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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K.B. Chaturvedi
  • Adv.; For Respondents/Defendant: V.K. Sharma
  • Adv.
Judges
  • T.N Singh, J.
Acts
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: K.B. Chaturvedi
  • Adv.; For Respondents/Defendant: V.K. Sharma
  • Adv.
Judges
  • T.N Singh, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges an order dated 30.10.1991 of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mcrena, which rejected an application made under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Tribunal held that no case of 'permanent disablement' had been made out and therefore did not grant interim compensation in favour of the applicant (the revisionist). The central procedural contention before the High Court was the maintainability of the revision petition against that Tribunal order; counsel were heard on this question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revision petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is maintainable in respect of an order passed by a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
  2. Whether the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a "civil court" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (and hence subordinate to the High Court for purposes of revision under Section 115 CPC).
  3. Whether, if revision is not maintainable, an aggrieved person can seek relief by invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order passed under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced for the insurer (Non-Applicant No. 3) — Mr. V.K. Sharma

  • Relied on the court's recent Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar (1992 ACJ 200 (MP)).
  • Emphasised that in that decision two Judges held that no appeal (and, by implication, no revision) lies against an order under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and that an aggrieved person must resort to Article 227 of the Constitution instead.
  • Argued that the remedy available under Article 227 applies equally where the aggrieved person is the claimant (and not only the owner or insurer of the offending vehicle), so the claimant's resort to revision was the wrong remedy though he is not remediless.

Arguments advanced for the revisionist (claimant) — Mr. K.B. Chaturvedi

  • Contended that the question is res integra and cited case-law supporting revisionability.
  • Mainly relied on Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, arguing that the Claims Tribunal is a "court" subordinate to the High Court; consequently, under Section 115 CPC a revision petition would be maintainable.
  • Relied on several authorities (including Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam and other decisions) to support the contention that the Claims Tribunal can be treated as a civil court for certain purposes and that revisional jurisdiction should be available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar, 1992 ACJ 200 (MP) Two Judges held that no appeal lies against an order under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act and that an aggrieved person should proceed under Article 227; the third Judge (obiter) suggested revision might be available. The court treated the Full Bench majority view as authoritative on non-maintainability of revision under Section 115 CPC in respect of Section 140 orders and relied on that decision to support dismissal of the instant revision; it noted the third Judge's obiter but did not follow it.
Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam, 1990 ACJ 862 (MP) Considered competence of Claims Tribunal to execute its own order by inherent powers (Order 21 CPC); the Tribunal was described as a "court-substitute" and the Full Bench avoided calling it a "court". Cited to show that Claims Tribunals are not readily to be equated with civil courts for all purposes and to caution against treating the Tribunal as a civil court simply to invoke Section 115 CPC.
State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi, 1979 ACJ 205 (SC) Supreme Court observed that for the purpose of Order 22 CPC the Claims Tribunal could be regarded as a 'civil court' because of the need to frame rules under Rule 9-A of Order 33; this was a limited recognition. Referred to as part of the authorities that grant only limited, purpose-specific recognition to the Tribunal as a 'civil court' rather than a general rule making revision available.
Bhagwati Devi v. M/s I.S. Goel, 1983 ACJ 123 (SC) Held that for the purpose of Section 25 CPC Claims Tribunals could be regarded as 'civil courts' to enable transfer of proceedings by the Supreme Court. Used to demonstrate instances where the Tribunal has been treated as a 'civil court' for specific statutory purposes, but not to establish a general right of revision under Section 115 CPC.
Prakramchand v. Chuttan, 1991 ACJ 1051 (MP) Addressed whether the High Court, hearing an appeal under a provision of the old Motor Vehicles Act, could exercise powers analogous to those in Order 41 Rule 31 CPC; concluded appellate court had inherent powers where statute did not inhibit them. Noted by the court as distinguishable and not supporting the revisionist's contention that Section 115 CPC applies to Tribunal orders under the new Act.
Income Tax Officer v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 Authority on inherent powers of appellate courts (cited in Prakramchand). Referred to as supporting a proposition about inherent appellate powers, but not dispositive of whether Section 115 CPC applies to Tribunal orders under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Narayan v. Shankar, AIR 1966 Mys 5 Held revision maintainable under a specific statute (Bombay Mamlatdar's Courts Act) because that Act expressly described the Mamlatdar's court as a "Mamlatdar's Court" (i.e., a court). Distinguished by the court: the statute there explicitly designated a body as a court, unlike the Motor Vehicles Act which is a special law not importing general CPC provisions automatically.
Khurshid Ahmad, AIR 1971 J&K 139 Addressed construction where the relevant Act used expressions such as "judge of the court of district," permitting reference to CPC provisions. Distinguished on facts: the J&K Act used language that warranted reference to CPC, unlike the Motor Vehicles Act's provisions under consideration.
Surendra Mohan Chaurasiya, 1970 MPLJ 253 Full Bench decision on State Transport Appellate Authority's power to remand in appeal under Section 64 of the old Motor Vehicles Act; affirmed principle that necessary powers to exercise jurisdiction may be implied. Cited to show an instance where implied powers were recognised, but the court regarded that context as different from the present question of invoking Section 115 CPC against a Tribunal order under Section 140.
Krishan Gopal v. Dattatrya, 1971 ACJ 372 (MP) Raised an identical question previously but was held distinguishable on facts (details not expanded in the opinion). Not applied as controlling; noted as distinguishable from the instant case.
Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia's case, 1988 MPLJ 78 Division Bench referred to Section 4 CPC (that CPC does not limit or affect special/local laws), relevant to the interplay between special statutes and the CPC. Used to support the proposition that the Motor Vehicles Act (a special law) and its Chapter X form a self-contained code immune to supplementation by CPC provisions like Section 115.
Shah Babulal Khimji, AIR 1981 SC 1786 Authority cited in support of the view that High Court's jurisdiction in matters arising under the Motor Vehicles Act must be exercised with reference to that Act rather than CPC. Invoked to reinforce that the High Court's power to interfere with Tribunal orders must be found within the Motor Vehicles Act and not by importing revisionary jurisdiction from CPC.
Phariya Bricks Works, 1990 MPLJ 371 Division Bench considered maintainability of revision under Section 115 CPC in a different context and referred to Section 2(14) CPC (definition of "order"). Referred to for the proposition that an order under Section 140 of the Act partakes the character of a final decision (an "order" or akin to a decree) but the critical distinction is that it is not passed by a civil court within the meaning required to invoke Section 115 CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the nature of the Claims Tribunal and the statutory scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act (the "Act"), as well as the relationship between special statutes and the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

  1. The court observed at the outset that the primary question was the maintainability of the revision. It stressed that the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law creating Claims Tribunals (the opinion cites the power in Chapter XII and Section 165(1) for constitution of Tribunals) and that the Act contemplates a specialised procedure; therefore a wholesale application of CPC provisions to Tribunal proceedings is not intended by the legislature.
  2. The court rejected the revisionist's reliance on Section 3 CPC (which defines "civil court") and on Section 115 CPC (revision) by invoking the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant — a special statute prevails over general provisions. In short, because the Motor Vehicles Act constitutes a special code (particularly Chapter X dealing with 'liability without fault' and Chapter XII dealing with Claims Tribunals), the CPC cannot be read in to supply a remedy of revision where the special law does not provide it.
  3. The court analysed prior decisions. It noted that in Sarmaniya Bai the Full Bench carefully described the Claims Tribunal as a "court-substitute" and avoided a general pronouncement that it is a "civil court." Similarly, the Supreme Court decisions in Darshana Devi and Bhagwati Devi were cited as recognising the Tribunal as a 'civil court' only for limited, specific statutory purposes (e.g., certain provisions of the CPC for framing rules or transfer of proceedings), not as a licence to import every CPC remedy.
  4. The court gave particular weight to the Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar (1992), where two of the three Judges held that orders under Section 140 are not subject to appeal or revision and that Article 227 is the appropriate remedy. The present court treated that majority view as determinative of the maintainability question, noting that the third Judge's contrary view was obiter and not followed.
  5. The court relied on Section 4 CPC (which provides that the CPC does not limit or affect special/local laws) and concluded that the power to make an order under Section 140 is a special power conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act. Consequently, such orders are not to be affected by CPC provisions, including Section 115 CPC. The court further observed that while an order under Section 140 resembles in effect a final determination of liability (and even partakes of the character of a 'decree'), that status does not convert the Tribunal into a civil court for purposes of invoking Section 115 CPC.
  6. The court also considered decisions relied upon by the revisionist (for example, cases interpreting other statutes where the statute expressly designated a body as a court) and distinguished them on the ground that those statutes specifically used language importing the CPC or describing the body as a court, unlike the statutory scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act currently under consideration.
  7. On these bases, the court concluded that revision under Section 115 CPC was not maintainable against an order under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and therefore the revision petition could not be entertained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was DISMISSED AS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

Direct consequences:

  • The revision has been dismissed for want of maintainability because, in the court's view, the Motor Vehicles Act is a special code and does not contemplate revision under Section 115 CPC against orders made under Section 140 of the Act.
  • The court expressly left open the alternative remedy: the revisionist-claimant may invoke the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to seek redress against the impugned order refusing interim compensation under Section 140.
  • No costs were awarded.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing precedent (notably the Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar and related authorities) to reaffirm that Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act forms a self-contained code in respect of liability without fault and that orders under Section 140 are not subject to revision under Section 115 CPC. The court did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond this application to the facts before it.

Show full summary ...

    Dimple v. Lajjaram And Others

    1. The question of maintainability of the revision is the moot point to be decided in this matter and on that counsel are heard.

    2. Against an order dated 30.10.1991 passed by the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mcrena, rejecting an application under Section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the instant revision is preferred. On merits, nothing need be said on the validity of the order though it may still be mentioned that the Tribunal found no case of 'permanent disablement' made out to make order for interim compensation in favour of the applicant, the revisionist.

    3. For the insurer, impleaded as non-applicant No. 3, Mr. V.K. Sharma has appeared and has challenged the maintainability of the petition. He has placed implicit reliance on this court's recent Full Bench decision rendered in the case of Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar 1992 ACJ 200 (MP). He has submitted that two of the Hon'ble Judges in clear and categorical terms held that no appeal against order passed under Section 140 was maintainable and at the same time it was also explicitly held that any aggrieved person would not be remediless and he can move this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order. The learned counsel has, therefore, contended that it makes no difference if in the instant case the person aggrieved is the claimant and not the owner or insurer of the offending vehicle. According to him a wrong remedy is resorted to by the claimant-revisionist but he is not remediless.

    4. However, Mr. K.B.Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing for the revisionist, submits that the question is res integra and he has cited also case-law in support of his contention based indeed mainly on the provisions of Section 3, Civil Procedure Code. His contention is that the Claims Tribunal is 'court' and is subordinate to this court. Therefore, in terms of Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, this revision is maintainable.

    5. Before I examine the case-law cited 1 found it necessary to remind myself that in terms of the provisions of the Act itself application whole-hog of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to any proceedings instituted before the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Act is not contemplated. The Act is a special law and the Claims Tribunal is a creature of the Act and not of Civil Procedure Code. Chapter XII is captioned 'Claims Tribunals' and in terms of Section 165(1) the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette 'constitute' one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals

    "for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles"
    . Obviously, for this short reason, Mr. Chaturvedi's contention based on Section 3, Civil Procedure Code, is legislatively rebuffed. In this regard reference only is to. be made to the well-known legal maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant.

    6. Reliance Mr. Chaturvedi has placed on this court's Full Bench decision in Sarmaniya Bai v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Parivahan Nigam 1990 ACJ 862 (MP). In that case the point mooted and decided was of the competence of the Claims Tribunal to execute its own order exercising its inherent powers in virtue not of the provisions of Section 3, Civil Procedure Code but of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code. We do not think if the head-note (8) in JLJ has correctly stated the court's opinion that the Tribunal is a 'civil court'. There is reference in that head-note to paras 15 and 16 of the judgment wherein Apex Court's decision in State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi 1979 ACJ 205 (SC), is discussed. Indeed, Bhagwati Devi v. M/s. I.S. Goel 1983 ACJ 123 (SC), also decided by the Apex Court, is also discussed in that decision at para 15 of the reports. On both decisions as well Mr. Chaturvedi has relied.

    7. In so far as Sarmaniya's case 1990 ACJ 862 (MP), is concerned with great care and circumspection this court's Full Bench has avoided the use of the term 'court' in relation to the Claims Tribunal and has described it rather as a 'court-substitute'. Similarly, Apex Court as well, in Darshana Devi's case 1979 ACJ 205 (SC) and Bhagwati Devi's case 1983 ACJ 123 (SC), took care to observe in one case (Darshana Devi) that the Claims Tribunal 'for the purpose' of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code, could be regarded as a 'civil court' on the footing that Rules had to be framed by the State Government under Rule 9-A of Order 33 and those had not been framed, but that omission would not affect the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in favour of the proper claimants; in the other case of Bhagwati Devi (supra) similarly, in short judgment, relying on Darshana Devi (supra), it was held that for the purpose of Section 25, Civil Procedure Code, Claims Tribunals could be regarded as 'civil courts' to enable the Supreme Court to make order of transfer of proceedings pending before one Claims Tribunal to another Claims Tribunal.

    8. On another Full Bench decision of this court, Prakramchand v. Chuttan 1991 ACJ 1051 (MP), Mr. Chaturvedi has relied. But that also does not help him. The question in that case was if this court in hearing an appeal under Section 110-D of the old Motor Vehicles Act could decide the same exercising powers which are contemplated under Order 41, Rule 31, Civil Procedure Code. That decision was also rendered on the footing that as an appellate court this court had inherent powers to act in that regard and in that manner there being nothing in Section 110-D, Motor Vehicles Act inhibiting or prohibiting that exercise. Reliance was placed by this court for reaching at that conclusion on a decision of the Apex Court in Income Tax Officer v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi, AIR 1969 SC 430.

    9. On one decision of Mysore High Court and another of J&K High Court Mr. K.B. Chaturvedi has also relied. In Narayan v. Shankar, AIR 1966 Mys 5, the question was of interpretation of Bombay Mamlatdar's Courts Act and of revision against an order passed by that court. There could be no difficulty in that case for the court to hold the revision maintainable because in Section 5(1) of the relevant Act it was expressly stated that, "Every Mamlatdar shall preside over the court which shall be called as a Mamlatdar's Court." In the other case Khurshid Ahmad, AIR 1971 J&K 139, it was held that the District Judge shall not be a persona designata in exercising his powers and jurisdiction in a proceeding under a special law, Succession (Property Protection) Act, 1977. However, in that case also the relevant Act used the expression, 'the judge of the court of district' and it was therefore that construing the term 'judge' reference was found legitimate to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

    10. However, this court's decisions are twosomes on which Mr. Chaturvedi placed implicit reliance and those are to be referred to and dealt with at some length. The first decision is by a Full Bench, rendered in the case of Surendra Mohan Chaurasiya 1970 MPLJ 253. That was, however, a case of State Transport Appellate Authority's power of making a remand in an appeal preferred to it under Section 64 of the old Motor Vehicles Act. The principle of law with which there could be no dispute clearly stated in that case is that conferment of power to make directions essentially and necessary for exercise of that jurisdiction is implied. Law stated in that regard in Maxwell and Craies was reiterated in that case. In the other case Krishan Gopal v. Dattatrya 1971 ACJ 372 (MP), however, directly an identical question arose but even that case is distinguishable for the reason to be stated presently.

    11. On difference between two learned Judges of this court reference was made to the third Judge on the question,

    "Whether the Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act, is a civil court and a revision petition would lie under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, against an order passed by it in the course of proceedings before it?"
    That question does not precisely arise in this case. As pointed out in the beginning, the impugned order was obviously passed in proceeding in regard to prayer for interim compensation in terms of Section 140 of the Act. However, with the view expressed in that case by the third Judge that the Claims Tribunal is to be regarded as a 'court' within the meaning of the term employed in Section 3, Civil Procedure Code and therefore, any order passed by the Claims Tribunal is revisable by this court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. I am unable to agree with that view and I express my respectful dissent. It is indeed not possible to subscribe to that view because of the holding in Sarmaniya's case 1990 ACJ 862 (MP) and also of this court's Full Bench decision in Gaya Prasad 1992 ACJ 200 (MP). However, the fact that Tribunal is 'constituted' under Section 110 (old) and the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law are points on which the court does not appear to have been addressed adequately. Be it mentioned in this connection that Section 110-C (2) of old Act had made the Claims Tribunal a 'deemed' civil court for the specified purposes and in my view that legislative mandate should have prevailed with the court deciding the case. But, there is no reference to that provision in the judgment.

    12. It is time I turn now to the latest decision in Gaya Prasad v. Suresh Kumar 1992 ACJ 200 (MP). As is pointed out at the outset, Mr. Sharma is right in contending that two of the learned Judges of that Bench took the view that a person aggrieved by an order passed under Section 140 is to pursue the remedy of petition in this court under Article 227 of the Constitution while the third Judge expressed the opinion, albeit obiter, that the Claims Tribunal being civil court subordinate to the High Court orders passed by it in the course of proceedings are open to revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, even if those are not appealable. In that connection, it is to be stated that the other two learned Judges holding the contrary view about the non-appealability of the order passed under Section 140 of the Act did base their conclusion on the fact that of the special law {Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), Chapter X of the Act was special provision: that was a self-contained code in regard to matters dealing with 'liability without fault' in case of motor accident.

    13. Law, in my view, is well settled that the provision, whether of appeal or revision, is creature of statute. If legislature in enacting the special law thought it advisable not to create the remedy of revision in respect of any order passed by the Claims Tribunal and thought it fit to provide appeals only against certain orders passed by the Tribunal, judicially the Claims Tribunal cannot be vested with the revisional jurisdiction. This court's Full Bench in Gaya Prasad 1992 ACJ 200 (MP), has indeed held that Chapter X is a self-contained code and what is also clear is that neither in that Chapter nor in Chapter XII which deals with the powers, jurisdiction and the functions of the Claims Tribunal, is made any provision of revision against an order passed by the Tribunal. Reference may be appropriately made also in this connection to Rajmata Vijayaraje Scindia's case 1988 MPLJ 78, wherein the Division Bench at para 7 of the report referred to Section 4, Civil Procedure Code and that is relevant to the instant controversy. A plain and simple reading of Section 4 makes it clear that

    "nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local laws not in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred."
    Power to make an order under Section 140 is a special power conferred on the Claims Tribunal under special law and any order passed by the Tribunal in exercise of that power is not to be affected obviously in any manner by any provisions of Civil Procedure Code including Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. For that holding inspiration may also be invoked from Shah Babulal Khimji's case, AIR 1981 SC 1786. Obviously, the High Court in dealing with any matter arising out of a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act would be exercising its jurisdiction with reference to provisions of that Act and not of Civil Procedure Code and it would be exercising 'special jurisdiction' under that Act and it has to find powers for interfering with any order passed in that proceeding in revision not outside that Act; revision being not contemplated under the new Act, that jurisdiction the High Court cannot assume unauthorisedly.

    14. The matter may now be viewed from another angle and on that some light I find in this court's Division Bench decision, Phariya Bricks Works 1990 MPLJ 371, wherein also the question of maintainability of a revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, was agitated in different context. Reference was made in that case to Section 2(14), Civil Procedure Code, which defines the term 'order' to trace the genesis of the power and jurisdiction of the court passing the order impugned in the revision. It is certainly undisputable that a revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, would be maintainable when an 'order' is passed by any court subordinate to this court in a case in which no appeal lies. Section 2(14) defines 'order' to mean 'the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree'. I do not think if it can at all be contended that an order passed under Section 140 of the Act would be anything else than an 'order', partaking the character, force and effect of a 'decree'. If that order cannot be called a 'decree', it is because that is not passed by a civil court. In terms of Section 2, Civil Procedure Code, even, an order under Section 140 of the Act is to be regarded as settling the controversy finally conclusively determining the right of parties in respect to liability contemplated under Section 140. The only difference is that the order is not passed in a 'suit'.

    15. For all the foregoing reasons this revision must be dismissed and is dismissed as not maintainable. However, it shall be open to the revisionist-claimant to move this court invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution for redressal of his grievance against the impugned order passed against him rejecting his claim for interim compensation for alleged disablement said to be suffered by him in a motor accident. No costs.

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    Comments

    Dimple v. Lajjaram And Others
    (Apr 9, 1992)