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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Application under Section 20, Arbitration Act

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from a contract dated 24 August 1977 for construction work at a paper plant in Bagaha, West Champaran, Bihar. The contract (and an earlier work order dated 16 August 1977) contained an arbitration clause naming Messrs Kothary & Co., Calcutta, as the arbitrator: “In the case of any dispute/differences ... shall be referred to arbitration of the Architect, namely, Messrs Kothary & Co., Calcutta, whose decision shall be final and binding on both the parties.”

Disputes developed under the contract and the petitioner (plaintiff) alleged breach by the named arbitrator Kothari & Co. On or about 11 January 1979 the petitioner instituted Title Suit No. 79 of 1979 in the City Civil Court seeking declarations, injunction and other reliefs. Interlocutory applications for injunction were rejected; an appeal (from the interlocutory order) was dismissed on 25 February 1980.

The petitioner previously filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act on 23 August 1980 before this court; that application was dismissed by S.C. Deb, J. on 12 September 1980 on the ground that there was a likelihood of conflicting decisions between the City Civil Court suit and an arbitrator-appointed reference.

The petitioner then applied to withdraw the City Civil Court suit under Order 23, Rule 1, sub-rule (3) of the Civil Procedure Code; by order dated 26 September 1980 the City Civil Court permitted withdrawal leaving liberty to institute a fresh suit and imposed payment of Rs. 200 as a condition. Following that withdrawal, on 1 October 1980 the petitioner presented the present (second) application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act seeking filing of the arbitration agreement and reference to arbitration (and, by prayer, seeking substitution of the named arbitrator).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court should make an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act to file the arbitration agreement and refer the parties to the arbitrator named in the agreement.
  2. Whether the petitioner can, in the Section 20 application, obtain substitution or variation of the arbitration agreement by asking the court to appoint a different arbitrator than the named arbitrator (i.e., whether the court has power under Section 20 to substitute the named arbitrator).
  3. Whether the petitioner’s prior conduct (instituting suit, pursuing interlocutory relief and appeal, withdrawing the suit with liberty to file afresh) constitutes sufficient cause or estoppel to refuse an order under Section 20.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Plaintiff) — Mr. Sunrhit Deb

  • All conditions under Section 20 (sub-section (1)) were satisfied and the respondent had not shown sufficient cause to refuse filing the arbitration agreement and making an order of reference.
  • The earlier Section 20 application was dismissed only because of the possibility of conflicting decisions while the City Civil Court suit was pending; that conflict has been removed because the suit was withdrawn under Order 23, Rule 1, sub-rule (3) CPC with liberty to file a fresh suit.
  • On instruction from the client, counsel withdrew the allegations against the arbitrator in the petition so that the original arbitration agreement could be filed and the named arbitrator appointed (i.e., petitioner no longer pressed the allegations of bias to enable filing of the agreement).

Respondent (Defendant) — Mr. Bimal Chatterjee

  • The petitioner’s prior conduct in instituting a suit before the ordinary civil court evidenced an intention to abandon the arbitration agreement and pursue ordinary litigation; that conduct constitutes sufficient cause for refusing an order under Section 20.
  • The City Civil Court order (Order No. 39 dated 26 September 1980) granted leave to file a fresh suit but did not permit reference to arbitration under Section 20; thus the petitioner is estopped from seeking an order under Section 20.
  • Submitted that the court’s exercise of discretion under Section 20 is analogous to its discretion under Sections 20 and 34 of the Arbitration Act and invoked established principles governing "sufficient cause" (including reference to Supreme Court authority in Abdul Kader's case).
  • Contended that the named arbitrator (Kothari & Co., a firm of architects and engineers) may not be a proper arbitrator (being a firm rather than an individual or institutional tribunal), which also constitutes sufficient cause not to file the arbitration agreement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Kader's case, AIR 1962 SC 406 Clarifies that Section 20 vests a wide discretion in the court; it is not possible to prescribe in general terms what constitutes "sufficient cause" to refuse an order under Section 20 — the court must decide on the facts of each case. The Court relied on this authority to justify exercising its discretion and to conclude that, on the facts of the present case, sufficient cause existed to refuse to file the arbitration agreement and make an order of reference.
Gannon Dunkerlay & Co., AIR 1962 Cal 360 Cited by respondent to support principles about the exercise of the court's discretion under the Arbitration Act (as to what constitutes sufficient cause). The Court noted the citation but did not elaborate detailed reliance on it in its reasoning; it was referenced by respondent counsel to reinforce the submission about discretionary exercise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a fact-specific, step-by-step analysis focused on whether sufficient cause existed to refuse an order under Section 20. The principal elements of the court's reasoning are:

  1. Procedural history and conduct: The petitioner had earlier instituted Title Suit No. 79 of 1979 in the City Civil Court, pursued interlocutory relief and an appeal (both unsuccessful), and had earlier applied under Section 20 which was dismissed by S.C. Deb, J. because of a pending suit and possibility of conflicting decisions. After withdrawal of the suit under Order 23 R.1 sub-rule (3) CPC with liberty to sue afresh, the petitioner filed the present Section 20 application.
  2. Allegations against named arbitrator: The petitioner in its petition made specific allegations (paras. 25 and 26) that the named arbitrator, Kothari & Co., was biased and unsuitable. The petitioner sought, by prayer (c), appointment of another arbitrator in place of Kothari & Co.
  3. Nature of Section 20: The court characterized Section 20 as a machinery provision that permits filing of the arbitration agreement and reference in terms of that agreement. The court emphasized that it has no power under Section 20 to vary or substitute the original arbitration agreement by appointing a different arbitrator in place of the one named in the agreement at the instance of one party.
  4. Effect of seeking substitution: The court held that the petitioner’s request effectively sought variation or substitution of the arbitration agreement (by replacing the named arbitrator), which the court cannot do under Section 20. This, the court held, constitutes sufficient cause to refuse to file the agreement.
  5. Conduct demonstrating abandonment/estoppel: The court found that, on the petitioner’s conduct — initiating ordinary court proceedings, pursuing interlocutory remedies, bringing an appeal and then withdrawing the suit to seek fresh remedy — the petitioner had shown an intention to abandon arbitration in favor of litigation. The court accepted respondent’s submission that such conduct amounted to estoppel by procedure and constituted sufficient cause to refuse the Section 20 relief.
  6. Nature of named arbitrator: The court acknowledged the respondent’s contention that a firm of architects and engineers (Kothari & Co.) may not be an appropriate arbitrator (not being an individual or institutional tribunal). While the court did not finally decide on that legal question, it treated the contention as adding weight to sufficient cause for refusing the order.
  7. Reliance on precedent: The court expressly relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Abdul Kader's case that the court has wide discretion and must decide sufficiency of cause on facts of each case. Applying that principle to the facts before it, the court concluded that this was a case where discretion should be exercised against making an order under Section 20.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act is dismissed; no order will be made for filing the arbitration agreement or for reference to the arbitrator named in the agreement, and the application is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner will not obtain a court order under Section 20 to file the arbitration agreement or to refer the matter to the named arbitrator (Kothari & Co.) pursuant to that agreement.
  • The court concluded that sufficient cause existed (on the facts and conduct of the petitioner, and due to the petitioner's attempt to vary the named arbitrator) to exercise its discretion against making an order under Section 20. The court emphasized that it has no power under Section 20 to substitute or vary the arbitration agreement by appointing a different arbitrator at the instance of one party.
  • The order expressly preserves the petitioner-plaintiff’s substantive rights to proceed according to law if so advised (i.e., the dismissal does not extinguish other legal remedies available to the petitioner).
  • No new broad legal precedent altering the scope of Section 20 was laid down by this order; the decision applies the established discretionary principle (as described in Abdul Kader's case) to the specific facts and conduct before the court.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been inferred beyond what appears in the text.

    M/S. Kalipada Das v. M/S. North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. .

    This is the second application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act for filing the arbitration agreement dated 24th August, 1977.

    2. Shortly the facts are that pursuant to an invitation of tender made by the respondent/defendant for construction of a paper plant building at Bagaha, District West Champaran in the State of Bihar the petitioning creditor submitted its tender and work order was placed by the respondent/defendant dated 16th August, 1977 and formal contract was entered into being dated 24th August 1977, a copy of which is annexed to the petition. The said contract contained an arbitration clause in the following terms:

    “In the case of any dispute/differences arise during the course of execution of this contract and/or thereafter relating to this contract, the matter/dispute/difference shall be referred to arbitration of the Architect, namely, Messrs Kothary & Co., Calcutta, whose decision shall be final and binding on both the parties.”

    It appears that certain disputes arose between the parties in respect of the said contract and the petitioner-plaintiff alleged breach on the part of the Architect Kothari & Co., the named arbitrator in the said arbitration clause and the petitioner-plaintiff claimed certain amount and thereafter on or about 11th January, 1979 the petitioner-plaintiff instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 79 of 1979 (M/S. Kalipada Das… v. M/S. North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd.….) in the City Civil Court inter alia praying for a decree for declaration that the said contract dated 24th August 1977 was still subsisting and also for injunction and other reliefs. In the said suit the plaintiff made an interlocutory application for temporary injunction against the respondent/defendant from obstructing the petitioner plaintiff from carrying out the work under the said contract which was rejected and from the said order the petitioner plaintiff preferred an appeal on 23rd January 1977 which was also dismissed on 25th February, 1980. On 23rd August, 1980 the petitioner plaintiff made the first application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act before this court which was dismissed by S.C Deb, J. on the 12th September, 1980 inter alia on the ground that there is a likelihood of conflicting decisions between the two forums, one being the said suit pending before the City Civil Court and another by the arbitrator if appointed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. It appears to me that in the said short judgment of Deb, J. dated 12th September 1980 his lordship held that there was sufficient cause not to make an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Subsequently the petitioner plaintiff made an application under Section 23(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure before the City Civil Court for withdrawing the said title suit unconditionally and for an order granting the petitioner leave and/or permission to institute fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of the title suit No. 79 of 1979 in the approppriate court. The City Civil Court 12th Bench by an order dt. 26th Sept. 80 made an order under Sec. 23, Rule 1, sub-rule (3) after contest and the petitioner plaintiff was permitted to sue afresh on the said subject-matter or cause of action if not otherwise barred and payment of Rs. 200/- was made a condition precedent to be made by the petitioner plaintiff to the respondent/defendant. Thereafter the present application under Section 20 was presented on the 1st October, 1980 and after directions were given for filing affidavits the matter came up for hearing.

    3. Mr. Sunrhit Deb, appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner submitted that all the conditions under S. (20?) sub-section (1) are satisfied and the respondent/defendant has failed to show sufficient cause why the arbitration agreement should not be filed and order of reference should be made as prayed for in the present petition. He also submitted that the previous Section 20 application was dismissed by Deb, J. only on the ground of possibility of conflicting decisions between City Civil Court and the arbitrator to be appointed under the Arbitration Act and such a situation should not be allowed to happen and, therefore, the application was dismissed. Mr. Deb submitted that thereafter the suit having been withdrawn under Order 23. R. 3. sub-rule (3) of the Civil Procedure Code the said suit is no longer pending and liberty was given to file a fresh suit on the same subject-matter and, therefore, the petitioner has instituted the present application under Section 20 which is to be treated as a suit under Section 20, sub-section (2) of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, all the conditions being satisfied an order should be made as prayed for.

    4. Mr. Bimal Chatterjee, appearing for the respondent/defendant, submitted that the petitioner-plaintiff having instituted a suit before the City Civil Court has indicated its intention to abandon the arbitration agreement and take recourse to ordinary course of law by filing the said suit. Therefore, that constituted a sufficient cause why the arbitration agreement should not be filed. He drew my attention to the order of the City Civil Court, a certified copy of which was produced in court being Order No. 39 dated 26th September, 1980 in the said Title Suit No. 79 of 1979 (M/S. Kalipada Das… v. M/S. North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd.….) and submitted that leave was granted only for the purpose of filing a fresh suit on the same subject-matter and not for reference to arbitration by making an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, the petitioner-plaintiff is estopped from making this application under Section 20 and that constitutes sufficient cause for not granting the order as prayed for. He referred to the well known principle that the court is to exercise its discretion in making an order under Section 20 and the principle under Sections 20 and 34 of the Arbitration Act as to the exercise of court's discretion is same. Reference may be made to the decision of Gannon Dunkerlay & Co., AIR 1962 Cal 360, Mr. Chatterjee also referred to the principle on which the discretion of the court is to be exercised and what is meant by sufficient cause under Section 20, sub-section (4) of the Arbitration Act as laid down in the Supreme Court decision in Abdul Kader's case reported in AIR 1962 SC 406. Therefore, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the present application should be dismissed as sufficient cause has been shown by the respondent/defendant as to why the order should not be made for filing the arbitration agreement. Mr. Chatterjee also pointed out that in the arbitration agreement the reference is made to named arbitrator being Kothari & Co., which is a firm of architect and well known engineers and not a tribunal of arbitration or a person who can be appointed as arbitrator. The said contention is not absolutely without substance as it may be contended that a firm of architect cannot be appointed as an arbitrator as it is not a tribunal of arbitration which generally takes institutional arbitrations. For the purpose of the present application it is not necessary for me to make any comment on the said submission and express any final opinion on this aspect of the matter.

    5. Considering the matter very carefully it appears to me that the petitioner-plaintiff after filing the said Title Suit No. 79 of 1979 in the City Civil Court, in which he made successive interlocutory application for injunction and preferred an appeal therefrom and also failed in the appeal then came up before this court in a previous Section 20 application filed the very same arbitration agreement and order of reference which was dismissed by S.C Deb, J. on the ground of the pendency of the suit before the City Civil Court and possibility of conflicting decisions between the court and the arbitrator. In the present petition it appears that the petitioner-plaintiff has made specific allegations against the said appointed arbitrator Kothari & Co. being biased and unsuitable for being appointed as arbitrator. The said averments are in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the petition. That perhaps, in my view, constitute sufficient cause why the arbitration agreement should not be filed as the petitioner-plaintiff is really asking to amend the arbitration agreement by replacing the arbitrator by another, other than the appointed arbitrator. Prayer (c) of the petition itself shows that the petitioner is asking for appointment of another arbitrator in place of Kothari & Co., the appointed arbitrator in the said agreement. In my view the said contention of the petitioner-plaintiff land the prayer in the petition make it quite clear that the petitioner-plaintiff is asking for varying the arbitration agreement between the parties by a sole arbitrator to be appointed by the court. In my view that will amount to substitution of the original arbitration agreement by the court. Section 20 is a machinery section by which the arbitration agreement is filed and reference is made to the appointed arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement. It is an admitted position that there is a named arbitrator, whether a firm of engineers and architect can be appointed as arbitrator is a different question but assuming such an appointment can be made then the petitioner-plaintiff is asking for appointment of another arbitrator than the appointed arbitrator which amounts to varying the original arbitration agreement which is sought to be filed by the petitioner-plaintiff in this application. Therefore, on the well-settled principle that under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act the court has no power to substitute one agreement by another agreement at the request of one of the parties. It appears to me that this also constitutes a sufficient cause why the arbitration agreement should not be filed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The petitioner himself has made specific allegations of bias and unsuitability against the arbitrator and, therefore, the question of filing the arbitration agreement as such cannot arise unless it is amended by replacing the appointed arbitrator by the parties under the arbitration agreement by another arbitrator, Mr. Deb appearing for the petitioner-plaintiff submitted that on instruction from his client he is withdrawing the allegations against the arbitrator made in the petition so that the order can be made for filing the arbitration agreement as such and order of reference may be made to the arbitrator appointed under the arbitration agreement. In my view, it is too late and cannot be encouraged by court as from the conduct of the petitioner-plaintiff all through first instituting a suit before the City Civil Court in respect of the said contract, making interlocutory applications and after the Same failed, preferring an appeal which also became unsuccessful then made an application under Section 20 which was also dismissed due to the pendency of the City Civil Court suit at that time, as hereinbefore stated; thereafter withdrawing the City Civil Court suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same subject-matter and is now coming forward with another application under Section 20 is something which the court should not encourage and it amounts to estoppel by the procedure and, in my view, Mr. Chatterjee is right in his submission that by the conduct of the petitioner-plaintiff it has demonstrated its intention to abandon the arbitration agreement and take recourse to suit and that constitute a sufficient cause.

    6. After carefully considering the facts of this case and the petitioners' own averments in paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26 I am satisfied that there is sufficient cause why the arbitration agreement should not be filed and prayer asked for substituting the appointed arbitrator by another arbitrator at the instance of the petitioner-plaintiff in this application is not permissible under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and court has no such power. Therefore, in my view, in the peculiar facts of this case which constitute sufficient cause being shown by the respondent/defendant why an order under Section 20 should not be made. I have already referred to the Supreme Court decision in Abdul Kader's case reported in AIR 1962 SC 406 where the Supreme Court has observed that the power of the court to make an order under Section 20 is a matter of discretion (at p. 410):

    “The words of this sub-section leave a wide discretion in the court to consider whether an order for filing the agreement should be made and a reference made accordingly. It is neither necessary nor desirable to lay down in general terms what would be sufficient cause which would entitle the court to refuse to make an order of reference. The court will have to decide on the facts of each case whether sufficient cause has been made out for not ordering the agreement to be filed and not making the order of reference.”

    Therefore, it is quite clear that the court has to exercise its discretion in making an order under Section 20 taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of a particular casa in its proper perspective and come to a conclusion whether an order under Section 20 should be made in the facts of a particular case. As I have analysed the facts of this case, from the conduct of the petitioners it has been demonstrated clearly that it has no intention to go to arbitration but filed a suit before the ordinary court of law, as he has done in this case, and withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same subject-matter. Apart from the said fact the petitioner himself has alleged bias and unsuitability of the arbitrator appointed under the arbitration agreement and, therefore, asking for variation of the arbitration agreement under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and his prayer (c) in the petition makes the said intention of the petitioner to vary the arbitration agreement by changing the arbitrator unilaterally by this court which the court has no power. Therefore, in my view, this is a fit case where the court should not exercise its discretion in favour of making an order for filing the arbitration agreement as the arbitration agreement, as it stands now is not asked for by the petitioner to be filed but he is asking for a different arbitration agreement by changing the name of the arbitrator to be filed which the court has no power to do. As a result there is some force in the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that a firm of architect and engineers being Kothari & Co. cannot be appointed as an arbitrator as it is not a person or an institutional arbitrator what is known as tribunal of arbitration and as such there is some force in that contention and constitute a sufficient cause for not making an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act.

    7. In the result, there will not be an order under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act and the application is dismissed with costs.

    8. This order will not prejudice the rights of the petitioner-plaintiff to proceed according to law, if so advised.

    Application dismissed.

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    Comments

    M/S. Kalipada Das v. M/S. North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. .
    (Jan 5, 1981)