1. In the writ application, the petitioners challenged the validity of the orders dt. 30th Mar., 1978, 9th Feb. 1979 and 21st Jan. 1980 passed by the Competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the order dt. 29th Aug. 1980 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue.

2. The fact of the case in short, is that, the respondents, Mrs. Sally I.D Rodda, the respondent 9 acquired the holding No. 56 and 56/1, Kings Road, Howrah by virtue of a deed of gift from her mother Mrs. Sophia Bibi Jackob. The holding No. 65/1, Kings Road is measured about 33 cottahs 6 chitaks of land covered by a pucca structure, a number of R.T and C.I sheds and several khatals. According to the petitioner, 56/1 Kings. Road was a property comprised of land with building and did not fall under the mischief of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. It was stated that by way of abundant caution, the said Respondent No. 8, Mrs. Rodda submitted a return under S. 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (referred to as the said Act). The name of the respondent No. 8 was mutated in the Register of the Howrah Municipality as well as in the Records of Rights mentioned by the Collector of Howrah in this behalf. It is further stated that in the Record of Rights, it was specifically mentioned that there were some structures in the said plot No. 43 in mouja Golabari, P.S Golabari, Howrah. From the Assessment Demand Register and the Muncipal Licence granted by the Howrah Municipality it appears that, in the said records there were specific mention about the existence of pucca structures, sheds and khatals on the said land. It was also stated that there was a small strip of land within the said holding No. 56/1, Kings Road, Howrah, which according to the petitioner was not also a vacant land.

3. On 12th Nov., 1976, the said respondent No. 8 made an application under S. 27(2) of the said Act before the Sub Divisional Officer and the Competent Authority, Howrah for permission to transfer the said property by way of sale and that the said application was received by the office of the said authority. In the said application, the Respondent No. 8 made a declaration that the said land and building held by her was intended to be transferred by way of sale to the petitioners and that it was also stated that the building situated in the said holding was constructed about 20 years back. Accordingly, the respondent No. 8 requested the Competent Authority to grant permission for effecting such transfer by way of sale. Thereafter, on 9th Feb. 1976, the Competent Authority under the said Act passed the following orders:

“Urban Land Ceiling Case No. CUC 745 of 1975 under S. 27 of the Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act, 1976

Name of Applicant : Mrs. Sally I.D Rodda, wife of Late I.D Rodda. Address : 10, Rippon Lane, Calcutta-700016.

Permission for sale of land with building the particulars of which are given below has not been refused or the right of preemption has not been exercised within the statutory periods of sixty days from the date of receipt of the application.

Particulars of land with building:—

1. Name of Municipality Mouza & J.L No. : How. Municipality. 2. Holding No. & Name of Street, Land or Road Kh. No. Dag No. Etc. : 58/1, King's Road. 3. Name of Police Station : Gola Bari. 4. Area of land with building in question Seal. 10-2-77. : 11 Kata 2 Ch. land with building. Sub-Divisional Officer Sadar, How. Competent Authority, 9-2-77. Signature, 10-2-77.”

4. It was stated that before such permission was granted, an enquiry was duly held in the matter and that the authority concerned on being fully satisfied with the particulars submitted in the said application granted such permission. Thereafter on the basis of the said order dt. 9th Feb. 1977 passed by the Competent Authority granting permission to sell the said property in question, the Respondent No. 8 sold the entire premises No. 56/1, King's Road, Howrah to the petitioner by executing 3 registered deed of sale bearing Nos. 3334, 3335 and 3336 on 21st July, 1977 for a consideration of Rs. 49,000/- for each such transaction. The said deed of sale was registered before the Registrar of Assurance, Calcutta and each of the three registered deeds bear the endorsement that “Permission u/S. 27(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act dt. 9-2-77 issued by S.D.O Howrah, the Competent A uthority and filed.” After the execution of the said deeds by the Respondent No. 8 in favour of the petitioners, possession of the said premises was made over to the petitioners and the transactions were concluded and the petitioners are in physical and peaceful possession of the said property since the date of the said purchase. It was stated that the petitioners had incurred a total expenditure of Rs. 2,00,000/- including the consideration money and other expenses for the purpose of purchase and registration charges etc. Bejore the said sale took place due clearance under S. 230 of the Income-tax Act was also obtained by the parties.

5. Long thereafter, the successor in office of the said Competent Authority, by the Memo No. 878/1(ii) dt. 30-3-1978 directed the Respondent 8 to show cause why the said sales should not be deemed to be null and void and why necessary penal measures should not be taken against her on the ground that “It has come to my notice that you hold vacant land and land with buildings with a dwelling unit therein at 56/1, King's Road P.S Golabari in Howrah Municipality the area to the extent of 1 bigha 11 cottahs 6, chitaks at the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.” In the said notice, it was stated that the said property was sold by executing a registered deed of sale on 21-7-77 by suppressing the fact about the character of the vacant land and land with buildings with a dwelling unit thereon in contravention of the provision of S. 5(3) of the said Act. Copy of the said Memo was forwarded to the writ petitioners. A copy of such show cause notice was also forwarded to a stranger, namely, the Secretary, Janata Adarsha Vidyalaya, 27 King's Road, Howrah. It was alleged that the said notice to show cause was issued at the instance and machination of the said Janata Adarsha Vidyalaya by the Competent Authority. It also appears that the said Janata Adarsha Vidyalaya filed a suitbeing Title Suit No. 147 of 1977 before the 4th Munsif, Howrah in [respect of the said property impleading the petitioners as defendants and that the application for injuction in that suit was rejected and thereafter prevailed upon the said authority to initiate such a proceeding for taking revenge.

6. The writ petitioners and the respondent 8, duly showed cause by written objections against the impugned show cause notice on 17th April, 1978 and 28th April, 1978 respectively. Thereafter the Competent Authority by the order dt. 9th Feb. 1979 rejected the said written objection filed by the petitioners and the respondent 8 and declared that the said transfer made in favour of the petitioners were null and void in terms of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the said Act. The said order was passed by the Competent Authority setting aside the said sales and declaring the other transactions null and void without giving the petitioners any hearing. Thereafter an appeal was preferred against the said decision of the Competent Authority dt. 9th Feb. 1979 by which the said sales were declared null and void and that the said appeal was ultimately dismissed by the order dt. 29th Aug. 1978 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue.

7. It was contended by Mr. Bhola Nath Sen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the Competent Authority had no authority and/or jurisdiction to review and/or recall the order passed under Section 27 of the said Act. It was also contended that unless the Statute expressly confers power 1 for review of the order, the Competent Authority had no such power to review the order which was passed by his predecessor-in-office. It was further contended that When permission to sell the property was given by the Competent Authority after due enquiry and on being satisfied about the matter the Competent Authority was estopped from declaring that the permission granted by the Competent Authority under S. 27 was null and void. It was further contended that the petitioners would not have purchased the property in question unless the permission had been given by the Competent Authority under S. 27 of the said Act. In other words it is contended that the writ petitioners had altered their position to their prejudice and had purchased the property relying upon the permission granted by the Competent Authority under S. 27 of the said Act and that under such circumstances the Competent Authority was estopped, from recalling the said order. The provision of S. 27 of the said Act is as follows:

“S. 27. Prohibition on transfer of urban property.

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3)of S. 5 and sub-sec. (4) of S. 10, no person Shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease for a period exceeding ten years, or otherwise, any urban or urbanisable land with a building (whether constructed before or after the commencement of this Act) or a portion only of such building for a period of ten years of such commencement or from the date on which the building is constructed, whichever is later, except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority.

(2) Any person desiring to make a transfer referred to in sub-sec. (1) may make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) On receipt of an application under sub-sec (2), the competent authority may, after making such inquiry as it deems fit, by order in writing, grant or refuse to grant the permission applied for:

Provided that the competent authority shall not refuse to grant the permission applied for unless it has recorded in writing the reasons for doing so and a copy of the same has been communicated to the applicant.”

The provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 and sub-sec. (4) of S. 10 of the said Act are set out below:

“S. 5. Transfer of vacant land.

(3) In any State to which this Act applies in first instance and in any State which adopts this Act under Cl. (1) of Art. 252 of the Constitution, no person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit immediately before the commencement of this Act shall transfer any such land or part thereof by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise until he has furnished a statement under S. 6 and a notification regarding the excess vacant land held by him has been published under sub-sec. (1) of S. 10; and any such transfer made in contravention of this provisions shall be deemed to be null and void.”

“S. 10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit.

(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under sub-sec. (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under sub-sec. (3)—

(i) No person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and

(ii) No person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.”

8. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the competent authority had the power to revoke and/or recall the order passed under S. 27 of the said Act if it has found that there was any mistake or under in the matter. It was further alleged that if the respondent No. 8 had suppressed any material fact, in that event, the order passed under S. 27 was a nullity. It was contended that as there was some discrepancy in the return filed by the respondent 8 for which the competent authority was misled and granted the permission which was ultimately found to be incorrect. It was further contended that power to pass order carries with it by necessary implication to review and/or to revoke the order passed under the law.

9. In the instant case, the Respondent No. 8 filed a return under S. 6 of the said Act and also filed an application for granting permission under S. 21 of the said Act. S. 27 of the said Act provides that no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise of any land in respect of which the said Act applies except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority. In the instant case, the respondent No. 8 made application for permission from the competent authority to transfer the said land and that such a permission is not granted automatically. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 27 provides that “On receipt of an application under sub-sec. (2), the competent authority may, after making such enquiry as it deems fit by order in writing grant or refuse to grant the permission applied for:” In the instant case, the competent authority after getting the application for permission to sell the property was entitled to cause enquiries as the competent authority thought it necessary and that after holding an enquiry, if any, and on being satisfied that it was a fit and proper case where such permission should be granted, such permission was given for sale.

10. On perusal of the provisions of Ss. 5, 10 and 27 of the said Act, it appears that no person holding any excess land could transfer any land by way of sale, gift, mortgage, lease or otherwise unless such person had furnished statement as required u/s. 6 of the said Act and on determination made, a notification regarding excess land held by such person is published and the date specified in the declaration under sub-sec. (3) of S. 10 of the said Act, had expired. In such a case the person concerned can transfer the land so allowed to be retained as a matter of right and for this the person concerned had not to take permission for such sale. The provisions of S. 27 of the said Act covers a different field altogether. In this case the competent authority had been given power to grant permission after holding an enquiry and being satisfied that there was no reason for refusing to grant permission/may grant such permission. The cases of transfer of land covered by S. 27 of the said Act are lands held by persons who had excess land and it does not cover the lands held by persons who had lands below the ceiling limit Section 26 of the said Act laid down that no person holding vacant land within the ceiling limit should transfer such land without giving notice of such transfer to the competent authority. So in view of the provision of Section 26 of the said Act, it is made clear that the scope of S. 27 of the said Act confers only in cases of land beyond the ceiling limit. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be argued that under the provision of S. 27 of the said Act prior permission is required for the purpose of sale of a property by a person who holds land below ceiling limit. The combined effect of S. 27 read with sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 and sub-sec. (4) of S. 10 of the said Act is that the competent authority may grant permission to sell property even during the pendency of the proceeding under the Act. If it be the intention of the legislature that no person shall be permitted to transfer any land or a part thereof if he was holding a vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit until the final publication is made and the date specified in the declaration is over. In view of the fact that a person who holds land beyond ceiling files a statement and ultimately the excess land is vested and period prescribed in S. 10(4) of the Act expires, that person is absolutely within its power to transfer any land allowed to be retained to him and for that purpose, no permission whatsoever is required from the competent authority. No other construction of the provision of the Section 27 of the said Act could be given. Incidentally it may be noted that the provision of S. 26(1) of the said Act which requires that person holding vacant land within ceiling limit would not transfer such land without giving notice of transfer to the competent authority had been struck down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mabarao Sahib Singhji v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 234. In the instant case, power had been exercised by the competent authority in accordance with the provision of S. 27 of the said Act and permission before transfer had been given by the competent authority and it does not appear that there is any provision for recalling and/or withdrawing and/or cancelling the permission once granted in this behalf in the absence of any provision for recall, revoke and/or cancel the order granting permission. The question is whether the competent authority have any jurisdiction to revoke a permission granted and acted by the parties. The power under S. 27(3) is a discretionary power and when that discretionary power had been exercised by the competent authority and thereafter the parties acting upon such permission had acted to their prejudice and transfer the land in question and after registering documents and parted with the possession in favour of the purchaser whether the said order could be revoked. No provision have been made to review and/or recall and/or cancel the permission once granted.

11. Regarding the first contention raised by the petitioner power of review unless expressly conferred by the Statute, such power of review cannot be said to be an inherent power. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1273. In that case it was held by the Supreme Court that “It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the government had power to review its own order. If the government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegatee could not have reviewed its order.” The order under S. 27 of the said Act is a statutory order and not administrative. In the instant case, in view of the nature of power conferred under S. 27 of the said Act it could not be said that the power of review was conferred upon such authority by necessary implication. When permission under S. 27 of the said Act is granted, in that event the purchaser who purchased the property, makes such purchase relying on such permission and that if permission is not granted, in that event, nobody would have purchased the property and that the document could not be registered. In the instant case, the writ petitioners on the basis of the representation contained in the order under Section 27 of the said Act passed by the Competent Authority had acted to their detriment and that it is alleged that thereafter the respondents, the competent authority could not be allowed to deny it later. In the Administrative Law of H.W.R Wade, 5th Edition at page 232, it was observed that “The basic principle of estoppel is that a person who by some statement or representation of fact cause another to act to his detriment not relying on the truth of it is not allowed to deny it later, even though it is wrong. Justice here prevails over truth. Estoppel is even described as a Rule of Evidence, but more correctly it is a principle of law”. In this case the respondents are also estopped on account of encouragement or acquiescence. It is now also firmly established principle that “Encouragement” or “acquiescence” may provide a foundation for estoppel (See Law Relating to Estoppel of Representation by Spencers, Bower and Tumor, para 289).

12. According to the nature of the power conferred under S. 27 of the said Act, in my view, once a permission is granted after making an enquiry and after due consideration of the matter, it is not open to the competent authority to review and/or revoke the order and/or to recall the same. This view, I am constrained to take in view of the fact that the legislature was fully aware that once a permission is granted under S. 27 of the said Act the property would be sold to a purchaser who would purchase the property for a valuable consideration and that no such transfer is permissible unless such a permission is granted. So once permission is granted, in that event the other persons' right are immediately affected. Here the petitioners are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration and that they had purchased the property because of express grant of permission under S. 27 of the said Act and in such a case there is no scope for declaring a concluded transfer as a nullity. The power under S. 27, if once exercised, then a series of subsequent events follows and that the interest of the third parties are immediately involved and in view of the nature of the power conferred, it is implicit that no power of review could be inferred even by necessary implication. If the contentions of the respondents are accepted that such power of review is implicit in that event, it would create great hardship to the bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration who had purchased only on the basis of the permission granted in, this behalf and invested money upon it and that such permission is not granted as a matter of course inasmuch as such permission could be granted after the authority concerned was satisfied after holding an enquiry in this matter. If the contentions of the respondents had to be accepted, in that event, that would lead to a wholly unreasonable result and it is well established principle that word in a Statute has to be interpreted to avoid any unreasonable result Lord Reid in the case of Luke v. Inland Revenue Commrs., 1963 AC 557 at page 577 observed “It is only where words are absolutely incapable of a construction which will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result, that the word of the enactment must prevail.” It is also the cardinal principle of Interpretation of a Statute that manifest absurdity or palpable Injustice or absurd inconvenience to be avoided. Lord Esher observed in R. v. City of London Court Judge, reported in (1892) 1 QB 273 at p. 290 “In my opinion, rule has always been this if the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear; and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity and other does not, the court will conclude that the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation.”

13. Accordingly, S. 27 has to be interpreted in such a manner which does not lead to an absurdity and/or wholly unreasonable and absurd result and as such I hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the competent authority was debarred from recalling the permission once granted under Section 27 of the said Act and could not declare the sale as null and void. This view I am taking in view of the fact that under the provision of the said Act, no power has been conferred upon any authority to declare a transaction as null and void when the transaction was made after obtaining a formal permission in writing under the provision of S. 27 of the said Act. It was a duty of the competent authority to take care and caution before passing an order under section 27 granting permission and once permission is granted and properties are sold on the basis of such permission the innocent and bona fide purchaser could not be made to suffer for any lapse or negligence on the part of the competent authority. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned order dt. 9th Feb. 1979 declaring the transaction by way of sale dt. 30th Mar. 1978 null and void including the order dt. 29th Aug. 1980 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue is set aside. Let a writ in the nature of Certiorari do issue quashing the order dt. 9th Feb. 1979 passed by the Competent Authority which is Annexure ‘N’ and the order passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dt. 29th Aug. 1980 which is Annexure ‘T’ to the petition. Let a writ in the nature of Mandamus do issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect or further effect to the order dt. 9th Feb. 1979 passed by the Competent Authority which is Annexure ‘M’ to the petition and the order passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue dt. 29th Aug. 1980 which is Annexure ‘T’ to the petition. There will be no order as to costs. This order is passed without prejudice to any other action that may be taken by the Competent Authority against the Respondent 8 in the matter in accordance with law.

Petition allowed.