Citation Codes

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Case Number

Misc. Petn. No. 27 of 1960

Attorney(S)

R.K. Tankha
Y.S. Dharmadhikari
for Opposite Party (No. 3)

Judges

P.V Dixit, C.J
K.L Pandey, J.

Acts

SECTION 64 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
SECTION 45 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Sub-section (8) of Section 57,
provision of Sub-section (8)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenges a revisional order of the State Transport Authority (respondent 1) dated 20-11-1959. That revisional order set aside an earlier order of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior (respondent 2) dated 24/25 February 1958 which had granted the petitioner an extension of a permit for the Datia–Nowgong route to include the Nowgong–Chhatarpur route.

Facts drawn from the opinion:

Two persons, Hassanand Dharamsingh (Datia) and Virbhandas Jasram (Satna), together held a permit for Datia–Nowgong for three years commencing 8-12-1956. The Nowgong Bus Association held a similar permit for the same route.
Hassanand and Jasram applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, to include the route Nowgong–Chhatarpur in their permits. The applications were published and representations (objections) were invited.
The Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company, Nowgong (respondent 3) objected, contending that the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, could not entertain the applications. Although respondent 3 was not present at the public hearing and its representation was made late, the Regional Transport Authority considered the objection and, invoking Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act, concluded it had jurisdiction to entertain the application.
One other objector withdrew; the Regional Transport Authority allowed the application on 24/25 February 1958, subject to validation under Section 63 by countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa. That countersignature was obtained.
On 11-4-1958 respondent 3 filed an application for revising the Regional Transport Authority's order. By the impugned order dated 20-11-1959, the State Transport Authority set aside the Regional Transport Authority's variation on the ground that it amounted to a grant of a fresh permit for territory wholly outside Gwalior's jurisdiction, and thus Gwalior lacked competence.
The petitioner challenged the revisional order in this petition and sought quashing of the State Transport Authority's order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether respondent 3 (Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company) was competent to challenge the Regional Transport Authority's order given that it did not appear at the public hearing and its representation was made beyond time.
Whether the existence of an appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act precluded a revision under Section 64-A of that Act (i.e., whether revision was incompetent where an appeal lay).
Whether the revision application filed by respondent 3 was barred by the period of limitation prescribed by Section 64-A and, if so, whether the point was waived or properly raised before the State Transport Authority.
Whether the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, had jurisdiction to vary an existing permit by including a new route (Nowgong–Chhatarpur) lying wholly outside its territorial jurisdiction, having regard to Sections 45, 57(8) and 63 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether a countersignature under Section 63 by the Regional Transport Authority of the other region (Rewa) could cure any alleged want of jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior.
Whether the State Transport Authority failed to consider points urged before it when passing the impugned revisional order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondent 3, not present at the public hearing and having submitted its representation out of time, was incompetent to challenge the Regional Transport Authority's order.
Because an appeal lay under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a revision under Section 64-A was incompetent.
The revision was barred by limitation and should be dismissed for that reason.
The petitioner's principal place of business lay within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, and therefore that Authority alone had jurisdiction under Section 45.
Any alleged lack of jurisdiction was cured by the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa, which had followed the required procedure for making a fresh grant.
The State Transport Authority failed to consider and decide the points urged before it at the hearing.

Respondent 3's Arguments (as recorded)

The original permit for Datia–Nowgong was a double permit and only one partner (Jasram) could claim relief in respect of that permit.
The partnership between Hassanand Dharamsingh and Virbhandass Jasram was a partnership-at-will and had been dissolved.
Virbhandass Jasram resided at Satna and had no place of business at Datia or within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, and thus Gwalior had no jurisdiction to consider his application.
The bus for which the original permit was granted met with a serious accident on 11-2-1960; Jasram subsequently assigned his permit to a person named Vishkarma for Rs. 19,000/- and was operating the permit with a bus belonging to Vishkarma.

Note: The opinion records that several of these contentions were challenged by the petitioner and that respondent 3 did not press some of these contentions before the court; the court therefore declined to consider them further.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545	Supports the view that only a permit-holder aggrieved by variation can appeal under clause (b) of Section 64, and that other persons providing transport facilities are disentitled to appeal under that clause.	Placed with other authorities to support the court's conclusion that third-party operators cannot rely on clause (b) and must, if at all, take their remedy under clause (f) of Section 64.
V. G.K. Bus Service v. Kerala State Transport Authority Tribunal, AIR 1960 Kerala 18	Also supports the proposition that only the permit-holder should be regarded as entitled to appeal under clause (b) of Section 64.	Relied upon to reinforce the court's acceptance of the narrower construction of clause (b) and to favour the interpretation that other transport providers must use clause (f) if applicable.
Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad, AIR 1959 SC 851	Supreme Court observations supporting the view that clause (b) is limited to permit-holders and does not extend to other persons providing transport facilities.	Used to support the court's adoption of the first view (restrictive interpretation of clause (b)) when construing Section 64.
Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1957 Raj 312 (FB)	Authority cited for the alternative view that third persons providing transport facilities can be aggrieved and may appeal under clause (b) when conditions are varied.	Not adopted by the court; cited as representing the contrary view, which the court rejected in its analysis of Section 64.
Heeralal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1959 Raj 41	Also supports the broader interpretation allowing third-party appellants under clause (b) of Section 64.	Cited as part of the alternative line of authority which the court considered but ultimately did not follow.
Beharilal Chourasiya v. Regional Transport Authority, Rewa, Misc. Petn. No. 32 of 1960, Dated 29-7-1960; AIR 1961 MP 75	Authority on the effect of a revision application filed beyond time; supports the view that an order passed on a revision application filed beyond time cannot be sustained if the point of limitation was raised.	The court noted that, in view of this authority, the impugned order made on a revision application filed beyond time could not be sustained if the limitation point had been properly urged; the court observed this but did not rest its final decision on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner addressing several inter-related questions:

Interpretation of Section 64 (appeal provision):
- The court examined clauses of Section 64, particularly clause (b) (as to appeals by permit-holders) and clause (f) (which expressly allows appeals by "any person ... providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant").
- Two competing views were considered: (a) that only permit-holders falling under clause (b) could appeal and other transport providers could not rely on clause (b) (supported by Kali Mudaliar, V.G.K. Bus Service and Ram Gopal), and (b) that third-party transport providers could also appeal under clause (b) (supported by Jairamdas and Heeralal).
- The court accepted the first view as correct. It reasoned that since clause (f) specifically provides a right of appeal to "persons providing transport facilities", it would be unreasonable to read clause (b) so broadly as to render clause (f) redundant or otiose. Therefore, third-party operators may appeal only under clause (f), not clause (b).
Application of that interpretation to respondent 3:
- Respondent 3 had not made its representation within the prescribed time and therefore could not be regarded as having validly opposed the variation.
- Because it had not validly opposed the variation, respondent 3 could not claim to be a person who "having opposed the grant" was aggrieved and hence could not appeal under clause (f) of Section 64.
- Consequently, respondent 3 could not appeal under Section 64 and, therefore, its revision under Section 64-A was not rendered incompetent by the mere existence of Section 64 remedies.
Limitation under Section 64-A:
- The court acknowledged that respondent 3's revision was filed beyond the thirty-day period prescribed by the First Proviso to Section 64-A.
- The petitioner contended that respondent 3 had failed to raise the limitation point before the State Transport Authority; the petitioner filed an affidavit asserting the point had in fact been urged before that Authority.
- The court observed that, on authority of Beharilal Chourasiya, an impugned order passed on a revision application filed beyond time cannot be sustained if the limitation point was properly urged; however, the court explicitly stated it would not rest its decision on that ground.
Jurisdiction to vary a permit to include a route outside territorial jurisdiction (Sections 45, 57(8), 63):
- The court examined the statutory provisions:
  - Section 45: Applications for permits to be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle(s), with provisos for multi-region or multi-state routes.
  - Section 57(8): An application to vary the conditions of a permit by inclusion of a new route must be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit (i.e., a procedural fiction so that the grant procedure applies).
  - Section 63(1)–(3): A permit granted by one Regional Transport Authority is not valid in another region unless countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that region; countersigning authority may attach or vary conditions when countersigning.
- The court rejected the contention that Sub-section (8) of Section 57 should be read as limiting the phrase "a new route or routes" to routes lying "within the territorial jurisdiction of a Regional Transport Authority"—such words do not appear in the statute and it would be improper to insert them.
- The court explained that Sub-section (8) creates a fiction (treating a variation as an application for a new permit) so that the procedural safeguards applicable to new grants apply; it does not change or displace the jurisdictional rules under Section 45 governing the authority competent to entertain an application.
- The court held that when a Regional Transport Authority had the competence to include a route at the time of the original grant (i.e., could have issued a permit covering that route), there was no reason why it could not later include the route by way of variation. Any use of the permit outside the Regional Transport Authority's territory is protected and validated by the countersignature procedure under Section 63, which allows the other Regional Transport Authority to attach conditions or vary conditions when countersigning.
- Therefore, the court concluded that the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, was competent to vary the original permit so as to include the new route Nowgong–Chhatarpur, notwithstanding that the new route lay outside Gwalior's territorial jurisdiction, provided the countersignature mechanism was observed (which, in this case, had occurred).
Conclusion on the correctness of the State Transport Authority's revisional order:
- Because the court found the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, competent to make the variation, it held that the State Transport Authority's revision (which set aside that variation on jurisdictional grounds) was erroneous and that the error was apparent on the face of the record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the impugned order of the State Transport Authority dated 20-11-1959.

Implications and Consequences (as stated in the opinion):

The order of the State Transport Authority dated 20-11-1959 is set aside.
The respondent 3 shall bear its own costs and shall pay the costs of the petitioner.
The security amount deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to the petitioner.
Hearing fee of Rs. 50 was noted.

Broader legal conclusion drawn by the court (regarding statutory interpretation):

The court held that Sub-section (8) of Section 57 (treating an application to vary a permit as an application for grant) is a procedural fiction and does not curtail the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority which issued the original permit. Where a Regional Transport Authority could have included the new route at the time of original grant, it may do so by variation; the validity of use outside its territory is governed by the countersignature procedure under Section 63.
On Section 64, the court held that third-party transport providers may not invoke clause (b) where clause (f) specifically provides for their appeal; third parties can appeal only under clause (f) and, further, must have validly opposed the grant to qualify under clause (f).

The court observed the time-bar point (limitation under Section 64-A) and referenced authority (Beharilal Chourasiya) indicating that orders passed on revision applications made beyond time may be unsustainable if the limitation point was properly urged, but the court did not base its final decision on the limitation ground.

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Jasram And Another v. State Transport Authority, M.P, Gwalior And Others

1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against a revisional order of the State Transport Authority (respondent 1) dated 20-11-1959, by which an order of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior (respondent 2) dated 24/25 February 1958 granting to the petitioner extension of a permit for Datia-Nowgong route up to Chhatarpur was set aside.

2. While Hassanand Dharamsingh of Datia and Virbhandas Jasram of Satna, who had combined, held a permit for Datia-Nowgong route for three years commencing from 8-12-1956 the Nowgong Bus Association held another like permit. These two permit-holders applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, for including the route Nowgong-Chhatarpur in the permits granted to them. The two applications were duly published and representations were invited against the proposed variation.

One of the two objectors was the Bundelkhand Motor Transport Company, Nowgong (respondent 3), who urged that the applications could not be entertained by the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior. Although that objector was not present at the public hearing fixed for the purpose and his representation was also made beyond time, the Regional Transport Authority considered the objection and held that, in view of Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it had jurisdiction to entertain the application made by Hassanand Dharamsingh and Virbhandass Jasram.

Since the other objector withdrew his objection, the application was allowed on 24/25 February 1958 and the new route Nowgong-Chhatarpur was included in the permit granted to them subject to the condition that it was validated under Section 63 of the Act by the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa. This variation of the permit was duly countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa. Even so, on 11-4-1958, the respondent 3 filed an application for revising the order dated 24/25 February 1958.

By the impugned order dated 20-11-1959, the State Transport Authority set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, on the ground that the application for inclusion of the route Nowgong-Chhatarpur was one made for the grant of a fresh permit and that since the route was wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, that Authority was not competent to make a grant in respect of that route.

3. The petitioner has challenged the order of the State Transport Authority on the following grounds:

(a) The respondent 3, which was not present at the public hearing to press its objection preferred beyond time, was incompetent to challenge the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior.

(b) Since an appeal lay under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the revision application under section 64-a of that act did not He.

(d) The petitioner's principal place of business was within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, and that Authority alone had, in view of Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act, jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

(e) The alleged lack of jurisdiction was cured by the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa which, as required, followed the complete procedure prescribed for making a fresh grant.

(f) The State Transport Authority failed to consider and decide the aforesaid points which were urged before it at the hearing.

4. The respondent 3 contested the above-mentioned points and further raised in support of the impugned order the following other contentions:

(a) The permit originally granted for the Datia-Nowgong route was a double permit and only one partner, namely Jasram, was disentitled to claim any relief in respect of that permit.

(b) This is more particularly so because the partnership between Hassanand Dharamsingh and Virbhandass Jasram was a partnership-at-will which was dissolved.

(c) Virbhandass Jasram is a resident of Satna and had no place of business at Datia or any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, which had therefore no jurisdiction to consider his application.

(d) The Bus No. MPG 2561 in respect of which the original permit was granted met with a serious accident on 11-2-1960. Subsequently Jasram assigned his permit to one Vishkarma for a valuable consideration of Rs. 19,000/- and was operating the permit with the help of a bus belonging to the said Vishkarma.

5. Only one of the contentions mentioned in the last paragraph was raised but not pressed in the revision before the State Transport Authority. In his affidavit, the petitioner has challenged the factual basis of all those contentions. Also, the respondent 3 did not press those contentions before us. For these reasons, we do not think it necessary to consider them.

6. One of the contentions urged before us is that since an appeal lay under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the revision under section 64-a of that act was incompetent. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent 3 was entitled to file an appeal under Section 64 ibid. Under that provision, an appeal may be filed by -

"Any person-

(f) being a local authority or police authority or an association which, or a person providing transport facilities who, having opposed the grant of a permit, is aggrieved by the grant thereof or by any condition attached thereto".

One view is that only the permit-holder, who is aggrieved by the variation of the condition of his permit can appeal under clause (b) and other persons providing transport facilities are disentitled to appeal thereunder: Kali Mudaliar v. Vedachala Mudaliar, AIR 1952 Mad 545 and V. G.K. Bus Service v. Kerala State Transport Authority Tribunal, AIR 1960 Kerala 18. This view finds support in the observations of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad, AIR 1959 SC 851.

The other view is that even third persons providing transport facilities are persons aggrieved by variation of conditions by including a new route and they are entitled to appeal under Clause (b). This view is supported by Jairamdas v. Regional Transport Authority, (S) AIR 1957 Raj 312 (FB) and Heeralal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1959 Raj 41. We think the first view is correct because the right of appeal by persons providing transport facilities and aggrieved by a variation having been specifically provided in clause (f), there was no point in giving to them a right of appeal under another clause.

Considered in another way, if clause (b) be regarded as conferring an unfettered right of appeal to persons providing transport facilities, the provision in Clause (f) would be, so far as those persons are concerned, otiose. We are, therefore, of opinion that other persons providing transport facilities over a route, which is included by variation under Sub-section (8) of Section 57 of the Act in another permit, can appeal only under Clause (f).

7. In the instant case, the respondent 3 did not make its representation within the prescribed time and cannot, therefore, be regarded as having validly opposed the variation. That being so, he was disentitled to appeal under clause (f) of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Since it could not appeal, the revision filed by it under Section 64-A of the Act was not incompetent.

8. It is not disputed that the revision was filed beyond the period of thirty days prescribed by the First Proviso to Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The plea of bar of limitation is met by the contention that the petitioner failed to raise the point before the State Transport Authority and should not now be permitted to agitate it. The petitioner has filed an affidavit to show that the point was in fact urged at the hearing before the State Transport Authority. If so, in the view that we have taken of this question in Beharilal Chourasiya v. Regional Transport Authority, Rewa, Misc. Petn. No. 32 of 1960, D/- 29-7-1960: (AIR 1961 MP 75) the impugned order passed on a revision application filed beyond time cannot be sustained. We do not, however, rest our decision on this ground.

8a. The State Transport Authority allowed the revision only on the ground that the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, had no jurisdiction to include in the petitioner's permit the new route. Nowgong-Chhatarpur lying wholly outside its territorial jurisdiction. The relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act governing this matter are these:

"Section 45: Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles:

Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal, to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle or vehicles:

Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business.

Section 57(8): An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of services above the specified maximum, or in the case of a contract carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vehicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit:

Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number or vehicles.

Section 63 (1): Except as may be otherwise prescribed, a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region, unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region, and a permit granted in any one State shall not be valid in any other State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of that other State or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned :

Provided that a private carrier's permit, granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region with the approval of the State Transport Authority, for any area in any other region or regions within the same State shall be valid in that area without the counter-signature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or of each of the other regions concerned.

(2) A Regional Transport Authority when countersigning the permit may attach to the permit any condition which it might have imposed it it had granted the permit, and may likewise vary any condition attached to the permit by the Authority by which the permit was granted.

(3) The provisions of this Chapter relating to the grant, revocation and suspension of permits shall apply to the grant, revocation and suspension of countersignatures of permits:

....."

9. It is conceded before us that, in view of Section 45, a Regional Transport Authority may grant a permit for any inter-regional or inter-state route, the interests of the operators of the other regions or of the other state being protected by Section 63. It is also not disputed that under Sub-section (8) of Section 57, a Regional Transport Authority may vary the conditions of a permit by including a new route within its jurisdiction.

It is, however, contended that if the new route included by variation lies wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, that Authority is not competent to include it in the permit already issued by it. Support is sought to be derived for this view from the provision of Sub-section (8) to the effect that an application to vary the conditions of any permit has to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit.

An application for variation is not in fact an application for the grant of a new permit. It has only to be treated as such an application. The fiction appears to have been created in order that the procedure prescribed for dealing with an application for the grant of a new permit must be followed. We are of opinion that in the context of variation of the conditions of an existing permit it was not intended that the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority granting that permit should be disregarded. The reason is this.

An application for variation of a permit has to be taken as a whole and fictionally treated as an application for a new permit for the entire routeA Regional Transport Authority, which had no jurisdiction to issue the original permit, cannot be required to vary its conditions. The application must, therefore, be made to the Regional Transport Authority issuing or having jurisdiction to issue the original permit. This brings us to the main question whether Sub-section (8) authorises, by variation, the inclusion of a new route lying wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction of a Regional Transport Authority.

The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent 3 implies that the words "within the territorial jurisdiction of a Regional Transport Authority" should be read after the expression "a new route or routes" occurring in Sub-section (8). In our opinion, since those words are not there, it would not be right to give to the wide words of the ex-pression a restricted meaning. It must be emphasised that, by varying the conditions of a permit by including a new route lying outside its jurisdiction, a Regional Transport Authority is not doing anything which it could not have done at the time of granting the original permit.

Now, when it could include the new route at the [time of the original grant, there is no good reason why it should not be able to do so when varying the conditions of a permit. It is obvious that, in either case, the permit has to be validated for use outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority concerned in the manner provided by Section 63 and the interests of the person affected are thus amply safeguarded. It is also contended that Section 45 applies only to applications for permits and is inapplicable to applications for variation of conditions of existing permits.

The short answer to this argument is that applications for variation have also to be treated as applications for the grant of new permits. For all these reasons, we are of the view that, in this case, the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, was competent to vary the conditions of the original permit so as to include in it the new route Nowgong-Chhatarpur. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether, if the Regional Transport Authority, Gwalior, had no jurisdiction to do so, that defect of jurisdiction could be cured by the counter-signature of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa.

10. Having regard to the view that we have taken of this case, the impugned order of the State Transport Authority dated 20-11-1959 is erroneous and the error is apparent on the face of the record.

We, therefore, quash that order and direct that the respondent 3 shall bear its own costs and pay those of the petitioner. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner. Hearing fee Rs. 50/-.

Jasram And Another v. State Transport Authority, M.P, Gwalior And Others

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondent 3's Arguments (as recorded)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Jasram And Another v. State Transport Authority, M.P, Gwalior And Others

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