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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • P.L. Inamdar
  • H.N. Dwivedi
  • for Opposite party
Judges
  • H.R Krishnan
  • P.R Sharma, JJ.
Acts
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • P.L. Inamdar
  • H.N. Dwivedi
  • for Opposite party
Judges
  • H.R Krishnan
  • P.R Sharma, JJ.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Article 227 petition concerning Section 18(2), Land Acquisition Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by one of the co-claimants in respect of property acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. The petition challenges a District Judge's order refusing to "go behind" a reference forwarded to the Court by the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioner's core contention was that the opposite party's application to the Collector (seeking relief under Section 18) was time‑barred under Section 18(2), and therefore the Collector was not competent to forward it as a reference to the Court.

Relevant events (as stated in the opinion):

  • The petitioner had earlier made an application under Section 18 which had been forwarded to the Court and was being considered there.
  • The opposite party filed two applications before the Collector: one on 30-9-1959 seeking a stay of disbursement of compensation pending a partition suit, and a second on 9-11-1959 seeking that the matter be forwarded to the Court as a reference. The Collector forwarded the later application as a reference.
  • It is not clear from the record whether Section 18(2) was raised before the Collector; if it was, the Collector treated it as of no consequence.
  • When the reference reached the District Judge, the petitioner asked the Court not to entertain it on the ground that it was time‑barred; the District Judge rejected this prayer and held that, once a reference had been made by the Collector, the Court should not sit in judgment over the Collector's decision to refer but should proceed to determine the objection on its merits after noticing the parties (per Section 20).
  • The petitioner brought the present petition under Article 227 challenging the District Judge's refusal to examine the competence of the Collector in forwarding the reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, once the Collector has forwarded an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court as a reference, the Court receiving that reference is competent to examine whether the Collector should have dismissed that application as time‑barred under Section 18(2) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that the opposite party's application before the Collector was time‑barred under Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, and on that ground the Collector should not have forwarded the application as a reference to the Court.
  • Consequently, the petitioner asked the District Judge to refuse to entertain the reference on the basis that the Collector had committed a mistake in sending it up in disregard of Section 18(2).

Opposite Party's Position (as presented in the record)

  • The opposite party filed two applications before the Collector: (i) on 30-9-1959 seeking a stay of disbursement of compensation pending a partition suit; and (ii) on 9-11-1959 seeking that the application be forwarded to the Court as a reference. The Collector forwarded the second application as a reference.
  • The opinion does not contain an expanded statement of legal argument by the opposite party contesting the petitioner's limitation point beyond these procedural steps.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj 490 Holds that the Court is not competent to "go behind" a reference made by the Collector; the Collector is not subordinate to the Court for purposes of appeal or revision. The Court aligns with this view and treats it as typical of one school of authority; the Court adopts this principle as in accordance with the wording of Sections 18, 19 and 20 and the scheme of the Act.
Boregowda v. Subbaramiah, AIR 1959 Mys 265 Holds that the Court to which a reference is made can go behind the reference and examine whether the Collector was competent to make it. The Court considered this contrasting line of authority but declined to follow it, explaining reasons grounded in statutory wording and inter‑tribunal relations.
Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary of State, AIR 1926 All 766 Referenced as an earlier Allahabad ruling relied upon in the Mysore line of cases (supporting the proposition that the Court can go behind the reference). Not adopted by the Court; cited in the discussion of conflicting earlier authority and noted as being followed in preference to a later Allahunad ruling by some courts.
Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, AIR 1932 All 597 Referenced as a later Allahabad ruling that contrasts with Sukhbir Singh. Referenced in the discussion of conflicting authority; the Court did not adopt the Mysore/older-Allahabad preference on the matter of going behind references.
Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao, 11 Ind Cas 690 (Nag) (1911) An older Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court ruling adopting the same line as the Mysore ruling (i.e., that the Court can go behind a reference). The Court treated this as persuasive only and noted it predated the 1949 amendment that later provided a statutory check in Madhya Pradesh; the Nagpur view was not binding on this Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central question as whether a Court receiving a reference from the Collector may examine whether the Collector should have dismissed the underlying application as time‑barred under Section 18(2). After reviewing divergent High Court authorities, the Court accepted the view represented by the Punjab decision (Hari Krishan Khosla) and rejected the contrary Mysore line (Boregowda).

The Court's reasoning, as stated in the opinion, proceeded by reference to statutory wording, statutory scheme and general principles governing relations between independent tribunals:

  • Statutory construction: The Court examined Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Land Acquisition Act. It noted that Section 19 (which specifies particulars to be sent with a reference) does not require disclosure of the interval between the award and the application — an omission that suggests the legislature did not intend the receiving Court to examine the Collector's compliance with Section 18(2).
  • Section 20 procedure: Once a reference is received, Section 20 directs the Court to notice the parties and proceed to determine the objection (i.e., the merits of the application). The Court read this as indicating that the Court's task is to decide the substantive objection, not to re‑open the question of whether the Collector properly forwarded the reference.
  • Inter‑tribunal relations: The Collector forwarding a reference is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction but is not subordinate to the Court for purposes of appeal or revision. Absent express statutory provision to the contrary, independent tribunals must presume the validity of acts of other tribunals in order to avoid interminable litigation over jurisdictional errors.
  • Presumption of validity: The Court concluded that, upon receipt of a reference, the Court must presume its validity and proceed to decide the objection on its merits rather than investigate the regularity of the Collector's decision to refer.
  • Remedial point and local amendment: The Court acknowledged that a party aggrieved by a Collector's mistake is not left entirely remediless in the present case because, in Madhya Pradesh, a local amendment (Section 3 of the C.P. and Berar Act VII of 1949, as extended by the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958) made any order of the Collector in respect of Section 18 subject to revision by the High Court as if the Collector were subordinate to the High Court under Section 115 CPC. That statutory provision provides a direct remedy against a Collector's erroneous or arbitrary order.
  • Alternative procedural avenue: The Court also noted that an aggrieved party could challenge an order of the Court dealing with a reference by a revision under Section 115 CPC rather than by Article 227; the petitioner had remedies by way of revision and condonation of delay if required.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that once the Collector makes a reference under Section 18, the Court receiving that reference is not competent to go behind the reference to examine whether the Collector should have dismissed the application as time‑barred under Section 18(2); instead, the Court must proceed to determine the objection on its merits after noticing the parties.

Implications and Immediate Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s Article 227 petition was dismissed with costs of Rs. 50 payable to the opposite party, and the balance of the petitioner's security deposit (if any) was directed to be refunded to the petitioner.
  • Procedural guidance: The opinion clarifies that the appropriate avenue to challenge the Collector's decision (in the context of Madhya Pradesh as it then stood) is revision to the High Court under Section 115 CPC, particularly in view of the local amendment making the Collector’s orders subject to revision by the High Court.
  • Precedential effect: The Court expressly followed the Punjab line of authority rather than the Mysore line. The opinion sets out the Court's reasons for doing so, but it does not announce any novel legal principle beyond its statutory construction and application to the facts; the result is the dismissal of the petition and the clarification of the procedural route for challenge rather than the creation of a new broad precedent beyond the reasoning stated.

Order delivered by Sharma, J.; another judge recorded "I agree."

Show full summary ...

    Kaliyanchand Devilal v. Kanchanbai Butilal And Others Non-Petitioners.

    1. This is a petition Under Article 227 of the Constitution by one of the parties to a dispute regarding the apportionment of compensation granted by the Collector in a land acquisition case. The ground is that the Court to which an application for reference by the opposite party was forwarded by the Collector should have held that the application to the Collector being timebarred under Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, he was not competent to entertain the reference. Actually, it rejected the petitioner's prayer to this effect, holding that once the reference had been made by the Collector it was not competent to consider its propriety or validity, but should straightway proceed to determine, after noticing the parties, the objection raised in the application.

    2. Without going into the merits of the contentions of the parties for and against "limitation" of the opposite party's application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act before the Collector, we have hear to decide whether once the reference has been received from the Collector, the Court is competent to see whether or not the Collector should have dismissed the application as timebarred under Section 18(2) of the Act.

    3. The facts are simple and are common ground. The parties seem to be co-sharers or at least claim to be so in the property that has been acquired. The petitioner himself made an application under Section 18 which was forwarded to the Court and is being considered as such. Some time later, the opposite party made her objections before the Collector. This she did in two applications, the first on 30-9-1959 asking only for a stay of the disbursement of the compensation till the filing and disposal of a partition suit by her. On more or less the same averments the second application was made on 9-11-1959, with the further prayer that this might be forwarded to the Court as a reference. The Collector forwarded it. It is not clear whether the effect of Sub-section (2) was raised before him; but if it was, he considered it to be of no consequence. Anyway, when the application came before the Court, the present petitioner who was already before it apropos of his own reference, prayed that it should not be entertained, the Collector himself having committed a mistake in sending it up in disregard of Section 18(2) of the Act. The Court took the position that once a reference had been made by the Collector, it was not for it to sit in judgment Over him, but it was his duty to proceed to investigate the merits of the objection in the manner provided in Section 20. From this order the petitioner has come up to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

    4. Since there has been some confusion in this regard, it is to be noted that the present petition is against the order of the District Judge refusing to go behind the reference, and not against the order of the Collector making it. No doubt, an application by a party aggrieved by an order of the Court dealing with a reference under the Land Acquisition Act should be one of revision under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code and not one under Article 227 of the Constitution. If this were the only difficulty, the petitioner would not be seriously inconvenienced, this petition having been filed within 45 days from the date of its order. He can pray that the petition itself might be treated as one under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code; this petition being dismissed, he might file another application under that section, and re-quest the Court to condone the delay in view of his having proceeded under Article 227. One or the other of these courses has been adopted by similar petitioners in other cases.

    5. The real difficulty, however, is on the merits. The question has come up before different High Courts, though not before that of Nagpur or the Madhya Pradesh, and there is a difference of view. Typical of one school is the line taken in Hari Krishan Khosla v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj 490 which incidentally cites a number of other rulings in direct support or of analogy. On this view the Court is not competent to go behind the reference made by the Collector who is not subordinate to it for the purposes of revision or appeal.

    tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they have also to consider whether there shall be any appeal from their decision; for, otherwise there will be none. It would be an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give them jurisdiction by wrongfully deciding certain facts to exist because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts."

    The Punjab ruling also refers to a number of older rulings which need not be separately set out.

    6. As against this, there is the line indicated in Boregowda v. Subbaramiah, AIR 1959 Mys 265.

    "It appears to be the intention of the scheme of the Act that normally speaking, the Deputy Commissioner (Collector) should make a reference when he himself does not decide the matter and that without an unnecessary loss of time .....

    The court to which a reference is made can go behind the reference and see whether it is competent."

    This ruling also gives some earlier citations, in particular, the rulings of Allahabad, the earlier (Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary of State, AIR 1926 All 766) being followed in preference to the later (Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, AIR 1932 All 597). It is of interest to note that an old ruling of 1911 in Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao, 11 Ind Cas 690 (Nag), of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court has taken the same line as the Mysore ruling. But the idea there seems to be that there should be some control on the Collector's making any reference, so that he might give due regard to Section 18(2). For one thing, the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Segments are not binding on this Court, but are only persuasive; for another, -- and this is more important -- subsequent local amendment in the Madhya Pradesh has, as will be presently noted, provided sufficient check over the possibility of an erroneous or arbitrary order by the Collector in this regard.

    7. On full consideration of both the views, we are satisfied that the Punjab view that the Court may not go behind the reference is in accordance with the wording of Sections 18, 19 and 20, the scheme of the Act and the general principles governing the relations between tribunals that are not subordinate to one another. Whether or not Section 18(2) lays down a law of limitation properly so called, or whether it is a matter of procedure only, it is no doubt a principle which the Collector should bear in mind when considering an application under Section 18(1). But the moment he decides to make a reference, the Court receiving it has nothing more to do with Section 18(2) of the Act. If the legislature had intended otherwise, the particulars in Section 19 would contain a heading relating to this, and calling for the mention of the interval between the award and the making of the application that is the subject-matter of the reference. Since there is no such heading, it would be proper to assume that the legislature is of the view that it is no business of the Court to see whether or not Section 18(2) has been disregarded. Another reason which supports this view is the wording of Section 20. The moment the Court receives the reference, it has to notice the parties and to proceed to determine the objection, that is to say, the subject matter of the application on merits that section does not indicate that before determining the objection, the Court is also to see whether or not the Collector has acted regularly in making the reference. In fact once the reference is made by the Collector, the Court has to presume it to be a valid one.

    8. There is a third ground also in support of the Punjab view. After all, the Collector making the reference, though a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, is not subordinate to the Court for the purposes either of appeal or revision. In all such cases unless statute expressly empowers it otherwise, each of the independent tribunals has to presume the validity of the acts of the others and not try to investigate whether or not it had committed an error of law; otherwise, there would be no end to controversies.

    9. There is, of course, the question whether a party affected by the Collector's mistake, if any is altogether without remedy. If the statute does not give any remedy there is an end to it and we cannot proceed on the assumption that every possible error on the part of every tribunal should be provided against by some right of appeal or revision. It would also be an interesting question if Section 18(2) is really a rule of limitation; but we need not examine it, because as it happens, in Madhya Pradesh there is a remedy for the possible mistake or illegality on the part of the Collector in making a reference. There is a local amendment to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act introducing Sub-section (3) (Section 3 of the C.P. and Berar Act VII of 1949 dt. 25-3-49).

    "(3) Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

    By the operation of the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1958, this was the law in force in the entirety of the new Madhya Pradesh at the relevant time, that is, November 1959. It is also to be noted that the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's ruling referred to was made in 1911 long before the amendment of 1949.

    10. This takes us to one more point against the petitioner. The petitioner's grievance is really against the order of the Collector on the application by the opposite party dated 9-11-1959. It is conceivable that he did not know of this application at that time and came to know of it only when the reference was received by the District Judge. Even so he had a remedy by way of revision to the High Court. If there was delay beyond his control, it was always open to him to make it a ground and ask for condonation before the High Court. But having such a simple and straightforward course open to him, he sought the help of the Court and when it refused to interfere, he has come up to this Court. Even if there was some substance in his petition (which there is not) this alone would justify its dismissal.

    11. The result is, looked at in any manner whatsoever, the petition is without any force. It is accordingly dismissed with costs payable to the opposite party of Rs. 50/- (fifty). The balance, if any, of the security deposit may be refunded to the petitioner.

    Sharma, J.

    12. I agree.

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    Comments

    Kaliyanchand Devilal v. Kanchanbai Butilal And Others Non-Petitioners.
    (Nov 9, 1962)