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  • Hindu Succession Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • Order 41, Rule 23 of the CPC,
  • Order 43, Rule 1(u).
  • Order 41, Rule 23.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Hindu Succession Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
  • Order 41, Rule 23 of the CPC,
  • Order 43, Rule 1(u).
  • Order 41, Rule 23.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns properties of the late Bidya Padhan (deceased before 1956). His widow, Daimati (defendant No. 2), survived him. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that defendant No. 1 is not the adopted son of Bidya Padhan and that the plaintiff is the next reversioner upon Daimati's death. Defendant No. 2 was ex parte. Defendant No. 1 contested, asserting that defendant No. 2 had earlier filed Title Suit No. 110 of 1956 which culminated in a compromise decree (Ext. E) dated 21-11-1957 that upheld defendant No. 1's status as the adopted son of Bidya Padhan. Defendant No. 1 argued the present suit was barred by res judicata and that the plaintiff had no reversionary right after the Hindu Succession Act, 1955.

At first instance the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on grounds of non-maintainability (plaintiff had no reversionary right), res judicata, and that defendant No. 1 was the adopted son. The lower appellate Court reversed the findings on maintainability and res judicata and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on the question of adoption, observing that no issue had been framed on that point and parties should have full opportunity to adduce evidence. A miscellaneous appeal was filed on 5-11-1962. Meanwhile, following the remand, the trial Court passed a decree for the plaintiff on 19-9-1962; no appeal was filed against that post-remand judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Miscellaneous Appeal was the proper mode of challenge, or whether a Civil Revision was maintainable against the lower appellate Court's remand order (preliminary issue of competence/maintainability).
  2. Whether the subsequent trial Court judgment made the appeal infructuous (i.e., whether the post-remand decree rendered the High Court proceedings moot).
  3. Whether the plaintiff possessed a reversionary right after the Hindu Succession Act, 1955, and thereby whether the plaint was maintainable.
  4. Whether the compromise decree (Ext. E) constitutes res judicata so as to bar the plaintiff's suit.
  5. Whether a remand to try the question of adoption was justified in view of the pleadings and the evidence — specifically, whether an issue on adoption existed and whether evidence supported adoption.

Arguments of the Parties

Mr. Misra (preliminary objections)

  • Raised two preliminary objections: (i) that a Civil Revision, and not a Miscellaneous Appeal, lies against the order under challenge; and (ii) that the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 19-9-1962 (passed after remand) concludes the matter and renders the miscellaneous appeal infructuous.

Mr. Rath (opposing counsel)

  • Contended that the lower appellate Court's findings on the three principal questions were untenable in law and based on errors of record.
  • Argued that there was an issue on adoption and that a definite plea of res judicata had been taken in the written statement.

Defendant No. 1 (substantive pleadings described in record)

  • Alleged that Title Suit No. 110 of 1956, filed by defendant No. 2, ended in a compromise decree (Ext. E) upholding his status as the adopted son of Bidya Padhan.
  • Claimed that the present suit was barred by res judicata and that the plaintiff had no reversionary right after the Hindu Succession Act, 1955.
  • Asserted in the written statement that he himself was in possession of the disputed property (a fact relied upon by the Court in its analysis).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shama Purshad Roy v. Hurro Purshad Roy, 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC) Money recovered under a decree cannot be recovered back in a fresh suit while the decree under which it was recovered remains in force; an original decree is to be taken as subsisting and valid until reversed; subordinate decrees dependent on an original decree fail if the original is reversed. The Court used this principle to reject the contention that the post-remand trial Court decree rendered the High Court proceeding infructuous: if the foundation decree is set aside, the dependent decree becomes inoperative.
B. Nanganna v. R. Venkatapayya, AIR 1923 PC 167 Approval of the legal proposition that subordinate/dependent decrees cannot be treated as subsisting when the original decree on which they rest has been reversed. The Court noted this authority as an approving authority for the same general principle relied upon from the earlier Privy Council decision.
Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Deo Singh, AIR 1955 SC 576 Illustrative approval by the Supreme Court of the general legal principle regarding the subsistence of decrees and the effect of reversal of a foundational decree. The Court cited this decision to show that the dictum from Privy Council decisions had been approved by the Supreme Court, supporting the view that the High Court could set aside a subordinate judgment's effects if its foundation collapsed.
Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1918 PC 87 Where an estate of a deceased Hindu has vested in a female heir, a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate, in the absence of fraud or collusion, is binding on the reversionary heir; the widow represents the estate (subject to limitations) and decrees against her bind reversioners. The Court applied this principle to hold that the compromise decree (Ext. E) entered by the widow admitting adoption binds the plaintiff unless the plaintiff proves fraud or collusion; absence of such proof meant the decree operated as res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Preliminary issues — mode of challenge: The Court examined whether the Miscellaneous Appeal was the correct procedural vehicle. It observed that a remand under Order 41, Rule 23 CPC is appealable only by a miscellaneous appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(u). However, the lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction to remand under Order 41, Rule 23; its remand was effectively made under the inherent power of Section 151 CPC. Consequently, the correct remedy against that remand is a Civil Revision rather than a Miscellaneous Appeal. The Court therefore allowed the Miscellaneous Appeal to be converted into a Civil Revision upon deposit of the additional court-fee.

Preliminary issue — infructuousness by subsequent decree: The Court considered whether the subsequent trial Court decree (dated 19-9-1962, passed after remand) made the present proceedings infructuous. Relying on Privy Council and other authorities (including Shama Purshad Roy and later approvals), it explained that subordinate or dependent decrees cannot be treated as continuing in force if the foundational decree or judgment upon which they rest has been reversed. Since the judgment of the Subordinate Judge (the foundational judgment) was under challenge, the subsequent post-remand decree could become inoperative if the foundation collapsed. Thus the second preliminary objection failed.

Maintainability / reversionary right: The Court analysed whether the plaintiff had a reversionary right and whether the plaint was therefore maintainable post the Hindu Succession Act, 1955. It identified two facts the plaintiff needed to prove: (i) that Daimati continued as a limited owner; and (ii) that Daimati was not in possession of the disputed land on the date of the Act. The Court noted the plaint lacked material particulars on possession at the critical date. But defendant No. 1's written statement asserted that he himself was in possession (thus, by defendant No. 1's own case, Daimati was not in possession). The Court treated this pleading and admissions as sufficient to hold, without resolving adoption, that Daimati continued as limited owner out of possession on the date of the Act and therefore the plaint was not doomed for want of a reversionary interest.

Res judicata (effect of Ext. E compromise decree): The Court then examined whether the earlier compromise decree (Ext. E) binds the plaintiff. It cited Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh and related authorities to state the settled rule: where a widow represents the estate, a decree obtained against her is binding on the reversionary heir unless tainted by fraud or collusion. The Court emphasised that the onus to show fraud or collusion lies on the plaintiff, not on defendant No. 1 to show bona fides of the previous suit. Both Courts below had found no evidence of fraud or collusion. The record contained no material from which an adverse inference could be drawn. Further, the Court reasoned that an admission of adoption by the widow in a decree would extinguish her proprietary title (leaving her only maintenance rights); such an admission could not be lightly set aside. Consequently, Ext. E stood as a valid decree operating as res judicata and barring the present suit.

Remand and the question of adoption: The Court noted procedural errors below: although Issue No. 4 related to adoption, the Subordinate Judge had stated that no issue had been framed on adoption. The learned lower appellate Court remanded for fuller consideration of adoption. On the evidence, however, the Court found no material showing the essential facts of adoption (notably, giving and taking). It held that there was insufficient evidence to support adoption, but declined to make a final finding on adoption because the plaintiff's suit was already barred by res judicata. Thus the remand on adoption became unnecessary in light of the res judicata finding.

Conclusion of analysis: Given the absence of any material to show fraud or collusion in the earlier suit and given that Ext. E effected an admission of adoption which extinguished the widow's title, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's suit is foreclosed by res judicata. Consequently the Court set aside the judgment of the lower appellate Court (which had reversed and remanded) and allowed the Civil Revision, restoring the trial Court judgment which was under challenge. The Court directed parties to bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: CIVIL REVISION ALLOWED. The judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the challenged trial Court judgment is restored. The plaintiff's suit is barred by res judicata in view of the compromise decree (Ext. E). Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff's declaratory suit fails on the ground of res judicata based on the compromise decree (Ext. E) entered by the widow in the earlier proceeding.
  • The lower appellate Court's remand order (and consequent overturning of the trial Court on maintainability and res judicata) is set aside; the trial Court judgment which had been under challenge is restored.
  • The decision applies established principles (as cited) rather than announcing a new legal principle; no new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities on res judicata and the effect of decrees against widows was created by this judgment.

BH/VRB/D.V.C

Final line in the opinion: Revision allowed.

    Baisnab Padhan v. Parma Padhan

    1. Defendant No. 1 is the appellant. The dispute relates to properties belonging to one Bidya Padhan who died before 1956 leaving his widow Daimati (defendant No. 2). Plaintiff fries the suit for a declaration that defendant No. 1 is not the adopted son of Bidya Padhan and that he is the next reversioner of Bidya Padhan on the death of Daimati. Defendant No. 2 is ex parte. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit alleging that title suit 110 of 1956 had been filed by defendant No. 2 on the identical ground and that it ended in a compromise decree (Ext. E) dated 21-11-1957 in which the status of defendant No. 1 as the adopted son of Bidya Padhan was upheld. Defendant No. 1 also claimed to be the adopted son of Bidya Padhan and averred that the suit was barred res judicata and was not maintainable as the plaintiff iiad no reversionary right subsequent to the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The learned trial Court dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff had no reversionary right, that the suit was parred by res judicata and that in fact defendant No. 1 was the adopted son of Bidya Padhan. The learned lower appellate Court reversed the first two findings and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on the question of adoption on the finding that no issue was framed on that question and that the parties must be given full opportunities to adduce evidence. This miscellaneous appeal against the judgment of the learned appellate Court was filed on 5-11-1962, but before this, the learned trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit, after remand, on 19-9-1962. No appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned trial Court passed after remand.

    2. Mr. Misra raised two preliminary objections—

    (i) that a Civil Revision and not Miscellaneous Appeal lies;

    (ii) that the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 19-9-1962 in accordance with the order of remand, against which no appeal was filed, concludes the matter and the miscellaneous appeal is infructuous.

    3. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, contended that the findings of the learned lower appellate Court on each of the three questions were untenable in law, and particularly the judgment was based on errors of record Inasmuch as there was an issue on the question of adoption and a definite plea had been taken in the written statement that the suit was barred by res Judicata.

    4. The first preliminary objection, raised by Mr. Misra regarding maintainability of the Miscellaneous Appeal, must stand. Against an order of remand under Order 41, Rule 23 of the CPC, only a miscellaneous appeal lies under Order 43, Rule 1(u). Any other order of remand is not appealable. The trial Court disposed of the suit not on any preliminary ground but on merits. The lower appellate Court had no jurisdiction to remand the suit under Order 41, Rule 23. That was clearly a remand order under Section 151 of the CPC. A Civil Revision and not a Miscellaneous Appeal is therefore maintainable. Court-fees of Rs. 6/- have been paid in the miscellaneous appeal and court-fees of Rs. 7.50 nP. is payable on a Civil Revision. Mr. Rath has filed an application to convert the Miscellaneous Appeal into a Civil Revision by depositing an additional court-fee of Rs. 1.50 nP. I have permitted this miscellaneous appeal to be converted into a Civil Revision. The first preliminary objection, though valid, no longer stands in the way of the appellant.

    5. The second preliminary objection has no substance. In 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC), Shama Purshad Roy v. Hurro Purshad Roy, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed thus—

    “Money recovered under a decree or judgment cannot be recovered back in a fresh suit or action whilst the decree or judgment under which it was recovered re-mains in force; but this rule of law rests, as their Lordships apprehend, upon this ground, that the original decree or judgment must be taken to be subsisting and valid until it has been reversed or superseded by some ulterior proceeding.

    Moreover, the decrees now under appeal rest on precisely the same cause of suit as the original decree which was reversed by the Order of Her Majesty in Council. The plaint in the case on which the original decree was recovered describes the interest recovered by the decrees under appeal as part of the same cause of suit, separated only for the convenience of Tare Purshad, and the decrees under appeal, therefore, were mere subordinate and dependent decrees, and their Lordships do not think that decrees can be held to have remained in force when the decree on which they were dependent had been reversed.”

    6. This dictum received the approval of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee subsequently in AIR 1923 PC 167, B. Nanganna v. R. Venkatapayya, though it dealt with another type of case, and of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 576, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Shiv Rattan Deo Singh. The judgment of the learned trial Court, after remand, dated 19-9-1962 is based on the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge which is under challenge in the High Court. It the basis itself collapses, the superstructure standing on it must go. This Court has jurisdiction to set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge, and if it so sets aside, the judgment of the trial Court, after remand, must automatically be inoperative. The second preliminary objection must accordingly fail.

    7. The finding of the learned Suboalinate Judge that the plaintiff has reversionary right cannot be negatived lit the peculiar facts of this case. Indisputably the plaintiff has no right of suit unless he establishes that he has a reversionary right. The plaintiffs success of the reversionary right would depend upon proof of two facts—(i) Daimati continues to be the limited owner; and (ii) Daimati is not in possession of the disputed land. After passing of the Act, Daimati would become full owner in respect of the properties of her husband if she is in possession on the date of the passing of the Act. The plaint was bereft of the material particulars showing one way or the other. Before filing the written statement, it was open to defendant No. 1 to call upon the plaintiff to file further particulars with a statement of fact as to whether Daimati was in possession of the disputed lands on the date of the passing of the Act. Without so doing, defendant No. 1, on the other hand, filed written statement asserting that Daimati was not in possession of the property but he himself was in possession. On defendant No. 1's own case in the written statement, the plaint becomes maintainable. If Daimati is not in possession, then it is now settled by authorities that the reversionary right continues and the next reversioner could file a declaratory suit.

    8. Mr. Rath brings to my notice that in the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff, there are statements that Daimati was in possession till sometime in 1957. I am ignoring those statements in view of the defendant No. 1's own case that he was in possession of the disputed land. It was open to him to say in the written statement that Daimati was in possession till 1957 and from 1957 onwards he himself came to possess. These facts have also not been taken into consideration by any of the Courts below and I cannot in second appeal for the first time fully go through the evidence and come to a different finding. Mr. Misra conceded before me that defendant No. 1 was in possession. On these facts I must hold, without reference to the question of adoption, that Daimati continued as limited owner being out of possession of the disputed property on the date of the passing of the Act. The suit cannot therefore be thrown out on the ground that it is not maintainable.

    9. The next question is whether the compromise decree (Ext. E) serves as res judicata so far as this suit is concerned. The proposition of law on the point is well settled. In AIR 1918 PC 87 Risal Singh v. Balwant Singh, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee formulated the law in unmistakable terms thus—

    “Where the estate of a deceased Hindu has vested in a female heir a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate is, in the absence of fraud or collusion, binding on the reversionary heir.

    Lest it may create some difficulty that the reversioner does not claim the property through the widow but through the last male owner, and it can be argued that the principle of res judicata, in terms, does not apply, their Lordships made it further clear that Section 11 of the CPC was not strictly applicable to the case as the plaintiffs were not parties to the suit and do not claim under a party to that suit. This principle has been applied by the Courts in India so as to bind reversioners by decisions in litigation, fairly and honestly conducted, given for or against Hindu females who represented the estate. It is also established by series of Privy Council decisions that the widow is not comparable to a trusee. She represents the estate fully but subject to certain limitations with regard to the power of alienation.”

    10. On the aforesaid authority, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the compromise decree effected by the widow admitting the adoption therein is not binding on him on the ground that the suit was not conducted bona fide or that the decree was tainted with fraud or collusion. Both the Courts below concurrently found that there was no evidence of fraud or collusion. The learned lower appellate Court misconceived the legal position in calling upon defendant No. 1 to establish by production of evidence that the suit was conducted bona fide and fairly. The onus is just the other way. No materials had been produced before the Court to draw an adverse inference. I am, therefore, satisfied that materials are lacking for a finding that the suit was brought and conducted unfairly. Merely because the suit ultimately ended in a compromise, it does not mean that it was not conducted bona fide.

    11. It may be noted that if the adoption is admitted, the widow is completely deprived of her title in the property and is entitled only to maintenance. Therefore the admission of the adoption in favour of the adopted son extinguishes her title and cannot be lightly brushed aside. Ext. E therefore stands as a valid decree and stares the plaintiff in face serving as res judicata. The suit is accordingly hit by the principle of res judicata and must fail.

    12. The last question relates to the remand on the question of adoption. It is somewhat remarkable that though Issue No. 4 directly relates to adoption, the learned Subordinate Judge mentioned that no issue had been framed under this question. From the two errors of record committed by him I am left with the impression that the learned Judge is accustomed to deal with cases without any regard to the materials on record. A bare look will show that Issue No. 4 pertains to adoption. In para 5 of the written statement there is a clear averment with regard to the suit being barred by res judicata. The learned trial Court held that there was evidence in support of adoption.

    13. From the evidence, discussed by the learned lower apellate Court. It cannot be held that evidence was sufficient in favour of adoption. There is absolutely no evidence regarding giving and taking. There being a clear issue on the point the learned Judge should have held, disagreeing with the learned trial Court, that there was no adoption. But I do not express any final view as he himself did not fully discuss the evidence in question thinking that no issue had been framed. This issue does not require any further discussion in view of my finding that the suit is barred by the principle of res judicata. In the result, the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court is set aside and the Civil Revision is allowed and the judgment of the learned trial Court is restored. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs throughout.

    BH/VRB/D.V.C

    14. Revision allowed.

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    Comments

    Baisnab Padhan v. Parma Padhan
    (Nov 12, 1963)