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  • SECTION 6 A GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to "the Code"). Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Land Acquisition Act, Hindu Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act
  • CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999),
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure....."
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code,
  • Section 96, CPC and Section 115, CPC
  • Order IX Rule 4 and Order IX Rule
  • Sections 24, 63, 99, 99A, 141, 144, 146
  • M.P. Accommodation Control Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC
  • Order 43 Rule 1, CPC
  • Order 6 Rule 17, CPC
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 6 A GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to "the Code"). Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Land Acquisition Act, Hindu Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act
  • CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AMENDMENT ACT
  • Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999),
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure....."
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code,
  • Section 96, CPC and Section 115, CPC
  • Order IX Rule 4 and Order IX Rule
  • Sections 24, 63, 99, 99A, 141, 144, 146
  • M.P. Accommodation Control Act
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC
  • Order 43 Rule 1, CPC
  • Order 6 Rule 17, CPC
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This order decides three civil revision petitions—Civil Revision Nos. 202/2000 (Sawal Singh v. Smt. Ramsakhi and Ors.), 286/2002 (Anokhi Lal v. Surendra Kumar and Ors.) and 388/2002 (Leela Bai v. Lottan and Ors.)—which involve a common question of law concerning the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) after amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999), which came into force on 1 July 2002.

Brief particulars of each revision, as stated in the opinion:

  • Civil Revision No. 202/2000 — The applicant challenged an order dated 18-1-2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Khurai (District Sagar) in Civil M.A. No. 19/99, by which an appeal filed by plaintiffs/respondents under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC was allowed and a temporary injunction was issued against the applicant.
  • Civil Revision No. 286/2002 — The applicant challenged an order of the First Civil Judge, Class 2, Khandwa, in Civil Suit No. 170-A/99 which allowed an application by plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint. This revision was filed on 6-2-2002 and admitted on 9-4-2002.
  • Civil Revision No. 388/2002 — The applicant impugned an order in which the trial court rejected a plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, and an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC was dismissed.

The batch of revisions was filed under Section 115 CPC. The opinion reproduces the amended Section 115 (post-1 July 2002), notes the text of the pre-amendment provision, and highlights that Sub-clause (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) (which provided that variation/reversal could be permitted where the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury) was omitted by the amendment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC after the amendment (particularly in relation to interlocutory orders passed "in the course of a suit or other proceedings")?
  2. Whether interlocutory orders which do not finally dispose of the suit or proceeding are amenable to revision under the amended Section 115 CPC.
  3. Whether revisions that were pending on 1 July 2002 are to be governed by the amended provisions of Section 115 CPC or by the law as it stood when the revisions were filed.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The applicants' counsel submitted that the proviso to Section 115 CPC cannot curtail the right of revision provided by the main section; in other words, the right of revision conferred by Section 115 is not to be curtailed by the proviso.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any other party's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shyam Sunder Agarwal & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 1321 Holds that even where a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order, such finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 CPC (as cited in the opinion via a passage referring to Hari Shankar and this proposition). The Court referred to this decision to support the proposition that proceedings under special statutes or final orders under other statutory regimes may still be subject to revisional scrutiny under Section 115 in appropriate circumstances, and to illustrate that some proceedings (though final under a special statute) may still fall within the ambit of revision if they are of an original or independent character.
Ramchandra v. Dattatraya, 1986 JLJ 344; 1986 MPLJ 406 = AIR 1986 MP 191 (Full Bench) Establishes that supervisory or revisional power under Section 115 CPC must be exercised in accordance with the law in force at the time when the power is sought to be exercised; and that amendment to Section 115 is procedural. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to conclude that pending revisions as on 1-7-2002 must be decided according to the amended Section 115 (i.e., the law in force when the revisional power was being exercised), and to justify application of the amended provision to pending matters.
Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126 Affirms that the right of appeal (and by analogy revision) is a creature of statute and is not an inherent right; distinctions between Section 96 (appeal) and Section 115 (revision) are noted. The Court invoked this authority to explain that Section 115 confers discretionary power (uses "may") and that revision is procedural in nature rather than a substantive right; thereby supporting the proposition that the legislature can curtail procedural remedies.
Reference to "Hari Shankar" (case-name invoked within a Supreme Court passage cited in Shyam Sunder Agarwal) Within the cited Supreme Court passage, Hari Shankar is referred to as authority for the proposition that finality attached by a special statute to an appellate order does not necessarily oust revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The opinion reproduces the Supreme Court passage that mentions Hari Shankar to underscore the principle that revisional jurisdiction may survive statutory finality in certain contexts; the Court used this to distinguish between orders that are interlocutory and those that are original/final in character.
AIR 1980 SC 1575 (case citation mentioned within the opinion) Referred to (via the Ramchandra discussion) for the proposition that an amendment made in Section 115 CPC was a procedural reform. The Court cited this to support the characterization of the 1999 amendment as procedural, reinforcing that procedural law governs whether revision lies at the time the power is invoked.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a structured manner, grounded in the text of Section 115 CPC (as amended) and prior case-law addressing the nature of revisional jurisdiction:

  1. Statutory change and its effect: The Court first identifies that Sub-clause (b) of the proviso to subsection (1) of Section 115 (which allowed interference where the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury) has been omitted by the 1999 amendment. The omission substantially changes the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
  2. Two compartments of Section 115: The Court explains that Section 115 has two parts: (i) the main part conferring revisional power to rectify errors in orders of subordinate courts, and (ii) the proviso which creates limitations or riders on that power. Even if the main part shows error or jurisdictional irregularity, the proviso may bar interference unless its conditions are satisfied.
  3. Scope of the proviso and "orders in the course of a suit or other proceedings": The proviso limits revision in respect of "any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding" except where such an order if made in favour of the applicant would have finally disposed of the suit or proceeding. The Court emphasizes that many interlocutory orders (for example, applications for amendment, injunctions, appointment of a receiver, commissions, filing documents, preliminary issues, addition of issues) are orders "in the course of a suit" and do not ordinarily finally dispose of the suit; hence they are generally excluded from revision under the proviso post-amendment.
  4. Distinction for "original proceedings": The Court draws a distinction for certain proceedings which, although arising in context of code procedures, have the character of original proceedings or standalone proceedings (for example, applications under Order IX Rule 4 and Order IX Rule 13 to restore suits). Such proceedings, because they can lead to final termination of rights or the proceeding itself (e.g., refusal to restore a suit), may permit revisional interference since they are not merely interlocutory steps in a continuing suit.
  5. Wide meaning of "other proceedings": The Court notes "other proceedings" should be read broadly. The Code uses the term "proceedings" across multiple provisions (Sections 24, 63, 99, 99A, 141, 144, 146, 147). Proceedings such as those under Section 144, execution-like proceedings, Section 152 (rectification of decree), Section 47 matters and proceedings under special statutes (e.g., M.P. Accommodation Control Act, eviction statutes, Land Acquisition Act, Hindu Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act) may be of a different character and treated as original or independent proceedings for revisional purposes.
  6. Legislative intent and procedural character of revision: The Court accepts the legislative intent behind the deletion of clause (b)—to restrict High Court interference in interlocutory orders and to promote expedition of civil proceedings. Revision is characterized as a procedural remedy and legislation can curtail procedural remedies. The Court also observes that Section 105 CPC provides a remedy to challenge certain interlocutory orders in appeal where no appeal otherwise lies.
  7. Temporal application (pending revisions): The Court addresses whether pending revisions as of 1-7-2002 are to be decided under the amended provision. Relying on the Full Bench decision in Ramchandra v. Dattatraya and the repeal and savings provision (Section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment Act), the Court concludes that pending revisions will be governed by the law in force at the time the revisional power is exercised (i.e., the amended Section 115), except that revisions already finally disposed of prior to the amendment remain unaffected.
  8. Application to the present petitions: The Court applies the foregoing principles to the three revisions:
    • Civil Revision No. 286/2002 (challenge to allowance of application under Order 6 Rule 17 to amend the plaint) is an interlocutory order which will not finally dispose of the suit; hence revisional jurisdiction under amended Section 115 is not exercised. The applicant is granted liberty to assail the order at an appropriate time or to file an appeal against the final order.
    • Civil Revision Nos. 388/2002 and 202/2000 arise out of orders passed in appeals under Order 43 Rule 1 in which applications under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 were decided. Deciding these revisions would not finally dispose of the suits; accordingly, revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised and these revisions are dismissed.
  9. Conclusion on revisional scope: The Court formulates conclusions (as printed in the opinion). Paragraphing in the opinion shows an incomplete item (labelled (a) without accompanying text). The opinion contains (b) and (c): (b) revisional jurisdiction will not be exercised in respect of all other orders "deciding any case" in the course of suit or other proceedings where allowing the revision would not finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings; (c) all pending revisions on 1-7-2002 will be decided as per the amended provisions of Section 115. The opinion thus emphasizes the restrictive post-amendment approach to interlocutory orders.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • DISMISSED: Civil Revision No. 286/2002 — The revision challenging the trial court's order allowing amendment of the plaint (Order 6 Rule 17 CPC) was dismissed because it is an interlocutory order which will not finally dispose of the suit; the applicant was granted liberty to challenge the order at an appropriate time or in a proper forum, including by appeal against a final order.
  • DISMISSED: Civil Revision Nos. 388/2002 and 202/2000 — Both revisions were dismissed on the ground that the impugned orders (relating to applications under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 and related appeals under Order 43 Rule 1) would not finally dispose of the suits and thus revisional jurisdiction under the amended Section 115 cannot be exercised.

Implications explained by the Court (as contained in the opinion):

  • The amendment to Section 115 (deletion of the proviso clause that allowed interference where the order would occasion failure of justice or irreparable injury) substantially curtailed the High Court's revisional jurisdiction in respect of interlocutory orders made "in the course of a suit or other proceedings."
  • Orders that are merely interlocutory and do not finally dispose of a suit are generally not amenable to revision under the amended Section 115; however, proceedings which have the character of original or independent proceedings (and which, if allowed or disallowed, may terminate rights or proceedings) may still be subject to revision where appropriate.
  • All revisions pending on 1 July 2002 are to be decided according to the amended Section 115 (i.e., the law in force when the revisional power is exercised), except for revisions that had been finally disposed of before the amendment came into force (which remain unaffected by the amendment under the repeal and savings provision cited).
  • Practically, the direct effect on the parties in these petitions is dismissal of the revisions; the Court expressly preserved applicants' opportunity to raise the issues at the appropriate stage (for example, by appeal against final orders) where applicable.

No new doctrine beyond application and interpretation of the amended Section 115 CPC was asserted as a binding innovation; the Court applied existing principles and cited established authorities to interpret the scope and temporal application of the amendment.


The summary above is strictly confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. Sections or items not expressly stated in the opinion have not been added or inferred.

    Sawal Singh v. Ramsakhi

    1. This order will decide Civil Revision Nos. 202/2000 (Sawal Singh v. Smt. Ramsakhi and Ors.), 286/2002 (Anokhi Lal v. Surendra Kumar and Ors.) and 388/2002 (Leela Bai v. Lottan and Ors.) involving same question of law. The facts of the cases are as under :--

    (Civil Revision No. 202/2000) The applicant has filed present revision challenging the order dated 18-1-2000 passed by Additional District Judge, Khurai, Distt. Sagar in Civil M.A. No. 19/99, by which appeal filed by plaintiffs/respondents under Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC was allowed and temporary injunction issued against the applicant during the pendency of the suit.

    (Civil Revision No. 286/2002) This applicant has challenged the order passed by First Civil Judge, Class 2, Khandwa, in Civil Suit No. 170-A/99 by which application filed by non-applicants/plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC was allowed and plaintiffs were permitted to amend the plaint. This revision was filed on 6-2-2002 and admitted on 9-4-2002.

    (Civil Revision No. 388/2002) In this revision the order passed by the Court below by which application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC filed by the plaintiff was rejected by the Trial Court and appeal filed by the applicant under Order 43 Rule 1, CPC, was also dismissed, is impugned.

    The batch of revisions has been filed invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to "the Code"). Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (46 of 1999), and came into force on 1st July, 2002 by Notification dated 6th June, 2002. Now, the amended Section is as under:--

    "115. Revision.-- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such Subordinate Court appears-

    Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.

    (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.

    (3) "A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court."

    Explanation:-- In this section, the expression, "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings."

    Prior to 1-7-2002, the provision reads as under:--

    "115. Revision.-- The High Court may call for the record of any cases which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such Subordinate Court appears-

    Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.

    (b) After Sub-section (2) but before the Explanation, following Sub-section (3) has been inserted namely:--

    "A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court."

    2. In nut-shell, now in Sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Code, following words which were in the statute book have been omitted :--

    (b) The order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.

    Except this, the amended Sub-section (1) is as it is as it was prior to 1-7-2002, but this has substantially changed in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of High Court.

    3. For the decision of the above revision petitions, following questions arise:--

    4. The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 115 of the Code can be segregated into two compartments, namely, first relating to the circumstance under which the High Court can exercise the jurisdiction for rectification of the errors pertaining to the order passed by inferior Courts, and secondly the proviso which follows the main section creating certain riders/qualifiers. If the proviso is read in its entirety in a constructive manner, it is quite clear that even if the requirements stipulated in the first part, such as, non-exercise of jurisdiction though vested, exercise of jurisdiction which is impermissible or commission of material irregularity in passing of the order, the Court shall not vary or reverse the order if conditions precedent enshrined in the proviso are not satisfied. By virtue of recent amendment by which Sub-clause (b) of the proviso to the Sub-section (1) has been deleted, what remains in the statute book is the proviso. The proviso creates an embargo in exercise of power of revision. To put it differently, it restricts the exercise of jurisdiction while entertaining the revision. The Court may be satisfied with regard to the components mentioned in the first compartment but unless the case fits into the category that has been engrafted in the proviso the Court will not be in a position to interfere.

    5. The proviso clearly lays a postulate that if the order which is under assail if it had been made in favour of party applying for revision, the suit or other proceedings would have been finally disposed of. The words used in this proviso which are of immense signification are "order passed in the course of a suit or other proceedings". There are certain categories of orders which came into existence in the course of hearing of the suit. To enumerate some:-- an order refusing/allowing an application for amendment, prayer for grant of injunction, relief seeking appointment of receiver, commission/survey knowing commission, application to file documents, application to take up an issue as preliminary one, application seeking addition of an issue and such other ancillary matters. These orders are precluded from the purview of assail as ordinarily, in a case of this nature the suit would not stand disposed of. But there are certain proceedings which are proceedings under the Code which may warrant interference because they have the status of original proceeding. To elucidate :-- applications under Order IX Rule 4 and Order IX Rule 13. These applications are filed in Court of law when the suit is not in existence or pending as the same has seen the extinction/end because of some obtaining circumstances. Hence, they are to be regarded as original proceedings. To give an example, if the Court refused to restore the suit for some reason or other and the matter travels to High Court in revision and if the revision is allowed, the said proceeding would stand terminated. Therefore, a proceeding of that nature is an independent proceeding otherwise immense hardship would be caused.

    6. The terms "other proceedings" have wide meaning and they should not be read in a narrow compass. In the Code 'other proceedings' are not defined but in Sections 24, 63, 99, 99A, 141, 144, 146 and 147, the word 'proceedings' has been used. Under Section 141, the legislation has specifically included the proceedings under Order 9, CPC but has excluded any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The term proceedings cannot be confined to a civil proceeding alone. It has the comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication.

    7. A proceeding instituted under section 144 of the code has to be treated as an original proceeding as it relates to different realm altogether. It has a different colour. Ordinarily, it is in the nature of an execution proceeding. The execution proceeding cannot be regarded as a proceeding in the course of the suit or related to an order passed under the suit or decision of an issue in the suit. Another example may be given. After the suit is disposed of an application may be filed under section 152 of code for rectification of the error in the decree. That proceeding has to be considered to be in a different sphere. Otherwise that would defeat the purpose of justice. A proceeding under Section 47 which was initially appealable after 1976 amendment is not appealable. If the same is not treated as an original proceeding, revision would not lie and the same cannot be the purpose of the proviso and such an acceptation would amount to traversity of justice.

    8. A consequence cannot be equated with the main proceeding. After the termination of the lis, to give effect to the verdict of the lis execution takes place. Hence, that has also to be kept in the compartment of original proceeding. Quite apart from the above, the proceedings which are initially under the special statute before the competent authority of the Code or under M.P. Accommodation Control Act or under any other eviction proceeding relating to public premises and such other ancillary proceedings are the original proceedings and if the appeal is barred then revision is maintainable because final order is passed in these proceedings. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision rendered in the case of Shyam Sunder Agarwal & Co. v. Union Of India., AIR 1996 SC 1321, wherein the Apex Court held :--

    "28. It may be stated that even if a special statute expressly attaches finality to an appellate order passed under that statute, it has been held by this Court in the case of Hari Shankar that such provision of finality will not take away revisional powers of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure....."

    The proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, Hindu Succession Act, Guardians and Wards Act and order passed under section 94 of the code are also in the realm of original proceedings. However, the list is not exhaustive but only illustrative. Now this Court will not exercise revisional jurisdiction in respect of those orders which would not dispose of the suit finally. Though on the decision of the suit the effect of the order may be substantial, material, or on jurisdictional issues, but if immediate effect is not the final disposal, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised, though those issues can definitely be raised when regular appeal is preferred.

    9. The learned Counsel appearing for applicants submit that by proviso, the right of revision cannot be curtailed. The main section provides a remedy to a litigant, but by the proviso, such a remedy has been curtailed. The proviso cannot curtail the right available under the main section. Suffice it to say that language of a proviso is normally construed in relation to the subject-matter covered by the section to which the proviso is appended. The proviso does not travel beyond the provisions to which it is a proviso. In the circumstances, while construing the proviso it is to be considered in relation to the principal section to which it stands as a proviso. Section 115 provides revisional jurisdiction to the High Court. Remedy of the revision is a procedural, which can be curtailed by legislation. The effect of the deletion of Clause (b) of the proviso is that the revisional jurisdiction in relation to interlocutory orders is curtailed. The legislation looking to the long pendency of the civil cases and proceedings had decided to provide speedy process to the Court so that the cases which are pending/filed in the Civil Courts may be decided expeditiously. In that regard, in the Code various provisions have been made in which the time period has been provided. In the procedure also, there are several amendments which give effect to the legislative intent for speedy trial. To achieve this aspect, the Legislature had deleted (b) clause of proviso with an intention that the interlocutory orders should not be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The proviso in the section does not form a separate section, but has to be read harmoniously in relation to the main provision.

    10. Apart from this, the legislation has provided remedy to challenge all such interlocutory orders by enacting Section 105 in the Code. Where no appeal is provided against the order, then any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal. In the circumstances, the effect of amendment is that the interim orders which have been passed in the course of a suit or other proceedings the High Court will not exercise its revisional jurisdiction in respect of those orders. While all the orders against which a revisional jurisdiction is invoked and result of which would have final disposal of the suit or other proceeding, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised. In the circumstances, each and every case has to be seen on the basis of the aforesaid criteria.

    11. The next question arises whether the pending revisions on 1-7-2002 will be governed by the amended provision or with the provisions which were in existence when the revision was filed. It is settled law that the remedy of revision is not as of right. It is procedural law and every case has to be decided on the existing law when the power is to be exercised. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ramchandra v. Dattatraya, 1986 JLJ 344 : (1986 MPLJ 406 = AIR 1986 MP 191) has considered this question, and ruled thus :--

    "8. In our opinion, in order to ascertain as to whether a right of revision is or is not conferred on a litigant, it would be necessary to examine the provision of law under which that right is being claimed. Does it provide that a revision shall lie against a particular order or does it merely confer power on a superior authority to revise orders of a subordinate authority ? In one case a substantive right is conferred while in the other case it is not so. That is why the Supreme Court held in AIR 1980 SC 1575 (supra) that the amendment made in Section 115, CPC was a procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court.

    9. The matter can be looked at from another angle. As held by the Supreme Court in Smt Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126. It is well settled that though there is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of a civil nature, a right of appeal inheres in no one and an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. The right of appeal is thus a creature of statute. Similarly, if a right of revision is claimed, it should be conferred by a provision of law. In this connection difference in the language used in Section 96, CPC and Section 115, CPC is noteworthy. Section 96, CPC provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction, to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decrees of such Court. Section 96, CPC thus confers a right of appeal. On the other hand, Section 115, CPC which deals with revisions provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case and if certain conditions are fulfilled, may make such order as it thinks fit. It is true, as urged on behalf of the petitioner, that the use of the word "may" in Section 115, CPC does not mean that the High Court has an unfettered discretion in dealing with a case under Section 115, CPC. But the fact that the discretion of High Court under Section 115, CPC is controlled by that provision docs not lead to the conclusion that a substantive right is conferred on a litigant by Section 115, CPC."

    12. In the repeal and savings clause of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999. Relevant Section is 32(2)(i), which reads as under:--

    "32. Repeal and savings.-- (2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act have come into force or repeal under Sub-section (1) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897),--

    (i) the provisions of Section 115 of the Principal Act, as amended by Section 12 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any proceedings for revision which had been finally disposed of."

    13. By the aforesaid provision, the only finally disposed of revision, which has been decided prior to coming into force of this Amendment Act will not be affected. The intcndment of the legislature is that all the pending matters will be governed by the amended provision. In Ramchandra 's case (supra), the Full Bench has also held :--

    "11. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, we have come to the conclusion that in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, in the Amending Act supervisory or revisional power under Section 115, CPC has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law in force at the time when the power is sought to be exercised....."

    14. In view of the Full bench decision, all the pending revisions will be decided in accordance with law which is in force at the time when the revisional power is exercised.

    15. In view of the aforesaid, conclusions are as under :--

    (a) The revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is available against:

    (b) The revisional jurisdiction will not be exercised in respect of all other orders 'deciding any case' in the course of suit or other proceedings, though there may be any error, defect, irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction, where allowing the revision would not finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings.

    (c) all the pending revisions on 1-7-2002 will be decided as per the amended provisions of section 115.

    16. In view of the aforesaid, in Civil Revision No. 286/2002, applicant has challenged the order passed by the Trial Court allowing the amendment application filed by plaintiff/non-applicant, is an interlocutory order. By allowing this revision, suit cannot be disposed of finally. In the circumstances, revisional jurisdiction in this case is not exercised. However, the applicant is granted liberty to assail the order at an appropriate time and forum, or in case occasion arises to the applicant to file an appeal against the final order. Dismissal of this revision will not come in the way of applicant to challenge the order.

    Civil Revision Nos. 388/2002 and 202/2000 Both have arisen out of order passed in appeal under Order 43 Rule 1, CPC in which application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of CPC was decided. Deciding these revisions will not dispose of the suits finally. In the circumstances, revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised. Consequently, these revisions are dismissed.

    17. Before parting with the cases, I unreservedly record my appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Shri Ravish Agrawal, Senior Advocate, Shri S.K. Seth, Additional Advocate General, Shri H.D. Khirwadkar, Shri R.P. Jain, Shri Ashok Lalwani, Shri Imtiaz Hussain, Shri A.K. Jain, Shri Alok Aradhe, Shri N.K. Patel, Shri Pramod Varma and other Advocates.

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    Sawal Singh v. Ramsakhi
    (Jul 29, 2002)