1. In this appeal Under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act, the Award passed by Claims Tribunal under Section 140 is challenged by the Insurer on a short ground. The question is, if it was incumbent on the said Tribunal to apportion or "specify" in the impugned award the "no fault liability" arising out of accident in which two motor vehicles were used so that the entire amount is not required to be paid by the Insurer who is required to discharge that liability of owner of one of the vehicles only.

2. When the appeal came up for admission, I entertained doubt if it could be admitted as the appellant is required as per Section 173 to make deposit of Rs. 25,000/- or 50% of the amount awarded, whichever is less. In the instant case, claimant/respondent No. I has been awarded Rs. 7,500/-. Although my attention was drawn to this Court's decision in Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354, rendered at the Indore Bench and it was pointed out that the impugned award being passed on 10-1-1989, no deposit need be made as the new Act came into force only from 1-7-1989, I failed to persuade myself to accept the law laid down to be correct. Happily, appellant having duly deposited Rs. 3,750/-, being 50% of the amount of the award, I am relieved of the anxiety. Otherwise, it might have been necessary for me to make a reference to Full Bench for reconsideration of the law laid down in the D.B. decision in aforesaid Jaswant Rao's case (AIR 1990 Madh Pra 354). I may, however, still observe that inspiration for that decision came from a chain of other decisions of this Court on the scope of Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897 (referred in Section 217(4) of the Act). But, all those decisions have been overruled recently in Babulal's case AIR 1990 Madh Pra 317 (FB).

3. On facts, it is undisputed that two vehicles were involved in the accident and the claimant who sustained injury and has got an interim award for that, was travelling in bus No. C.P.H. 8440, owned by respondent No. 3, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, for short, the "Corporation". The bus collided with truck bearing registration No. CIW 7432 owned by respondent No. 2, but the truck is admittedly insured with the appellant. Shri Johri, appellant's counsel, contended that case of collision prima facie made it a case of contributory negligence of the vehicles involved in the accident and that had to be determined by the Tribunal when passing award finally Under Section 168 of the Act.

Still, even at the stage of making interim award Under Section 140, the Tribunal was not excused of its duty to apportion "no fault liability" between the owners of the two vehicles involved in the accident and that duty was ingrained in the provision under which the award was passed and that the expression used in Section 140(1), "jointly and severally" explicitly referred to that duty.

4. Counsel for the Corporation (respondent No. 3), Shri Khot, conceded that he failed to lay hand on any reported decision in regard to the controversy mooted in the appeal. However, he cited certain decisions to which I shall advert in due course. For the present, however, I must state at once that the impugned award follows substantially the statutory mandate. The sum awarded is made payable by non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3, namely, the Insurer and the Corporation; the other non-applicant, Bhagwandas, who was owner of the truck insured with the appellant has been left out. In any case, that minor flaw in the award does not invalidate it for the reason that the owner's liability is passed on statutorily to the Insurer in terms of Section 149(1) of the Act and as such, the Tribunal did not act illegally or arbitrarily or without jurisdiction in naming the Insurer as the person who had to discharge the liability under the award because he had to discharge the same in terms of the said provision.

5. In my view, there is material difference between the phraseology used by the Legislature in Sections 140 and 168 of the Act; the word "specify" is used in Section 168(1) and that is avoided deliberately in Section 140(1), on the other hand, it is true, the Legislature had in its contemplation "no fault liability" arising from use of more than a single motor vehicle and took care, therefore to state that "the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation...... in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this Section". Reading the subsequent Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4), it is difficult to conceive of any duty on the Tribunal of naming the tortfeaser in the order for payment of the "fixed sum" of Rupees 25,000/ - in case of death and Rs. 12,000/ - in case of permanent disablement as ad hoc compensation on the basis of "no fault liability" to the person or persons entitled. Sub-section (3) clearly states that neither any pleading nor any proof is required of "wrongful act, neglect or delay of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles from or of any person". Sub-section (4) buttresses further that position by envisaging that the quantum of compensation "fixed" and made statutorily "recoverable" cannot be "reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement".

6. However, I cannot say that the apprehension which Shri Johri has expressed is wholly without any basis in that there will be likelihood of the Insurer losing its entitlement to claiming statutorily envisaged exoneration subsequently in the same proceeding, in terms of Sections 149(2) and 170 of the Act. About that, more later, because in my dissent in Bhagwandas 1990 ACC CJ 495 (Madh-Pra), certain views I expressed on the corresponding provision of the Old Act, Section 96(2). At this stage, however, I must say that the proviso to Section 168(1) also clearly indicates that the provision for payment of ad hoc compensation on the principle of "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140 is an independent provision. Section 144 adds to the rigour of the rigid mandate of Section 140. Indeed, Section 141(2) of the same Chapter X embodying Section 140 as well, vests on the Tribunal an inexorable duty of dealing with and disposing of "as expeditiously as possible" the claim for compensation contemplated Under Section 140. Reliance, therefore, of Shri Khot on this Court's decision in Manila Ramdei 1987 ACC CJ 764 : AIR 1988 Madh Pra 98 is most appropriate as this Court has taken the view that the Claims Tribunal is required to exercise Under Section 92-A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, its jurisdiction suo motu to pass an order the reunder in the absence of an application for the contemplated relief. In Mahila Phoolwati 1986 ACC CJ 106 : AIR 1986 Madh Pra 187, this Court has held that the moment it is found by a Court or Tribunal on material available to it that one or more motor vehicle/motor vehicles is or are involved in an accident, the provisions of section 92-a become alive and generate sufficient power to enable jurisdiction to be exercised the reunder to help the hapless and helpless. Relief, in my view, according to the contemplation of the Legislature, is to be provided to the widows and orphans quickly and instantly to preempt and prevent their destitution and vagrancy and that object of the Legislature can be fulfilled only if the order Under Section 140 is passed imaginatively to ensure the relief to reach quickly, effectively and positively to the destituted. It is indeed, therefore, desirable rather than, as done in the instant case in the impugned award, if any of the two vehicles (in case in which the accident is one of a collision between the two) is an insured vehicle, order Under Section 140 is expeditiously passed specifying that the liability under that order is to be discharged by the Insurer. However, the Claims Tribunals are advised to frame their orders suitably to conform also to the language used in Section 140 to hold primarily the "owners" of both motor vehicles in such a case to be "jointly and severally" liable to discharge the "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140(1). By that the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to indicate Insurer's statutory liability contemplated Under Section 149 is not impaired and the Tribunal may still name the Insurer as person liable to discharge the liability in respect of order passed Under Section 140(1) of the Act; but that will leave no doubt at least about the right of the Insurer to agitate subsequently exonerating finally of his liability and to press for an order for reimbursement by way of restitution.

7. To two recent decisions of this Court rendered by two learned single Judges in the case of National Insurance Co. v. Sadhelal AIR 1990 Madh Pra 383 and United Indian Insurance Co. v. Vijaya Singh (1990 ACC CJ 938 Madh Pra, my attention is drawn. In last mentioned decision, there is an observation that the "insurance company has its remedy open to realise the same from the owner/ insurer of the vehicle". In that case, it was pleaded by the Insurer that only the tractor was insured and the trailor was not which had caused the accident. How and when and what remedy the Insurer can avail is, however, not indicated. In Sadhelal, the view taken is that trial of statutory defences available to the Insurer is to be postponed and held along with other issues and that award of compensation Under Section 92-A against the Insurer along with owner was not illegal. Shri Knot cited also Madras High Court's D.B. decision in United India Insurance Co. v. Lakshmi 1990 ACC CJ 390 : (AIR 1990 Madras 108) but the law laid down therein is of no relevance to the controversy mooted. In that case, it was held that in case of an accident between two trucks, the Insurer had no liability for death of the owner of one of the trucks in which he was travelling even though there was negligence of the driver of that truck resulting in the accident and his employer's death. Because, Insurer's liability Under section 95(1) of the old act was "third party liability" only. In Bhagwandas (1990 ACC CJ 495) (Madh Pra) (supra), I had taken the view that the statutory right of the Insurer to claim exoneration in terms of the exclusionary clause envisaged Under section 96(2), old act, cannot be whittled down by putting a premium in owner's default in pleading and proving that the Insurer was not entitled to enforce the provision in the facts and circumstances of the case. Apex Court's decision in Skandia Insurance Co.'s case 1987 ACC CJ 411 : (AIR 1987 SC 1184), I had analysed carefully and the purport of the decision I had tried to explain therein though I had taken the view also that in an appeal Under Section 110-D, Old Act, jurisdiction of this Court to hold Insurer liable Under section 92-a, old act would be available because of the pendency itself of the appeal despite the fact that the accident had taken place prior to enactment of the new provision.

8. It does not need reiteration that primary obligating to discharge liability in respect of an order passed Under Section 140(1) as also an award passed Under Section 168(1) is that of the owner or owners of the offending motor vehicle or motor vehicles and that is made vicariously dischargeable by the Insurer in terms of Section 149(1). Section 141(9) deals with two circumstances pertaining to residual liability in respect to which trial takes place in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act culminating finally in the award Under Section 168(1) of the Act. Both Clauses (a) and (b) envisage credit to be given for the compensation already paid by any person Under Section 140(1) when finally his liability is determined on the principle of "fault", but there is no provision in Chapter X to deal with cases and circumstances during trial held in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII for providing any relief to any owner or Insurer subsequently in case it is found that he or they are entitled to any reimbursement because the obligation they had earlier discharged Under Section 140(1) was not his or theirs. Indeed, Section 140(1) explicitly contemplates liability to be discharged not only "jointly" but also "severally", it would be possible evidently to raise that contention subsequently. Evidently, circumstances of a particular case may be such as when there is either a case of contributory negligence or a case of Insurer claiming exoneration in terms of the provisions of Section 149(2) or Section 170 of the Act. In such cases, the Insurer may shift his liability finally to the Insured person, whose vehicle it had insured and in other cases the owner or the insurer himself may claim that in a case of accident involving more than one motor vehicle the entire obligation to discharge "no fault liability" contemplated Under Section 140(1) was that of the other motor vehicle or motor vehicles and not one which he owned or insured. The question is, if in such type of cases either the owner or the insurer had to go to a civil suit or the Claims Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to adjust equities between parties exercising its jurisdiction Under Section 168(1) of the Act.

9. In this connection, reference may be appropriately made to this Court recent Full Bench decision in Sarmaniya Bai's case 1990 ACC CJ 860 : AIR 1990 Madh Pra 306 wherein the nature of powers and jurisdiction exercised by Claims Tribunal is analysed. The view taken is that the Claims Tribunal, though meant to function as a "Court's substitute", retained inherent jurisdiction exerci-sable by a Civil Court. Such Tribunals do not lose inherent jurisdiction and inherent power traceable to the pre-existing dispensation and in that case, it was held that Claims Tribunals are entitled to execute awards and orders passed under the Act, for payment of compensation to victims of motor accidents applying expressly the provisions of Order 21, CPC despite the said provision not being made explicitly applicable to Claims Tribunals functioning in this State.

10. According to me, the provisions neither of Chapter X nor of Chapter XII, deprive expressly the Claims Tribunals of their jurisdiction to adjust equities between parties while disposing of finally claim made for compensation arising from motor accident in terms of an "award" passed Under Section 168(1) of the Act. Section 141 of Chapter X, as earlier indicated, does not deal with cases and circumstances when it may be necessary to adjust equities. True, in Section 168(1), the power/ jurisdiction contemplated the reunder is that "in making an award, the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the Insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle insured in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be". It is also true that power is made exercisable to fulfil the object of making "an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it (Tribunal) to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid". About adjustment of equities between owners and Insurers inter se expressly no provision is made. One thing which, however, is crystal-clear is that jurisdiction is not denied explicitly on the other hand to the Claims Tribunal to make such an adjustment. It is in this gap that there will be scope for the Claims Tribunal to exercise its inherent jurisdiction of restitution. Reference, in this connection may be made to Privy Council's decision in Jail Berham v. Kedar Nath AIR 1922 PC 269 from which I find it immensely profitable to extract the following passage:

".....It is the duty of the Court Under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved......."

11. Law being, as stated above, there exists no ground for holding that the Insurer/ appellant would not have adequate remedy to be claimed in the same proceedings in the course of trial of the same lis at the same forum. He would not be driven to a separate suit as would make that remedy ineffective and inefficacious. Indeed, as I have held in Bhagwandas (1990 ACC CJ 495) (Madh Pra) (supra), it is necessary to take care of such fortuitous situations in which an Insurer finds, it saddled with undeserving liability. Because, the national wealth which the Insurance Companies garner as nationalised public undertakings are to be husbanded properly for the common good of all citizens and victims paradoxically of the boon of modern civilisation. I am definitely of the lopinion, therefore that while the indefeasible liability contemplated Under Section 140(1) of the Act is to be discharged instantly by the Insurer when he is ordered to do so by the Claims Tribunal, it shall still be open to him to agitate the question of restitution during trial of the claim made for compensation on the "principle of fault" and it shall be duty then of the Claims Tribunal to deal with that prayer and to pass necessary order in that regard in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Accordingly, while passing the "award" Under Section 168(1), appropriate order may also be passed by the Claims Tribunal against the person who is liable to reimburse the insurer for any liability that the latter had discharged in terms of the order passed Under Section 140(1) if claim for such relief is properly made and established.

12. The result evidently is that the appeal has no substance. The impugned order passed against the appellant/Insurer asking him to pay Rs. 7,500/- to claimant/respondent No. 1 Under Section 140(1) is a valid order and that calls for no interference. The balance amount of Rs. 3,750/- shall be deposited by the appellant within two weeks and when that is done, that shall be disbursed to the claimant/respondent. The appellant shall be entitled to claim adjustment of inter se liability vis-a-vis Corporation finally, later, when the award Under Section 168(1) of the Act is passed.

13. The appeal is dismissed and is disposed of in terms of the above observations. No costs.