requires that where vehicles are to be used in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application must be made to the RTA of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route lies (or where portions are approximately equal, to the RTA of the region in which the vehicle is proposed to be kept).
- Sub-section (2) applies only when the two or more regions lie in different States, in which event the State Government may direct that applications be made to the State Transport Authority.
From this, the court concluded that Section 45 delineates which authority is the proper forum for permit applications and that the authority receiving the application is expected to dispose of it under the statutory procedure.
Application to facts: The route at issue covered parts of two districts (Sambalpur and Bolangir) within the same State, therefore falling squarely under the first proviso to Section 45(1). Consequently, sub-section (2) (which concerns regions in different States) did not apply. On that statutory basis, the court found the STA lacked the statutory jurisdiction to invite applications for and grant the permit.
Role of Rule 52-A: The court analyzed Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules, which provides that where disposal relates to the business of more than one RTA, disposal shall be made by the STA (and contains a proviso allowing RTAs to issue permits pursuant to STA directions). The petitioner contended the Rule conflicted with Section 45 and was ultra vires. The court observed the contention but stated it was unnecessary to decide the ultra vires question for disposing of this case. Importantly, the court held that even if Rule 52-A were applied, it could not validate the STA's action here because the STA itself had invited applications — an initial act which, under the court's statutory reading, required demonstration of authority to assume jurisdiction.
Section 44(3)(b) and assumption of jurisdiction: The opposite parties argued that under S.44(3)(b) the STA could assume RTA duties (for routes common to two or more regions) by deciding to do so. The court acknowledged that the STA may assume such duties but emphasized that such assumption must be evidenced by a decision or resolution. The court noted absence of any material showing that the STA had in fact decided to assume the duties of the RTAs of Sambalpur and Bolangir in respect of this route. The court reasoned it would be administratively chaotic to permit simultaneous, unannounced exercises of jurisdiction by the STA without a prior decision to that effect.
Preliminary estoppel/maintainability: The court addressed the opposite parties' reliance on estoppel—arguing that the petitioner had submitted to the STA's jurisdiction by applying and so should be barred from relief. The court distinguished authorities cited for that principle because this case turned on want of jurisdiction. It reiterated established law (citing United Commercial Bank Ltd., Kiran Singh, and Sheik Hussain) that consent or appearance cannot confer jurisdiction where jurisdictional conditions are lacking and that a decision without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be attacked at any stage. Applying these principles, the court held the petitioner's conduct did not and could not confer jurisdiction on the STA; therefore the estoppel objection failed.
Conclusion of analysis: Because the STA had no demonstrated statutory authority to deal with the permit application for this intra-State, two-region route (under the first proviso to S.45(1)), and because no evidence showed the STA had properly assumed RTA duties under S.44(3)(b), the court concluded the STA's grant of the permit was made without jurisdiction and was therefore invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court held that the grant of the permit by the State Transport Authority was without jurisdiction, and accordingly quashed the grant and the appellate order upholding it.

Direct consequences and implications:

The writ petition was allowed; the STA's grant of the second-bus permit to opposite party No. 3 and the decision in appeal upholding that grant were quashed.
The court awarded costs against the opposite parties and directed payment of hearing fees of rupees one hundred.
The court negatived the preliminary objection of estoppel and held that the petitioner's prior conduct did not confer jurisdiction on the STA.

Broader precedent: The opinion applied existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities about the inviolability of jurisdictional limits (consent cannot confer jurisdiction) but did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond those cited authorities. The decision's immediate effect is the invalidation of the STA's grant in this case; the opinion does not state that it establishes a new, broader precedent beyond applying established principles concerning jurisdiction.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the provided opinion text.

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Dayalal N. Joshi v. State Transport Authority, Orissa, Cuttack And Others Opposite Parties.

R.N Misra, J.:— The petitioner and opposite party No. 3 are stage carriage operators. The petitioner has been operating a stage carriage on the route Bargarh to Rampur with extension to Pinka. This permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority of Sambalpur in 1960 and was duly, countersigned by the Transport Authority of Bolangir. In. 1967, the State Transport Service came to operate a second bus on this route, but sometime after withdrew the service. As there was need for a second bus to cater to the travelling public on this route and no other operator was forthcoming, the petitioner was allowed to operate a second bus on this route from August 1969. The Regional Transport Authority while granting the permit imposed a condition that the permit would be alive until the State Transport Authority issues a permit for a second bus. The State Transport Authority opposite party No. 1 in due course Invited applications from intending pliers for this route. The petitioner, opposite party No. 3 and six others applied and on 28th of October 1970, the State Transport Authority granted the permit for a second bus on this route in favour of opposite party No. 3. The petitioner carried an appeal and lost. This writ petition is directed against the said appellate order and we are asked to quash the grant of the permit and the appellate order upholding such grant.;

2. The petitioner's contention is that the State Transport Authority has no jurisdiction to grant the permit on the route and as such, the grant is liable to be quashed. On the of her hand, the opposite party No. 3 contends that the State Transport Authority has jurisdiction. A preliminary objection to the entertainment of the writ petition is raised on the ground that the petitioner is estopped born challenging the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority to deal with the matter. It is stated that in August 1969, when the petitioner was permitted to ply a second bus on this route, its life was extended till the State Transport Authority filled up the vacancy for the second permit when applications were Invited by the State Transport Authority, the petitioner had also applied for the grant of the permit for the second bus. He submitted to the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority, applied for a permit and having lost has now come up to question the jurisdiction of that authority to deal with the route. As such the writ petition should be thrown out in limine.

3. Normally we should have considered the question of maintainability first but we think it appropriate to defer consideration of the preliminary point because it has first to be ascertained as to whether there is force in the contention of the petitioner that the State Transport Authority had any statutory jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Upon a finding as to whether exercise of jurisdiction is vitiated totally for want of it or there has been an irregular exercise of jurisdiction, the fate of the preliminary point would depend.

4. Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act is relevant for the purpose. For convenience, sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof which are material are extracted:

“(1) Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of lie region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles.

Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles;

Provided further that H if is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1). the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in case of any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under that sub-section shall be made to the State Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business”.

5. The first proviso to sub-section (1) makes it clear that where it is proposed to use the vehicle in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application has to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies. Sub-section (2) which was Introduced into the statute under amending Act 56 of 1969 with effect from 2nd March, 1970, makes it clear that in respect of two or more regions lying in different States, the application has to be made to the State Transport Authority. Section 45 is intended to provide as to where the application for a permit has to be made. There is no scheme in the statute that the application has to be made before one authority and it has to be disposed of by another authority. We must assume, therefore, that the authority to which the application is made is to dispose of the application in accordance with the procedure laid down under the statute.

6. In this case, two areas covered by the route lay in two separate districts—one portion in the district of Sambalpur and the other in the district of Bolangir. Thus it is a case covered by the first proviso to Section 45(1) and is not one to which sub-section (2) of S. 45 would at all apply. On that basis the petitioner contends that the State Transport Authority had no statutory jurisdiction to invite applications for the route and deal with the same.

7. Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules made under the Act provides:

“When the disposal of any matter relates to the business of more than one Regional Transport Authority such disposal shall be made by the State Transport Authority.

Provided that with the general or specific direction of the State Transport Authority a Regional Transport Authority may Issue permits for more than one region in accordance with the quota fixed by the State Transport Authority and such permits shall be deemed as permits Issued by the State Transport Authority and shall not require the counter-signature by the other Regional Transport Authorities”.

8. The petitioner contends that this Rule is not in accord with the provisions of Section 45 of the Act and as such must be treated to be ultra vires the statute.

9. The opposite parties take the stand that under Section 44(3) of the Act, the State Transport Authority would assume jurisdiction to deal with the matter. That sub-section as far as material reads thus:

“A State Transport Authority shall give effect to any directions issued under Section 43 and subject to such directions and save as otherwise provided by or under this Act shall exercise and discharge throughout the State the following powers and functions, namely—

(b) to perform the duties of a Regional Transport Authority where there is no such Authority, and if it thinks fit or if so required by a Regional Transport Authority, to perform those duties in respect of any route common to two or more regions;

10. It is stated that the State Transport Authority has thought it fit to perform the duties of the Regional Transport Authority in regard to the route in question. No material has been placed before us to show that the State Transport Authority had never decided to assume jurisdiction over the route in question in terms of Section 44(3)(b) of the Act. We cannot accept the contention that while under the statute power would vest in the Regional Transport Authority to deal with the matter, it would be open to the State Transport Authority in exercise of Section 44(3)(b) of the Act to simultaneously exercise such jurisdiction without prior decision to that effect. That would not only lead to administrative chaos but would introduce uncertainties which would frustrate the purposes of the Act it may be open to a State Transport Authority in exercise of the powers vested in Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 44 of the Act to resolve and assume such jurisdiction as was indicated in the case of Ratanlal v. Chairman, R.T.A Bikaner Region, AIR 1970 Raj 125. We have already indicated that no documents have been placed before us to show that there was a prior resolution of the State Transport Authority to that effect. We must, therefore, assume that the State Transport Authority had never decided to assume jurisdiction to perform the duties of the Regional Transport Authorities of Sambalpur and Bolangir in respect of this route.

11. It is argued for the petitioner that Rule 52-A of the Orissa Motor Vehicles Rules is ultra vires the statute. The opposite parties contend that there was no provision in the statute clearly prescribing disposal of matters relating to disposal of such matters by Transport Authorities as provided under Rule 52-A. As such it does not directly run counter to any statutory provision. It is not necessary for the disposal of this case to decide that aspect. Even in terms of Rule 52-A only the disposal of the application could be by the State Transport Authority. As we have already stated where even the invitation of the application was made by that authority. As such even by application of Rule 52-A of the rules, the action of the State Transport Authority cannot be upheld.

12. On the aforesaid discussion, we would hold that the grant of the permit by the State Transport Authority was without jurisdiction.

13. The point that remains for consideration is whether the writ petition can be thrown out on the preliminary objection. The opposite parties rely on the principle that where a party has submitted to the jurisdiction of an authority such conduct disentitles him from any relief from the hands of the Court particularly under extraordinary jurisdiction. In support of such a principle reliance has been placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjrai v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 397. But as we find the present case is one of want of jurisdiction and where there is absence of jurisdiction and jurisdiction is exercised, the dispute goes to the root of the matter. In United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230, their Lordships indicated that consent cannot give a Court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. No appearance or consent can give a jurisdiction to a Court of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess. Again in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340, it was stated—

“………It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties………,”

14. A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sheik Hussain and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 36 while dealing with constitution of authority under the Motor Vehicles Act took the self-same view. We are led to hold, therefore, that the conduct of the petitioner could not confer jurisdiction on the State Transport Authority to deal with the matter.

15. Again, the plea of estoppel has its own limitations. We do not find any conduct of the petitioner which would really go to the extent of showing that he is personally estopped from approaching the Court. We would accordingly negative the preliminary objection.

16. On the basis of what we have already indicated, it would follow that the State Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to deal with the grant of a permit on the route in question and as such the grant of the permit by it is an act without jurisdiction. We would accordingly allow the application, quash the grant by the State Transport Authority and the decision in appeal upholding such grant with costs. Hearing fee rupees one hundred.

17. Panda, J.:— I agree.

18. Application allowed.

Dayalal N. Joshi v. State Transport Authority, Orissa, Cuttack And Others Opposite Parties.

Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.N. Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Opposite Parties' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Dayalal N. Joshi v. State Transport Authority, Orissa, Cuttack And Others Opposite Parties.

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