Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Judges

K.Shrivastava
G.Sohani

Acts

provisions of the W.A. Act as well as Sections 95 and 96 of the M.V. Act
Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the M.V. Act')
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the W.C. Act).
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923,
Section 110-AA of the M.V. Act.
Section 110-A of the M.V. Act
Section 110 B of the M.V. Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises under Section 110‑D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against an award dated 1‑10‑1984 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, West Nimar, Mandleshwar in Claim Case No. 96 of 1982. On 5‑5‑1982 a bus (registration M.P.U. 5034) owned by respondent No.1 Pramod Shah and insured with respondent No.3, while being driven by respondent No.2 Gulsher (the second driver), met with an accident near Khetia on the Khetia‑Pansemal road. The appellant, Mangilal (referred to as AW 2), who was the first driver of the bus and an occupant at the time, suffered multiple injuries including a comminuted fracture of the left tibia, required approximately three months' indoor treatment, and sustained a permanent disability rendering him unable to work as a bus driver.

On 5‑11‑1982 the appellant filed a claim petition under Section 110‑A of the M.V. Act against the owner, the second driver and the insurer, claiming Rs. 1,00,000 for medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earnings and loss of expectation of life. The owner and the driver remained ex parte; the insurer contested the claim denying negligence and contending the claim was exaggerated. The Tribunal held that the accident was caused by negligence of respondent No.2, that the appellant sustained the injuries asserted, and awarded Rs. 24,425 (comprising Rs. 18,900 for permanent disability and Rs. 4,000 for pain, suffering and medical expenses). The appellant challenged the award in this appeal, contending the Tribunal erred by assessing compensation by reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and seeking a higher award and increased interest.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is so inadequate as to require interference on appeal.
Whether the learned Tribunal erred in assessing compensation by reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 rather than applying the provisions and broad discretion available under the Motor Vehicles Act (notably Sections 110‑AA and 110‑B) where a claimant elects to proceed under the M.V. Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The Tribunal assessed compensation for permanent disability by reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (W.C. Act), which was incorrect for a claim under Section 110‑A of the M.V. Act.
Because the appellant has become incapacitated to work as a driver, he is entitled to a higher amount of compensation than awarded by the Tribunal.
The rate of interest fixed by the Tribunal at 6% per annum should be increased.

Respondent No. 3 (Insurer)'s Arguments

The appellant is capable of taking up other work, and therefore the award made by the Tribunal does not merit interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
New India Assurance Co. v. Bagdibai, 1985 M.P.L.J. 114	Explains that in cases of personal injury or death of a workman in the course of employment arising from a motor accident, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Sections 95 & 96 of the M.V. Act are attracted if the vehicle is insured; liability under the W.C. Act is irrespective of negligence, whereas proof of negligence is a pre‑condition for a claim under Section 110‑A of the M.V. Act.	The court relied on this explanation to distinguish the regimes and to support the view that a claimant who elects to proceed under the M.V. Act and proves negligence should not have his claim restricted by the W.C. Act framework.
Saminder Kaur's case, 1987 ACJ 7	Clarifies the import of the term "compensation" and emphasises that the word "just" in the statutory context has wide amplitude.	The court used this principle to affirm that the tribunal's discretion under Section 110‑B should be exercised liberally to award a "just" amount, not a niggardly sum.
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmaladevi, 1980 ACJ 55	Holds that the quantum of compensation must be determined liberally because the law values life and limb in generous scales.	The court invoked this authority to support a liberal approach in assessing damages for injury and disablement under the M.V. Act.
Vinod Kumar Bhatnagar's case, 1984 ACJ 776	States that compensation to a living person for sufferings and disablement must be substantial and not paltry.	The court cited this to reinforce that awards for personal injury should be substantial and reflect the gravity of disablement.
Deepti Tiwari v. Bhanwar Lal, 1966 ACJ 217 (M.P.)	Used for the proposition that damages for loss of the amenities or pleasures of life must be assessed against the personal circumstances of the plaintiff.	The court referred to this decision to emphasise that the claimant's personal circumstances must form the background to assessment of non‑pecuniary damages.
Mukhtyar v. M.P.S.R.T.C., 1987 (II) M.P.W.N. 200	Holds that where there is amputation of a leg, compensation should be Rs. 50,000 or more (as a guide).	The court relied on this decision as persuasive authority when fixing the compensation in the present case at Rs. 50,000 given the nature and permanence of the appellant's disability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, relying only on the material and authorities cited in the opinion:

Identification of the core issue: the court framed the point for consideration as whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was inadequate and required interference.
Law governing choice of remedies: the court noted Section 110‑AA of the M.V. Act, which permits a person entitled to compensation for death or bodily injury to claim under either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Motor Vehicles Act but not both, and emphasised that where a claimant elects the Tribunal and undertakes the burden of proving negligence, there is no reason to restrict the claim by reference to the W.C. Act.
Error in approach by the Tribunal: the court found force in the appellant's contention that the learned Tribunal erred by using the W.C. Act as the basis for assessing compensation in a claim brought under Section 110‑A of the M.V. Act.
Scope of tribunal's discretion under the M.V. Act: the court referred to Section 110‑B which requires the Tribunal to determine an amount of compensation that "appears... to be just," and reiterated authorities that "just" should be given wide amplitude and that the quantum must be liberal rather than niggardly.
Factors for assessment: the court reiterated the conventional bifurcation of damages into pecuniary and non‑pecuniary losses, noted the difficulty of precise mathematical calculation, and emphasised that assessments must consider pain and suffering, loss of amenities, reduction in expectation of life, and the claimant's personal circumstances.
Application to the facts: the court reviewed the medical evidence before the Tribunal — injury reports and the testimonies of Dr. B.N. Chouhan, Dr. Jamindar and Dr. Sinha — which established multiple lacerated wounds, fracture, mal‑union and shortening of the left leg, visible wasting and ongoing oozing of the wound as late as 7‑8‑84, and an assessed permanent disability of the left leg in the range of 40–60% with consequent inability to drive efficiently.
Comparative and precedential guidance: the court considered a Division Bench decision indicating that amputation cases attract awards of Rs. 50,000 or more and treated this as persuasive when fixing compensation for a case of permanent disabling injury of the left leg.
Conclusion of adequacy: after weighing the claimant's age, income, the extent and permanence of disability and the cited authorities, the court concluded that the original award was inadequate and that just compensation in the circumstances is Rs. 50,000 inclusive of medical expenses.
Interest and costs: the court increased the rate of interest on the award to 9% per annum from the date of the application until realization, modified the award accordingly, directed that respondent No.3 pay the appellant's costs in this Court while bearing its own costs of the appeal, and provided for counsel's fee of Rs. 200 if certified.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is partly allowed: the Tribunal's award is modified and the compensation is increased to Rs. 50,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of the application until realization.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The compensation originally awarded by the Claims Tribunal (Rs. 24,425) is increased to Rs. 50,000 (inclusive of medical expenses).
The enhanced amount shall carry interest at 9% per annum from the date of the application until realization.
The award of the Tribunal is modified accordingly.
Respondent No.3 (the insurer) shall bear its own costs of this appeal and shall pay the appellant's costs in this Court; counsel's fee of Rs. 200 is allowed if certified.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles regarding the Tribunal's wide discretion under Section 110‑B to award "just" compensation and the permissibility under Section 110‑AA for a claimant to elect the forum of the Tribunal rather than be confined to the Workmen's Compensation framework. The court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying established authorities; its primary effect is to correct the assessment in this case and to reaffirm that awards for permanent disablement should be substantial and liberal in approach.

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Mangilal v. Pramod And Anr.

1. This appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the M.V. Act') is directed against the award dated 1-10-1984 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal West Nimar, Mandleshwar in Claim Case No. 96 of 1982.

2. Facts not in dispute for the purposes of this appeal are these. The appellant Mangilal (AW 2) at the relevant time, was employed as first driver of the bus bearing registration number M.P.U. 5034 owned by the respondent No 1 Pramod Shah and insured with the respondent No. 3. On 5-5-82 at about 9 a.m. when it was being driven by its second driver, the respondent No. 2 Gulsher, it met with an accident on the Khetia-Pansemal road near Khetia. The appellant Mangilal in his capacity as the first driver of the bus was one of the occupants of the bus. As a result of the accident the bus bumped violently and turned on its left side In consequence, the appellant sustained multiple injuries including communited fracture of tibia of the left leg. He had to remain as an indoor patient for a period of about three months and the wound of the leg had not healed up even by 7-4-84. He has suffered permanent disability due to the fracture and is not in a position to work as bus-driver.

3. The appellant on 5-11-82 filed a claim petition under Section 110-A of the M.V. Act against the owner of the bus, its second driver Gulsher and the insurer, the respondent No. 3. According to the claim petition the petitioner, at the time of the accident was aged 40 years, and was earning Rs. 1000/- per month inclusive of pay of Rs. 600/- and allowances. The accident was occasioned due to rash and negligent driving by the respondent No. 2 Gulsher. Towards medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earning and loss of expectation of life a claim in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- was laid.

4. The owner and the driver of the accident bus remained ex-parte. The insurer alone contested the claim by denying the averments as to rash and negligent driving. The claim was also assailed as highly exaggerated.

5. At the conclusion of the trial the learned Tribunal held that the accident in question was occasioned due to negligence of the respondent No. 2 and that the appellant has sustained several injuries including the fracture as a result of the accident. It held that the defaulting driver of the bus, vicariously his master and under the contract of insurance the insurer of the vehicle were jointly and severally liable towards compensation which it assessed at Rs. 24,425/- consisting of Rs. 18,900/- for permanent disability, Rs 4000/- for pain and suffering and the medical expenses.

6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant in this Court is that the claim is under the M.V. Act and the learned Tribunal etred in assessing compensation for permanent disability on the basis of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the W.C. Act). It is urged that the appellant having become incapaciated to work as driver is in his circumstances, entitled to a higher amount towards compensation. According to the learned Counsel the rate of interest at 6% per annum also deserves to be increased.

7. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 is that the appellant can certainly take-up other work and the award does not deserve to be interfered with.

8. The point for consideration is whether the amount of compensation is inadequate to as to require interference.

9. On a careful consideration we find that there is force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the learned Tribunal erred in assessing the compensation with reference to the W.A. Act.

10. In the decision in New India Assurance Co. v. Bagdibai 1985 M.P.L.J. 114 it has been pointed out that in the case of personal injury or death of a workman in the course of his employment and arising as a result of motor accident the provisions of the W.A. Act as well as Sections 95 and 96 of the M.V. Act are attracted if the owner of the vehicle is insured in respect of the motor vehicle. The liability under the W.C. Act is irrespective of the question of any negligence but proof of negligence is a pre-condition for a claim under Section 110-A of the M.V. Act.

11. Reference at this stage may be made to the provision embodied in Section 110-AA of the M.V. Act. It reads thus:

Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, where the death or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this act, 1923 the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter VII A, claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both.

Where the claimant prefers the forum of the Tribunal and undertakes the burden of proving negligence there is no reason why his claim should be restricted with reference to the provisions of the W.C. Act. It is under Section 110 B of the M.V. Act that the legislature has provided for compensation to the victim of a motor accident. The provision thereunder requires the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just.

12. In the decision is Saminder Kaur's case 1987 ACJ 7 the import of the term 'compensation' has been explained and it has been pointed out that the word 'Just' occurring in the section is of a very wide amplitude. It is true that a claimant should not be permitted to make a fortune out of mis-fortune that has be-fallen him but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmaladevi 1980 ACJ 55 the determination of the quantum of compensation must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales. As pointed out in the decision in Vinod Kumar Bhatnagar's case 1984 ACJ 776 compensation to a living person for his sufferings and disablement has to be substantial and not merely taken.

13. No amount of money can restore the fractured human frame to its original condition. In determining the monetary compensation under Section 110-B of the M.V. Act various factors have to be taken into consideration The determination of compensation by any precise mathematical calculation is not possible in the very nature of things and it has rightly been remarked that in determination of compensation arithmatic is a good servant but a bad master.

14. In a case of personal injury compensation awarded falls under the following two heads:

(a) for pecuniary loss, and

(b) for non-pecuniary loss.

Full compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant has to be awarded subject to rules of remoteness and mitigation. As regards non-pecuniary loss or general damages, items of loss and injury for which compensation is claimed have to be quantified in terms of money. Personal injuries sustained may be simple or grave and in addition to pain and hardship may occasion loss of pleasures of life. Damages are awarded in respect of pain and suffering already undergone and likely to be undergone in future, in respect of the loss of the amenities of life and in respect of the reduction in the expectation of life. Assessment of damages for pain and suffering has necessarily to depend upon a reasonable view of the case having regard to all the circumstances. It has also to be remembered that damages awarded in an action for torts are compensatory and not punitive. As regards damages to be awarded for the loss of pleasures of life, the personal circumstances of the plaintiff must form the background of the assessment. In this connection reference may usefully be made to the division bench decision in Deepti Tiwari v. Bhanwar Lal 1966 ACJ 217 (M.P.). Note has also to be taken of the fall in the purchasing power of money and also of the fact that the claimant can claim compensation but once.

15. It is well-settled that unless the compensation awarded is too inadequate or too excessive no interference in appeal is called for.

16. Now we proceed to determine the question applying the aforesaid principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

17. The testimony of the appellant Mangilal (AW 2) is that after the accident he was admitted in Barwani Hospital and as the doctor there advised amputation of the leg, he decided to shift to Ujjain for treatment. He stated that his left leg has become weak and is also shortened and he cannot drive a motor vehicle. He has stated that he was having a monthly income of Rs. 900/- inclusive of Rs. 600/- as salary and allowances. With this evidence on record it cannot be held that the appellant was earning Rs. 600/- only. We also have it in the evidence of Dr. B.N. Chouhan (AW 3) that on examining the appellant on 5-5-82 he had found 4 lacerated wound on his person including fracture and had prepared the injury report of date vide Ex. P-19 Dr. Jatnindar (AW 1) was examined on 7-8-84. He identified the appellant and in the deposition of the doctor, the learned Tribunal has appended a note to the effect that there is visible thinning of the appellant's left leg which still had an oozing wound. According to the evidence of Dr. Jamindar the appellant's left leg has become permanently disabled. The testimony of Dr. Sinha (AW 4) is that the appellant has suffered permanent disability of the left leg to the tune of 40 to 60 per cent inasmuch as there is bowing of the bone and absence of dorsal flex as a result of the wasting of muscles.

18. A perusal of paragraph 9 of the deposition of Dr. Jamindar (AW 1) shows that there is mal-union and shortening of leg and as a result the appellant even after the wound heals up, would not be in a position to walk normally or to drive motor vehicle with efficiency.

19. In the Division Bench decision in Mukhtyar v. M.P.S.R.T.C. 1987 (II) M.P.W.N. 200 it has been held that where there is amputation of leg compensation should be Rs. 50,000/- or more.

20. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case including the age of the appellant, his income and his disability, we are of opinion that a total compensation in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) including medical expenses would constitute just compensation.

21. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The amount of compensation determined by the learned Claims Tribunal is increased to Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand). This amount shall carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the application till realisation. The award shall stand accordingly modified. The respondent No. 3 shall bear its own costs of this appeal and shall pay to the appellant the latter's costs in this Court. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/- if certified.

Mangilal v. Pramod And Anr.

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Respondent No. 3 (Insurer)'s Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mangilal v. Pramod And Anr.

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