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  • section 180 and other provisions of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1957,
  • section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959,
  • section 180 of the Code. Under section 179
  • section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code
  • SECTION 74 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 180(1) of the Code
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 180 and other provisions of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1957,
  • section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959,
  • section 180 of the Code. Under section 179
  • section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code
  • SECTION 74 CONTRACT ACT
  • Section 180(1) of the Code
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed against the dismissal by the trial Court of his suit for damages for breach of an agreement. The undisputed facts set out in the opinion are as follows:

  • The defendants (together with three others) were joint owners of agricultural lands measuring 587.01 acres in village Khandabarb, Tahsil Budni, District Sehore, inherited from their predecessor Khursheed Ahmad. The Government of Madhya Pradesh disputed their title; that litigation ended in the defendants' favour.
  • While the dispute was pending, on 5-8-1964 the defendants executed an agreement (Ex. P-1) to sell "all the standing jungle including all the timber and firewood etc." to the plaintiff for Rs. 60,000. Under the agreement the defendants would deliver possession to enable the plaintiff to clear and remove timber and other produce after the defendants obtained possession following settlement with the Government. The plaintiff was entitled to cut, clear and remove and prepare charcoal within two years from the date of delivery of possession.
  • The agreement contained a clause that if any party failed to perform its part, the other party would be entitled to claim Rs. 50,000 from the defaulter. The plaintiff paid Rs. 3,500 as an advance the same day, with a proviso that if the dispute was not settled by end of January 1965 the advance would be refunded.
  • The defendants did not deliver possession by 31-1-1965; the advance Rs. 3,500 was refunded on 29-10-1966. The defendants later received possession from the State on 20-12-1969 but did not deliver possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sued claiming Rs. 50,000 as damages under the agreement.
  • During the suit's pendency the defendants entered into another agreement on 31-7-1970 with Jagdish Chandra for sale of the standing jungle, timber and firewood for Rs. 1,51,000; Jagdish Chandra cut and removed the entire produce.
  • The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appealed to the court issuing the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agreement in question is void ab initio as being in contravention of section 180 and other provisions of the M.P. Land Revenue Code (the opinion at places refers to 1959 and elsewhere to 1957) such that it cannot be enforced.
  2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 50,000 as damages as stipulated in the agreement (i.e., whether the stipulated sum is enforceable as liquidated damages or whether it is a penalty).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The agreement subsisted even though the plaintiff took back the advance of Rs. 3,500 on 29-10-1966; the refund was "without prejudice" to the plaintiff's rights under the agreement, and the plaintiff had an endorsement to that effect by defendant Salim Ahmad Khan on the receipt.
  • On defendants obtaining possession on 20-12-1969 they were bound to put the plaintiff in possession of the jungles, including timber and firewood; the defendants' subsequent agreement with Jagdish Chandra amounted to breach of the earlier agreement.
  • The plaintiff claimed that he would have earned a profit of Rs. 40,000 to Rs. 50,000 under the contract and therefore Rs. 50,000 was stipulated as damages; he also amended the plaint to state the land was wholly jungle and that defendants wanted the jungle cleared for cultivation, arguing the agreement was therefore not hit by section 180.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The suit agreement contravened section 180 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code and was therefore illegal and void. The defendants argued the agreement, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of the Code.
  • One defendant (Firoz Ahmad Khan) was a minor at the time of the agreement; his mother Begum Rafiya Khursheed could not act as guardian of the minor's property, rendering the agreement inoperative to that extent.
  • Because the plaintiff had taken back the advance Rs. 3,500, the suit agreement had come to an end and any stipulation to the contrary was invalid.
  • The three daughters of Khursheed Ahmad (other co-owners) were not parties to the agreement; their consent was not obtained and therefore no such agreement could have been validly entered into.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 Interpretation of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act: when a contract names a sum for breach or contains a penalty stipulation, the aggrieved party is entitled to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named; compensation must be reasonable and awarded only for legal injury which naturally arises or was contemplated by the parties. The court relied on the decision to explain the distinction between penalty and liquidated damages and to hold that even where a sum is named, the court must assess whether legal injury resulted and whether the named sum is reasonable. Applying that test, the court concluded the Rs. 50,000 stipulation was a penalty and that the plaintiff had not shown legal injury entitling him to compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations closely tied to statutory provisions and factual findings in the record:

  1. On enforceability under the Land Revenue Code:

    The court examined sections 179 and 180(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. It noted section 179 declares the Bhumiswami (landowner) owner of all trees standing in his holding, and section 180(1) provides that transfer by a Bhumiswami of any trees standing in his holding (except the produce) is void unless the land itself is transferred. The court analysed the terms of Ex. P-1 and the pleadings and evidence (including the plaintiff's testimony) and found that the defendants agreed to sell "all the standing jungle including all the timber, fire-wood etc." — i.e., an absolute transfer of all rights in the standing trees while not transferring the land itself.

    Because the agreement purported to transfer the Bhumiswami's interest in standing trees without transferring the land, it was in direct violation of section 180(1) and therefore void to that extent. The court also observed statutory/regulatory prohibitions under section 240 and rules framed thereunder which forbid cutting certain species without Collector's written permission; since the agreement contemplated cutting and removing trees, it would be hit insofar as it purported to validate cutting of protected species absent such permission. On these bases the trial court's finding that the agreement was unenforceable under the Code was affirmed.

  2. On the minor's capacity:

    The court accepted the trial judge's finding that as to defendant Firoz Ahmad Khan (a minor at the time), the agreement was unenforceable, because under Mohammedan law a mother cannot be the legal guardian of a minor's property. That finding was held to be unassailable.

  3. On the claim for Rs. 50,000 (penalty vs liquidated damages):

    The court turned to section 74 of the Contract Act and the precedent of Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass to frame the legal test: where a sum is named for breach, courts may award reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named, but compensation must be for legal injury which naturally arose or was contemplated. The court considered whether Rs. 50,000 was a genuine pre-estimate of loss (liquidated damages) or an extravagant stipulation (penalty).

    Given the contract's stated consideration of Rs. 60,000 and the plaintiff's own admissions — that in 1964 timber prices were low, that he had not invested any money under the agreement, and that he had taken back the Rs. 3,500 advance — the court found it unrealistic to accept that breach of a Rs. 60,000 contract would reasonably cause Rs. 50,000 loss. The defendants' evidence that the Rs. 50,000 sum was inserted at the plaintiff's instance supported the view that the clause was penal. The plaintiff's speculative assertions about likely profits (and the fact he would have needed substantial additional investment) were insufficient to establish legal injury or entitlement to the stipulated sum.

    Accordingly, the court concluded the Rs. 50,000 clause was a penalty and, even if the agreement were otherwise enforceable, the plaintiff had not proved legal injury to justify awarding even reasonable compensation under section 74. Therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages on that basis.

  4. Disposition:

    On the combined statutory and contractual analyses, the court affirmed the trial judge's core conclusions concerning unenforceability under the Land Revenue Code and the minor's incapacity, but disagreed with the trial judge's award-entitlement conclusion. The appellate court held that no damages were recoverable by the plaintiff even assuming enforceability, and thus dismissed the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The court affirmed that the suit agreement was in violation of section 180(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code and could not be enforced insofar as it purported to transfer standing trees without transfer of the land; it also affirmed that the agreement was unenforceable as to the minor defendant because his mother could not act as guardian of the minor's property. Further, applying section 74 of the Contract Act and the Supreme Court authority cited, the court held the Rs. 50,000 stipulation to be a penalty and the plaintiff had not proved legal injury entitling him to damages.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed and he was denied recovery of Rs. 50,000 as damages.
  • The agreement is void/unenforceable to the extent it attempted to transfer standing trees without transfer of the land; the defendants' subsequent sale to Jagdish Chandra and removal of timber is a factual finding recorded in the opinion.
  • The trial judge's finding that the agreement was not binding on the minor defendant was upheld.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs; counsel's fee to be as per schedule if certified (as recorded in the opinion).

No broader legal implications or new precedent were pronounced beyond application of the cited statutory provisions and the established precedent (Fateh Chand). The opinion treats the case as an application of existing statutory rules and established contract-law principles to the facts before the court.

    Sardar Gurubax Singh Gorowara v. Begum Rafiya Khurshid And Others .

    C.P Sen, J.:— The plaintiff has filed this appeal against the dismissal of his claim by the trial Court for damages on account of breach of agreement by the defendants.

    2. The facts not in dispute are that the defendants along with 3 others are the joint owners of agricultural lands measuring 587.01 acres situated in village Khandabarb, Tahsil Budni, District Sehore. They had inherited these lands from their predecessor in interest Khursheed Ahmad. After his death, the Government of Madhya Pradesh disputed their title resulting in litigation which ultimately ended in their favour. During pendency of the dispute, the defendants executed an agreement Ex. P-1 on 5-8-1964. It was agreed that the defendants would sell all the standing jungle including all the timber and firewood etc. to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 60,000 and the defendants would deliver possession of the aforesaid lands for the purpose of clearing and removing all timber, fire-wood and other produce after the dispute with the Government of M.P was settled and the defendants obtained possession. The plaintiff was entitled under the agreement to cut, clear and remove all the timber, firewood etc. and prepare charcoal from the jungle within 2 years from the date of delivery of possession by the defendants. It was also stipulated in the agreement that if any party failed to perform his part of the agreement, the other party would be entitled to claim Rs. 50,000 from the defaulter. On the same day, the plaintiff paid Rs. 3500 to the defendants as advance payment. It was further stipulated that if the dispute of the defendants with the Government was not settled by the end of January 1965 the advance amount of Rs. 3500 would be refunded to the plaintiff. As the defendants did not deliver possession of the lands by 31-1-1965 the amount of Rs. 3500 was returned to the plaintiff on 29-10-1966. Subsequently, the defendants received possession of the lands on 20-12-69 from the State of M.P but did not deliver possession to the plaintiff. Therefore, the present suit was filed by the plaintiff claiming damages of Rs. 50,000 as stipulated in the agreement. During pendency of the suit, the defendants entered into similar agreement with one Jagdish Chandra on 31-7-1970 for the sale of standing jungle, timber and fire-wood in consideration of a sum of Rs. 1,51,000 and the said Jagdish Chandra in pursuance of that agreement had cut and removed the entire timber, fire-wood and jungle produce from the jungle.

    3. The plaintiff's case is that on settlement of dispute and getting delivery of possession of their lands, the defendants were bound to put the plaintiff in possession of all jungles including all timber, fire-wood etc. after 20-12-69. Though the plaintiff took back advance payment of Rs. 3500 on 29-10-66 as per the terms of the agreement, the agreement stipulated that in spite of the refund the agreement would subsist and the refund would be without prejudice to the plaintiff's right under the agreement. This was also the endorsement made by the defendant Salim Ahmad Khan on the receipt passed by him. In spite of this subsisting agreement, the defendants entered into another agreement on 31-7-70 with one Jagdish Chandra for Rs. 1,51,000 and thereby they committed breach of the agreement. Though the defendants are profited by sum of Rs. 91,000 the plaintiff claims only Rs. 50,000 as damages which have been stipulated in the agreement.

    4. The defendants resisted the suit and denied all the allegation. According to them the suit agreement was in contravention of section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959, and, therefore, illegal and void. The defendant Firoz Ahmad Khan was a minor at the time of the agreement and his mother defendant Begum Rafiya Khursheed could not act as the guardian of the minor's property and, therefore, so far as Firoz Ahmad Khan was concerned the agreement was inoperative. As the plaintiff had taken back the advance payment of Rs. 3500, the suit agreement came to an end and even if there was a stipulation to the contrary in the agreement, the same is bad in law. Besides the defendants, the 3 daughters of Khursheed Ahmad Khan are also owners of the suit lands and no such agreement could have been entered into without their consent.

    5. The learned trial Judge found that the suit agreement between the parties was bit by section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959, and could not be enforced. He further held that the suit agreement was not binding on the defendant Firoz Ahmad Khan, who was a minor, and his mother defendant Begum Rafiya Khursheed could not have acted as guardian of the minor's property. However, be found that the agreement was not bad for uncertainty of performance nor the 3 daughters of Khursheed Ahmad Khan were necessary parties to the suit. Although the plaintiff took back advance payment of Rs. 3500, still as per terms the agreement subsisted. It has also been found that the defendants subsequently by another agreement dated 31-7-70 sold all jungle, timber and fire-wood etc. to one Jagdish Chandra for Rs. 1,51,000, who had cut and removed them. But it has been held that if the agreement was valid, then the plaintiff would have been entitled to Rs. 50,000 as damages as stipulated in the agreement. He, therefore, dismissed the suit.

    6. The only questions for considerations are (i) whether the agreement in question is void ab initio being in contravention of section 180 and other provisions of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1957, and (ii) whether the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 50,000 as damages as stipulated in the agreement. The finding of the trial Court that the agreement against Firoz Ahmad Khan is unenforceable because he was a minor and his mother was not authorised to enter into transaction on his behalf as his guardian is unassailable. Under the Mahomedan Law, mother cannot be legal guardian of minor's property.

    7. The defendants in their written statement submitted that the suit agreement is in contravention of section 180 of the M.P Land Revenue Code and is forbidden by law. If the agreement is allowed to stand, it would defeat the provisions of the Code. The plaintiff by amendment in the plaint contended that the land in question was completely a jungle and the defendants desired to clear it off for the purpose of cultivation. Since they had no source to do so, they entered into suit agreement with the plaintiff for that purpose. Therefore, the agreement is not hit by section 180 of the Code. Under section 179 all trees standing in a holding belong to Bhumiswami. Section 180(1) of the Code is as under:—

    “The transfer by a Bhumiswami of any trees standing in any land comprised in his holding except the produce of such trees shall be void unless the land itself is transferred.”

    It is evident from these provisions that Bhumiswami is the owner of all trees standing in his holding but he is forbidden from transferring any trees standing thereon except the produce of such trees. Such a transfer shall be void unless the land itself is transferred. Now we have to see whether the interest of the Bhumiswami in the standing trees has been transferred or only the produce of such trees has been transferred. The suit agreement Ex. P. 1 recites that the defendants agreed to sell all the standing jungle including all the timber, fire-wood etc. to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 60,000 for the purpose of clear felling and removing all the timber, fire-wood and other products. The defendants would deliver possession of the lands to the plaintiff for that purpose and within 2 years thereof the plaintiff was to remove all the trees. In the plaint also it is pleaded that the defendants agreed to sell all the standing jungle including all the timber and fire-wood etc. and that the possession of the jungle would be delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff. In his evidence also plaintiff Gurubux Singh (P.W 1) has deposed that the entire jungle was sold. Therefore, there cannot be any manner of doubt that all the interest of the defendants in all the standing trees on the suit lands was agreed to be sold absolutely to the plaintiff and all their rights in the trees ceased. It is true that all the standing trees were to be cut and removed with in 2 years of delivery of possession but there was no stipulation that after 2 years the rights of the defendants in the trees would be revived. At the most the plaintiff could not have cut and removed the trees after 2 years but his right to enjoy the products of the trees would have continued thereafter also. It follows that all the trees standing in the jungle were sold by absolute sale but the land on which trees were standing was not sold. As such, the agreement was in violation of Section 180(1) of the Code. This being the position, the suit agreement cannot be enforced and is void. This apart, under section 240 of the Code there is prohibition against cutting of certain trees. As per the rules framed under this section, certain species of trees have been mentioned which shall not be cut without the permission in writing of the Collector. It can be assumed that there were also trees in the jungle of the species mentioned in the rules which could not be cut without prior permission of the Collector. Such trees are found in jungles. In the plaint also it is mentioned that the defendants had agreed that they would obtain necessary permission for cutting the trees from the competent authority. Unless and until such permission was obtained, all the trees could not be cut and removed. It is not known as to what was the extent of such trees in the Jungle. Therefore, under these rules the agreement would also be hit so far they stipulate cutting of the trees which is prohibited under the rules without the prior permission of the Collector. The finding of the trial Judge is accordingly affirmed on this point.

    7-A. Now the question remains the plaintiff is entitled to damages of Rs. 50,000 as stipulated in the agreement and as has been held by the learned trial Judge. We are unable to agree with the finding of the trial Judge. Section 74 of the Contract Act provides that “when a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains, any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.” The Supreme Court in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass . AIR 1963 SC 1405. has held as under:—

    “The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by section 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of ‘actual loss or damages’; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach.”

    8. Now it remains to be seen whether the sum of Rs. 50,000 as stipulated in the agreement is by way of penalty or liquidated damages. If it is penalty then the plaintiff will have to prove actual damages suffered by him and in case it is liquidated damages then the plaintiff may get the sum named in the agreement, if legal injury is caused. The suit agreement is only for the consideration of Rs. 60,000 and it is not possible to accept that for breach of such agreement, damages of Rs. 50,000 would be suffered, therefore the stipulation was by way of penalty Defendant Saleem Ahmad Khan (D.W 1) has stated that this sum of Rs. 50,000 was mentioned as damages for breach of agreement at the instance of the plaintiff. As against this, plaintiff Gurubux Singh (P.W 1) has stated that because he would have earned profit of Rs. 40,000 to 50,000 out of the suit agreement and therefore Rs. 50,000 was stipulated as damages but he admitted that in forest contracts at times losses are incurred but he was definite that he would have earned profit of Rs. 50,000. This he could have earned after investing a sum of Rs. 1,50,000. This amount would have been required for preparing coal, cutting timber and for transport charges. Obviously he has not taken into consideration the value of the species of the trees which could not be cut if the permission was refused by the Collector. He further admitted that in 1964 when the suit agreement was entered into the price of timber was quite low and that is why he agreed to purchase the jungle for Rs. 60,000 only. He asserted that the consideration was the proper price of the jungle sold, which means that he would not have earned any substantial profit even in that year. He states that in 1970 the prices have gone fourfold. The plaintiff has not invested a single pai in pursuance to the agreement and on the other hand he has taken refund of advance payment. So without incurring any loss the plaintiff wants damages of Rs. 50,000, which he cannot get as liquidated damages also as no injury has been caused to him. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to any damages for breach of agreement even if it is assumed that the agreement is enforceable.

    9. For the reasons stated above, the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Sardar Gurubax Singh Gorowara v. Begum Rafiya Khurshid And Others .
    (Sep 22, 1978)