Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant, Chhotelal, lodged a criminal complaint before the Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, against Gangaprasad Jaiswal (partner in Messrs Shri Uma Shankar Oil Mills, Allahabad) under Sections 417, 420 and 500 IPC. The factual allegations in brief are:

  • On 22 November 1960 Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das (Jabalpur) entrusted a bank draft for Rs. 15,000 payable to Shri Uma Shankar Oil Mills, Allahabad, to the complainant, authorising delivery of 400 tins of mustard oil against the draft.
  • The complainant met the accused at the Mills in Allahabad and informed him of the draft. The accused caused oil cans to be loaded into a truck, instructed delivery to Jabalpur under the complainant's direction, and upon receiving the draft ordered the truck unloaded and sent away despite the complainant's protest; the complainant was threatened and left for Jabalpur. The accused encashed the draft on 24 November and denied receipt when the Jabalpur firm telegraphed for dispatch.
  • It was alleged that the accused falsely told the Jabalpur firm that the complainant had acted in his personal capacity, had given the draft as his own money, and was indebted to the accused for Rs. 2,500 (alleged defamation).
  • On 6 January 1961 the complainant was asked to sign as a witness on an agreement repeating that false story; he alleged he signed under undue influence (alleged cheating at Jabalpur).

Procedurally, the accused raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Jabalpur Court. The trial Magistrate overruled the objection; a revision to the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, was dismissed. The accused then moved this revision (before the Court whose opinion is summarized).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court at Jabalpur has jurisdiction under Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code to try the offence of cheating alleged to have been committed at Allahabad (i.e., whether the "consequence" of the offence occurring at Jabalpur renders Section 179 applicable).
  2. Whether the complaint, as drafted, discloses an offence of cheating in respect of the alleged incident of 6 January at Jabalpur (i.e., whether the accused is alleged to have participated in the Jabalpur incident).
  3. Whether the imputations allegedly conveyed by the accused to the Jabalpur firm amount to defamation and whether the Jabalpur Court has jurisdiction to try the defamation charge.
  4. Ancillary raised contention: whether the accused is protected by Exception (9) to Section 499 IPC in respect of the alleged defamatory statements (this was argued but the Court did not decide it at this stage).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's (Revisionist's) Arguments — as stated by counsel Shri R.S. Dabir

  • The case does not fall within the purview of Section 179 CrPC; the alleged offence of cheating was committed at Allahabad and therefore the Court at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction to try that offence.
  • As to the offence of defamation, no case is made out even on the allegations; alternatively, the accused is entitled to the protection of Exception (9) to Section 499 IPC.

Complainant's / Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Relying on Section 179 CrPC and on precedent (Emperor v. Atma Ram, AIR 1934 All 846), the complainant argued that although misrepresentation and delivery of the draft occurred at Allahabad, the real consequence (pecuniary loss) occurred at Jabalpur and therefore Jabalpur courts have jurisdiction.
  • The learned Additional Sessions Judge had accepted the aforesaid line and relied on the quoted Allahabad High Court decision in support of Jabalpur's jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Atma Ram, AIR 1934 All 846 Relied upon to support the proposition that Section 179 CrPC permits trial where the loss or consequence to the injured party (here the firm) ensued (i.e., jurisdiction where the consequence occurred). The learned Additional Sessions Judge had relied on this decision to uphold jurisdiction at Jabalpur. The Court in this opinion disagreed with applying that case broadly to confer jurisdiction based on remote pecuniary loss that is not an integral part of the offence.
Ibrat Hussain v. The State, AIR 1955 All 363 Illustrated the principle that jurisdiction under Section 179 depends on consequences that are integral to the offence (example: offender could be tried where the marriage took place but not where deprivation at home was felt). The Court cited and approved the principle from this decision to support a narrow interpretation of "consequence" in Section 179 — i.e., only consequences integral to the offence confer jurisdiction.
Ishar Das v. Emperor, 8 Cri LJ 75 (Lahore) Held that Lahore Court had jurisdiction where the loss to the Bank occurred at Lahore; cited in support of a broad application of Section 179 where the loss to the head office was the relevant consequence. The Court noted the case and expressly disagreed with any broad proposition that a remote loss confers jurisdiction; the Court rejected applying Ishar Das to justify Jabalpur jurisdiction here because the pecuniary loss to the principal firm was remote and not an ingredient of the offence.
Barkat Ali v. Imperial Bank of India, AIR 1945 Lah 213 Explained legal differences between drafts and cheques; held purchaser of a draft cannot require the issuing bank to stop payment on grounds concerning the consideration that prompted purchase. The Court relied on the principle to explain why a draft results, for practical purposes, in an immediate debit entry and why the offence was complete when the draft was delivered to the accused at Allahabad (i.e., the delivery completed the cheating irrespective of later pecuniary loss to the principal firm).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and functional analysis of Section 179 CrPC to determine whether jurisdiction for the alleged offence of cheating could be exercised at Jabalpur. The analysis proceeded in these main steps:

  1. Interpretation of Section 179: The Court parsed the provision to show it confers jurisdiction on:
    • the Court within whose territorial limits anything was done by reason of which a person is accused of the offence; and
    • the Court within whose limits any consequence ensued by reason of which the person is accused of the offence.
    The phrase "by reason of which" applies to both clauses and limits jurisdiction to acts or consequences that are integral to the accused's culpability for that particular offence.
  2. Distinguishing integral consequences from remote effects: The Court emphasized that not every consequence flowing from a crime confers jurisdiction where it occurred; only consequences that are an integral part of the offence (i.e., without which the offence is not complete) are relevant. To illustrate this limitation the Court gave examples (assault at X, death at Y, family suffering at Z) and cited Ibrat Hussain to show the principle applied in earlier case law.
  3. Assessment of the facts against the legal test:
    • The Court found the acts constituting the alleged cheating — the misrepresentation, the loading of oil in the truck to induce delivery, the taking of the draft — were done at Allahabad. The critical consequence that completed the cheating offence was the complainant's delivery of the bank draft at Allahabad.
    • The remote pecuniary loss ultimately borne by the principal firm in Jabalpur was held not to be an ingredient essential to the offence of cheating in this context; it was merely a consequential loss and therefore did not attract Section 179 jurisdiction at Jabalpur.
    • The Court contrasted payment by draft (which is different from payment by cheque) and relied on Barkat Ali to explain how a draft's mechanics make the delivery of the draft to the accused the completing consequence of the deception.
  4. On the alleged cheating at Jabalpur arising from the 6 January incident, the Court carefully read paragraph 8 of the complaint and concluded it does not disclose any act or involvement of the accused; the complaint attributes pressure to "persons present there including Shri Radheshyam Agrawal" (who is not an accused). Thus, paragraph 8 did not constitute a charge of cheating against the accused and was dismissed.
  5. Regarding defamation, the Court declined to decide finally whether the elements of defamation were made out or whether Exception (9) applied. The Court observed that the trial Magistrate had not applied his mind properly to the defamation question and stated it would be open to the accused to raise these issues before the trial Magistrate again. However, the Court held that the Jabalpur Court has jurisdiction to try the defamation charge because the alleged imputation was published at Jabalpur.
  6. Conclusion from the analysis: Section 179 does not render the Court at Jabalpur competent to try the cheating alleged to have been committed at Allahabad because the pecuniary loss at Jabalpur was not an integral consequence of the cheating; the offence was complete at Allahabad when the draft was delivered.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision partly allowed — the Magistrate at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction to try the offence of cheating alleged to have been committed at Allahabad; that part of the complaint is not triable at Jabalpur.

Direct implications and orders made:

  • The allegation of cheating based on the events at Allahabad is not triable at Jabalpur and is therefore excluded from proceedings there.
  • The portion of the complaint alleging cheating at Jabalpur arising from the 6 January incident (paragraph 8) is dismissed outright for failure to disclose any offence by the accused.
  • The matter is remitted to the trial Magistrate at Jabalpur to proceed with the complaint only insofar as it concerns the offence of defamation, in accordance with law; the accused may again raise contentions (including applicability of Exception (9) to Section 499 IPC) before the trial Magistrate.
  • The revision as a whole is described as "partly allowed" and the case is remanded (the opinion concludes with the direction: "Case remanded").

The Court did not finally decide whether the alleged defamatory statements constituted an offence or whether Exception (9) applied; those matters were left to be agitated at trial.

    Ganga Prasad Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain

    1. Chhotelal filed a complaint in the Court of Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur, against Gangaprasad Jaiswal, Partner of Messrs Shri Uma Shankar Oil Mills, Allahabad, under Ss. 417, 420 and 500 of the Penal Code. In short the allegations were these. On November 22, 1960, Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das, Jabalpur, entrusted to the complainant a bank draft for Rs. 15,000/- payable to Shri Uma Shankar Oil Mills, Allahabad, by handing over to the said Mills against delivery of 400 this of mustard oil. The complainant went to Allahabad. There he met the accused Gangaprasad in the premises of the Mills and informed him of having brought the aforesaid draft with the aforesaid instructions.

    2. As the complainant was not willing to hand over the draft without delivery of the oil, the accused sent for a truck and loaded it with cans containing the requisite weight of oil. The accused instructed the driver of the truck to carry it to Jabalpur under the complainant's direction. When this was done, the complainant handed over the draft to the accused. No sooner the accused got the draft than he ordered the truck to be unloaded and in spite of complainant's vehement protests the oil cans were removed from the truck and it was sent away. The complainant was threatened with dire consequence if he did not leave Allahabad immediately. The entire atmosphere was charged with menace so that he immediately left for Jabalpur. In the mean time, the Jabalpur firm had informed the accused by telegram about having sent the draft and requested him’ for despatch of the oil. The accused denied the fact of receipt of the draft. He, encashed it on the 24th November. It is further alleged in the complaint that the accused informed Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das that the complainant had entered into a bargain with the accused in his own name and on his personal account and had also given the draft as his own money and, further, that the complainant was indebted to the accused to the extent of Rs. 2,500/-.

    3. It is then stated in the complaint that on January 6, 1961, the complainant was called at the premises of Messrs Satya Narayan and Company, Jabalpur, and asked to sign as a witness on an agreement between Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das of the one part and the accused of the other, in which the aforesaid false story was repeated. The complainant was reluctant to sign even as a witness but eventually he was persuaded to do so on the ground that Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das would lose Rs. 15,000/- if the complainant did not sign the document. It is alleged that the complainant signed the agreement as a witness under undue influence.

    4. On these allegations, it is said in the complaint that the offences of cheating were committed (1) at Allahabad when there was a false representation and the draft was obtained from the complainant, and (2) at Jabalpur when the complainant was made to sign the agreement of the 6th January; and the offence of defamation was committed when the accused deliberately and falsely informed the Jabalpur firm that the complainant had given the draft as his own and had entered into a bargain on his own account and that he was indebted to the extent of Rs. 2,500/-.

    5. By way of a preliminary objection the accused challenged the jurisdiction of the Jabalpur Court. It was overruled by the trial Magistrate. He went in revision which has been dismissed by the. First Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur. Hence this revision.

    6. Shri R.S Dabir, learned counsel for the accused contends that the case does not fall within the purview of Section 179 of the Cr PC and since on the complainant's own showing the offence was committed at Allahabad, the Court at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction to try the offence of cheating. As to the offence of defamation he contends that no case is made out even on the allegations made in the complaint and, at any rate, the accused was protected under Exception (9) to Sec. 499 of the Penal Code.

    7. Regarding the offence of defamation I would guard myself against expressing any opinion as to whether it is constituted or not and whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of Exception (9). Those are matters which can again be agitated by the accused before the trial Magistrate on an appropriate occasion. It will not be proper to dismiss the complaint with regard to the charge of defamation at this stage. The learned Magistrate does not seem to have seriously applied his mind to that question, perhaps for want of adequate material. It will be open to the accused to move the trial Magistrate again. Quite apart rom the question whether the offence of defamation is constituted or not, I have no doubt that the Court at Jabalpur has jurisdiction to try it inasmuch as the imputation was published here.

    8. As regards the offence of cheating alleged to have been committed at Jabalpur, I have carefully perused paragraph 8 of the complaint which contains the incident of the 6th January. It does not disclose that the accused played any part in that incident. His presence is not mentioned there. It is vaguely alleged that the complainant signed the agreement as a witness under the undue influence of ‘persons present there including Shri Radheshyam Agrawal’ (proprietor of Messrs Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das, Jabalpur). Radheshyam is not an accused. Learned counsel for the complainant is unable to satisfy me that paragraph 8 contains any accusation of cheating against the accused. This part of the complaint must, therefore, be dismissed outright as it does not disclose any offence to have been committed by the accused.

    9. This brings me to the question whether the offence of cheating committed at Allahabad can be tried at Jabalpur as well. The trial Magistrate has disposed of this point in a very slipshod manner and his order does not disclose any serious application of the mind. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has gone into the question elaborately and has decided it against the accused, relying on a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Emperor v. Atma Ram, AIR 1934 All 846. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the complainant on Section 179 of the Cr PC which confers jurisdiction on Courts constituted at the place where the act constituting the offence was committed as also at the place where the consequence ensued. The argument is that although the misrepresentation took place at Allahabad and the complainant was also made to deliver the bank draft at Allahabad, the real consequence of the offence, that is to say, the loss which flawed from cheating occurred to the firm Shri Gopal Rameshwar Das at Jabalpur.

    10. On a careful perusal of S. 179 it is quite clear to me that the word ‘consequence’ occurring therein connotes only that consequence which is I an integral part of the offence and not a consequence which is not material to the culpability of the accused in relation to that particular offence. On an analysis of S. 179 it must be said that it confers jurisdiction on:

    (1) the Court within whose territorial jurisdiction anything was done by reason of which a person is accused of the commission of the offence; and

    (2) the Court within whose territorial limits any consequence ensued by reason of which the person is accused of the commission of any offence.

    11. The expression ‘by reason of which’ is of the utmost significance and it governs both the clauses, i.e, anything which has been done, and any consequence which has ensued. The latter has been made undoubted by the use of the word ‘of’, meaning ‘by reason of’. It is, therefore, not every consequence which may flow from a crime which may confer jurisdiction to the Court within whose local limits it ensued. This I would illustrate by two examples. A assaulted B at X. He was removed to the hospital at Y where he died. At Z resides the family of B. Although the Courts at X and Y will have jurisdiction to try the offence because the assault is the act which is an integral part of the offence and the death is also an integral part of the offence of murder or culpable homicide, yet the Court at Z will have no jurisdiction simply because in consequence of the murder, B.'s family suffered there.

    12. Another instance is found in the decision of Mr. Justice Desai (as he then was) in Ibrat Hussain v. The State, (S) AIR 1955 All 363. That was a case under S. 494 of the Penal Code. It was held that the offender could be tried at the place where he married the complainant's wife but not at the place where the complainant suffered the consequence, namely, the deprivation of the consortium of the wife at his own house. Although the last mentioned consequence undoubtedly flows from the offence, yet it is not its ingredient so that it is immaterial for the constitution of that offence. Instances can be multiplied but I consider it wholly unnecessary in view of the clear language of the law.

    13. Learned counsel for the complainant relies on Ishar Das v. Emperor, 8 Cri LJ 75 (Lah). In that case one D of Lahore presented a forged draft and got it cashed at the Bombay Office of the Mercantile Bank of India having no branch if the Punjab. On another date one I of Amritsar presented another forged draft and got it cashed with the help of D at Multan Branch of the Punjab National Bank. Both the drafts purported to have been signed and issued by the Manager of the Amritsar Branch of the Punjab National Bank which had no branch at Bombay and of which the Head Office was at Lahore. Both the accused D and I were jointly tried by a Magistrate at Lahore. It was contended that the trial was bad inasmuch as the Magistrate at Lahore had no jurisdiction. It was held with the aid of Section 179 of the Cr PC, that the Lahore Court had jurisdiction inasmuch as the loss to the Bank, which occurred at Lahore where the Head Office of the Punjab National Bank was situate, was the consequence contemplated in that section. If that case lays down such a fcroad proposition as to say that it is the loss which is occasioned as a consequence of the cheating which confers jurisdiction on the Court, I respectfully disagree. A remote loss or consequence which is not an integral part of the offence is not contemplated by Section 179 of the Cr PC.

    14. Applying the above test to the present case it must be said that the alleged offence of cheating was committed at Allahabad when the complainant was made to deliver the Bank Draft to the accused by loading the oil cans in the truck not with the intention of delivering the goods but solely for the purpose of taking the draft from him. The act of the accused in making the representation to the complainant and in taking the draft from him were committed at Allahabad. ‘By reason of’ these things done, the applicant may be accused of having committed cheating. The consequence which ensued was the handing over of the Bank Draft by the complainant which he would not have delivered to the accused, if he had not been deceived by the accused. It was ‘by reason of this consequence — the delivery of the draft — that, the applicant may be accused of having committed cheating.

    15. But the remote pecuniary loss which was ultimately occasioned to the principal firm is not an integral part of cheating inasmuch as it was not ‘by reason of’ the loss suffered by the principal that the offence of cheating was constituted. Since the offence was complete in itself by reason of the act having been done at Allahabad and the consequence of the pecuniary loss to the Jabalpur firm is a mere result which was not essential for the completion of the offence, S. 179 is not applicable. This is all the more clear from the illustrations to that section. All the consequences mentioned in each of those illustrations are such as are integral part of the offence, that is to say, without which, the offence is not complete.

    16. Payment by draft essentially differs from, payment by cheque. When a Bank issues a draft payable on another Branch of the same Bank or on some other Bank, a debit entry is made in the accounts of the issuing Bank, in advance, in anticipation of the fact that the draft would be cashed and payment would be made to the holder at the Bank named in the draft. If actually such payment is not had and the draft is not cashed, then the debit entry, is accordingly corrected. A draft differs from a cheque firstly, in that it can be drawn only by a Bank on another bank or another Branch of the same Bank but not by a private individual as in the case of cheques and, secondly, in that it cannot so easily be countermanded as a cheque, either by the person purchasing it or by the Bank to which it is presented. It was held in Barkat Ali v. Imperial Bank of India, AIR 1945 Lah 213, that the purchaser of a draft is not entitled to ask the issuing Bank to stop its payment on the grounds such as matters relating to the consideration in respect of which the draft was issued at his instance.

    17. In the present case the offence became complete as soon as, because of the alleged deception “practised on the accused, the complainant delivered the draft to him. In the case of AIR 1934 All 846 (supra) although the contract of sale was entered into at Dehradun by the agent of the complainant, on the latter's advice the firm in which he was a partner and which carried, on business of commission agents at Muzaffarnagar the Bijaks were purchased at Muzaffarnagar.

    18. It was held that the complainant's firm at Muzaffarnagar was deceived into purchasing the Bijaks in consequence of misrepresentation made by the accused through the complainant and that but for his misrepresentation the purchase would not have been made at Muzaffarnagar, so that the consequences ensued at Muzaffarnagar. On those facts S. 179 was applied. In the present case the firm at Jabalpur of which the complainant was, an agent did nothing at Jabalpur in consequence of the deception practised upon the agent at Allahabad. The learned Additional Sessions Judge erred in taking aid of the said decision of the Allahabad High Court.

    19. In the result I hold that the Magistrate at Jabalpur has no jurisdiction to try the offence of cheating. That part of the complaint is not triable at Jabalpur. The case is sent back to the trial Magistrate for proceeding with the complain as regards the offence of defamation in accordance with the law. The revision is partly allowed.

    AG/V.B.B

    20. Case remanded.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ganga Prasad Jaiswal v. Chhotelal Jain
    (Aug 31, 1962)