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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act),
  • Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 that Rule 22
  • Order 14, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 17 and in Section 20
  • sub-Section (2) of Section 20,
  • sub-Rule (5) of Rule 5
  • sub-Rule (4) of Rule 5,
  • writing.17. Rule 23
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Act),
  • Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 that Rule 22
  • Order 14, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 17 and in Section 20
  • sub-Section (2) of Section 20,
  • sub-Rule (5) of Rule 5
  • sub-Rule (4) of Rule 5,
  • writing.17. Rule 23
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order dated November 27, 2001 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), Calcutta in O.A. No. 51 of 2001. On December 6, 2001 the petitioner moved this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; the Court refused to entertain that revisional application on the ground that the order was appealable under Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (the Act), and directed the petitioner to approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. The Court did not decide the merits and allowed the petitioner to take back the certified copy of the impugned order on furnishing a xerox copy.

Pursuant to that direction the petitioner filed an appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) as Appeal No. DRAT/CAL-/A/21 of 2001. The DRAT by order dated January 10, 2002 dismissed the appeal on the basis that no appeal lay against an interlocutory order appointing a Receiver; the DRAT concluded that Section 20 of the Act permitted appeal only against a final order passed under Section 19.

The petitioner then filed an application for review of this Court’s earlier order dated December 6, 2001 and sought leave to file a fresh Article 227 application against the orders of October 18, 2001 and November 27, 2001 (the October order had merged into the November 27 order). While these applications were pending, this Court issued a suo motu rule calling on the bank to show cause why the DRAT order of January 10, 2002 dismissing the appeal as not maintainable should not be set aside. The bank waived service of notice and the rule was heard along with the review and related applications.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court should review and recall its earlier order of December 6, 2001 that declined to entertain an Article 227 application because an efficacious alternative remedy (an appeal under Section 20 of the Act) existed.
  2. Whether an appeal under Section 20 of the Act lies only against a "final order" passed under Section 19 of the Act, or whether it lies against "any order" (including interlocutory orders such as appointment of a Receiver).
  3. Whether this Court should set aside the DRAT's order dated January 10, 2002 dismissing the appeal as not maintainable and direct the DRAT to decide the appeal on merits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Mitra)

  • First, existence of an efficacious alternative remedy (such as an appeal) is not an absolute bar to entertain an application under Article 227; the High Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction where the impugned order was without jurisdiction, violated principles of natural justice, or caused manifest injury. Mr. Mitra relied on various decisions of the Supreme Court in support of this general proposition.
  • Second, the petitioner relied specifically on Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank (AIR 1997 Calcutta 96), where Chatterjee, J. had held that the words "an order" in Section 20 should be interpreted to mean only a "final order" under Section 19. Mr. Mitra submitted that this Court was not previously informed of that decision and so this Court should recall its December 6, 2001 order in light of Pratap Ch. Dey.

Bank's Position

The bank waived service of notice through its counsel (Mr. Dhandhania) and did not present detailed opposing arguments in the course of the reported reasoning. The opinion does not provide a detailed account of distinct legal submissions made on behalf of the bank.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank, AIR 1997 Calcutta 96 Held that the words "an order" in Section 20 of the Act mean only a "final order" passed under Section 19 (i.e., appeals available only against final orders). The Court considered this decision but expressly disagreed with its reasoning. The Court held that Pratap Ch. Dey overlooked Section 17(2) and therefore could not be treated as a binding precedent for the proposition that only final orders are appealable under Section 20.
P.N.B. v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 JT (SC) 408 : AIR 2001 SC 3208 Principles laid down by the Apex Court that informed the Court's earlier order of December 6, 2001. The Court stated that its earlier order dated December 6, 2001 was in conformity with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in this decision and relied on that conformity in refusing review.
Gemini Arts (P) Ltd. v. Indian Bank, (Madras Single Judge, Feb 25, 1998) (2000 DRC 226) Held that appeals under Section 20 of the Act are maintainable against interlocutory orders. The Court cited this decision as one of several High Court decisions taking the view that appeals under Section 20 are not limited to final orders.
Sandeep Singh Sandhu v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, (P. & H. High Court, Feb 13, 1998) (2000 DRC 265) Held that appeals under Section 20 may be maintainable against interlocutory orders. Cited by the Court as another High Court decision supporting the proposition that Section 20 appeals can lie against interlocutory orders.
Bank of India v. Baroda Cables Pvt. Ltd., (Gujarat Division Bench, Sep 1, 1997) (2000 DRC 269) Accepted that appeals under Section 20 can lie against interlocutory orders. Included among the High Court authorities relied upon to show that other High Courts have taken the view that interlocutory orders are appealable under Section 20.
Kavita Pigments & Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, (Patna High Court, Aug 26, 1999) (2000 DRC 578; AIR 2000 Patna 43) Held that appeals under Section 20 are maintainable not only against final orders but also against interlocutory orders; explicitly disagreed with Pratap Ch. Dey. Cited as support for the Court's view that Pratap Ch. Dey is not the correct legal position and that appeals may be entertained against interlocutory orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands corresponding to the petitioner's two main contentions.

  1. On the review application and the existence of an alternative remedy:

    The Court accepted the general legal proposition that the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy (such as an appeal) is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. However, the Court reiterated the settled limitation on that proposition: the supervisory jurisdiction should be exercised only where the impugned order is passed without jurisdiction, is against principles of natural justice, or is manifestly illegal.

    Applying that standard to the present facts, the Court observed that the DRT had, by an ex parte order dated October 18, 2001, appointed a Receiver over the petitioner’s business, and thereafter, after hearing, made the previous order absolute by appointing a Receiver till disposal of proceedings under Section 19. The Court noted that a Tribunal under the Act has ample authority to appoint a Receiver and that whether appointment was justified depended upon facts and circumstances. The Court therefore could not characterize the appointment as an order made without authority. Given that view, the Court concluded that its earlier decision to refuse to entertain Article 227 in view of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal was not vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.

    The Court also stressed that if the Appellate Tribunal erroneously refused to entertain the appeal in spite of a specific direction from this Court, that erroneous refusal could not itself be a ground to review the High Court’s earlier order; instead the petitioner ought to have challenged the Appellate Tribunal’s order. Consequently, the Court found no basis to recall or vary the December 6, 2001 order by way of review.

  2. On the interpretation of Section 20 and the authority of Pratap Ch. Dey:

    The Court analyzed the Pratap Ch. Dey decision, which held that "an order" in Section 20 meant only a final order under Section 19. The Court disagreed with Chatterjee, J.'s reasoning. The Court relied primarily on Section 17(2) of the Act, which provides that an Appellate Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction to entertain appeals "against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act." The Court read the phrase "any order made" in Section 17(2) together with Section 20 and concluded that the statutory text supports appeals against "any order" (except those specifically excluded such as orders by consent under sub-section (2) of Section 20).

    The Court further illustrated that the restrictive interpretation in Pratap Ch. Dey was premised on Section 21, which imposes a deposit condition when an appeal is preferred by a person from whom an amount of debt is due; the Court held that Section 21 addresses only a particular situation and cannot be used to construe the broader wording in Sections 17(2) and 20. The Court also noted procedural rules (Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993) and the scheme that certain orders of the Registrar are to be "deemed to be made by the Tribunal," reinforcing that such orders should be appealable.

    The Court supported the natural reading of "any" by citing dictionary definitions demonstrating "any" means "every" or "no matter which." The Court therefore concluded it could not follow Pratap Ch. Dey and treated that decision as not authoritative for the restricted interpretation.

  3. On authority from other High Courts:

    The Court observed that four High Court decisions (Madras, Punjab & Haryana, Gujarat and Patna) had taken the view that appeals under Section 20 are maintainable against interlocutory orders. The Court noted that Patna and Madras High Courts had taken notice of Pratap Ch. Dey and disagreed with it.

  4. Consequence for the present proceedings:

    Because the Court considered its December 6, 2001 order to have been correct and binding on the Appellate Tribunal, and because the Appellate Tribunal had erroneously dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, the Court exercised its suo motu power to set aside the DRAT order dated January 10, 2002 and directed the Appellate Tribunal to consider the appeal on merits. The Court expressly stated it had not gone into the merits of the appeal itself and directed the Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the appeal on merits within one month from communication of the order.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The application for review of the order dated December 6, 2001 is dismissed.
  • The other revisional application (C.O. No. 80 of 2002) seeking leave to file a fresh revisional application against the earlier order is dismissed as not maintainable.
  • The suo motu rule is made absolute and the order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. DRAT/CAL-/A/21 of 2001 is set aside; the Appellate Tribunal is directed to consider the appeal on merits and dispose of it within one month from communication of this order.
  • No order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner’s review attempt to recall the High Court’s December 6, 2001 order has failed; however, because the Appellate Tribunal’s order dismissing the appeal as not maintainable was set aside, the petitioner’s appeal to the Appellate Tribunal must now be heard on merits within the specified time frame. The Court expressly refrained from deciding the substantive merits of the appeal itself.
  • On precedent and legal interpretation: The Court rejected the narrow interpretation in Pratap Ch. Dey (that Section 20 applies only to final orders under Section 19) and concluded that Section 17(2) and Section 20, read together, allow appeals against "any order" made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal (subject to the statutory exceptions). The opinion cites other High Court decisions that align with this broader view. The Court nevertheless confined itself to deciding the procedural questions in the present case and did not decide the substantive appeal on merits.
  • No damages to costs: The Court made clear there would be no order as to costs.

Order accordingly.

    Jenson & Nicholson (India) Ltd. v. Industrial Investment Bank Of India And Others

    1. Challenging an order dated November 27, 2001 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in O.A No. 51 of 2001, the petitioner in the past moved an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court on December 6, 2001 when this Court refused to entertain the said revisional application on the ground that the said order being an appealable one under Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (“Act”), the petitioner should approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. This Court however did not go into merit and permitted the learned advocate for the petitioner to take back the certified copy of the order impugned on furnishing a xerox copy thereof.

    2. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated December 6, 2001 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act being Appeal No. DRAT/CAL-/A/21 of 2001 but the learned Appellate Tribunal by its order dated January 10, 2002 dismissed the said appeal on the ground that no appeal lay against an interlocutory order appointing Receiver over the property. The learned Appellate Tribunal was of the view that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act was maintainable only against a final order passed by the learned Tribunal on an application under Section 19 of the Act.

    3. After the passing of the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed an application for review of my earlier order dated December 6, 2001 and has prayed for leave to file a fresh application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against order dated November 27, 2001 as also an earlier order dated October 18, 2001 which had merged with order dated November 27, 2001.

    4. At the time of hearing of these two applications I issued a suo motu rule calling upon the bank to show cause why the order dated January 10, 2001 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appeal as not maintainable should not be set aside.

    5. Mr. Dhandhania, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the bank waived service of notice on behalf of his client and thus the said suo motu rule was also heard along with these two applications.

    6. By the application for review the petitioner has prayed that in view of subsequent order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act holding that the appeal against order dated November 27, 2001 was not maintainable, this Court should vary or recall the earlier order passed by this Court refusing to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and should permit the petitioner to move a fresh application against the selfsame order dated November 27, 2001. In my opinion, the ground taken in the application for review is devoid of any substance. This Court in the past having specifically held that the order impugned in the said application viz. order dated November 27, 2001 was an appealable order under Section 20 of the Act, the learned Appellate Tribunal which is subject to the superintendence of this Court cannot come to a different conclusion holding that no appeal is maintainable against such order. The said order dated December 6, 2001 was passed in the presence of the petitioner as well as the bank and as such was binding not only upon the parties but also upon the learned Appellate Tribunal which is bound to follow the direction given in the said order. Thus, even though the petitioner has not challenged the said order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, when attention of this Court was drawn to such order, this Court was compelled to issue a suo motu rule under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it appears that neither of the parties challenged my order dated December 6, 2001 before the Supreme Court and on the contrary, the petitioner by complying with my direction preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal. Thus, there is no scope of disputing the correctness of my order at the instance the petitioner unless it can establish that any of the grounds available to a litigant for reviewing an order exists.

    7. Mr. Mitra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made twofold submissions in support of the application for review. First, he has contended that existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal is not an absolute bar to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even if there is any efficacious alternative remedy available to a litigant. Mr. Mitra continues, this Court sitting in a jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can entertain such application if it appears that the order impugned was without jurisdiction or against the principle of natural justice causing injury to such a party. In support of such contention Mr. Mitra has relied upon various decisions of the Supreme Court.

    8. Secondly, Mr. Mitra contends that in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank reported in AIR 1997 Calcutta 96, Chatterjee, J. held that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act is available only against final order under Section 19 of the Act. Mr. Mitra submits that attention of this Court was not drawn to the aforesaid decision of Chatterjee, J. and in view of existence of such a decision of this Court, this Court should be bound by such decision and on that ground alone this Court should recall the earlier order dated December 6, 2001.

    9. As regards the first contention of Mr. Mitra there is no dispute with the proposition of law that existence of an alternative remedy is not the absolute bar in the matter of entertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But law is equally settled that such discretion should not be exercised unless it is established that the order impugned in such application was passed without jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or is manifestly illegal which requires no elaborate argument. In the instant case, the learned Tribunal by order dated October 18, 2001 ex parte appointed a Receiver over the business of the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner came up with an application for variation or cancellation of the said order whereupon the learned Tribunal below after hearing both the parties has made the previous order absolute thereby appointing a Receiver till the disposal of the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act. There is no dispute that a Tribunal constituted under the Act is vested with ample authority to pass order appointing Receiver in appropriate cases. Whether in the fact of the present case such appointment was justified or not is a question which depends upon the facts and circumstances of this case. But at any rate, the said order could not be described as an order passed by the Tribunal having no authority to appoint Receiver. By the previous order I held that such order being appealable, the petitioner can make appropriate submission before the appellate authority. Therefore, in the instant case, under such situation. I refused to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal. If the petitioner thinks that the Receiver was appointed by not following the well accepted principles which are required to be followed before appointing a Receiver, the petitioner can agitate such grounds before the Appellate Tribunal. Whether I was justified in refusing to entertain such application is a question which can be agitated by the petitioner only before a higher forum but there is no scope of investigating such question again in an application for review. This is not a case of error apparent on the face of record which requires no argument. Moreover, if the Appellate Tribunal erroneously refused to entertain such appeal in spite of specific direction of this Court, that cannot afford a ground for reviewing my earlier order. In such a case, it was the duty of the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal refusing to entertain an appeal in spite of specific direction of this Court. I, thus, do not find any reason to go into a detail discussion whether in the fact of the present case I was justified in refusing to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or whether this is a fit case where in spite of efficacious alternative remedy I should have entertained the earlier application.

    10. As regards the second point advanced by Mr. Mitra, it is true that in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey, (AIR 1997 Cal 96) (supra), Chatterjee, J. while disposing of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India held, inter alia, that the words “an order” appearing in Section 20 of the Act do not mean “any order” but those words should be interpreted as only “final order” passed by learned Tribunal on the application under Section 19 of the Act. In the said case before His Lordship, the petitioner came up under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order refusing to hear out a particular issue as preliminary issue of law by exercising power conferred on a Court under Order 14, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before deciding other issues. The learned Tribunal below refused to hear out such issue as preliminary issue but directed that the same should be taken up with other issues at the time of final hearing.

    11. Being dissatisfied, a defendant came up under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before His Lordship. While entertaining such revisional application and ultimately dismissing the same on merit. His Lordship was of the opinion that even existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal is no bar to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. His Lordship further held that an order refusing to hear a jurisdictional issue as preliminary issue is not a final order and therefore such an order was not an appealable one and as such it could not be said that the petitioner therein had any efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal.

    12. In arriving at such conclusion His Lordship mainly relied upon Section 21 of the Act which provides that where an appeal is preferred by any person from whom the amount of debt is due to a bank or a financial institution or a consortium of banks and financial institutions, such appeal shall not be entertained by learned Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal 75% of the amount of debt so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under Section 19. His Lordship thus was of the opinion that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act could be filed only against a final order of the Tribunal and not against “any order” that may be passed by it.

    13. With great respect to His Lordship, I am unable to convince myself to agree with the reasons assigned by His Lordship. In my view, the provisions of Section 21 of the Act describe only a situation where an appeal is preferred by a defendant against whom the amount of debt due to the plaintiff has been determined by the Tribunal. But that does not mean that no appeal can be preferred under any other circumstances. For instance, even if an application under Section 19 of the Act is dismissed by holding that no amount is due or payable to the bank or by passing a decree of a lesser amount than one claimed by bank, in such a case, the bank can prefer appeal and for the purpose of preferring such appeal the bank is not required to deposit any amount as condition precedent. Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act are not guiding factors in interpreting the words “an order” appearing in Section 20. It appears from the said order that although His Lordship made reference of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act but overlooked a very relevant specific provision contained in Section 17(2) of the Act. The said provisions are quoted hereunder:—

    “17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.— (1)………………………………

    (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    14. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that an Appellate Tribunal from the appointed day is entitled to entertain “appeals” against “any order made” or deemed to have been made by a Tribunal under this Act. Thus, there is no scope of interpreting the words “an order” appearing in Section 20 of the Act as only “final order” and not as “any order”. Even in sub-Section (2) of Section 20, only bar created for entertaining an appeal against order made by Tribunal is the order passed with the consent of parties. Therefore, if Sections 17(2) and 20 of the Act are read together there is no scope of ambiguity that appeals lie before learned Appellate Tribunal against “any order” passed by Tribunal except a consent order. His Lordship overlooked the phrase “appeals against any order made” appearing in Section 17(2) of the Act as quoted above and thus I am unable to treat the aforesaid decision passed by His Lordship as a precedent.

    15. In this connection it will be profitable to refer to the meaning of the adjective ‘any’ in the following dictionaries:—

    a) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English by A.S Hornby (Fourth Edition) — Every; no matter which.

    b) Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary— Every; All; One or some indiscriminately of whatever kind;

    c) Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary — One indefinitely; some: whichever, no matter which;

    16. Moreover, it appears from the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 that Rule 22 vests the Register with the authority to exercise such other functions as are assigned to him under those rules and/or by the Presiding Officer by a separate order in writing.

    17. Rule 23 enumerates those powers and in addition to that the Tribunal can also authorise the Registrar to pass such other functions as it thinks fit. It appears from sub-Rule (5) of Rule 5 that there is provision of an appeal against the order of Registrar to the Tribunal only against an order declining to register an application under Section 19 of the Act passed under sub-Rule (4) of Rule 5, but against orders passed by the Registrar by virtue of powers under Rule 23 or against other functions especially assigned by Tribunal there is no provisions for appeal to the Tribunal itself. Therefore, those orders passed by Registrar should be “deemed to be made by the Tribunal”. The inclusion of the phrase “deemed to have been made by Tribunal” appearing both in Section 17 and in Section 20 indicates that those orders of the Registrar are also appealable before learned Appellate Tribunal. His Lordship also overlooked the aforesaid aspect.

    18. In view of what have been stated above, I am unable to follow the decision in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank, (AIR 1997 Cal 96) (supra), as an authority for the proposition of law that only a “final order” under Section 19 of the Act is appealable under Section 20 of the Act. In my opinion, any order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal can be challenged in appeal if such order prejudicially affects an aggrieved appellant.

    19. It may not be out of place to mention here that four different High Courts in the following cases have taken the view that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act is maintainable not only against final order but also against interlocutory orders:—

    1) Gemini Arts (P) Ltd. v. Indian Bank, Writ Petition Nos. 15892, 16798 to 16801 and 16358 to 16369 of 1997 — decided by a Single Judge of Madras High Court on February 25, 1998, (2000 DRC 226).

    2) Sandeep Singh Sandhu v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Civil Revision No. 3644 of 1997 — decided by P. & H. High Court on February 13, 1998; (2000 DRC 265).

    3) Bank of India v. Baroda Cables Pvt. Ltd., Letters Patent Appeal No. 470 of 1997 — decided by a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court on September 1, 1997; (2000 DRC 269).

    4) Kavita Pigments & Chemicals (P) Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2373 of 1999 — decided by Patna High Court on August 26, 1999; (2000 DRC 578): (AIR 2000 Patna 43).

    20. Of the aforesaid four decisions, the Patna High Court and the Madras High Court have taken note of the aforesaid decision passed by Chatterjee, J. and have disagreed with the view expressed by His Lordship on the aforesaid question.

    21. I thus dismiss the application for review holding that there is no error not to speak of error apparent on the face of record in my order dated December 6, 2001 and thus the other revisional application being C.O No. 80 of 2002 by which the petitioner has prayed for leave to file fresh revisional application against earlier order is also dismissed as not maintainable. My order dated December 6, 2001 was quite in conformity with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in case of P.N.B v. O.C Krishnan reported in (2001) 6 JT (SC) 408 : (AIR 2001 SC 3208).

    22. As regards the suo motu rule issued by this Court, I make the said rule absolute by setting aside the order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. DRAT/CAL-/A/21 of 2001 and direct the learned Appellate Tribunal to consider the said appeal on merit. I have already indicated that the learned Appellate Tribunal was bound by the order dated December 6, 2001 passed by this Court and acted illegally in holding that the appeal was not maintainable. The learned Appellate Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal on merit positively within one month from the date of communication of this order. I make it clear that I have not gone into the merit of the said appeal.

    23. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.

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    Jenson & Nicholson (India) Ltd. v. Industrial Investment Bank Of India And Others
    (Jan 25, 2002)