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  • section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, under section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act,
  • SECTION 20 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
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  • section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, under section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act,
  • SECTION 20 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Appeal arising from decree for specific performance

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the defendants (heirs of Nanku Ram Sonkar) from the judgment and decree dated 15-04-1993 passed by the First Additional District Judge, Sagar in Civil Suit No. 5-A/1989, which decreed specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff.

Brief chronology and facts as recorded in the opinion:

  • On 20-11-1987 an agreement to sell (referred to as Ex. P-1) for the suit house was executed between the original plaintiff Krishna Kumar Rathore and Nanku Ram; the plaintiff paid Rs. 7,000 as advance; the balance consideration was Rs. 16,000 to be paid before execution of the sale deed.
  • Nanku Ram died in December 1987 during the pendency of the matter; the respondents to this appeal are the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff.
  • Plaintiff (original) sent notices dated 27-01-1989 and 03-03-1989 (Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-3) to the heirs seeking execution of the sale deed; the suit for specific performance was filed subsequently (record notes filing on 10-03-1989).
  • Defendants denied the genuineness of the agreement (alleging fraud or forgery and that the property was HUF property beyond Nanku Ram's exclusive power to alienate). The Trial Court examined evidence and granted specific performance to the plaintiff; the defendants challenged that decree on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs proved that Ex. P-1 (the agreement to sell dated 20-11-1987) bears the genuine signature of deceased Nanku Ram, particularly in the absence of handwriting expert evidence?
  2. Whether the plaintiffs proved their readiness and willingness to perform the contract (a necessary condition under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act) such that specific performance should be granted?
  3. Whether the defendants' allegation of fraud (that the signature was obtained by deceit and that a forged agreement was prepared) was established, or whether the admission in the written statement shifted the burden?
  4. Whether, given the facts (including delay in issuing notices and filing suit), the appellate court should exercise its discretion under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act (and its powers under section 107(2) CPC) to refuse specific performance despite the Trial Court's decree?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • They denied execution of the impugned document and contended that plaintiffs failed to prove the signature of deceased Nanku Ram on Ex. P-1 (no handwriting expert was examined).
  • Even if the document were held to be executed, plaintiffs failed to prove readiness and willingness to pay the balance consideration, which is a cardinal requirement for specific performance; therefore the Trial Court erred in decreeing specific performance.
  • They alleged that the signature was obtained by fraud — that a stamp paper was signed in connection with repairs/utility connections and later a forged agreement of sale was prepared; they also pleaded that the property belonged to a Hindu Undivided Family, so Nanku Ram lacked exclusive alienation rights.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs' Legal Representatives') Arguments

  • Plaintiffs pleaded and led evidence of readiness and willingness and relied upon witness testimony (including attesting witnesses) to prove execution and payment of Rs. 7,000 as advance.
  • The written statement by defendants admitted the signature of deceased Nanku Ram on Ex. P-1 (albeit alleging fraud); respondents argued that once signature was admitted in pleading, the burden lay on defendants to prove the alleged fraud.
  • Respondents contended that defendants failed to prove fraud, and therefore the Trial Court correctly decreed specific performance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Rangaraju Naidu v. S. Thiruvarakkarasu, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680 That relief of specific performance is discretionary and equitable in nature. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that it could decline specific performance in the exercise of judicial discretion given the plaintiff's conduct (delay and timing of notices), applying equitable considerations to refuse the relief.
His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526 : AIR 1996 SC 2095 Authority cited in the context of assessing "readiness and willingness" required for specific performance. The court invoked this Apex Court decision to support its conclusion that, in the absence of documentary proof of funds and on the facts of the case, plaintiff's claim of readiness and willingness was not satisfactorily established.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, addressing first the genuineness of Ex. P-1 and then the crucial question of readiness and willingness for specific performance:

  1. Signature/genuineness of Ex. P-1:
    • The defendants' written statement contained an admission that Ex. P-1 bore the signature of deceased Nanku Ram, although they alleged the signature was obtained by fraud. The court emphasised that admissions in pleadings have high evidentiary value and operate as a waiver of proof on that point.
    • Given that admission, the plaintiffs' failure to examine a handwriting expert did not prevent the court from holding that Ex. P-1 bore Nanku Ram's signature.
    • Evidence from defendants' witnesses (DW-2 and DW-3) did not convincingly establish that the signature was not genuine; DW-2 admitted the document was not executed in his presence, and DW-3's testimony conflicted with the written admission. The defendants failed to produce witnesses who could show the signature was obtained by fraud.
    • Conclusion: Ex. P-1 was held to bear the signature of Nanku Ram.
  2. Readiness and willingness (legal standard and application):
    • The court noted section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires readiness and willingness as a precondition for a decree of specific performance; this is a cardinal ingredient.
    • The court analysed the terms of Ex. P-1 and observed that it expressly made payment of the Rs. 16,000 a condition for executing the sale deed, indicating the plaintiff did not possess the full funds at the time of agreement.
    • Although the plaint averred that the plaintiff insisted repeatedly on execution of the sale deed, the court found no documentary proof (and the registered notices Ex. P-2 and Ex. P-3 did not state that prior insistence) to corroborate that the plaintiff had been ready with funds or had pressed the vendor during the short interval before the vendor's death.
    • The court emphasised the delay between Nanku Ram's death (December 1987) and the sending of notices and filing suit (notices in early 1989, suit filed on 10-03-1989): a delay of about one year and three months. The court held that such delay was relevant and detrimental to an inference of readiness and willingness.
    • The court invoked its discretionary power under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, observing that the equitable nature of specific performance allows refusal where conduct and delay render the remedy inappropriate. It also noted appellate powers under section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
    • On the totality of facts — lack of documentary proof of funds, the timing of notices, and the delay in filing suit — the court concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfactorily proved readiness and willingness and that equity did not favour granting specific performance.
  3. Relief and monetary claim:
    • Although specific performance was refused, the court accepted that Rs. 7,000 had been paid as advance by the plaintiff and ordered refund of that amount by the defendants with simple interest at 6% per annum.
  4. Costs and incidental directions:
    • The appeal was allowed in part to the extent indicated; parties were directed to bear their own costs. Counsel fee to be certified according to the schedule, if certified.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Trial Court's decree for specific performance is set aside and the suit for specific performance is dismissed. The appeal is "partly allowed" to the extent that the defendants are ordered to refund Rs. 7,000 (advance) with simple interest at 6% per annum.

Consequences and practical effect:

  • The plaintiff's claim for specific performance of the sale agreement is refused on grounds that readiness and willingness were not satisfactorily proved and, in equity, specific performance should not be granted given the delay and circumstances.
  • Defendants are directly liable to refund the advance amount of Rs. 7,000 with interest at 6% p.a.
  • Each party bears its own costs; counsel fees to be certified if applicable.

The opinion does not state that it establishes any new legal precedent beyond applying established principles (including the discretionary nature of specific performance and the requirement of readiness and willingness). The decision's implications are confined to the rights and liabilities of the parties in this case.


Source: Judgment text as provided. This summary has been prepared strictly on the basis of the material contained in the supplied opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond that text.

    Mohini And Others v. Vidhyawati Rathore And Others

    For Appellants: A.B Khan

    For Respondents: R.D Hundikar
    List of cases referred: 1. S. Rangaraju Naidu v. S. Thiruvarakkarasu., 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680 (Para 16) 2. His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar., (1996) 4 SCC 526 : AIR 1996 SC 2095 (Para 17)

    JUDGMENT

    1. The defendants having lost from the Trial Court has challenged the judgment and decree dated 15-4-1993 for specific performance of contract passed in favour of plaintiff by First Additional District Judge. Sagar in Civil Suit No. 5-A/1989, by preferring this appeal.

    The respondents are the legal representatives of plaintiff Krishna Kumar Rathore who during the pendency of the suit died. Defendants/appellants are the heirs of Nanku Ram Sonkar. In brief the case of the plaintiff is that Nanku Ram entered into an agreement of sale with plaintiff-Krishna Kumar on 20-11-1987 in respect to the suit house. A document to that effect was executed on that day and in pursuance to the contract, plaintiff - Krishna Kumar paid a sum of Rs. 7000/- to deceased Nanku Ram. It was agreed between the parties that balance amount of consideration Rs. 16,000/- would be paid to Nanku Ram and thereafter he (deceased Nanku Ram) will execute a sale deed in favour of plaintiff. It is no more in dispute that Nanku Ram after executing the document of agreement to sell breathed his last in December, 1987. According to the plaintiff, he insisted deceased Nanku Ram in his life time and after his death to his heirs (defendants) to execute sale deed after obtaining the balance amount of consideration Rs. 16,000/-. Nanku Ram, during his lifetime and after his death present defendants avoided to execute the sale deed, as a result of which plaintiff on 27-1-1989 and 3-3-1989 sent two notices to get the sale deed executed but neither they sent any reply to the notice nor executed the sale-deed. Hence, the present suit for specific performance of contract has been filed. According to the plaintiffs, they are still ready to purchase the suit property on payment of balance sale price Rs. 16,000/- and they are also ready to bear necessary expenses. An alternative prayer to refund the advance amount Rs. 7,000/- with 12% per annum interest has also been made.

    3. The defendants/respondents though initially denied the execution of the document of agreement of sale by their predecessor Nanku Ram and also denied averment that original plaintiff Krishna Kumar ever paid any amount of Rs. 7000/-, however, in special pleas of their written statement, they pleaded that in the riots of year 1984, the suit house became dilapidated and for its alteration and also for the purpose of installation of water and electric connection, it became necessary to execute a document of agreement and for that purpose, the plaintiff by playing fraud, obtained signature of deceased Nanku Ram on a stamp paper. However, that portion of the stamp paper was later on torned on which logo of stamp was embossed and on the remaining portion of the stamp paper, plaintiff prepared a forged document of impugned agreement of sale. It has further been pleaded that the suit house is property of Hindu undivided family and, therefore, deceased Nanku Ram was not having exclusive right to alienate the suit house.

    4. On the basis of aforesaid pleadings the Trial Court framed necessary issues. Thereafter, parties led their evidence. The Trial Court on examining the evidence decreed the suit of plaintiff of specific performance of contract by impugned judgment and decree. Hence this appeal.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that defendants denied the execution of impugned document and also denied signature of deceased Nanku Ram on it and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the signature of deceased Nanku Ram on the impugned document of agreement to sell, having failed to do so, it is not proved that impugned document Ex. P-1 bears the signature of deceased Nanku Ram. His further contention, is that even if it is held that document was executed then, as plaintiffs have failed to prove their readiness and willingness, which is a cardinal ingredient in a case of specific performance of contract, the Trial Court erred in law in decreeing the suit.

    6. Refuting the aforesaid submission of learned counsel for the appellants, it has been contended by learned counsel for respondents that plaintiffs in their plaint not only pleaded their readiness and willingness but also proved this fact by leading cogent evidence. It has also been putforth that since defendants in their written statement admitted the signature of deceased on impugned document of agreement to sell, though in the pretext of obtaining it by fraud, it was for the defendants to prove the fraud. According to learned counsel, the defendants utterly failed to prove fraud and, therefore, learned Trial Court did not erred in decreeing the suit.

    7. I shall now deal with the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. The first submission of learned counsel that the signature of deceased Nanku Ram on Ex. P-1 is not proved as plaintiffs have failed to examine any handwriting expert is considered. On bare perusal of Ex. P-1, it is revealed that this document was written on 20-11-1987. According to the plaintiffs, deceased Nankuram signed this document. The attesting witnesses are PW-2 Abdul Shakir and PW-3 Lallu Ram Yadav. Original plaintiff Krishna Kumar died before he could be examined. One of the legal representative is widow PW-1 Vidyawati Rathore. According to her, in his presence impugned document was executed and it was agreed between the deceased Nanku Ram and her husband that the suit house shall be sold for a consideration of Rs. 23,000/- and sum of Rs. 7000/- was paid cash towards advance money. According to her, Nanku Ram told that Rs. 16,000/- shall be received by him at the time of execution of the sale-deed. According to this witness, her husband insisted deceased Nanku Ram for several times to get the sale-deed executed but he avoided. Her husband also sent notices to the defendants and the drafts of notices are Ex. P-2 and P-3. Theses notices are dated 21-7-1989 and 3-3-1989. The argument could have been considered if the defendants would not have admitted the signatures of deceased Nanku Ram on Ex. P-1. On going through the written statement, it is gathered that defendants specifically admitted the signatures of deceased Nanku Ram though according to them it was obtained by playing fraud. It is well settled in law that admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon though it is not a conclusive proof. There are several kind of admissions and one important kind of admission is the admission made in the written statement. According to me the admission made in the written statement stands on higher footing and having greater degree than evidenciary admission. The admission in the pleading fully binds a party who makes it and makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. In the present case, as it has been admitted by the defendants in their written statement that impugned document Ex. P-1 bears the signature of Nanku Ram, this part of admission in the written statement is having value of higher degree and, therefore, in absence of any proof of the signature of deceased Nanku Ram by examining hand writing expert, would not make any difference.

    8. Out of several defendants, DW-2 Ram Avtar and DW-3, Ganesh Sonkar were examined. Ram Avtar in his cross-examination admitted that the impugned document (Ex. P-1) was not executed in his presence, other defendant Ganesh Sonkar though said that Ex. P-1 does not bear the signature of his father but in the written statement he admitted the signature of Nanku Ram on the impugned document. As the defendants failed to examine any witness before whom signature of deceased Nanku Ram on Ex. P-1 was obtained, therefore, the plea putforth by them that just to prepare an agreement of obtaining electric and water connection, signature of Nanku Ram was obtained by plaintiffs' predecessor Krishna Kumar and thereafter a forged document of agreement of sale was prepared, is not proved. Thus, accordingly I hold that Ex. P-1 bear the signature of Nanku Ram.

    9. The next question which, has been raised by learned counsel for appellants that whether original plaintiff Krishna Kumar ever insisted deceased Nanku Ram and after his death, present defendants, to get the sale deed executed, shall now be considered. In a suit for specific performance of contract, the question of readiness and willingness plays a vital role because under section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, for obtaining a decree of specific performance of contract, the condition of readiness and willingness is pre-supposed and without proving readiness and willingness, a suit for specific performance of contract cannot be decreed.

    10. In abovesaid context I shall now deal the pleading and evidence of plaintiffs in that regard. According to the plaint averments, impugned document Ex. P-1 was executed on 20-11-1987 and it was signed by Nanku Ram whose heirs are present defendants/appellants, the plaintiff further pleaded and which has not been denied by the defendants in their written statement that in the month of December, 1987 Nanku Ram passed away. Thus, it would mean that within a month Nanku Ram died. In the document (Ex. P-1) no period has been fixed for executing the sale deed, though it is well settled in law that the time is not an essence of the contract. But, in the document, it has been specifically mentioned that whenever Krishna Kumar would pay Rs. 16,000/- a sale deed would be executed and registered. For better understanding, it shall be apposite to re-write that part of the document

    11. These averments in the document indicates that plaintiff was not having requisite money with him otherwise this condition would not have been incorporated in the document that whenever plaintiff would pay the balance amount, the house in dispute would be sold to him. Normally, this type of condition is not embodied in a document. One could infer that this condition was inserted only because plaintiff was not having sufficient funds with him.

    12. In the plaint, though it has been pleaded that plaintiff Krishna Kumar insisted Nanku Ram for several times to get the sale-deed executed but he avoided. At this juncture, we should not forget that Nanku Ram died in December, 1987 and Ex. P-1 is dated 20-11-1987. Thus, according to the plaintiff in between 20-11-1987 and December, 1987 for several times, it was insisted by him to get the sale deed executed. If during this short period of one month, the plaintiff was ready to purchase the suit house then why that condition was embodied in the document that whenever Rs. 16,000/- shall be paid, document of sale deed would be executed.

    13. Though in the plaint in very specific words, it has been pleaded that plaintiff Krishna Kumar insisted Nanku Ram to get the sale-deed executed on payment of balance consideration Rs. 16,000/- but this fact has not been proved by any documentary evidence. Plaintiff sent two registered notices Ex. P-2 and P-3 dated 27-1-1989 and 3-3-1989 respectively to the defendants but nowhere in these notices this fact has been mentioned that plaintiff ever insisted Nanku Ram to execute the sale deed. These notices were sent to the present defendants after the death of Nanku Ram and immediately before filing of the suit, but this fact does not exist in the said notices and for the first time, this fact was embodied in the plaint that plaintiff Krishna Kumar insisted Nanku Ram to get the sale deed executed. According to me, just to give an artificial colour of readiness and willingness, this fact has been pleaded in the plaint.

    14. It may be noted that in December, 1987 Nanku Ram died and according to the plaintiff, he insisted the deceased to execute the sale-deed which was avoided by him. The suit was filed on 10-3-1989 meaning thereby after near about one year and three months of the date of the death of the deceased. According to the plaintiff, deceased avoided to execute the sale-deed, in other words impliedly he denied to execute the sale deed, but the suit was not filed and the plaintiffs waited for a year and three months. In a suit for specific performance of contract, delay plays a vital role and in order to infer the readiness and willingness of plaintiff, the delay of a great extent, in the present case, would be a relevant factor to refuse the exercise of the discretion in favour of plaintiff. Under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the discretion has been vested in the Court to allow or disallow a decree of specific performance of contract and the Court is not bound to grant the relief of specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Though there is a rider put by the statute on the Court that the discretion should not be exercised arbitrarily. Indeed, it should be based on, sound reasonings guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Thus, this Court while exercising the appellate jurisdiction can also exercise the discretionary power to allow or dis-allow the relief of specific performance. Apart from this power conferred to this Court by section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, under section 107(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court being an appellate Court also enjoys the same powers and duties as are conferred and imposed on the Trial Court before whom the suit was instituted. From the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is luminously clear that this Court can also exercise discretionary power to allow or dis-allow relief of specific performance of contract.

    15. On testing, the abovesaid law on the anvil of present factual scenario as there is a great delay in filing the suit, this has put a deep dent on plaintiff's conduct in respect to his readiness and willingness.

    16. As discussed hereinabove, plaintiff Krishna Kumar insisted deceased Nanku Ram when he was alive to execute the sale deed and he avoided then why notices were sent after the expiry of one year and two months. This would be an additional factor not to exercise the discretion in favour of plaintiff and equity also so demands. The Supreme Court in the case of S. Rangaraju Naidu v. S. Thiruvarakkarasu. 1995 Supp (2) SCC 680 has laid down that relief of specific performance is discretionary one. It is thus clear that the relief is equitable one and when the plaintiff did not bother to issue notices immediately after when Nanku avoided to execute the sale deed and they were sent soon before filing of the suit, would go to show that just to bring the suit in the clutches of readiness and willingness two notices were sent and immediately the suit was filed on 10-3-1989. A civil suit has to be decided not only on the basis of the evidence and its impact with technicality, but, also by applying the principles of “probabilities and preponderance”.

    17. The term “readiness and willingness” is to be decided on the anvil of the facts and circumstances of the each case. In the present case, nowhere in the plaint, it has been so pleaded or has been said by plaintiff Vidhyawati Rathore in her evidence that plaintiffs are possessing sufficient funds to pay the balance sale price. Though, it has been pleaded that plaintiff is ready and willing to purchase the suit house after payment of Rs. 16,000/-. There is no documentary proof that plaintiffs were having funds with them to pay the balance consideration. In this context, I may profitably rely on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar., (1996) 4 SCC 526 : AIR 1996 SC 2095.

    18. The plaintiff Krishna Kumar and after his death the present plaintiffs/appellants are tenant in the suit house Smt. Vidhyawati Rathore in her cross-examination also admitted this fact.

    19. On the aforesaid premised reasons, according to me, the Trial Court erred in law in decreeing the suit. The suit for specific performance of the contract is hereby dismissed, however, defendants are bound to refund the amount of Rs. 7000/- which was obtained by Nanku Ram along with simple interest @ 6% per annum.

    20. The appeal succeeds in part and is hereby allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Counsel fee according to the schedule if certified.

    Appeal partly allowed.

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    Comments

    Mohini And Others v. Vidhyawati Rathore And Others
    (Mar 24, 2004)