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  • Art. 15 to Schedule 1 to the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.14.
  • SECTION 3 BENGAL AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908)
  • Order 21, Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • provisions of Order 21 of the CPC.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Art. 15 to Schedule 1 to the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.14.
  • SECTION 3 BENGAL AGRA AND ASSAM CIVIL COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908)
  • Order 21, Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
  • provisions of Order 21 of the CPC.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The application before the Court is brought under Order 21, Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for execution of an order dated 6 September (year indicated elsewhere in the opinion as 2002) passed in Writ Petition No. 2581 of 2001.

The essential facts as recorded in the opinion are:

  • The respondent, Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, was a tenant occupying portions of property at 3A, Auckland Place, Kolkata; the petitioners are the landlords.
  • On 19 September 2000 the respondent agreed to refer a dispute on revision of rent to the competent authority under a State Government circular (August 3rd/11th, 1993).
  • The First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, decided on 20 March 2001 that the fair and reasonable rent was Rs. 2,83,389/- per month (inclusive of taxes and repairs), effective from 1 January 1997.
  • The petitioners forwarded a draft agreement; the respondent did not accept or implement the determination, and did not pay the bill of Rs. 1,33,43,616.54p raised on 6 June 2001.
  • The respondent vacated certain floors in June and December 2001 and purported to increase rent from July 2001 at a rate lower than fixed by the competent authority.
  • Because the March 20, 2001 determination was not implemented by the respondent, the petitioners filed a writ petition. By order dated 6 September (2002) the writ petition was allowed and the respondent was directed to follow the March 20, 2001 decision.
  • The respondent did not comply with that direction and the petitioners filed the present execution application in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction seeking execution under Order 21 CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order passed by the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be executed under Order 21 of the CPC by initiating execution proceedings in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
  2. Whether the provisions of the CPC (including Order 21) apply to writ proceedings given Section 141 of the CPC and the High Court's procedural freedom under Articles 226/227.
  3. Whether an order passed by a writ court can be executed by a civil court in the absence of express statutory power to do so.
  4. Whether contempt proceedings are the exclusive mode of enforcing orders passed in writ proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's (Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority) Arguments — Mr. Moloy Basu, Senior Advocate

  • The application is not maintainable because an order passed in a writ petition cannot be executed under Order 21 of the CPC.
  • Section 141 of the CPC indicates that the Code's provisions do not apply to proceedings under Article 226; hence civil execution procedures are inapplicable to writ orders.
  • An order in a writ petition can be enforced only by initiating contempt proceedings (i.e., contempt is the exclusive or appropriate remedy for enforcement of writ orders).
  • Relied on authorities including Charanlal v. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Harijan Samuhik..., Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, and Ratanlal Nahata v. Nandita Bose.

Petitioners' Arguments — Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, Senior Advocate

  • An order passed in a writ petition can be executed under the provisions of the CPC.
  • Rule 53 of the High Court's writ rules provides that provisions of the CPC are applicable to writ petitions "as far as it can be made applicable", so execution under CPC procedures is permissible.
  • Relied on several authorities (listed in the opinion) to support the proposition that execution may follow CPC procedures, including Food Corporation Of India v. S.N. Nagarkar and multiple other cases cited in the judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Charanlal v. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Harijan Samuhik Krishi Sahakari Sanstha (Samiti) Saliya Barodi, cited in the opinion (citation(s) in the text: AIR 1990 Madh Pra 114 and later referenced as AIR 1980 Madh Pra 114). Reportedly supports the contention that an order passed in a writ petition is not a decree or order in a suit and therefore is not executable under Order 21 CPC. The Court observed that this decision apparently supports the respondent's contention but expressly stated its inability to agree with that view; the Court held that an order passed in a writ petition can be executed and that power to execute is inherent in the authority that passes the order.
Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1996 SC 1092 Quoted for the proposition that High Courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 have procedural freedom and need not be constrained by procedural provisions of the CPC; provisions of the Code may be taken as a guide but cannot limit writ jurisdiction. The Court relied on paragraph 11 of this decision to support the view that Section 141 removes doubt about the writ Court's freedom to adopt its own procedures and that the High Court may adopt procedures other than those in the CPC.
Ratanlal Nahata v. Nandita Bose, AIR 1999 Cal 29 Relied on by the respondent as authority relevant to the contention on execution of writ orders. The Court did not treat this decision as addressing the specific issue; it was among the cases cited at the bar that the Court said did not address the present issue.
Jogendra Chandra Sen v. Wazidunnissa Khatun, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 860 Relied on by petitioners in support of executing orders under civil procedures. The Court recorded that the petitioners relied on this and other cases; it did not single out this case for substantive analysis in resolving the maintainability point, and treated many such citations as not addressing the precise issue.
Kilachand Devchand & Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, AIR 1934 Bom 452 Relied on by petitioners as supporting application of civil execution procedures. The Court noted reliance but did not base its ruling on this authority; it was not treated as directly addressing the jurisdictional question before the Court.
Sm. Moni Manjuri Dassi v. Mrs. Razik, AIR 1954 Cal 6 Relied on by petitioners. Recorded as relied upon by petitioners; the Court did not rely on it in its reasoning addressing maintainability.
Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragadda Ramakrishnayya, AIR 1962 SC 1886 Relied on by petitioners. Recorded as relied upon; not analyzed as determinative of the present jurisdictional issue by the Court.
Rokyayabi v. Ismail, AIR 1984 Kant 234 Relied on by petitioners. Recorded as relied upon; not treated as resolving the specific question of execution of writ orders in the civils side jurisdiction.
Vinay Kumar Vijay Kumar Ganodia v. Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd., (1991) 1 Cal LJ 136 Relied on by petitioners. Recorded as reliance; not directly applied by the Court to the maintainability issue.
Food Corporation Of India v. S.N. Nagarkar, (2002) 2 SCC 475 : AIR 2002 SC 808 Relied on by petitioners for the proposition that an order passed in a writ petition can be executed by following Order 21 CPC procedures. The Court agreed this decision supports that a writ order can be executed by following CPC procedures but emphasized that in that case the execution application was made before the writ Court itself; the Court held that Food Corporation does not establish that a Civil Court exercising ordinary original jurisdiction can execute an order passed by the High Court in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds through a jurisdictional and procedural analysis grounded in the following steps and observations recorded in the opinion:

  1. Distinction of Jurisdiction — The impugned order was passed by the Court exercising extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Although the underlying dispute arose from civil relations, the jurisdiction in which the order was passed was not the Court's civil (Original Side) jurisdiction. The present execution application was filed in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
  2. Civil Court Power — The Court noted that while functioning as a civil Court it operates under the Original Side Rules and does not possess the power to entertain or decide Article 226 writ applications. Consequently, an order passed by the writ Court could not have been passed by the Court in its civil jurisdiction; there is no express provision empowering a civil Court to execute an order passed by the writ Court.
  3. Scope of CPC and "Civil Court" — The CPC empowers civil Courts to execute orders passed by them or transferred by other civil Courts. The writ Court is not a "civil Court" within the CPC or the Original Side Rules; therefore, the CPC does not, by itself, grant a right to file an application before a civil Court to execute an order passed by the High Court in writ jurisdiction.
  4. Precedents and Section 141 — The Court reviewed authorities and quoted Puran Singh (para 11) to demonstrate that Section 141 clarifies that the writ Court has freedom to adopt its own procedures and is not bound by the procedural provisions of the CPC; however, following CPC procedures is not prohibited. The Court emphasized that the writ Court's power to execute its orders is inherent in its plenary jurisdiction under Article 226.
  5. Rules 53 and 53A of the High Court writ rules — The opinion quoted Rule 53 (applicability of CPC provisions "as far as it can be made applicable") and Rule 53A (express provision allowing execution of certain orders and transfer to District Courts). The Court interpreted these rules as showing flexibility: the writ Court can follow CPC procedures where necessary but Rule 53A does not amount to an exhaustive delegation of execution power for all categories of writ orders to civil Courts.
  6. Rejection of Absolutist Positions — The Court rejected two absolutist contentions: (a) that the writ Court is prohibited from following CPC procedures (the Court held there is no such bar), and (b) that orders passed by writ Courts can be enforced only by contempt proceedings (the Court held contempt is not an adequate or exclusive substitute for execution proceedings because contempt primarily punishes and may not achieve all modes of execution).
  7. Core Conclusion on Maintainability — Applying the above analysis, the Court concluded that the present execution application filed in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction is not maintainable because there is no express statutory power enabling the civil jurisdiction to execute an order passed in writ jurisdiction.
  8. Ancillary observations — The Court clarified it had not decided the underlying matter on merits; it noted the petitioners remain at liberty to initiate a fresh proceeding for the same relief before the competent forum (if permissible); and the Court declined to award costs in favour of the respondent.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED AS NOT MAINTAINABLE — The application for execution under Order 21 CPC (E.C. No. 58 of 2003) filed in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction is dismissed as not maintainable.

Implications (direct effects and what the opinion states about broader consequences):

  • The immediate practical effect is that the execution application before the Court in its civil original jurisdiction fails and is dismissed.
  • The Court did not decide the substantive merits of the underlying dispute; the petitioners may initiate fresh proceedings for the same relief before the competent forum, if otherwise permissible in law.
  • The Court articulated and recorded these broader conclusions (as reached in the opinion): (a) a writ Court exercising Article 226 powers is not a "Civil Court" under the CPC for the purposes of execution by civil courts; (b) the writ Court has inherent power to execute its own orders and may adopt CPC procedures (including those in Order 21) for execution if it so chooses; and (c) contempt proceedings are not the exclusive mechanism for enforcing writ orders and cannot substitute for execution proceedings in all respects.
  • The opinion does not state that it is laying down a novel binding precedent beyond these conclusions; it expressly records that the present order is one of maintainability in the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction and that the Court has not decided the matter on merits.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Application dismissed." The Court directed that certified copies of the judgment and order may be supplied to the parties if applied for.

    Bonbehari Roy And Others v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority .

    1. This is an application under Order 21, Rule 11(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short ‘the CPC), it has been filed for execution of order dated Sept. 6th passed in Writ Petition No. 2581 of 2001.

    2. The facts:— The respondent (Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority) is the tenant of certain portions of the property at 3A, Auckland Place, Kolkata. The petitioners are the landlords. On Sept. 19th, 2000 the respondent agreed to refer the dispute regarding revision of rent to the competent authority in terms of circular dated August 3rd/11th, 1993 of the State Government. On the reference the First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, gave the decision dated March 20th, 2001. He fixed the fair and reasonable rent at Rs. 2,83,389/- per month inclusive of all taxes and costs of repairs and maintenance, the determination was directed to be effective from Jan. 1st, 1997. The petitioners forwarded the draft copy of the agreement, but the respondent did not respond. On June 6th, 2001 the petitioners raised a bill for Rs. 1,33,43,616.54p. The respondent did not pay the amount. On June 29th, 2001 the respondent vacated three floors out of seven floors it was occupying at the premises. On Dec. 30th, 2001 it surrendered two more floors. By a letter dated August 6th, 2001 the respondent increased the rent from July, 2001. The increase was at a rate much lower than the one fixed by the competent authority. Since the decision dated March 20th, 2001 given by the competent authority was not implemented by the respondent, the petitioners filed the writ-petition. By the order dated Sept. 6th, 2002 it was allowed; the respondent was directed to follow the decision dated March 20th, 2001. The respondent, however, did not comply with the direction. Hence the petitioners have filed this application for execution of the order.

    3. Mr. Moloy Basu, senior advocate, appears for the respondent. He questions the maintainability of the application by making the following submissions. An order passed in a writ petition cannot be executed under Order 21 of the CPC. As provided in Section 141 of the CPC, its provisions do not apply to a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. An order passed in a writ petition can be enforced only by initiating a contempt proceeding.

    4. Mr. Basu relies on the decisions in Charanlal v. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Harijan Samuhik, Krishi Sahakari Sanstha (Samiti) Saliya Barodi, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 114; Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 205 : (AIR 1996 SC 1092) and Ratanlal Nahata v. Nandita Bose, AIR 1999 Cal 29.

    5. Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, senior advocate, appears for the petitioners. His submissions in reply, are the following. The order passed in a writ petition can certainly be executed under the provisions of the CPC. Rule 53 of the writ rules of this Court provides that provisions of the CPC are applicable also to a writ petition.

    6. Mr. Chatterjee relies on the decisions in Jogendra Chandra Sen v. Wazidunnissa Khatun, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 860; Kilachand Devchand & Co. v. Ajodhyaprasad Sukhanand, AIR 1934 Bom 452; Sm. Moni Manjuri Dassi v. Mrs. Razik, AIR 1954 Cal 6; Dokku Bhushayya v. Katragadda Ramakrishnayya, AIR 1962 SC 1886; Rokyayabi v. Ismail, AIR 1984 Kant 234; Vinay Kumar Vijay Kumar Ganodia v. Canton Carpentary Works (P) Ltd. (1991) 1 Cal LJ 136; and Food Corporation Of India v. S.N Nagarkar., (2002) 2 SCC 475 : (AIR 2002 SC 808).

    7. For the reasons recorded hereinafter I am of the view that this execution application is not maintainable.

    8. The order sought to be executed was passed by this Court in exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Although the proceeding was a civil proceeding, the jurisdiction exercised was not one of a civil Court. The execution application has been filed by invoking the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court. Under this jurisdiction this Court functions as a civil Court, and its procedures are governed by the Original Side Rules of this Court. While functioning as a civil Court this Court does not, of course, possess the power to entertain and decide applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. So the order sought to be executed could not have been passed by this Court under this jurisdiction. There is no express provision that empowers the civil Court to execute an order passed by the writ Court.

    9. The provisions of the CPC do not give one the right to file an application before the civil Court for execution of an order passed by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. They empower a civil Court to execute an order passed by it or transferred to it by another civil Court. The writ Court is not a civil Court. The phrase “Civil Court” has not been defined in the CPC, though it has been enacted for indicating the powers and prescribing the procedures of the Courts of civil judicature. The classes of civil Courts were mentioned in Section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.

    10. All the decisions cited at the bar, except for the three I shall presently deal with do not address the present issue in any manner.

    11. The decision in Charanlal v. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Harijan Samuhik Krishi Sahakari Sanstha (Samiti) Saliya Barodi, AIR 1980 Madh Pra 114 apparently supports Mr. Basu's contention that an order passed in a writ petition cannot be executed under provisions of Order 21 of the CPC. In it the learned judge held that since an order passed in a writ petition is not a decree or an order passed in a suit, it is not executable. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the view. In my view, an order passed in a writ petition can be executed, and if necessary procedures prescribed in the CPC can be followed for the purpose. It is anomalous to suggest that the writ Court which has the power to pass an order would lack in the power to execute it. Power to execute an order, unless conferred on some other authority or forum, is always inherent in the authority or forum that passes it.

    12. As a Court of plenary jurisdiction the writ Court while exercising powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is free to adopt its own procedures, and follow them. It cannot be compelled to follow the procedures prescribed in the CPC, this is so for the specific provision made in its Section 141. In this context it will be useful to see what the Supreme Court said in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 205 : (AIR 1996 SC 1092) paragraph 11 of the report reads as under:—

    “11. We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different Courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to writ proceedings on the basis of Section 141 of the Code. When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction have to be traced and found in Arts. 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well recognised principles for exercising of discretionary power, and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time, it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious.”

    13. Rules 53 and 53A of the rules framed by this Court regarding applications filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, being relevant in the present context, are quoted below:—

    “53. Save and except as provided by these Rules and subject thereto, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings under Art. 226 and nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of this Court to make such orders may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.

    53A. The Court may in proceedings under this Chapter impose such terms as to costs and as to giving of security as it may deem fit. Where costs have been awarded by the Court in a writ petition or in an appeal from an order passed on a writ petition, any party entitled into thereto may apply to the Court for execution of the order. The application shall be accompanied by an affidavit stating the amount of costs awarded. The Court may direct the order to be sent to the District Court of the District in which the order is to be executed. The order may be executed by such Court or be transferred for execution to any subordinate Court.

    Explanation: This Rule is in addition to the Rules of recovery prescribed under Art. 15 to Schedule 1 to the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act and under Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”

    14. In my view, while the provisions in Section 141 of the CPC remove the doubt about the writ Court's freedom to adopt its own procedures, they, however do not prohibit the writ Court from following the procedures, prescribed in the CPC. Rule 53 of its writ rules clearly shows how this Court has made its writ jurisdiction procedurally free and flexible. It has made it clear that, if necessary, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, it would follow the procedures prescribed in the CPC. In Rule 53A of its writ rules this Court has also spelt out its own power, while exercising its writ jurisdiction, to execute its own orders of certain kinds. There is, however, no reason to say that in the writ rules power to execute its all kinds of orders has not been asserted, because it does not possess such power. Power to execute its own orders is not derived by the writ Court from the relevant writ rules, it is inherent in it that derives the plenary power from Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

    15. From the above discussions the following conclusions can be reached. The writ Court that does not exercise any civil jurisdiction is not a ‘Civil Court” within the meaning of the provisions of the CPC or the Original Side Rules of this Court. So an order passed by a writ Court cannot be executed by the Civil Court in the absence of express power conferred on it for the purpose by law. Though the writ Court is not bound by the procedures prescribed in the CPC, there is no bar to its following any of them if it is found necessary in a given case. For executing its own orders the writ Court possesses the inherent power as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, and it can adopt its own procedures for the purpose. If it is necessary it can also follow the procedures prescribed by Order 21 of the CPC.

    16. I am, however, unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that in view of the decision in Food Corporation Of India v. S.N Nagarkar., (2002) 2 SCC 475 : (AIR 2002 SC 808) as a Court of civil jurisdiction this Court can execute the order passed by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The decision, though supports the view that an order passed in a writ petition can be executed by following the procedures prescribed in Order 21 of the CPC, does not, however, lay down the law that orders passed by the writ Courts can be executed by the civil Courts. From the judgment (See: para 13 of SCC) it appears that there the execution application was made in the writ petition, that is to say before the writ Court that passed the order.

    17. I am also unable to accept Mr. Basu's contention that orders passed by the writ Courts can be enforced only by initiating contempt proceedings. The main purpose of a contempt proceeding is to punish the person who commits contempt of the Court. The initiation of a contempt proceeding may at times bring about the wanted compliance with the order passed by the writ Court, and the event may be a mitigating factor while considering the question of sentence but in a contempt proceeding it may not be always possible to ensure execution and enforcement of the order. The various different modes of execution of orders and decrees, as recognised by law, cannot be resorted to by the Court in a contempt proceeding. On the contrary, in an execution proceeding, the Court, while pursuing the main object and following the recognised modes of execution, on its own motion can simultaneously initiate a contempt proceeding for its limited and special purpose. An execution proceeding begins solely for the benefit of the person who initiates it, the same is not the case in a contempt proceeding, which is aimed at upholding the dignity, majesty and authority of the Court, and in which the person initiating the proceeding in no time looses his identity. So a contempt proceeding can never be a substitute for an execution proceeding.

    18. In view of the above this application (E.C No. 58 of 2003) fails; and hence it is hereby dismissed as not maintainable in this ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court.

    19. It is, however, made clear that I have not decided the matter on merit, and this order shall not prevent the petitioners from initiating a fresh proceeding for the same relief before the competent forum, if otherwise permissible in law.

    20. In the facts and circumstances of the case I am not inclined to make any order for costs in favour of the respondent. Hence, there will be no order for costs in this application.

    21. Urgent certified xerox copy of this judgment and order may be supplied to the parties, if applied for.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    Bonbehari Roy And Others v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority .
    (May 18, 2004)