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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition sought a Writ of Mandamus directing respondents not to give effect to an impugned termination order dated 23-6-1986 (annexure 'D') received by the petitioners on 26-6-1986, which purported to terminate the petitioners' storing agency. The petitioners are a partnership firm appointed by the Food Corporation of India (F.C.I.) as storing agent at Mogra, District Hooghly, and an agreement between the parties was executed in 1968 (the text refers to dates 28-10-1968 and 28-8-1968 at different places). The petitioners allege they employed staff and developed the business in reliance on that appointment.

The petitioners challenged Clause 37 of the agreement as arbitrary, unilateral and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, and alleged mala fides and breach of natural justice because no opportunity to be heard was given before termination. The writ petition was entertained and an interim order was made keeping the impugned termination subject to the result of the petition; the petition was contested by respondents by affidavit-in-opposition and the petitioners filed an affidavit-in-reply. Respondents contended Clause 37 permitted termination by notice and that earlier representations had been considered; they also relied on an arbitration clause (Clause 41) as an alternative remedy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the F.C.I. authorities can revoke the storing agency contract by invoking the termination clause (Clause 37) without notice and without a nexus to a reasonable cause for such termination.
  2. Whether Clause 37 of the agreement is reasonable or whether it is arbitrary, unfair or inconsistent with constitutional protections (in particular Article 14) against mala fide and unfair acts.
  3. Whether the courts should intervene to protect the weaker party from oppressive contractual terms arising from inequality of bargaining power.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Somnath Chatterjee)

  • Clause 37 is arbitrary, unilateral and violative of the protections guaranteed under Chapter III of the Constitution, particularly Article 14.
  • Because of inequality of bargaining power, the petitioners (weaker party) could not bargain or object when the agreement was executed; many clauses are unfair, unconscionable and injurious to public interest.
  • The F.C.I., as a powerful statutory instrumentality, imposed terms that allow termination without justification; courts should "lift the veil" and strike down Clause 37 to prevent whimsical and arbitrary termination.
  • The termination violated principles of natural justice because no opportunity to be heard was afforded before termination.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court decision (1986) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 1986 SC 1571 (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojonath Ganguly) — particularly paras. 88 and 89 — to show courts can strike down unfair and unreasonable contract clauses where bargaining power is unequal.

Respondents' Arguments (as reflected in the record and advanced by Mr. Mukul Prakash Banerjee)

  • Clause 37 of the agreement allowed termination by either party and the F.C.I. issued notice dated 23-6-1986 giving two months' prior intimation of termination.
  • As per an earlier writ petition and subsequent directions, the petitioners' representations were heard and considered by the Senior Regional Manager of the F.C.I., who found no reason to interfere with the termination order.
  • Provisions of the Indian Contract Act (referred to Ss. 201 to 204 and S. 182 for agency) govern the rights and duties of parties to a contract; on this basis the writ petition lacks merit.
  • A contractual arbitration clause (Clause 41) was pointed out as an alternative remedy available to the petitioners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1986) 3 SCC 156 : AIR 1986 SC 1571 — Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojonath Ganguly (B.N. Ganguli) The principle that courts will not enforce—and will strike down—an unfair and unreasonable contract or clause where the parties are unequal in bargaining power; courts may review contractual terms to prevent exploitation of a weaker party and to secure social and economic justice under Article 14. The Court relied on the principle from this Supreme Court decision as the governing test: it examined whether the parties were unequal in bargaining power, whether Clause 37 was unilateral and unreasonable, and concluded Clause 37 was unreasonable and therefore struck it down and set aside the impugned termination order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the single central question: whether F.C.I. could revoke the storing agency by invoking Clause 37 without notice or a reasonable nexus for termination, and whether that clause was itself reasonable in constitutional terms.

The court applied the Supreme Court's enunciated principle (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath Ganguly) that where there is substantial inequality of bargaining power a court may strike down unfair and unreasonable contractual clauses. The court analysed whether the facts of the instant case brought it within that principle by examining:

  • Comparative positions of the parties: the corporation's dominant position and the storing agent's relatively weak position, the practical difficulties for an agent to negotiate or alter standard-form terms presented by a large statutory agency.
  • The practical consequences of the contract: the storing agent invests funds, hires labour, builds infrastructure and alters his economic and social position in reliance on the agency.
  • The substance of Clause 37: whether it afforded the agent any opportunity to be heard before termination and whether it required a justiciable cause or public purpose that could be examined by a court.
  • The meaning of "reasonableness": the court explained that reasonableness must be judged both objectively and subjectively and requires that rights and liabilities of both sides be balanced; a clause that gives one side unilateral discretion without safeguards is suspect.

On applying these considerations, the court found Clause 37 unreasonable because it did not provide the agent an opportunity to explain or be heard before termination and thus permitted rescission by a stroke of a pen without minimum safeguards. The court observed that while the F.C.I. may terminate an agency for public purpose, there must be a justiciable cause and the minimum procedural requirement is notice and an opportunity to show cause prior to termination. Having scrutinised the record and the contractual framework, the court concluded the F.C.I.'s steps to rescind were legally bad and Clause 37 was struck down as unreasonable and bad in law.

The court did not purport to determine whether every contract between unequal parties is invalid; rather, it tested the specific clause in the context of the parties' relationship and the procedural protections (or lack thereof) available to the petitioners.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed; Clause 37 of the Agreement dated 28-8-1968 is struck down as unreasonable and bad in law, and the impugned order of termination dated 23-6-1986 is set aside.

Implications:

  • The petitioners are entitled to resume the business of the storing agency under the Agreement (subject to the limits of the court's order as recorded).
  • The order does not prevent the F.C.I. from initiating proper proceedings to determine the agreement provided such proceedings comply with legal requirements — in particular by giving the petitioners notice and an opportunity to show cause and by relying on justiciable grounds according to law.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The decision is the court's resolution of the dispute between the parties on the facts and law presented; the opinion applies the Supreme Court principle cited rather than announcing an independent new rule beyond those principles. (The opinion does not state that it creates a novel precedent of its own.)
Petition allowed.

    In Re v. Om Prokash Pariwal

    1. This writ petition has been filed for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents not to give any effect or further effect to the impugned order of termination dt. 23-6-1986 being annexure ‘D’ to the present writ petition received by the petitioners on 26-6-1986 purporting to terminate the storing agency of the petitioners. It is stated that the petitioner 1 is a partnership firm and engaged in carrying on business as storing agent of Food Corporation of India. It is further stated that the Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as the FCI) appointed the petitioner No. 1 as a storing agent at Mogra, District-Hooghly on Oct. 28, 1968 and an agreement was duly executed by and between them on 28-8-1968. After the appointment as storing agent by the F.C.I at Mogra, the petitioners appointed employees, labourers and took effective steps to discharge duties and functions as storing agents to the satisfaction of the authorities concerned. It is alleged that various clauses, terms and conditions were incorporated under the said agreement in favour of the F.C.I and to the prejudice of the petitioners. Since the petitioners were in a weaker position, they could not raise any objection at the time of entering into the said agreement and as per the averments made by the petitioners several terms and clauses are mostly arbitrary and unilateral in nature having no scope of either raising any objection or to make any bargain thereof. It is ascertained that most of the clauses in the agreement dt. 28-10-1968 are unreasonable, unconscionable, unfair and injurious to public performance and public interest. A purported step has been taken by the respondents to terminate the storing agency of the petitioners by invoking Cl. 37 of the said agreement and purported to give the petitioners two months notice to the effect that the agreement will be terminated by 25th Aug. 1986. Being aggrieved the present writ petition has been filed on the ground that the Cl. 37 in the agreement dated 28-10-1968 is arbitrary, unilateral, without jurisdiction and violative of Clause (Article) 14 of the Constitution of India. The said purported order of termination has been challenged alleging that the foundation of the purported order of termination is mala fide and the respondents cannot issue the purported order of termination by invoking Cl. 37 of the agreement which, in fact, is arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and opposed to the public policy. Such a step is contrary to the Constitution or the provisions and guarantees enshrined in Chapter III of the Constitution and in particular (Art.) 14 of the Constitution. The F.C.I authority having taken the advantage of a superior position in view of Art. 12 of the Constitution cannot and could not enter into any agreement with the citizens and unfair, unreasonable, and unconscionable clauses which offend the constitutional protections conferred upon the citizens under Ch. III of the Constitution, rendering the purported order of termination to be struck down in limine. The purported order of termination being violative of the principles of natural justice and procedural justice as no opportunity was afforded to the petitioners of being heard before such steps were taken the same is violative of the principles under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The authority had not terminated the storing agency in the proper manner and the acts done and/or caused to have been done are not bona fide and the same are violative of the principles of natural justice.

    2. The writ petition was entertained and an interim order was made to his extent that the impugned order of termination will be subject to the result of the application. It was made clear that the termination, if made in the meantime will also abide by the result of the writ application.

    3. The writ petition is contested by filing an affidavit-in-opposition and an affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the petitioners.

    4. The contesting respondents 2, 3, 4, 6 and 11 have controverted the allegation made in the writ petition. Their specific stand is that the writ petitioners were appointed as storing agents on 28th Oct. 1968 and Cl. 37 of the agreement provided the provision for terminating the agency by either party. The storing agency of the writ petitioners was terminated by a notice dt. 23rd June 1986 giving two months' prior intimation and a previous writ petition was moved on 26th August, 1986 before P.K Mazumdar J. and as per direction given by the Hon'ble Court at the time of disposal of the earlier application, the petitioners were heard and their representations were considered by the Senior Regional Manager of F.C.I and after hearing the parties and upon considerations of the materials on record he did not find any reason to interfere with the order. It was further contended that the writ petition is not maintainable as in Cl. 41 of the agreement there is an arbitration clause which is a specific alternative remedy.

    5. Mr. Somnath Chatterjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has argued with emphasis that the Cl. 37 of the agreement dt. 28-10-1968 is itself arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the protection guaranteed under Ch. III of the Constitution of India, whenever an agreement is executed a contract is concluded. There must be “offer” and “acceptance” to conclude a contract vis-a-vis an agreement. Unless the parties are in equal position there cannot be fair offer and voluntary acceptance between the unequal parties. The stronger power always takes advatage against the weaker side. Eventually, the weaker side has to concede and the clauses are provided and the terms are incorporated unilaterally tilting the balance in favour of the powerful side and the humiliating acceptance by the weaker. In the instant case, the F.C.I authority has the monopoly to deal with the business and the terms offered by them have been made in such a way that the clauses are absolutely in their favour and to their utter discretion and the agents so appointed are not in a position to make any bargain nor can raise their voice seeking incorporation of the terms protecting their interests. Cl. 37 of the agreement dt. 28-10-1968 is a typical example and the Courts should not shut their eyes but they should lift the veil to know the truth and protect the weaker side by striking the Cl. 37 so that the agency cannot be terminated whimsically and arbitrarily without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Mr. Chatterjee has strongly argued that the Government administration is now known to be “open administration” and there is no feudal concept to terminate any agency depending upon mere capricious desire and arbitrary discretion. There must be justification and there must be reasons as to why the termination of agency is required and as to why the agreement would be terminated without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to show cause against the steps proposed to be taken and there must be requirement to terminate the agency for public purpose and for real administrative measure. If the Cl. 37 of the agreement dt. 28-10-1968 becomes ineffective, steps taken by the respondent become ultra vires and the purported order has to be quashed. Since the Cl. 37 as indicated above is contrary to the protection guaranteed by the Constitution, the order of termination has no foundation at all. He has mainly relied upon the Supreme Court decision reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (AIR 1986 SC 1571) (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Brojonath Ganguly). He has drawn the attention of this court to paras. 88 and 89 of the said reported decision and submitted that there should not be “pick and choice” policy to terminate “storing agency” of the petitioner.

    6. Mr. Mukul Prakash Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the contesting F.C.I authority has mainly argued that Ss. 201 to 204 of the Contract Act provide inter alia, the rights and duties of the parties to a contract. The term of “agency” is provided under S. 182 of the said Contract Act. According to him, there is no merit in the writ petition.

    7. Having heard the Learned lawyers of the respective parties, the only question arises in the instant case as to whether the F.C.I authorities can revoke the storing agency contract with the petitioners by invoking the relevant clause of “termination” without notice and without having a nexus to the reasonable cause of such termination. Is the clause of termination reasonable? Is the clause itself contrary to and inconsistent with the guarantee of protection against mala fide and unfair acts? Will the Courts remain helpless to save the right of the weaker side when it is subjected to arbitrary actions and deliberate acts of oppression by shutting their eyes that there is a contract, and nothing can be done against the same? It is pointed out in (1986) 3 SCC 156 : (AIR 1986 SC 1571) (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. B.N Ganguli) (supra) that the United States of America and the United Kingdom have statutorily recognised at least in certain areas of the Law of contracts, that there cannot be unreasonableness (or lack of fairness if one prefers that phrase) in a contract or a clause in a contract where there is inequality of bargaining power between the parties although arising out of circumstances not within their control or as a result of situation not of their creation. Other legal systems also permit judicial review of a contractual transaction entered into in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court decision evidenced that for example, S. 138(2) of the German Civil Procedure Code provides that a transaction is void “when a person” exploits “the distressed situation, inexperience, lack of judgemental ability, or grave weakness of will of another to obtain the grant of promise of pecuniary advantages which are obviously disproportionate to the performance given in return”. It was further found that the decision according to the French Law is very much the same. The Supreme Court posed the question as to Courts of India. It was found that (in para No. 89 of 1986 (3) SCC 156 at p. 215: (Para 90 of AIR 1986 SC 1517 at Pp. 1610-11) (supra)):—

    “Should then our Courts not advance with the times? Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the day? Should all jurisprudential development pass us by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of 19th Century theories? Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the Courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample underfoot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our Judges are bound by their oath to “uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great quality clause in Art. 14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No Court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard from or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infrastructural organisations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.”

    8. The principle as enunciated by the Supreme Court has been highlighted in the aforementioned decision. It has to be seen whether such a principle can be applied to the instant case. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are put to acid test and alkali test, the Court will have to find as to whether the petitioners on the one hand and the Food Corporation of India on the other hand are in a similar situation and the agreement was made having less potential power of the petitioners. It has also to be considered as to whether the “storing agency” agreement is made by a stereo-typed form of contract made at the instance of officers of the Food Corporation of India having all the advantages in one way traffic or both the parties stand at one par and there are equal offers and voluntary acceptance to make a concluded contract in a fair way considering all the advantages and disadvantages of both sides. It has got also to be considered whether the Clause of “termination” in the storing agency contract as in the instant case is incorporated for the benefit of both sides in the total framework of the entire agreement itself and considering the infrastructure of the storing agency type of business by which the giant corporations engage an ordinary citizen of the country to enter into business transaction. It is often said that law is blind but it is never said that the Courts are blind. The facts and circumstances will convince a person with ordinary prudence, nay a person having knowledge of jurisprudence, that any contract between two unequal parties providing advantage to the stronger section is a result of the pressure of the stronger one and the discretion of the stronger side is exercised when the weaker one has no other option but to surrender to the dictates at the time of obtaining the contract. This background should not be lost sight of. A set down terms of contract can hardly be challenged by a storing agent at the time of his appointment. It can safely be ascribed that the terms are unilateral and the parties are not on equal terms and there is never real offer and counter-offer. The next question comes whether the particular clause of termination in the impugned agreement is reasonable. The reasonableness has a wide connotation. It has to be understood both objectively and subjectively. There must be objective manifestations that the particular clause is well balanced and the rights and liabilities of both sides are protected. Law is blind because before law the conception of “inequality” is alien. Before law, every entity must be equal. The word “discrimination” and “disparity” are enemies to fair play and justice. Naturally, the Courts will have to visualise all the aspects in a bigger dimension. There should be reading in between the lines and implications should properly be comprehended. The Corporation on one hand engagesa businessman to start a storing agency. The contract is arrived at. Pursuant to the contract, the person engaged as a storing agent invests huge funds of money, engages a number of workmen and starts an infrastructure of business, however, it may be, in a maxi form or in mini form. Financially, and in many other ways he changes the pattern of his life. He plans his dreams and desires. He changes his position in economic and social life. All on a sudden, without any reasonable cause and by a stroke of pen, if the business is stopped the contract is rescinded by not giving an opportunity to know the reasons and/or to show cause against any reasons arrived at subjectively, there will be a mockery of Constitutional protection. It is not correct that whenever there is a contract between unequal persons the contract is vitiated or the clauses are unreasonable. Each case has obviously distinguishing features. In the background of the contract between unequal persons the relevant terms are required to be examined as to whether regard being had to the materials on record the “clause or clauses” are unilateral in nature and whether for the benefit of one person, and in particular for the stronger person and to the disadvantage of the weaker side. If such a test is applied to the present case, it appears that the relevant clause of termination in the present case is unreasonable inasmuch as the agent does not get any opportunity to explain against the proposed action of termination. The Court cannot also examine as to whether there is a public purpose for termination of the agency. It is true that for public purpose the F.C.I can terminate the agency provided there is a justiciable cause. The minimum requirement is a notice to be given to the storing agent asking him to show cause before and an opportunity of hearing should be given before termination of contract. The clause of “termination” in the present case appears to this Court is unreasonable. The contract may always be rescinded according to law, and if anybody has suffered any wrong caused by the other party there is a process of payment of compensation also for wrongful termination. Having scrutinised the entire facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that the steps taken by the F.C.I to rescind the agreement are bad in law. The Clause No. 37 in the Agreement dated 28-8-68 is struck down as unreasonable and bad in law. Accordingly the writ petition succeeds. The impugned order is set aside. The petitioners are entitled to resume the business of storing agency as per the Agreement. This order will not however, prevent the F.C.I to initiate a proper proceeding by giving an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause and to take appropriate steps for determination of the agreement, if there are other justiciable grounds according to law. The writ petition is thus disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.

    Petition allowed.

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    In Re v. Om Prokash Pariwal
    (Sep 16, 1987)