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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.N. Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two First Miscellaneous Appeals (No. 255 of 1964 by the decree-holders and No. 264 of 1964 by the auction-purchaser) arising from an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to set aside an execution sale.

The disputed property (Premises Nos. 1 and 2 Nityadhon Mukherjee Road, Howrah) was held by Sils in superior interest; respondent No. 1 (or his predecessor) was the lessee under a lease dated October 6, 1920 for fifty years (expiring 16 August 1970). The appellants were sub-lessees.

In or about 1957 the appellants instituted Title Suit No. 104 of 1957 for specific performance of a contract of renewal of the sub-lease. That suit was decreed on 6 July 1960, including costs. The decree (including costs of Rs. 1,731.69 P.) was put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 21 of 1960 on 20 August 1960 with two prayers: (1) execution and registration of a lease/sub-lease in terms of the decree; and (2) realisation of decretal costs by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor-lessor's interest.

The judgment-debtor's objection under Section 47 CPC was dismissed on 25 January 1961. The lease (sub-lease) was executed and registered between 3 March 1961 and 17 April 1961. The decretal-costs realisation proceeded; the sale took place on 11 September 1961, when Sailendra Nath Ganguly (Respondent No. 2 in F.M.A. 255 and appellant in F.M.A. 264) purchased the interest for Rs. 9,999/-. Delivery of possession was purportedly taken on 1 December 1961 after obtaining the sale certificate.

On 13 December 1961 the judgment-debtor Kanyalal Jhawar applied to set aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 90 (Misc. Case No. 65 of 1961), alleging that sale processes and related execution processes had been suppressed. The learned trial Judge allowed that application by order dated 21 February 1964. The present appeals challenge that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution sale should be set aside under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC on the grounds of fraud/material irregularity and suppression of process.
  2. Whether the sale was conducted at a grossly undervalued price such that it amounts to a fraud on the Court and vitiates the sale.
  3. Whether the application to set aside the sale was time-barred (i.e., barred by limitation).
  4. Whether service of the notice under Order 21, Rule 66 CPC on the judgment-debtor was proved.

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-Debtor's (Applicant's) Arguments

  • The judgment-debtor applied to set aside the execution sale under Order 21, Rule 90 alleging that the sale processes and the related execution processes had been suppressed.
  • The application asserted material irregularity and/or fraud in the conduct of the sale (as reflected by the trial court's consideration and ultimate allowance of the application).

Decree-holders' and Auction-purchaser's (Appellants') Arguments

  • Their primary opposition to the setting-aside application was based on three contentions: (a) there was no material irregularity or fraud in the sale proceedings; (b) the property was not sold at an undervalue; and (c) the application to set aside the sale was time-barred.
  • Before the High Court they also attacked the learned Subordinate Judge's findings that: (a) the auction-purchaser was a benamidar (nominee) of the decree-holders; (b) the sale proceedings were vitiated by fraud; (c) the property had been sold at a shockingly low valuation; (d) processes had been fraudulently suppressed; and (e) the judgment-debtor suffered substantial injury as a result of the material irregularity and fraud. The appellants contended these findings were not supported by the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Marudanayagam Pillai v. Manickavasakam Chettiar, 49 Cal WN 292 : AIR 1945 PC 67 Authority that deliberately putting a shockingly low valuation for property in a sale proclamation may amount to fraud on the Court and vitiate the sale. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that an abnormally low proclamation value (Rs. 1,500) and resulting sale price indicated fraud on the Court warranting setting the sale aside.
Prabodh Chandra Mukherjee v. Pasupati Mukherjee, (1967) 71 Cal WN 649 Explanation/precedential application of the principle that a deliberately low valuation can amount to fraud on the Court. Used to explain and reinforce the Marudanayagam principle, as applied by this Court, to the facts here (abnormally low valuation vitiating the sale).
Pankaj Kumar Pakhira v. Nani Bala Pakhira, ILR (1968) 1 Cal 43 Another decision of this Court illustrating application of the principle that undervaluation in sale proclamation can constitute fraud on the Court. Also cited to show the Court's earlier treatment of similar undervaluation-as-fraud issues and to support the conclusion that the sale should be set aside.
Kamal Kumar Nag Choudhury v. Parbati Charan Kundu, AIR 1961 Cal 81 (SB) Principle that fraud on the part of decree-holders is sufficient for certain procedural consequences under Section 18 of the Limitation Act; it need not be shown that the auction-purchaser also acted fraudulently. The Court cited this case to support its statement that fraud on the part of the decree-holders will vitiate proceedings irrespective of questions under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and that fraud by the auction-purchaser need not be established for that consequence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a step-by-step analysis strictly grounded in the materials before it:

  1. Valuation from income: The Court accepted the figures before it that the interest sold entitled its holder to a net profit of Rs. 600 per month. This came from realisable sub-lease receipts of Rs. 1,600 per month and an outgoing rent to the head lessor of about Rs. 1,000 per month.
  2. Remaining lease term and minimum value: Because at the time of sale the lease had roughly nine years remaining (sale Sept. 1961; lease expiring in 1970), the Court computed a conservative minimum value of the interest as not less than Rs. 60,000 on that footing.
  3. Comparison with declared values and sale price: In contrast, the decree-holders had stated a value of Rs. 6,000 in the execution petition and further reduced it to Rs. 1,500 in the sale proclamation. The sale fetched Rs. 9,999 and odd. The Court found this gap stark and alarming.
  4. Explanations examined and rejected: The decree-holders offered two principal explanations for the low proclamation value — (a) that the property was heavily in arrears; and (b) the judgment-debtor's name had not been mutated in the landlord's sherista. The Court examined documentary material (including the rent counterfoil, Ext. J) and found that arrears, if any, did not exceed one or two months and the necessary thirty-day period for forfeiture had not expired. Oral testimony suggesting later payment was contradicted by the counterfoil. The non-mutation point was held to be of little consequence because the interest was transferable under law and lack of mutation did not reduce its value.
  5. Conclusion of intentional undervaluation/fraud on Court: On this record the Court concluded the abnormally low proclamation value could not be justified by the explanations and amounted to a deliberate act by the decree-holders — an act that, on authority (Marudanayagam and the subsequent Calcutta decisions), amounted to fraud on the Court and vitiated the sale.
  6. Service of requisite notice under Order 21, Rule 66 CPC: The Court also scrutinised the proof of service of the notice under Order 21, Rule 66. The only evidence was the process-server's return; the process-server admitted lack of independent recollection and no identifier or named witnesses were produced. On that basis the Court found service of the notice on the judgment-debtor had not been proved.
  7. Knowledge and timing: Given defective service and the accepted evidence (which the trial court had accepted and which this Court found no reason to reject) that the judgment-debtor was residing far from the property and had no knowledge of the attachment or proclamation, the Court accepted that the judgment-debtor only learned of the sale on or about 9 December 1961. On that footing, the Court held the setting-aside application was within time and not barred by limitation.
  8. Effect of fraud on limitation and necessity of establishing fraud by purchaser: The Court observed that, because this was a case of fraud on the Court, the proceedings were vitiated irrespective of Section 18 of the Limitation Act; for the purposes of that section, fraud by the decree-holders alone would suffice and it was not necessary to establish fraud by the auction-purchaser.
  9. Scope of appellate review: The Court noted that it was unnecessary to decide every other finding by the Subordinate Judge because the above conclusions (fraud on Court; defective service; timely application) were sufficient to support setting aside the sale and dismissal of the appeals.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court affirmed the learned Subordinate Judge's order setting aside the execution sale and dismissed the appeals. In the Court's words, the appeals "would fail and they would be dismissed."

Implications / Consequences:

  • The sale in question is vitiated and set aside because of fraud on the Court arising from an abnormally low valuation in the sale proclamation and related conduct.
  • The judgment-debtor's application to set aside the sale was held to be within time and not barred by limitation; the Court explicitly stated that fraud on the part of the decree-holders is sufficient for the relevant consequences under the Limitation Act and it is not necessary to establish fraud by the auction-purchaser.
  • The appeals by the decree-holders and the auction-purchaser were dismissed; there would be no order as to costs in either appeal.
  • The ancillary interim Rules connected to these appeals were treated as spent by the disposal of the appeals, and the related Civil Revision Rules were deemed disposed on that footing.
  • The Court declined to re-open or disturb any other subordinate findings unnecessary to the dispositive conclusion.

Final procedural disposition: Appeals dismissed; no order for costs; connected interim Rules deemed spent.

    Sisir Kumar Mukherjee And Others v. Kanyalal Jhewar And Others

    P.N Mookerjee, J.:— The above two appeals arise out of the same proceeding under Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC for setting aside an execution sale. First Miscellaneous Appeal No. 255 of 1964 is by the decree-holders and the other First Miscellaneous Appeal, namely, No. 264 of 1964, is by the auction-purchaser.

    2. The property in question, namely, Premises Nos. 1 and 2 (now No. 1) Nityadhon Mukherjee Road, Howrah, belonged to the Sils (sic) in superior interest, under whom respondent No. 1 and/or his predecessor was the lessee under a lease, dated October 6, 1920, for a period of fifty years, expiring in August 16, 1970. The appellants were sub-lessees in respect of the said property. In or about the year 1957 the appellants instituted a suit (Title Suit No. 104 of 1957 of the First Court of the Subordinate Judge, Howrah) for specific performance of a contract of renewal of the sub-lease. That suit was decreed on July 6, 1960. with costs. The said decree, including the decree for costs, was put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 21 of 1960 on August 20, 1960. In the said execution, there was a two-fold prayer: first, for execution and registration of a document of lease or sub-lease in terms of the above decree and, secondly, for realisation of the decretal costs of Rs. 1,731.69 P. by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor-lessor's interest. The judgment-debtor's objection under Section 47 of the CPC, filed on November 4, 1960 (Misc. Case No. 51 of 1961), was dismissed on January 25, 1961, and, thereafter, the lease (sub-lease) was executed and registered between March 3, 1961 and April 17, 1961. This was followed by the decree-holders' prayer for realisation of the above decretal costs by attachment and sale of the lessor's interest, as stated hereinbefore. In this proceeding, the sale was actually held on September 11, 1961, and Sailendra Nath Ganguly (Respondent No. 2 in F.M.A 255 of 1964 and Appellant in F.M.A 264 of 1964) became the auction-purchaser for a sum of Rs. 9,999/-. Delivery of possession was purported to have been taken by the auction-purchaser on December 1, 1961, after obtaining the requisite sale certificate. On December 13, 1961. the judgment-debtor Kanyalal Jhawar applied for setting aside the said sale under Order 21, Rule 90 of the CPC in Misc. Case No. 65 of 1961, (sic) and that the sale processes and relative execution processes had all been suppressed. This application was eventually allowed by the learned trial Judge by his order, dated February 21, 1964, and, against the said order, the present two appeals have been filed by the decree-holders and the auction-purchaser respectively.

    3. The judgment-debtor's prayer for setting aside the sale was opposed principally upon three grounds. First, that there was no material irregularity or fraud in the sale proceedings; that the property was not sold at an under value and thirdly, that the application for setting aside the sale was time-barred. All the above objections, however, were overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge and the sale was set aside, as stated above. Before us, Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the decree-holders appellants in F.M.A 255 of 1964, and Mr. Bose, appearing for the auction-purchaser appellant in F.M.A 264 of 1964, have assailed the above decision of the learned Subordinate Judge upon the grounds inter alia that his findings to the effect that the auction-purchaser was really a benamidar for the decree-holders; that the sale proceedings were vitiated by fraud, that the property was sold at a gross under valuation, shockingly low, that the relative processes were all fraudulently suppressed and that the judgment-debtor suffered substantial injury as a result of material irregularity and fraud, would not be supported by the materials on record.

    4. In our view, however, whatever might be said with regard to some of the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge, his ultimate conclusion that the sale in question was liable to be set aside has to be affirmed on the following short grounds.

    5. It is clear from the materials before us that the interest, which was purported to have been sold in the execution sale in question, entitled its holder to a net profit of Rs. 600/- per month on the footing that he was entitled to realise from the sub-lease, the above decree-holders themselves, a sum of Rs. 1600/- per month and was liable to pay to his head lessor, on account of the disputed property, a rent in the neighbourhood of Rs. 1,000/- per month.

    6. That, further, at or about the time of the disputed sale, the relevant lease had a life of about nine years, the sale having taken place in September, 1961, and the period of the lease was to expire in 1970 and, upon the above footing, on the minimum computation, the value of the interest, to be sold, could not be less than Rs. 60,000/-. In the execution petition, the decree-holders put the valuation at Rs. 6,000/- and, in the sale proclamation, it was further reduced to Rs. 1,500/-, the decree-holders' explanation being that the property was heavily in arrears at the time of the settlement of the said sale proclamation and, further, that the judgment-debtor's name had not been mutated in the landlord's sherista.

    7. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that none of the above explanations would be sufficient for reducing the value of the disputed property to the abnormally low figure of Rs. 1,500/- apart from the fact that, so far as the property being heavily in arrears, the records would not sustain the said allegations. Even on the materials produced on the decree-holder's side, the arrear at the relevant time would not exceed one or two months' and, if we go by the counterfoil, (Ext. J), on which reliance was placed for showing that rent for this particular property had been paid only upto the month of May, 1961, and a part of June, 1961, the only arrears, which would be outstanding at the relevant date, would be for the month of June, 1961, and the decree-holders' allegation that that entitled the landlord to forfeit the lease under the terms thereof, would not also be supported, as, on the said counterfoil, the requisite period of thirty days had not expired.

    8. Its true that, in the oral evidence, something was said that this rent was paid sometime in October, 1961; but, in view of the fact that that evidence would be contradicted by the said counterfoil itself, it will be hard to accept the said statement or the relative explanation, given on the decree-holders' side.

    9. So far as non-mutation of the judgment-debtor's name in the landlord's sherista, we do not consider it to be of much importance as there is no question that the interest was transferable under the law and therefore, the mere fact that the holder's name had not been mutated in the landlord's sherista would not jeopardise his interest or reduce its value.

    10. We have, therefore, before us, the picture of a property, worth at least Rs. 60,000/-, put in the sale proclamation as having a value of Ra 1,500/- and, upon such valuation, the sale was held at a price of Rs. 9,999/- and odd. It would, in our view, be a case, where the decree-holders would be guilty of deliberately putting a shockingly low valuation for the disputed property in the proclamation for sale and on the authority of the Judicial Committee in the case of Marudanayagam Pillai v. Manickavasakam Chettiar, 49 Cal WN 292 : (AIR 1945 PC 67), as explained in the two decisions of this Court, in Prabodh Chandra Mukherjee v. Pasupati Mukherjee, (1967) 71 Cal WN 649 and Pankaj Kumar Pakhira v. Nani Bala Pakhira, ILR (1968) 1 Cal 43, this would amount to fraud on Court and would vitiate the sale apart from the question of any other material irregularity in the publishing or conducting of the sale.

    11. We may also point out that, in the instant case, whatever might be said with regard to service of the other processes, there is hardly any satisfactory evidence of service of the notice under Order 21, Rule 66 of the CPC on the judgment-debtor. The only evidence on this point is of the process-server, who confines himself to the return, submitted by him, and frankly confesses that he has no independent recollection in the matter. So far as the said return is concerned, it purports to have been served in the presence of an identifier and also unnamed moka bila witnesses and none of them has been examined in support of such service. In the circumstances, apart from the other reasons, given by the learned Subordinate Judge, for not accepting this service, we are inclined to hold that service of this notice under Order 21, Rule 66 of the CPC on the judgment-debtor has not been proved.

    12. It is clear, therefore, that this notice cannot fix the judgment-debtor with knowledge of the sale proceedings. As to the service of the other processes, namely, the sale proclamation and the attachment processes, even if that was made, having regard to the admitted fact that the judgment-debtor was residing far away from the disputed property and, upon his evidence, which has been accepted by the court below, and which we have no reason to reject in the facts and circumstances of this case, the judgment-debtor had no knowledge of either the attachment or the service of the sale proclamation. It is clear, therefore, that knowledge on the part of the judgment-debtor as to the sale proceedings prior to the date, alleged by him, has not been established and on the evidence before us, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that his case that he came to know of the sale only on December 9, 1961, may well be accepted.

    13. In this view, we would hold that the sale proceedings in question were vitiated by fraud on Court on the part of the decree-holders and that the judgment-debtor's application for setting aside the sale was within time and would not be barred by limitation (Vide the cases, already cited).

    14. We do not deem it necessary to go into the correctness or otherwise of any of the other findings of the learned Subordinate Judge, as, in our opinion, the same will not be necessary for supporting the conclusion, in view of our above findings, that the instant sale should be set aside.

    15. We may add also that the instant case being a case of fraud on Court, it will vitiate the proceedings apart from or irrespective of any question under Section 18 of the Limitation Act and that, even for purposes of the said section, fraud on the part of the decree-holders would be enough and it will not be necessary for attracting the same to establish fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser, (Vide, in this connection, Kamal Kumar Nag Choudhury v. Parbati Charan Kundu, AIR 1961 Cal 81 (SB)).

    16. In the premises, the appeals would fail and they would be dismissed.

    17. There would, however, be no order for costs in either of them.

    Civil Revision Cases Nos. 1496 & 1782 of 1964.

    18. As these Rules are for interim orders, pending the disposal of the above appeals, our above decision, disposing of the said appeals, puts an end to these Rules too, and they must be deemed to have spent themselves as a result of the above disposal of the connected appeals and must be held to be disposed of on that footing.

    19. We order accordingly.

    20. There will be no order for costs either in any of these Rules.

    21. Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J.:— I agree.

    22. Appeals dismissed.

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    Sisir Kumar Mukherjee And Others v. Kanyalal Jhewar And Others
    (Jan 9, 1970)