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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner company entered into a contract with Nizam Sugar Factory Ltd., a Government Company, for the supply of 12 lakh gunny bags. The contract (dated August 1983) required deposit of Rs. 1,00,000 as earnest money by cash, demand draft or a bank guarantee. The petitioner furnished a bank guarantee dated 8-8-1983 from Allahabad Bank, Calcutta, valid until 30-4-84. The guarantee contained clauses that allowed the Government Company to demand payment at their discretion and required Allahabad Bank to pay forthwith on demand without reference to the petitioner.

Due to a strike at the petitioner's factory beginning 16-1-1984, the petitioner was unable to meet the delivery schedule. By letter dated 13-2-1984 the Government Company cancelled the contract citing failure to adhere to the delivery schedule and stated that the order for the balance quantity was cancelled without prejudice to the terms and conditions of the order.

By letter dated 14-3-1984 Allahabad Bank informed the petitioner that the Government Company had registered a claim of Rs. 1,00,000 under the bank guarantee and requested the petitioner's instructions; the bank indicated that if no response was received within a week it would have to remit the amount to the beneficiary. The petitioner filed a writ application challenging enforcement of the bank guarantee. On 29-3-1984 an ad interim order was granted restraining (g) the Government Company from demanding or receiving any amount under the bank guarantee or giving effect to the demand dated 13-2-1984, (h) Allahabad Bank from making any payment under the bank guarantee, and (i) the respondents from acting in reliance on the demand.

The petitioner sought extension of that interim order. Notice was said to have been served on the respondents, but no one appeared for them. The present judgment addresses the continuation of the interim order and the enforceability of the bank guarantee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract between the petitioner and the Government Company is void for non-compliance with the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (FCR Act) and the Bye-laws of the East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Limited, and consequently whether the bank guarantee furnished in consideration of that contract is void.
  2. Whether the court should continue the interim injunction restraining the Government Company from demanding under, and the bank from paying, the bank guarantee (i.e., whether enforcement of the bank guarantee can be restrained by injunction).
  3. Whether a writ lies against the Government Company in respect of entering into, cancelling the contract or enforcing the bank guarantee — specifically whether the Government Company was discharging a statutory function that would attract writ jurisdiction.
  4. Whether the Government Company acted arbitrarily in terminating the contract and whether that termination can be set aside in the present jurisdiction by the writ court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The contracts for trading and the sale or purchase of jute goods are subject to the provisions of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 and the Bye-laws of the East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Limited.
  • The contract between the petitioner and the Government Company did not comply with the said Act or the Exchange bye-laws, and therefore the contract is void.
  • Because the bank guarantee was issued or furnished in consideration of entering into that agreement, the bank guarantee is also void and cannot be enforced.
  • Reliance was placed on Megna Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ashoka Marketing Co. (AIR 1971 SC 166) for the proposition that a contract not in accordance with the Act or the bye-laws and not in prescribed form would be void, and on Jaikishan Dass Mull v. Luchhiminarain Kanoria & Co. (AIR 1974 SC 1579) which reiterated those principles.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments. No counsel appeared for the respondents at the hearing as recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Megna Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ashoka Marketing Co., AIR 1971 SC 166 Held that if a contract is not in accordance with the FCR Act or the Exchange bye-laws and is not in the prescribed form, the contract would be void; literal compliance may not be essential but the contract must contain all terms and conditions set out in the prescribed form. The court observed the petitioner relied on this decision but found no particulars showing non-compliance here; the court was unable to conclude that the contract was not entered into in compliance with the Act or the bye-laws.
Jaikishan Dass Mull v. Luchhiminarain Kanoria & Co., AIR 1974 SC 1579 Reiteration of the principles laid down in Megna Mills regarding the requirements for validity under the FCR Act and Exchange bye-laws. The court noted this decision reiterates the principles but found no support from the petitioner showing the contract failed to meet those requirements in the present case.
United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, AIR 1981 SC 1426 Courts generally refrain from granting injunctions to restrain performance of contractual obligations arising out of letters of credit or bank guarantees; banks giving performance guarantees must honour them according to their terms. The court relied on this authority to conclude that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify restraining the bank from paying under the guarantee and that the interim injunction should not be continued.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded as follows:

  1. Existence of a Concluded Contract: The court found there was a concluded contract between the petitioner and the Government Company and noted the petitioner had acted upon that contract.
  2. Applicability of FCR Act and Exchange Bye-laws: The court was prima facie satisfied that the FCR Act, 1952 had no application in this case. Even if the Act and bye-laws were applicable, the petitioner produced no particulars explaining how the contract failed to comply with them. In the absence of such particulars, the court was unable to hold the contract invalid on that ground.
  3. Timing and Conduct: The court observed the petitioner sought to challenge the contract's validity only after it had committed a breach and the Government Company had terminated the contract. The court treated this sequence critically, implying the challenge was opportunistic.
  4. Breach and Termination: The court accepted that there had been a breach by the petitioner (due to the strike and failure to supply as per schedule) and that the Government Company terminated the contract. The court held that whether that termination was right or wrong could not be decided in the writ jurisdiction before it in the present proceedings and noted that no allegation of arbitrary conduct by the Government Company in terminating the contract had been made.
  5. Writ Jurisdiction: The court held that in entering into, cancelling the contract or enforcing the bank guarantee the Government Company was not discharging a statutory function, so the mere fact that the State held 51% of the company's paid up share capital did not make it amenable to writ jurisdiction for these matters.
  6. Enforceability of Bank Guarantee and Injunctive Relief: Citing United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India, the court reiterated that courts typically refrain from granting injunction to restrain enforcement of bank guarantees and letters of credit. A bank giving a performance guarantee must honour it according to its terms and the courts will not ordinarily interfere. The court found no exceptional circumstances here to justify interference with implementation of the bank guarantee and was not satisfied that invocation of the guarantee was wrongful, illegal or arbitrary.
  7. Conclusion on Interim Relief: On these bases, the court concluded that no prima facie ground existed to continue the interim order and therefore vacated the interim injunction previously granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The interim order dated 29-3-1984 was vacated, and Allahabad Bank (respondent 3) was directed to forthwith make payment of the amount covered by the bank guarantee to respondent 2 (the Government Company).

Other directives and immediate consequences:

  • If the Rule (i.e., the petition) ultimately succeeds, respondent 2 shall refund the amount recovered under the bank guarantee to the petitioner.
  • The Advocate on Record of respondent 2 was directed to communicate the order to Allahabad Bank forthwith, and a plain copy of the order was to be given to the Advocate appearing for the party.

Implications:

The direct effect is the immediate enforcement of the bank guarantee by the bank and payment to the Government Company, subject to restitution if the petition eventually succeeds. The court indicated that the matter did not raise issues warranting writ intervention against the Government Company and that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant restraining enforcement of a bank guarantee. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies existing authority (notably United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India) to the facts and denies continuation of the injunction.

    Alliance Mills (Lessees) Pvt. Ltd., And Another v. Union Of India And Others

    1. The petitioner company entered into a contract with Nizam Sugar Factory Ltd. of Hyderabad, a Government Company within the meaning of S. 617, Companies Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Government Company). The said contract was for supply of 12 lacs gunny bags by the petitioner company to the said Government Company at Hyderabad. One of the conditions of the contract was that a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- should be deposited towards earnest money, either in the shape of cash or Demand Draft or a bank guarantee of a Schedule Bank in favour of the Government Company and should be furnished along with the tender. One of the conditions of the said contract is that in the case of any default by the petitioner either in quantity to be supplied or in the delivery period or in the event of any defect in the quality of gunny bags supplied, the Government Company is entitled to invoke the Bank Guarantee and purchase the defaulted quantity at the prevailing market rate at the risk and responsibility of the petitioner. The loss or damages incurred would be recovered from the petitioner. The contract was entered in August 1983. The petitioner company furnished Bank Guarantee from Allahabad Bank, Calcutta, as and by way of earnest money of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The said Bank Guarantee is dt. 8-8-1983, and was to remain valid till 30-4-84. One of the clauses of the said Bank Guarantee is that the said Government Company shall have the right to demand payment under the said Bank Guarantee at any time in their discretion and Allahabad Bank bind themselves to pay to the Government Company the guaranteed amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- without raising any objection or making any reference to the petitioner. One other term of the said Bank Guarantee is that Allahabad Bank shall not raise any question on a demand being made by the Government Company and shall forthwith on demand pay the guaranteed amount to the Government Company.

    2. It is alleged by the petitioners that due to the strike commenced at the petitioners factory with effect from 16-1-1984, the petitioners could not fulfil the terms and conditions of the said contract. By a letter D/- 13-2-1984, the Government Company cancelled the said contract in the following terms:—

    “Sub: Supply of “A” Twill bags.

    Ref: Our Order No. P/RD/Gunnies/83-84/M/11765 dated 12-8-1983.

    As per the terms of the above order you should have made supplies as per the schedule indicated below:—

    October, 1983 — 2.00 lakh bags December, 1983 — 2.62 lakh bags January, 1984 — 2.38 lakh bags February, 1984 — 3.28 lakh bags.

    To our dismay we found that at the end of December 1983, you have hardly supplied 2.00 lakh bags and you could supply a further quantity of 1.8 lakh bags approximately till 15-1-1984. Subsequently you informed us that you will not be able to supply any bags due to strike in the Jute Mills till normalcy returns. As you had failed to stick to the delivery schedule at least up to 15-1-1984 we were put to lot of inconvenience and forced to make alternative arrangement for keeping our factory running. Kindly treat our order for the balance quantity as cancelled, as we had already made alternative arrangements to meet our requirements.

    This cancellation is issued without prejudice to the terms and conditions of our order…….”

    3. By a letter D/- 14-3-1984, Allahabad Bank intimated the petitioner company that they have received a letter from the beneficiary of the Bank Guarantee (that is the Government Company) stating that the petitioners had failed to supply them bags as per terms of the order and that the Government Company has registered their claim for Rs. 1,00.000/- with the Allahabad Bank against the said Bank Guarantee. By the said letter, petitioner Company was requested to advise Allahabad Bank their instructions/comments and if nothing was heard regarding encashment of the Bank Guarantee within a week, then Allahabad Bank would have no other alternative but to remit the amount to the beneficiary of the guarantee to honour the commitment under the said Bank Guarantee. It is surprising that although it was specifically mentioned in the Bank Guarantee that before making the payment, no reference would be made to the petitioner company, even then, Allahabad Bank, for the reasons best known to them, without encashing the Bank Guarantee intimated the petitioner company about the demand made by the Government Company.

    4. In the writ application the petitioner company have challenged the enforcement of the Bank Guarantee by the Government Company. Upon the said application on 29-3-1984, A.K Janah. J. granted ad interim order in terms of prayers (g), (h) and (i) which are to the following effect:

    (g) Injunction restraining respondent 2 and/or its servants or agents and/or assigns from demanding or receiving any amount under the purported Bank Guarantee D/- 8-8-1983 and from giving any effect to the purported demand D/- 13-2-1984;

    (h) Injunction restraining respondent 3 from making any payment under the Bank Guarantee D/- 8-8-1983;

    (i) Injunction restraining respondents 2 and 3 from giving any effect to the purported demand D/- 13-2-1984 and from acting in reliance thereof.

    5. The petitioners have asked for extension of the said interim order on the same application. It has been submitted that notice has been served upon the Government Company as well as on Allahabad Bank. No one, however, appears on behalf of the respondents.

    6. It has been contended by Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner company, that the contracts for trading and the sale or purchase of jute goods are subject to the provisions of Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and Bye-laws of the East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Limited (hereinafter referred to as the said Exchange). The contract between the petitioner company and the Government Company was not in compliance with the provisions of the bye-laws of the said Exchange or the said Act and as such the said contract was and is void. Consequently the said Bank Guarantee which was issued or furnished in consideration of entering into the said agreement is also void and no effect can be given thereto. In support of his contention Mr. Gupta has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Megna Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ashoka Marketing Co.† reported in AIR 1971 SC 166. It was laid down there that if the contract is not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act or the Bye-laws of the said Exchange and is not in form prescribed, the contract would be void and illegal. It was further held by the Supreme Court in that case that literal compliance with the prescribed form may not be essential but if the contract does not contain all the terms and conditions set out in the form the contract would be void. It has nowhere been alleged that either the petitioner company or the Government Company is a member of the said Exchange. Assuming that the FCR Act, 1952 and, the Bye-laws of the said Exchange are applicable it has not been shown that the contract entered into in this case is not in the prescribed form. Nor it is the case of the petitioner that all the terms and conditions of the contract have not been set out in the tender. On the contrary, all the terms and conditions of the contract are contained in the tender documents.

    7. Mr. Gupta has also cited another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jaikishan Dass Mull v. Luchhiminarain Kanoria & Co., reported in AIR 1974 SC 1579 which has reiterated the principles laid down in the case of Megna Mills Co. Ltd. (supra).

    8. In my judgment, this application is thoroughly misconceived. There was a concluded contract by and between the petitioner and the Government Company. I am prima facie satisfied that FCR Act, 1952 has no application in this case. In any event in absence of any particulars as to how and in what manner the contract in this case was not in compliance with the said Act and the Bye-laws of the said Exchange, I am unable to hold that the contract has not been entered into in compliance with the provisions of the said Act and the Bye-laws. The petitioner company has acted upon the contract and only after it has committed breach and the contract has been terminated by the Government Company the petitioner has come with the story that the contract is void not being in conformity with the provisions of the said Act and the Bye-laws.

    9. There is a breach of contract on the part of the petitioner company and accordingly the Government Company terminated the contract. Whether that termination is right or wrong cannot be decided by this Court in this jurisdiction. It has not been alleged that the Government Company acted arbitrarily in terminating the Contract. On the contrary, in the letter D/- 13-2-1984, the reasons have been given why the Government Company.was compelled to cancel the contract. I am also not satisfied that any writ will lie in the instant case against the Government Company inasmuch as the Government Company in the matter of entering or cancelling the contract or enforcing the Bank Guarantee is not discharging any, statutory function. Merely because fifty one per cent of the paid up share capital of the Government Company is held by State of Andhra Pradesh will not make it amenable to the writ jurisdiction. The rights and obligations of the parties must be governed by the contract and no question of any violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution or any other provision of Constitution arises. I am also of the view that the Government Company was and is entitled to invoke the Bank Guarantee in terms of the contract. It has been laid by the Supreme Court in the case of United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India reported in AIR 1981 SC 1426 that the courts, usually refrain from granting injunction to restrain performance of contractual obligations arising out of Letter of Credit or a Bank Guarantee. In view of the Banker's obligations under the Bank Guarantee to pay, his customer cannot instruct him not to pay. A Bank Guarantee is very much like a Letter of Credit. The Courts will do their utmost to enforce it according to its terms. They will not, in the ordinary course of things, interfere by way of injunction to prevent its due implementation. A bank which gives a performance guarantee must honour that guarantee according to its terms. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case to justify the interference with the implementation of the Bank Guarantee. I am not satisfied that the invocation of the Bank Guarantee by the Government Company is wrongful illegal or arbitrary. After entering into a contract with the Government Company for supply of gunny bags and after having acted upon the said contract and having failed to perform its part of the obligations, the petitioner company cannot now contend that the said agreement was not legal or valid in view of the provisions of FCR Act, 1952, and the Bye-laws of the East India Jute & Hessian Exchange Limited. This is not a case in which writ court should exercise its discretion and grant the injunction.

    10. I am prima facie satisfied that no ground has been made out for the interim order being continued till the disposal of the Rule. I, therefore, vacate the interim order D/- 29-3-1984 and direct Allahabad Bank, respondent 3 to forthwith make payment of the amount covered by the Bank Guarantee to respondent 2. In the event the Rule succeeds, respondent 2 shall refund the said amount covered by the Bank guarantee to the petitioner. Advocate on Record of respondent 2 is directed to communicate this order to Allahabad Bank, respondent 3 forthwith.

    11. Let a plain copy of this order countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be given to the Advocate appearing for the party.

    Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Alliance Mills (Lessees) Pvt. Ltd., And Another v. Union Of India And Others
    (May 29, 1984)