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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (D.N. Das Gupta, J. & T.P. Mujkherji, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenged an order of a learned Municipal Magistrate of Calcutta convicting the petitioners under Section 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Petitioner No. 1, Messrs Netai Chandra and Surendra Nath Dey (alias Netai Charan Dey Surendra Nath Dev), was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100. Petitioners 2 and 3 were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each. Two other persons tried with the petitioners were acquitted at the trial.

The prosecution's case was that on 22 June 1961 Dr. A. B. Mazumdar, Food Inspector of the Corporation of Calcutta, took two samples of mustard oil from the petitioners' premises after complying with formalities and sent them to the Public Analyst, who reported them as adulterated. The accused pleaded not guilty.

The defence asserted that petitioner No. 1 was a wholesale dealer licensed by the Corporation of Calcutta to deal both in edible oils and in "oil sweeping" (sweeping oil), that the material in the tins was oil sweeping (used for manufacturing, e.g., soap) which was kept outside the shop awaiting collection, and that the salesman told the Food Inspector at the time of sampling that the tins contained oil sweeping rather than mustard oil. The defence also contended that petitioners 2 and 3 were not present or in charge of the business at the relevant time.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the substance from which samples were taken constituted "mustard oil" (i.e., "food" within the meaning of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act) or was oil sweeping (a non-food material) such that the Act would not apply.
  2. Whether a Public Analyst's report that omits the results of certain prescribed tests (specifically the "unsaponifiable matter" test listed in Appendix B, item A.17.06) can be relied upon or admitted in evidence without calling the Public Analyst for examination under section 13(5) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The Food Inspector lawfully took samples of "mustard oil" from the petitioners' premises; the samples were sent to the Public Analyst whose report indicated adulteration (presence of linseed oil causing deviation in B.R. reading, saponification and iodine values).
  • The prosecution relied on the Public Analyst's report (dated 27 June 1961) to establish adulteration and supported the convictions at trial.

Petitioners' (Defence) Arguments

  • The material sampled was not mustard oil but "oil sweeping" (a mixture of oil, impurities and dirt) kept separately and sold for manufacturing purposes (e.g., soap-making); the salesman expressly told the Food Inspector this at the time of sampling.
  • There was documentary and testimonial proof of a sale of nine tins of oil sweeping to a purchaser named Shyamlal (a soapmaker), including account books and a licence/receipt indicating Shyamlal's business.
  • The Public Analyst's report was defective or incomplete because it omitted certain prescribed test results (notably the "unsaponifiable matter" test required by Appendix B, item A.17.06), and the prosecution did not examine the Public Analyst to explain omissions, raising doubts as to the report's genuineness and completeness.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the pivotal factual-legal question as whether the sampled material was "mustard oil" (thus falling within the scope of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act) or whether it was oil sweeping (outside the Act's protection as "food"). The court's analysis proceeded through the following main steps, based strictly on the textual record:

  1. Evaluation of contemporaneous admissions and notes: The court noted that when the Food Inspector intended to take samples from nine tins, the accused told him the tins contained oil sweeping and that the Food Inspector recorded that the accused had so informed him. The Public Analyst's report itself described the sample as "mustard oil said to be shipping oil" (the report language indicating the sample was described as such).
  2. Consideration of defence documentary and testimonial evidence: The defence produced account books and a witness (DW1 Shyamlal) who testified to purchasing the nine tins for soap manufacturing; a licence/receipt showed that Shyamlal was a soapmaker and seller. There was evidence that the tins were placed outside the shop and that Shyamlal arranged carriage for the tins, corroborating that the tins were in the process of sale and removal.
  3. Assessment of the Magistrate's fact-finding: Although the Magistrate accepted that the accused had told the Food Inspector the tins contained oil sweeping, he rejected the defence case that the tins had been sold to Shyamlal and considered the account books not genuine, partly because the scribe said he attended Shyamlal's shop only two or three times a week. The revisional court found these reasons unconvincing and examined the account books itself, concluding they appeared genuine and reliable.
  4. Credibility issues: The Magistrate disbelieved Shyamlal for failing to state the licence-fee or the landlord's name; the revisional court accepted the explanation that Shyamlal was an old man whose business was primarily run by his son and others, making such lapses plausible and not fatal to his credibility.
  5. Licence consideration: The revisional court noted a licence issued by the Corporation of Calcutta to the accused dated 8 July 1961 permitting wholesale trade in edible oils and "sweeping oil" from the same premises for the year 1961–1962 (the year in which the samples were taken). The court observed that the Corporation had permitted sales of both edible oils and oil sweeping from the same place, and found it inconsistent that sellers should be prosecuted for selling oil sweeping when licensed to do so from that place.
  6. Conclusion on the central question of classification: On the totality of evidence (the admission to the Food Inspector, the documentary and testimonial evidence of sale to Shyamlal, the presence of the tins outside the shop and the credible account books), the court was satisfied the accused never attempted to sell the material as mustard oil but sold it as oil sweeping — a mixture of oil, impurities and dirt — which is not "mustard oil" as defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
  7. Treatment of the Public Analyst's report and statutory testing obligations: The court addressed defence counsel Mr. Dutt's contention that the Public Analyst omitted the "unsaponifiable matter" test prescribed in Appendix B, item A.17.06, and observed that all prescribed tests should be carried out by the Public Analyst and reported. The court held that omission of particular tests is a matter affecting the weight and acceptability of the opinion, not necessarily its admissibility under section 13(5) of the Act; the report can be received in evidence without calling the Public Analyst, but whether the opinion will be accepted depends on the facts of each case. The court also noted irregularities in the copies of the Public Analyst's report (the B.R. reading omitted in the copies), and that the prosecution did not call the Public Analyst to explain.
  8. Application of legal principle to facts: Because the court concluded the sampled substance was not mustard oil within the Act, it found that the question of adulteration under the Act did not arise and therefore the convictions could not stand regardless of any deficiencies in the Public Analyst's report.

Holding and Implications

CONVICTIONS SET ASIDE; PETITIONERS ACQUITTED.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The convictions and sentences of the petitioners were set aside.
  • The petitioners were acquitted.
  • If the fine had been paid, it must be refunded.
  • Petitioners who were on bail were discharged from their bail bonds.
  • The rule in the revision petition was made absolute; the second judge (T.P. Mujkherji, J.) concurred.

Broader implications: The opinion did not purport to lay down any new, general precedent beyond the application of existing statutory standards and evidentiary principles to the facts. The court emphasized: (a) the importance of the Public Analyst performing and reporting all prescribed tests (Appendix B, item A.17.06), and (b) that omissions affect the weight of the analyst's opinion rather than its automatic inadmissibility under section 13(5). However, because the court found the sampled material was not "mustard oil" as defined in the Act, it resolved the case by acquittal on the factual classification ground rather than by setting a broad rule on admissibility in the abstract.


This summary has been prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion's contents has been added or inferred.

    Messrs Netai Chandra And Surendra Nath Dey v. Corporation Of Calcutta Opposite Party.

    D.N Das Gupta, J.:— This revision petition is directed against the order of a learned Municipal Magistrate of Calcutta convicting the petitioners under Section 7(1)/16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Petitioner No. 1 Messrs Netai Chandra and Surendra Nath Dey alias Netai Charan Dey Surendra Nath Dev was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100 Petitioners 2 and 3 were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months each. Two other persons, namely Netai Chandra Dev and Shyam Sundar Dey were also tried along with the petitioners but they were acquitted.

    2. The case for the prosecution is that on 22nd June, 1961 Dr. A.B Mazumdar, Food Inspector of the Corporation of Calcutta, went to the petitioners' firm and expressed his intention to take samples of mustard oil he took two samples after complying with all formalities and sent samples to the Public Analyst for analysis and report. On receipt of his report that the samples were adulterated the accused persons were prosecuted and placed upon trial. The accused persons pleaded not guilty. Their defence is that petitioner No. 1 is a wholesale dealer in edible oils and it was granted a licence by the Corporation of Calcutta to deal not only in edible oils but also in oil sweeping. When oil is poured in drums drops fall on the floor and get mixed up with dirt and other impurities such all is mopped up with rags and squeezed into drums. Then the scum or the sediments are allowed to drop down to the bottom and the oil above the scum is sold as oil sweeping for manufacturing purposes, such as manufacturing soap. The oil sweeping is popularly known as Latainara or Sabari 9 the containing such sweeping oil are kept outside the shop room near the door. Those tins had been sold by the petitioners as sweeping oil and were kept outside for being taken away by the buyer. Within a very short time of the tins being kept outside, the Food Inspector appeared on the scene and expressed his intention to take samples from those tins. Samples were accordingly taken by the Food Inspector. But at the time when they were taken the salesman definitely told him that the stuff from which the samples were taken was not mustard oil but oil sweeping. Another plea of defence was that petitioner No. 2 Surendra Nath Dey and the two persons who were acquitted were not present and were not in charge of the business.

    3. The crucial point for determination in this case is whether the stuff from which the samples were taken by the Food Inspector was mustard oil, that is, food within the meaning of the Food Adulteration Act. The noticeable feature in this case is that as soon as the Food Inspector wanted to take samples of mustard oil from the aforesaid 9 tins the accused gave out that those tins did not contain mustard oil but oil sweeping. The Food Inspector also made a note that the accused had told him that the sample that was being taken was samples of sweeping oil. It appears from the Public Analyst's report also that the sample that was received by him was sample of “mustard oil said to be shipping oil” There is also the evidence of DW 1 Shyamlal who was examined as a defence witness that he had purchased those 9 tins of oil sweeping for manufacturing soap. There is evidence to show that Shyamlal is a “Soapmaker and Seller” That would appear from the receipt granted by the Licence Officer of the Corporation of Calcutta. Account books were produced by the accused persons as well as by Shyamlal to prove the transaction, namely, the sale by the accused and purchase by Shyamlal of those 9 tins of oil sweeping. It is also beyond controversy that the said 9 tins were outside the accused's shop. There is evidence on behalf of the defence that after purchasing the said tins of oil sweeping Shyamlal gave the challans to the Thelawala to carry the oil sweeping to Shyamlal's shop. If that evidence is accepted then that would conclusively prove that the stuff from which the sample was taken by the Food Inspector was not mustard oil but oil sweeping. The learned Magistrate accepts the evidence that at the time of taking the sample the accused did tell the Food Inspector that what the Food Inspector was taking was not sample of mustard oil, but sample of oil sweeping Indeed that is admitted by the Food Inspector himself. But the learned Magistrate does not accept the evidence that the said 9 tins were sold by the accused to Shyamlal as tins containing oil sweeping. The grounds given by the learned Magistrate for not accepting the evidence on that point are not convincing. The learned Magistrate does not consider the account books as genuine simply because the scribe who was examined as a defence witness has said in his evidence that he used to go to Shyamlal's shop twice or thrice in the week to write out the books. The lean ed Magistrate thinks that the account book, were not kept in the regular course of business. It is rather difficult to understand the reasoning of the learned Magistrate. We have ourselves examined the account books and we do not find any reason to consider them to be spurious documents manufactured for the purpose of this case. The account books appear to us to be genuine and reliable. The learned Magistrate disbelieved Shyamlal because he could not say how much licence-fee is payable for his business and because he could not give the name of the landlord of his shop. Now, it appears from his evidence that he is an old man and the business is looked after not by him but by his son and other people. So, in those circumstances there is nothing extraordinary in his failing to say what amount was payable as trade tax or what the name of the and lord was. We are unable to agree with the learned Magistrate that the defence story of sale of aforesaid 9 tins of oil sweeping to Shyamlal is unacceptable. There are no grounds for doubting this transaction as a genuine transaction. It appears from a licence granted by the Corporation of Calcutta to the accused that they are permitted to carry on business and exercise the profession, trade or calling of W.S Trade in coconut oil, groundnut oil, linseed oil, mustard oil and sweeping oil, etc. This licence was granted by the Corporation of Calcutta to the accused on 8th July, 1961 for carrying on the business during the year 1961–1962, that is, the year in which the samples were taken by the Food Inspector. Therefore, by virtue of this licence the accused persons were authorised to carry on wholesale trade and business not only in edible oils, but also in oil sweeping from the same premises, namely, Bg 17/13+14 Orphan-gunge Market. The Corporation has permitted the accused to sell edible oil and oil sweeping from the same place. But when the accused persons sell oil sweeping from that place they are prosecuted for selling oil sweeping. It is not easy to understand the policy underlying the granting of licences to persons for selling edible oil as well as oil sweeping from the same place.

    4. On a careful consideration of the evidence and circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the accused persons never tried to sell the stuff contained in the said 9 tins as mustard oil and that they sold the said stuff to Shyamlal as oil sweeping, that is, a mixture of oil impurities, dirt and sweeping, etc. That stuff certainly is not food within the meaning of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.’

    5. It appears from the Public Analyst's Report that a sample of ‘mustard oil’ (said to be shipping oil) was received by him for analysis and report. On examination of the sample the Public Analyst was of the opinion that the sample of mustard oil did not conform to be standard in respect of B.R Reading, Saponi ??? value and Iodine value due to the ??? of linseed oil and therefore, the sample ??? adulterated. Regarding this report we find ??? true copies of this report were enclosed the petition of complaint filed on 11th August, 1961. The Public Analyst's Report is dated 27th June, 1961, but it is remarkable that the B.R Reading is not given in the true copies of the report which were filed along with the petition of complaint. We do not know whether that omission was due to some mistake on the part of the person who copied out the Public Analyst's Report or whether the B.R Reading did not at all appear in the original report of the Public Analyst. At least that raises some doubt about the genuineness of the Public Analyst's Report. That doubt could have been removed only if the Public Analyst was examined in the case. But no attempt was made by the prosecution to explain what the real position was. That is one aspect of the Public Analyst's Report. Mr. Dutt, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners further contends that a very important test which is given in A. 17.06 in Appendix B to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, namely, the test regarding “Un saponifiable matter” has not been carried out. Against the item A. 17.06 the following is specified:

    “Mustard oil (Sarson-ka-tel) means the oil expressed from clean and sound mustard seeds, belonging to the compestris, juncea or napus varieties of Brassica. It shall be clear, free from rancidity, suspended or foreign matter, separated water, added colouring or flavouring substances or mineral oil. It shall conform to the following standards:

    (a) Butyro-refractometer reading at 40 Degree C. .. 58.0 to 60.5 (b) Saponification value .. 168 to 176 (c) Iodine value …. 96 to 108 (d) Unsaponifiable matter more than 1.2 per cent. .. Not (e) Free Fatty acid as Oleic acid Not more than 3.0 per cent. … (f) Bellier (Turbidity test) by Ever's method (Acetic acid) than 26.5 Degree C. … Not more

    The test for argemone oil should be negative.”

    6. Mr. Dutt contends that there must be reasons for those standards being laid down by the Legislature and that it is obligatory on the part of the Public Analyst to carry out all the tests to find out whether the mustard oil conforms to the standards prescribed. He cannot pick and choose. Mr. Dutt's contention is that unless all the tests are carried out by the Public Analyst his report does not become a complete report and cannot be admitted into evidence under section 13 of the aforesaid Act. Now, we would agree with Mr. Dutt that all the tests which are laid down in item A. 17.06 should have been carried out by the Public Analyst, and the report which has been submitted in this case by the Public Analyst does not contain the results of all the tests laid down. The test to find out “Un saponifiable matter “has not been carried out. When item A. 17.06 prescribes that “it shall conform to the following standards”, the Public Analyst is required to give his opinion in respect of all the standards so laid down.

    7. That is his imperative duty. He cannot leave out any test in his discretion. But we cannot say that the report cannot be used as evidence under section 13(5) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act without examining the Public Analyst. Whether his opinion can be accepted or not on account of the omission to carry out any particular test is a different matter and would depend on the facts of each particular case. On the facts of this case, however, we must say that the question whether the mustard oil is adulterated or not does not arise, because the sample taken was not a sample of mustard oil, but a sample of oil sweeping which is not ‘mustard oil’ as defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

    8. In the result the conviction and the sentences of the petitioners cannot be sustained and are set aside. The petitioners are acquitted. The Pine, if paid, must be refunded. The petitioners who are on bail are discharged from their bail bonds.

    9. The Rule is made absolute as above.

    T.P Mujkherji, J.:— I agree.

    DJ/VRB/D.V.C

    10. Rule made absolute.

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    Messrs Netai Chandra And Surendra Nath Dey v. Corporation Of Calcutta Opposite Party.
    (Aug 27, 1965)