Arunabha Barua, J.:— This revisional application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is for the purpose of quashing of the investigational proceedings of Bhatar P.S Case No. 48 dated 9.5.97 under sections 325/326/329/347/467/469 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the corresponding proceedings of G.R Case No. 609/97 of the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Burdwan and this is directed against order dt. 25.4.97 passed by Sri T.K Das, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-in-Charge, Burdwan in F.I.R Case No. 226/97 whereby the learned Magistrate passed an order in terms of section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursuant to which the aforesaid case was registered for investigation.

2. Petitioner, Krishna Chandra Chaudhuri, was to run a petrol pump. The complainant, Nityananda Saha, who was a Scheduled Caste, was a clerk over there at a monthly salary of Rs. 1,500/-. In short, the incident was over severe assault on the complainant by the petitioner because the complainant had failed to record inflated shortage of petrol in the relevant register of the petrol pump. Besides the abuse and assault the complainant was also forced to sign on a blank stamp paper to execute a document showing debt of Rs. 5,000/- owed by the complainant to the petitioner. The complainant was also subsequently confined in a room and assaulted. Two days later on 21.3.97 the complainant informed Bhatar P.S as also the local panchayat about the incident and G.D Entry bearing No. 1125 was registered at Bhatar P.S For the serious injury sustained by the complainant he was treated at the Burdwan Hospital. As the Bhatar Police was delaying taking any steps on the complaint, the complainant had written to the Superintendent of Police, Burdwan but no steps had been taken against the petitioner-accused. According to the petitioner he was completely innocent and had been falsely implicated in the case. Since no action was taken by the Police on the complaint, the complainant moved the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Burdwan with the petition of complaint against the petitioner-accused, Krishna Chandra Chaudhuri praying for sending the complaint to the O.C Bhatar P.S for investigation under section 156(3) Cr. P.C on the receipt of the complaint the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-in-Charge, Burdwan sent the said petition of complaint to O.C Bhatar P.S for investigation and report treating the same as F.I.R

3. The said order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate-in-Charge dt. 25.4.97 has been assailed here in this revision and the order reads as follows:—

“Received the petition of complaint from one Nityananda Saha against the person named therein with the prayer to send the complaint to the O.C, Bhatar P.S for investigation under section 156(3) Cr. P.C

Send it to O.C, Bhatar P.S for investigation and report, treating this as F.I.R”

4. The only point for determination is, whether the said order dt. 25.4.97 is legal and valid and whether the investigation proceedings in pursuance thereof should be quashed in the exercise of the power under section 482 Cr. P.C by this Court.

5. The mainstay of the contention of the petitioner (accused) as voiced by the learned advocate for the petitioner is this. If the factum of a cognizable offence is brought to the notice of police it is incumbent for the police authority to draw up a First Information Report in terms of the information so given. In the event of omission by the police authority to act in terms of the mandate of the Code of Criminal Procedure the remedy does not lie by way of filing a second complaint before the court praying for a direction under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for treating the second complaint as First Information Report but the remedy is to move the court concerned by way of drawing the attention of the court and praying for obtaining report from the police station concerned about the action taken on the basis of the first complaint. The term First Information Report as the name suggests is information given about commission of an offence first in point of time and as such once an information alleging commission of a cognizable offence is given to the police station the second complaint on the self-same subject matter is not tenable under the law and any case started on the basis of the second complaint being not in accordance with law is without jurisdiction and consequently the investigation carried on the basis of such 2nd complaint is liable to be quashed being an abuse of the process of court. In the instant case from the complainant it appears that prior to filing of the said complaint the complainant had lodged a diary with the police station and as such the investigation which is now being conducted on the basis of the second complaint should not be allowed to continue.

6. Now, on facts, the admitted position is, the complainant, an employee of the petrol pump, who claims, he belongs to Scheduled Caste, allegedly sufferred attrocities having been perpetrated on him since he was severely abused and assaulted several times by the petitioner-accused and also since he was forcibly made to sign on a blank paper having been confined in a room under threat and duress. The petition of complaint which was filed before the Magistrate under section 156(3) and upon which the learned Magistrate had made the impugned order clearly makes out commission of cognizable offences on the face of it as spelt out in the said petition of complaint or F.I.R This petition of complaint has been dubbed as a second petition of complaint or a second F.I.R and the petitioner questions its legality. Nay, the petitioner even goes to the length of questioning the legality of the investigation proceedings based upon and pursuant to this complaint before the learned Magistrate. We would probably do well to appreciate the factual situation that points to the sheer helplessness of the complainant. It is true that he succeeded in getting the police of the Bhatar P.S making only a G.D Entry in respect of the information with regard to the alleged incident he had conveyed to the police. The police stood apathetic and so he had even appealed to the Superintendent of Police about the police inaction at the P.S Having done that, since his complaint was not taken care of and no action taken he moved the court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Burdwan, by a petition of complaint under section 156(3) of the Cr. P.C so that a legal action in pursuance of that could be taken up by the learned Magistrate to redress his grievance and bring the culprit to book. The point is, what option the complainant was left when after his initial endeavours to move the police for an investigation in accordance with law had become abortive? And indeed, the second consideration is, if he had taken resort to the option of moving a petition of complaint under section 156(3) Cr. P.C, was this option to be legally shut out, or in other words, whether the learned Magistrate was not legally competent to direct the police to treat this petition of complaint as the F.I.R for investigation and report. As a matter of fact, there was no existence of a first F.I.R; there was only a G.D Entry simpliciter. In no manner this petition of complaint filed before the learned Magistrate can be called the second complaint. In any view of the matter, the whole point is, whether the learned Magistrate at all erred in law in taking up the petition of complaint which had prima facie made out cognizable offences to be investigated into and only sending it to the O.C, Bhatar P.S for investigation and report, treating that petition of complaint as F.I.R It is pertinent to note that in no point of time he actually took cognizance of the offence. What the learned Magistrate had done was only a legal acceptance of the option open to the complainant at that point of time having been driven from pillar to post in trying to set the criminal law in motion to redress his grievances and also a legal recognition of the option the complainant could legitimately and legally resort to. The action of the learned Magistrate is amply supported by a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Madhu Bala v. Suresh Kumar, AIR 1997 S.C 3104, which I shall be presently dwelling upon. But first, I think, I must refute one principal contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner-accused relying on a ruling of a Single Bench of this Court (per A.B Mukherjee, J.) in Anwarul Islam v. The State Of West Bengal, reported in 1996 (1) CHN 465. There in connection with dealing with a petition of complaint under section 156(3) Cr. P.C, it was held as follows:—

It is incumbent for the police authority to draw an FIR in terms of the complaint. In the event of omission the remedy does not lie by way of drawing up a second application for treating the same as F.I.R But the remedy is to move the court concerned by way of drawing the attention of the court and praying for obtaining report from the P.S concerned about the action taken on the F.I.R

A second complaint on the self-same application is not tenable under the law. Acceptance of F.I.R on the basis of the second complaint is without jurisdiction and consequently the investigation carried on its basis cannot be allowed to proceed being an abuse of the process of the court.

Once cognizance is taken under section 190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is incumbent for the learned Magistrate to proceed in accordance with section 200 and the subsequent sections before a process could be issued under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

7. This decision of the Court in Anwarul's case, I am afraid, is not applicable to the facts and points of law involved in our instant case. Para 13 of the said judgment in Anwarul Islam's case need be cited as below:—

13. A scrutiny of the order passed by the learned C.J.M, on 15.9.95 on the second complaint clearly reveals that the learned Magistrate not only perused the petition of complaint itself, he is bound to do even if he wants to send the same to P.S under section 156(3) Cr. P.C He also heard the learned Advocate and also gave his consideration over the matter following which he sent the same to the P.S This is in my opinion amount to taking of cognizance under section 191(A) Cr. P.C and as such it was incumbent for the learned Magistrate to proceed in accordance with the section 200 Cr. P.C and subsequent sections before a process could be issued under section 204 Cr. P.C

8. One material difference is that in that case the cognizance was taken on the petition of complaint under section 156(3) Cr. P.C whereas here in our instant case there is simply none at all. So, I am afraid, the said decision of the Single Bench of this Court is hardly of any assistance to negative the contention of the complainant.

9. I might now straightway refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in AIR 1997 S.C 3104. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:—

Whenever a Magistrate directs an investigation on a ‘complaint’ the police has to register a cognizable case on that complaint treating the same as the FIR and comply with the requirements of the Police Rules. Therefore, the direction of a Magistrate asking the police to ‘register a case’ makes an order of investigation under section 156(3) cannot be said to be legally unsustainable. Indeed, even if a Magistrate does not pass a direction to register a case, still in view of the provisions of section 156(1) of the Code which empowers the police to investigate into a cognizable case and the Rules framed under the police Act, 1861 it (the police) is duty bound to formally register a case and then investigate into the same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, does not in any way stand in the way of Magistrate to direct the police to register a case at the police station and then investigate into the same. When an order for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code is to be made the proper direction to the police would be to register a case at the police station treating the complaint as the First Information Report and investigate into the same.

When a written complaint disclosing a cognizable offence is made before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance upon the same under section 190(1)(a) of the Code and proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. The other option (emphasis mine) available to the Magistrate in such a case is to send the compliant to the appropriate Police Station under section 156(3) for investigation. Once such a direction is given under sub-section (3) of section 156 the police is required to investigate into that complaint under sub-section (1) thereof and on completion of investigation to submit a ‘police report’ in accordance with section 173(2) on which a Magistrate may take cognizance under section 190(1)(b) but not under section 190(1)(a). Since a complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a ‘police report’ in view of the definition of ‘complaint’ referred to earlier and since the investigation of a ‘cognizable case’ by the police under section 156(1) has to culminate in a ‘police report’ the ‘complaint’ as soon as an order under section 156(3) is passed thereon—transforms itself to a report given in writing within the meaning of section 154 of the Code, which is known as the First Information Report (FIR). As under section 156(1), the police can only investigate a cognizable ‘case’ it has to formally register a case on that report.

10. The impugned order of the learned Magistrate, in my opinion, was perfectly on the lines of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case law as cited above.

11. There is no question of quashment of the investigation pursuant to the FIR as ordered by the learned Magistrate by the impugned order dt. 25.4.97 since the factual foundation of the offences alleged, have been duly laid down in the petition of complaint or the FIR in question. In this connection, I might profitably rely upon a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N Datta v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2001 AIR SCW 3133. It has been held therein by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as follows:—

FIR ought not to be thwarted at the initial stages if an offence is disclosed but in the event however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Criminal proceedings, in the normal course of events ought not be scuttled at the initial stage, unless the same amounts to an abuse of the process of law. In the normal course of events thus, quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than ordinary rule. The genuineness of the averments in the FIR cannot possibly be gone into and the document shall have to be read as a whole to decipher the intent of the maker thereof. It is not a document which requires decision with exactitude, neither it is a document which requires mathematical accuracy and nicety, but the same should be able to communicate or indicative of disclosure of an offence broadly and in the event the said test stands satisfied, the question relating to the quashing of a complaint would not arise. It is this context, however, one feature ought to be noticed at this juncture that there cannot possibly by any guiding factor as to which investigation ought to be scuttled as the initial stages and investigations which ought not to be scuttled. The FIR needs to be considered and if the answer is found on a perusal thereof which leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly, law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police since two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.

While liberty of an individual are “sacred and sacrosanct” and it is a bounden obligation of the Court to protect them but in the event of commission of a cognizable offence and an offence stand disclosed in the FIR, interest of justice requires further investigation by the Investigating Agency. Needless to record that investigation of an offence is within the exclusive domain of the police department and not the law courts. In the event of disclosure of an offence, it is a duty incumbent to investigate into offence and bring the offenders to books in order to serve the cause of justice.

It had already been stated in the celebrated case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335: 1992 AIR SCW 237, that the power to quash criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases, that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or complaint. While exercising the inherent power and deciding whether the investigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should be taken by the Court and at that stage it is not possible for the Court to sift the materials or to weigh the materials and then come to the conclusion one way or the other.

12. In view of what has been stated above, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dt. 25.4.97 was perfectly legal and valid and the criminal proceedings in question do not suffer from any abuse of the process of court.

13. Accordingly, no interference with the impugned order of the learned Magistrate dt. 25.4.97 is called for and the revisional application is hereby dismissed.

14. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties.

Revisional application allowed.

S.K.P