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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • J.N.Sinha
  • A.P.Sen
Judges
  • G.P Bhutt, C.J
  • T.P Naik, J.
Acts
  • provisions of Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure. 20.
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 77 of the Railways Act (Exs. P-3 to P-5). Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dated 18-7-1950, (Exs. P-9, P-11 and P-13).
  • Sub-rule (2) (Sic Clause d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act : (Exhibits F-3 to P-5).
  • provisions of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act
  • provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • SECTION 77 RAILWAYS ACT
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act,
  • Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • J.N.Sinha
  • A.P.Sen
Judges
  • G.P Bhutt, C.J
  • T.P Naik, J.
Acts
  • provisions of Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure. 20.
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 77 of the Railways Act (Exs. P-3 to P-5). Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dated 18-7-1950, (Exs. P-9, P-11 and P-13).
  • Sub-rule (2) (Sic Clause d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act : (Exhibits F-3 to P-5).
  • provisions of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act
  • provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • SECTION 77 RAILWAYS ACT
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.
  • Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act,
  • Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is a joint Hindu family firm (Dhanraj Samrathmal, Balaghat) constituted by two brothers. On 3-3-1950 a consignment of 123 bags of chillies (85 maunds) was booked at Mandsaur to Lamta under invoice No. 1 and railway receipt No. Q/1-32496. The receipt was sent to the plaintiff through a bank and the plaintiff obtained it after payment. Eleven bags arrived at Lamta in April 1950; the remaining 112 bags were missent to Allahabad and ultimately arrived at Lamta on 16-9-1950. On inspection the entire consignment was found partly caked, discoloured, powdered and wet; open delivery was given on 5-11-1950 after payment of freight and wharfage, and a certificate of percentage damage (without prejudice) was recorded by the Chief Commercial Inspector.

The plaintiff served notices on the railways on 28-6-1950 under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and on 18-7-1950 under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, claiming compensation for non-delivery (and later damages for late delivery and deterioration). The suit for damages (filed 3-3-1951) sought about Rs. 11,301/3/6. The Additional District Judge, Balaghat, dismissed the suit solely on the ground that the notices under Section 77 Railways Act and Section 80 CPC were not valid for the claim in suit. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notices served on 28-6-1950 (under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act) were sufficient and valid, given that the plaintiff only became aware of late delivery and deterioration after some goods arrived and later on open delivery.
  2. Whether the notices served on 18-7-1950 (under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure) sufficiently stated the cause of action and relief claimed so as to comply with Section 80.
  3. Whether the plaintiff firm had a right of suit as assignee of the consignor (i.e., whether it was entitled to sue on the railway receipt).
  4. Whether the suit was barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act (i.e., whether the plaintiff being a firm required registration under Section 69).
  5. Whether the quantum of damages assessed by the trial court was correct and, if so, what decree should be passed.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The notices dated 28-6-1950 (under Section 77 Railways Act) and 18-7-1950 (under Section 80 CPC) satisfied statutory requirements and no further or fresh notices were necessary after the railway was able to trace the consignment.
  • The plaintiff claimed title/right to sue as assignee of the consignor under the endorsement on the railway receipt and by delivery practices of the railway.
  • The damages claimed were composed of loss due to late delivery and deterioration; particulars and quantum were supported by market rate differences and certificate of damage by the Chief Commercial Inspector.

Defendants' (Railways') Arguments

  • The notices were invalid and improper for the purposes of the claim in suit (i.e., non-compliance with Section 77 and Section 80), so the plaint should be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(2)(d) CPC.
  • The plaintiff had no cause of action or right to sue because it was not an assignee of the railway receipt.
  • The suit was barred by limitation and by non-compliance with Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act (i.e., plaintiff not registered as partnership).
  • The claim was exaggerated and the market-rate assumptions or the entitlement to the whole amount claimed were disputed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shamsul Haq v. Secretary of State, AIR 1930 Cal 332 Section 77's object is to prevent stale and possibly dishonest claims; it is a protective measure to guard against fraud rather than to deprive legitimate claimants. The court relied on this description of Section 77's object to interpret the mandatory notice requirement purposively — to prevent fraud but not to defeat bona fide claims where the railway was put on inquiry in time.
East Indian Rly. Co. v. Jethmall, ILR 20 Bom 669 Notices of claims are not to be construed with extreme strictness; substantial compliance is sufficient. The court used this principle to support a liberal construction of the notice requirement under Section 77, holding that the 28-6-1950 notices substantially complied with the statute.
Secretary of State v. Nagorao, ILR (1939) Nag 206; AIR 1938 Nag 415 A Section 80 notice need not set out all details like a pleading; its object is to give sufficient warning to the defendant so it may consider compromise or restitution. The court applied this approach in interpreting the sufficiency of the 18-7-1950 notices under Section 80, concluding they substantially informed the railway of the intended suit.
Jones v. Nicholl, (H.844) 1 M & W 361; 153 ER 149 Common sense should be applied to the construction of notices; they need not be technical pleadings. The court cited this to reinforce that notices under Section 80 should be read sensibly and need only substantially satisfy their object of informing the defendant.
Dhiansingh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 Illustration of the purpose of pre-suit notices to the government and the need for sufficient warning. Referenced to support the proposition that Section 80 notices are intended to give a fair warning and opportunity for redress or compromise.
Krishna Behari v. Brojeswari Chowdranee, 2 Ind App 283 (PC) 'Cause of action' in a notice should be construed with reference to substance not form; it need not include every fact. The court relied on this to decide that the Section 80 notices sufficiently stated the cause of action even though they did not state the final form of the monetary claim later pursued.
Tekait Doorga Prasad Singh v. Tekaitni Doorga Konwari, 5 Ind App 149 (PC) Similar principle: cause of action construed with regard to substance rather than pedantry of form. Used together with the above authority to justify construing the Section 80 notices generously.
P.L.N.K.L. Chettyar Firm v. Ko Lu Doke, AIR 1934 Rang 278 A plea that the defendant does not know a fact (denial of knowledge) is not equivalent to a denial and does not put the fact in issue. The court applied this principle to hold that the defendants' statement of ignorance about the plaintiff being the assignee was not a substantive denial; it did not defeat the plaintiff's proof of assignment.
Lakhmi Chand v. Ramlal, AIR 1931 All 423 Support for the proposition that denial of knowledge is not a proper denial of a fact. Used along with the foregoing Rangoon precedent in evaluating the defendants' written statement on assignment.
Shah, Mulji Deoji v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Nag 31 When no particular mode of assignment is prescribed by statute, rights under a document (e.g., railway receipt) can be transferred in any manner that makes the transferor's intention clear. The court relied on this to find that the consignor's intention to transfer rights to the plaintiff was sufficiently established by endorsement, delivery practice and testimony.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, addressing the statutory notice requirements first and then subsidiary contentions:

  1. Section 77 Railways Act: The court acknowledged the statutory mandatory nature of Section 77 but examined its object — prevention of stale/dishonest claims and protection of railways from groundless litigation. Relying on authorities it held that substantial compliance with the notice requirement suffices because the statute prescribes no particular form.
    • Facts applied: goods were booked on 3-3-1950; parts of the consignment arrived earlier (11 bags on 3-4-1950) but plaintiff was not informed; the remainder arrived 16-9-1950; open delivery and certificate of damage took place on 5-11-1950.
    • The plaintiff served a written claim under Section 77 on 28-6-1950 (within six months of delivery for carriage). Given the railway's endorsements "Not received" and the plaintiff's inability to know the exact fate of the consignment, the court found that the 28-6-1950 notices were a permissible and proper invocation of Section 77.
    • The court emphasized that Section 77 does not require the monetary value or detailed computation in the initial notice; the purpose of the notice — to prevent stale claims and to put the railway on enquiry — was fulfilled.
  2. Section 80 CPC: The court analysed the statutory checklist (cause of action; plaintiff's name/description/residence; relief claimed). It found plaintiff's name/details satisfactory and examined whether the notices sufficiently stated cause of action and relief.
    • Relying on authority the court held that a Section 80 notice need not be a pleading and may be construed sensibly; if it substantially informs the government/railway of the grounds and relief sought it is adequate.
    • The 18-7-1950 notices were in terms similar to the Section 77 notices and, in the court's view, substantially informed the railways of the intended suit. The fact that the claim later became one for late delivery and deterioration (rather than non-delivery) after the rails traced and delivered the goods did not invalidate the earlier notice.
    • The court also noted the defendants' conduct (asking the plaintiff to provide particulars of damage) as evidence they were aware of the claim and its basis, reinforcing that the object of Section 80 was achieved.
  3. Assignment and Right to Sue: The defendants' assertion that the plaintiff had no right to sue because it was not assignee was examined. The court found:
    • Documents (endorsement on railway receipt "Please deliver to Dhanraj Samrathmal-ji, Balaghat") and delivery practices (railway delivering after collecting charges; inward delivery book endorsement) plus oral testimony supported that the plaintiff was treated and acted as assignee.
    • Authorities were applied to hold that, absent a prescribed mode of assignment, transfer may be effected by any mode showing the transferor's intention; the evidence established such intention.
  4. Section 69 Partnership Act: The trial court had held Section 69(2) not applicable because the suit was on behalf of a joint Hindu family firm and there was no record of registration as a partnership; this view was affirmed (i.e., Section 69 did not bar the suit).
  5. Quantum of Damages: The trial court's computation (Rs. 10,071/6/6 originally found; appellate court accepted the trial court's method and figures after applying the market rates and percentage deterioration as certified) was examined. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's assessment and arrived at a final decree figure of Rs. 10,090/9/- (including adjustments made on appeal) and awarded proportionate costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the trial court's finding that the plaint was liable to be rejected for non-compliance with the notice requirements. Concretely:

The notices dated 28-6-1950 (under Section 77, Indian Railways Act) and 18-7-1950 (under Section 80, CPC) were held to be valid and to have substantially complied with statutory requirements.

The court further held that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit as assignee of the consignor and that Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act did not bar the suit because the plaintiff was a joint Hindu family firm (not an unregistered partnership for the purpose alleged). The court accepted the trial court's approach to quantum and awarded the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 10,090/9/- with proportionate costs.

Implications

  • Direct effect: The plaintiff's plaint is no longer liable to be rejected on the ground of invalid notices; the plaintiff obtains a decree for Rs. 10,090/9/- with proportionate costs.
  • Procedure: The decision emphasizes a purposive and substantial-compliance approach to statutory pre-suit notices under Section 77 Railways Act and Section 80 CPC — notices need not spell out exact quantum or every detail, provided they achieve the statutory object of warning and enabling the defendant to investigate or compromise.
  • Scope: The opinion does not announce that it is laying down a novel principle beyond applying established authorities; it confines itself to interpreting and applying existing principles to the facts before it. (The opinion does not discuss any broader precedential changes beyond its application to the present case.)
Show full summary ...

    Samrathmal v. Union Of India

    1. This is a first appeal by the plaintiff, a joint Hindu family firm, whose suit for damages, amounting to Rs. 11,301-3-6, for the lass suffered by it on account of late delivery of goods as also their deli-very in a deteriorated condition has been dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Balaghat, on the sole ground that the notices served by it on the respondent railway companies under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not legal and valid for the purposes. of the claim in suit.

    2. Seth Samrathmal and Seth Ratanchand are real brothers and they constitute the plaintiff joint Hindu family firm which is carrying on business at Balaghat under the name and style of 'Firm Dhanraj Samrathmal, Balaghat'.

    3. On 3-3-1950, one Maganlal Sualal booked a consignment of 123 bags of chillies, weighing 85 maunds, at Mandsaur, a railway station on what is now known as the Western Railway (then known as the Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway) under invoice No. 1, and railway receipt No. Q/1-32496, to Lamta, a railway station on what is now known as the Eastern Railway (then the Bengal Nag-pur Railway). The consignment was booked to self, but the railway receipt was sent to the plaintiff firm, through a bank. The plaintiff firm duly got possession of the receipt on making the required payment to the bank. The railway receipt also contained on it an unsigned endorsement, 'Please deliver to Dhanraj Samavthmalji, Balaghat' (see Ex. D-1). Out of the aforesaid consignment, 11 bags of chillies arrived at Lamta railway station on or about 3-4-1950. The remaining 112 bags were missent to Allahabad from Ujjain, and those bags ultimately arrived at Lamta railway station on or about 16-9-1950. The defendant-respondent railways did not adduce any evidence of the circumstances under which the 112 bags of chillies were missent to Allahabad - while under transhipment at Ujjain.

    4. On the strength of the railway receipt in its possession, the plaintiff firm claimed delivery of the consignment from the railway authorities at Lamta railway station, but, as the consignment on inspection was found to be considerably damaged, and as the contents of all the 123 bags were found by the plaintiff firm to be partly caked, discoloured, powdered and wet, it insisted on an open delivery. On on about 5-11-1950, the Chief Commercial Inspector, Calcutta, gave an open delivery of the whole consignment to the plaintiff firm on collection from it of the freight and wharfage charges due on the consignment. As per copy of the Inward Foreign Delivery Rook of Lamta (Ex. P-28), the Chief Commercial Inspector certified that, on the basis of percentage, 11 bags were damaged to the extent of 85 per cent and 112 bags to the extent of 72 per cent. It was further stated that the certificate was 'without prejudice'.

    5. Before receiving the aforesaid delivery, the plaintiff firm, on the basis of its estimate that the consignment should have arrived at Lamta railway station within fifteen days of its despatch from Mandsaur railway station, had demanded delivery of the consignment from the railway authorities at Lamta railway station on 18-3-1950 and onwards, but it was informed that the goods had not arrived. As regards the 11 bags, which, according to the written statement of the defendants-respondents had reached Lamta railway station in the month of April 1950, Gendmal (P.W. 1) states that he had gone to the railway station Lamta for the purpose of taking delivery of the goods in April 1950, but was not informed that the 11 bags had already arrived. He, however, admits that no endorsement of non-arrival was obtained on the railway receipt in the month of April 1950. A. perusal of the railway receipt (Ex. D-1), however, shows that an endorsement 'Not received' was made on it by the railway authorities at Lamta on 1-5-50) and again on 25-8-50.

    6. On 28-6-1950, the plaintiff firm served notices on the railways concerned, viz., the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, the Bombay Baroda and Central India Railway and the Bengal Nagpur Railway,. under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act : (Exhibits F-3 to P-5). On 18-7-1950, it served notices (Exhibits P-9, P-ll and P-13) on the defendants respondents, under S, 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, In both sets of notices, the plaintiff firm alleged that, in the ordinary course, the goods booked at Mandsaur ought to have reached Lamta within a fortnight; that it had gone to the railway authorities at Lamta to take delivery of the goods on or about 18-3-1950 and many a time thereafter but was always told that the goods had not reached Lamta and that they were not consequently delivered to it; that the non-delivery was owing to the negligence and misconduct on the part of the railway authorities in charge of the goods during transit, who did not take proper care of the goods; and that, in view of the non-delivery of the goods, it was entitled to recover their price, which, according to the prevailing market rate at the time at Lamta was Rs. 140/- per maund. The plaintiff firm accordingly claimed that it was entitled to recover from the defendants-respondents Rs. 11, 900/- plus interest at 1 per cent per mensem on that amount from 18-3-1950 till the date of payment.

    7. After taking delivery of the goods on 5-11-1950, on a certificate regarding the percentage of damage from the Chief Commercial Inspector, the plaintiff firm did not give any further notices to the defendants-respondents either under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act or under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and filed the present suit for damages on 3-3-1951, claiming Rs. 11,301/3/6 from them. The claim in suit was constituted of the following items :

    Rs.

    10,071/6/6 ...

    Damages due to late delivery (the market having fallen from Rs. 140/- per maund to Rs. 80/-per maund on the date of delivery) and due to delivery of the goods in damaged condition.

    Rs.

    892/8/-

    ...

    Interest on Rs. 11,900/- (the price which it would have realized if delivery had been in the ordinary course) at 1% per mensem.

    Rs.

    327/5/-

    ...

    Interest on the amount of damages claimed (Rupees 10,071/6/6) for the period from 6-11-1850 to 2-1-1951, at the rate of 1% per mensem.

    Rs.

    10/--/--

    ...

    Expenses incurred in letters and notices.

    Rs.

    11,301/3/6 ...

    Total.

    8. The defendants-respondents, though they appeared to contest the suit through their pleader on 9-7-1951, did not file their written statement till 14-11-1952, when the Court had by its order, dated 11-7-1952, directed that the case wa,s to proceed ex parte. By their written statement, they disputed the claim of the plaintiff firm. They denied that it had any right of suit; that the 123 bags of chillies booked at Mandsaur were not offered for delivery to it until a5-9-1950; that the market rate of chillies at Lamta during the month of April 1950 was Rs. 140/- per maund and that it had fallen at the rate of delivery of the consignment to Rs. 80/- per inaund.

    According to the defendants-respondents, the claim of the plaintiff firm was exaggerated and was liable to fail, inter alia, on the grounds that it had no cause of action for the! suit against them, that the suit was not maintainable in its present form, that it was bad for want of valid and proper notices under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that it was barred by limitation and that it was not maintainable on the ground that the plaintiff firm was not registered under Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act.

    9. The trial Court held that the plaintiff firm was entitled to sue as assignee of the consignor 'Man-gilal Sualal' of Mandsaur; that the suit, being a suit on behalf of a joint Hindu family firm, the provisions of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act were nofl artplicable; and that the plaintiff firm had suffered damages due to late delivery and delivery in a damaged condition, amounting to Rs. 10,071/6/6. It, however, held that the suit failed on account of the failure of the plaintiff firm to give notices of the claim in suit to the defendants-respondents as required by Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    The notices under these sections, which are dated 28-6-1950 and 18-7-1950, were held to be invalid and not proper on the ground that they related to a claim for non-delivery of the consignment, whereas the suit was for damages on account of late delivery and delivery of the goods in a damaged condition.

    10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff firm contended that the notices dated 28-6-1950 (Exhibits p-3 to p-5) and those dated 18-7-1950 (Exhibits P-9, P-11 and P-13). the first set under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and the second set under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amply satisfied the requirements of law and that no fresh notices of the claim in suit were necessary.

    11. Under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act, a person shall not be entitled to compensation for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods delivered to a railway to be carried, unless his claim for compensation had been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the goods for carriage by the railway'.

    It would be seen that this section prescribes no particular form of notice. All that it requires is that a claim for compensation shall be preferred to the railway administration in writing and that the said claim shall be preferred within six months from the date of delivery of the goods for carnage by the railway.

    12. In the instant case, admittedly the goods were delivered for carriage by the railway at the Mandsaur railway station on 3-3-1950. The requisite notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act had, therefore, to be given to the railway administration in writing on or before 3-9-1950. Eleven bags out of the consignment were received at Lamta railway station on 3-4-1950, while the rest of the bags arrived there on 16-9-1950. The plaintiff firm, however, was never apprised of the arrival of the eleven bags on 3-3-1950, till the total consignment had arrived, us the endorsements, 'Not received', dated 1-5-1950 and 25-8-1950, on the railway receipt (Ex. D-l) clearly show.

    It was under the circumstances not possible for the plaintiff firm to have complied in terms with the requirements of Section 77 of the Railways Act, if it were to give the notice of its claim for compensation as laid in the suit after 16-9-1950, when alone it became aware both of the fact of late delivery and of the damaged condition of the goods. So far as the extent of the damage was concerned, that became known on 5-11-1950, when open delivery was effected and certificate of damage without prejudice was given to the agent of the plaintiff firm. If, therefore, the contention of the respondents were to be accepted, the result w.ould be that, in the instant case, no suit for damages could at all be filed because no notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act could possibly be given,

    13. We will, therefore, examine whether it is permissible under Section 77 of the Act to prefer a claim for compensation to the railway administration, even before the goods arrived at their destination and the fact of their late arrival and in deteriorated condition became known to the plaintiff firm.

    14. Though the provisions of Section 77 of the Act are mandatory and a suit for compensation for loss destruction or deterioration of goods' is liable to fail if no notice is given, the object of the section is stated to be to prevent stale and possible dishonest claims for loss, destruction or deterioration being made against the railway administration, when, owing to delay, it might be impossible to trace the transaction or to check the allegations made, and when evidence to rebut a dishonest claim might'. no longer be available. It is intended as a weapon of defence against fraud and not as a means to enable the railway authorities to deprive their customers of their just dues; see Shamsul Haq v. Secretary of State AIR 1930 Cal 332. Another important object of the section, as stated by lenkins, C.J. in East Indian Rly. Co. v, Jethmnll ILR 20 Bom 669 is the necessity of protecting the railways from groundless litigation. In that case it is also laid down that notices of claims are not to be cons-trued with extreme strictness; there must be a substantial compliance with the terms of the Act by which they are prescribed.

    15. No form of notice having been prescribed it will be a matter to be considered, on the facts of each case, whether the particular notice or notices satisfied the requirements of law. In the instant case, the goods had not arrived at their destination within the usual period in which they should have ordinarily arrived. The plaintiff firm could have no idea whether the goods had been lost or destroyed. The only endorsement the railway administration was making on the railway receipt (Ex. D-1) was 'Not received'. Realizing that the period of six months was manda-tory, the plaintiff firm rightly preferred a claim for compensation under Section 77 of the Railways Act on or about 28-6-1950.

    The requirement of law is that a claim for compensation shall be preferred. It does not require the money value of the claim to be stated, nor does it require the exact and detailed computation regarding the compensation claimed. As stated earlier, the notices served their purpose of preventing stale and possibly dishonest claims and of. putting the railway administrations on enquiry, so that they could trace the consignment and check the allegations made by the plaintiff firm. As, thereafter, the railway administrations took time to trace the consignment and offer it for delivery, no further notices in respect of that consignment were necessary, as the purpose of Section 77 of the Railways Act had been served.

    The further facts, that ultimately a delivery was made possible, even though late, because the consignment could be traced and redirected to the station of delivery and that the traced consignment had suffered damage due to deterioration, are all matters of detail going to the assessment of exact compensation payable to the owner, with which the no-tice under Section 77 of the Railways Act is not concern-ed. We are therefore, of opinion, that the notices, dated 28-6-1950, (Exs. P-3 to P-5) amply complied with the provisions of Section 77 of the Railways Act.

    16. Next come the notices under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dated 18-7-1950, (Exs. P-9, P-11 and P-13). These are in terms similar to the notices under Section 77 of the Railways Act (Exs. P-3 to P-5). Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that before instituting a suit against the Union Government representing the Railways, a notice in writing be delivered to the prescribed officer, stating--

    (a) the cause of action,

    (b) the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff, and

    (c) the relief which he claims.

    It is not disputed that the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff had been mentioned in the notices. The only question is whether they had stated the cause of action and the relief claimed so as to satisfy the requirements of Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure.

    17. The notice should not be construed as if it were pleading. It need not set out all the details and facts of the case : See Secretary of State v. Na-gorao ILR (1939) Nag 206 at p. 212 : (AIR 1938 Nag 415 at p, 418) . On the other band, it is necessary to import a little common sense into notices of this kind : Jones v. Nicholl* H.844) 1.3 M and W 361 : 153 ER 149. See also Dhiansingh v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 274 at p. 281. The object of the notice is to give a sufficient warning to the defendant if a case which is about to be brought against it, so that it may, if it wishes, compromise the case, or after restitution, if it considers that restitution is due without recourse being had to a Court of law in which the Government might be mulcted in costs ILR (1939) Nag 206 : (AIR 1938 Nag 415) (supra).

    If, therefore, the notice substantially satisfied its object in informing the parties concerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed, the requirements of the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be amply satisfied. 'Cause of action', though it ordinarily means a bundle of all those facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege in order to enable him to the relief claimed, need not, in the context in which it has been used here, be construed in any narrow or pedantic sense. The expression must he construed rather with reference to substance than to the form of the action: See Krishna Behari v. Rrojeswari Chowdranee 2 Ind App 283 (PC) and Tekait Doorga Prasad Singh v. Tekaitni Doorga Konwari 5 Ind App 149 at p. 157 (PC). If it substantially informs the defendant of the grounds of complaint, the 'cause of action' would have been amply stated within the meaning of this section.

    18. In the instant case, in our opinion, the notices substantially stated the cause of action and the relief claimed, and they could not be held to be invalid or improper on that account. It is true that the chum as disclosed in the notices was one in respect of compensation for non-delivery, but merely because after the services of the notices, the respondents were able to trace the consignment and effect delivery (though late and in a deteriorated condition) and for that reason the plaintiff firm could reduce its claim for non-delivery to one for late delivery and deterioration of the goods, it does not follow that the earlier notices became ineffective or invalid. Furthermore, in the instant case, the respondents were fully aware of the claim, and the reason therefor, which they had to meet; and, as stated by them in paragraph 12 of their written statement, they could not redress the grievances of the plaintiff firm because

    "the defendants asked the plaintiffs several times to supply them with the beejnk to ascertain the exact amount of the damage, but the plaintiffs did not care to send the same or to show his khata book to them."

    The object of the notice had, therefore, been amply achieved, and, in our opinion, there is no merit in the contention that the plaintiff firm had not served on tbe respondents proper notices under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    19. We, therefore, set aside the finding of the trial Court that the plaint was liable to be rejected under Sub-rule (2) (Sic Clause d) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, because of the non-compliance by the plaintiff firm with the provisions of Section 77 of the Railways Act and Section 80 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure.

    20. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, sought to support the dismissal of the suit on other grounds on which they had failed in the trial Court.

    21. The first contention is that the plaintiff firm had no right of suit as it was not an assignee of the railway receipt, whereby Mangilal Sualal of Mandsore had booked the consignment in question to self.

    22. The case of the plaintiff was that the consignment in question was booked by Mangilal Sualal of Mandsore to Lamta 'to be delivered to the plaintiff'. The respondents in their written statement did not specifically deny this fact. Their plea was : 'The defendants do not know if the plaintiff is the assignee of the consignor, Mangilal. Sualal Jain as alleged in Para 2 of the plaint*. A denial of the- knowledge of a particular fact is not a denial of the fact and has not even the effect of putting the faet in issue. It merely means that the defendants-respondents deny that they have any knowledge of the fact, but a person can admit a fact of which he has no personal knowledge : P.L.N.K.L. Chettyar Firm v. Ko Lu Doke, AIR 1934 Rang 278 aft p. 280 and Lakhmi Chand v. Ramlal, AIR 1931 All 423.

    23. The question was, however, put in issue and the finding of the trial Court was that the plaintiff firm was the consignor's assignee of the goods in suit, The finding is based on the oral evidence of Gendmal (P.W. 1) and Maganlal (P.W. 4), and the internal evidence furnished by the documents Exhibits D-l. P-2 and P-28. Gendmal (P.W. 1) has stated that the railway receipt (Exh. D-1) bears an endorsement in the name of the plaintiff, and Maganlal (P.W. 4) who was the consignor of the goods in question, has stated that the railway receipt (Exh. D-1) was handed over to Gendmal (P.W. 1) and thereunder the right to take delivery of the goods accrued to the plaintiff firm.

    The railway receipt (Exh. D-D itself shows an endorsement, 'Please deliver to Dhanraj Samratbmal-ji, Balaghat', and apparently acting on the said endorsement the delivery of the goods was effected to the plaintiff firm by the railway administration after collecting from it the freight and wharfage charges. The copy of the Inward Foreign Delivery Book of Lamta (Exh. P-28) bears an endorsement of the Chief Commercial Inspector, Calcutta: 'Delivered to consignee Gendmul for D. Samrathmal on 5-11-1950'. It is thus clear that the railway administration treated the plaintiff firm as the assignee of the railway receipt.

    24. In Shah, Mulji Deoji v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Nag 31 at p. 45 Tambe, J says :

    "When there is no particular mode of assignment prescribed by the statute, these rights could be transferred in any manner. The only thing to be considered is whether the intention of the transferor to transfer the rights is made clear by the mode adopted."

    25. Looking to the evidence in the case, we are satisfied that the intention of the consignor to transfer his rights under the railway receipt (Exh. D-1) to the plaintiff firm is amply established by the evidence on record.

    26. It is then contended that the suit was hit by the provisions of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. But, as pointed out by the learned Additional District Judge, there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff is a partnership firm, and consequently Section 69 of the Act has no application. On the other hand, he ha.s found that the suit was on behalf of a Joint Hindu family firm, and we agree with his finding on this issue.

    27. The quantum of damages which could be awarded to the plaintiff firm is also disputed; but nothing has been shown to us how the figure of compensation arrived at by the learned Additional District Judge is incorrect, if (1) the market price of the goods is accepted to be Rs. 140/- per maund from April to August 1950, and Rs. SO/- per maund at the time of delivery, and (2) the percentage of de-terioration is accepted to be as given by the Chief Commercial Inspector, Calcutta, in Exh. P-28. The plaintiff firm (appellant) is, therefore, entitled to a decree for Rs. 10,090/9/- with proportionate costs throughout. We agree with the figure of compensation arrived at by the Trial Court for the reasons given by it with which we agree.

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    Samrathmal v. Union Of India
    (Jan 30, 1959)