AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Presidency Magistrate.LH/MVJ/D.V.C12. Rule discharged.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Presidency Magistrate.LH/MVJ/D.V.C12. Rule discharged.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Abdul Samad Bepari, challenged an order of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta dated 15 March 1963, which directed process to be issued against him under Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code (cheating). On 3 June 1960 the complainant, Manasha Charan Bakshi, filed a written petition alleging that Abdul Samad Bepari, by false representations, induced the complainant to copy out, sign and deliver a letter drafted by the petitioner and that the petitioner sought to use the letter to interfere with the complainant’s rights in respect of specified premises. The 3 June 1960 petition recited facts and mentioned the offense, but the prayer said the petition was filed "for future reference" because the accused was reported to be in Pakistan.

On 8 February 1963 the complainant filed a subsequent petition (described in the opinion as "cryptic") stating only that the accused had returned to Calcutta and requesting that the earlier petition be reopened and that a warrant of arrest issue. The Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate called for the earlier petition, examined the complainant and some witnesses on 12 February 1963, sent the matter to another Presidency Magistrate for an inquiry under Section 202 Cr. P.C., received that report, considered the material and the accused’s objections to maintainability, and ultimately negatived those objections. He then issued summons against the petitioner under Section 417 I.P.C. The petitioner moved the High Court for writ/quashing of the proceedings arising from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Magistrate was justified in treating the 3 June 1960 petition together with the 8 February 1963 petition as a valid complaint warranting cognizance under Section 417 I.P.C.
  2. Whether the Magistrate erred in deferring the immediate examination of the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 Cr. P.C., i.e., whether the requirement to examine "at once" was breached.
  3. Whether the High Court petition (revision) was maintainable when the accused had not personally submitted to the magistrate's jurisdiction after the issue of process (i.e., whether non-appearance after summons barred the petition).
  4. Whether, on the material before the Magistrate, any irregularity or omission vitiated the proceedings so as to require quashing under Section 537 Cr. P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Accused) — Mr. A.K. Dutta

  • Contended that the earlier petition dated 3 June 1960 contained no accusation or prayer for the Court to take action; it merely sought to file the petition for future reference.
  • Argued that the Magistrate was not entitled to take cognizance on the basis of the second petition of 8 February 1963 or to "restore" the previous petition and treat both petitions together as a complaint within the meaning of Section 4(h) Cr. P.C.
  • Maintained that under Section 200 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate was required to examine the complainant and witnesses "at once" and that postponement was not permissible; the Magistrate's delay to examine them was therefore unlawful.
  • Asserted that the second petition itself did not make out a prima facie case under Section 417 I.P.C., so process should not have been issued.
  • Argued on merits that no case was made out under Section 417 and thus summons were unwarranted.

Complainant's Representative — Mr. F.M. Sanyal

  • Raised a preliminary objection: the petition to the High Court was not maintainable because, after issue of summons, the accused did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate; accordingly the accused lacked locus to file a revision petition in the High Court.
  • Relied on practice and an unreported decision (Kanailall Jatia v. Ramkrishnadas Gupta) to support the contention that such petitions are "not ordinarily" entertained where the accused has not submitted to jurisdiction after summons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanailall Jatia v. Ramkrishnadas Gupta, Criminal Revn. No. 750 of 1957; reported AIR 1958 Cal 128 (decision of N.K. Sen J.) Practice that petitions challenging issuance of summons where accused has not submitted to jurisdiction "should not ordinarily be entertained". The Court observed that the cited passage used the word "ordinarily" and did not lay down a hard and fast rule; it therefore treated the authority as supporting only a discretionary practice and not an absolute bar to maintainability. The Court concluded the High Court petition was entertainable on the facts.
K.N. Tapurla v. State (Cal), Criminal Revn. Case No. 948 of 1958 (J.P. Mitter and S.K. Sen, JJ.) Authority for the proposition that in a summons case it may not be necessary for the petitioner to surrender/appear in Court before moving the High Court for a rule. The Court relied on this decision together with Kanailall Jatia to hold there is no absolute rule requiring surrender and that the petition was entertainable despite non-appearance after summons in the magistrate’s court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court proceeded in two main stages: first addressing the preliminary objection to maintainability, and then the merits and procedural objections to the magistrate's conduct.

On maintainability:

  • The Court examined authorities cited by the complainant and found that those decisions did not establish a hard and fast rule barring High Court petitions whenever an accused has not submitted to a magistrate after summons; the language in the cited decision used the word "ordinarily," indicating discretion rather than an absolute rule.
  • The Court also noted another decision (K.N. Tapurla) where it was held unnecessary for a petitioner in a summons case to surrender before moving the High Court. Combining these authorities, the Court concluded there is no statutory bar or uniform rule preventing the High Court from entertaining such petitions.
  • Additionally, the accused had appeared before the Magistrate through an attorney to raise objections to maintainability; on these facts the Court held that non-appearance after summons did not render the petition non-entertainable. Hence the preliminary objection by Mr. Sanyal was rejected.

On the merits and procedure:

  • The Court reviewed the 3 June 1960 petition and found that paragraphs 5 and 8 and the preamble made clear accusations of cheating under Section 417 I.P.C.; therefore the assertion that no accusation was made was rejected.
  • The Court acknowledged that the 3 June 1960 petition did not explicitly pray for criminal action (it stated the accused was in Pakistan and filed the petition for future reference), but held that a complaint need not contain every detail; if a justifiable inference of an accusation against a person can be drawn from the petition, a magistrate may take cognizance.
  • The Court accepted the Magistrate’s view that the two petitions (3 June 1960 and 8 February 1963) together constituted a complaint; because the earlier petition set out accusations and the second petition reported the accused’s return and requested reopening, the Magistrate was entitled to take cognizance and issue process.
  • Regarding the contention that Section 200 requires immediate ("at once") examination of complainant and witnesses, the Court held that "at once" indicates the ordinary practice of prompt examination, but short postponement to call for earlier records and ascertain the contents was acceptable in the circumstances. The Court stressed that indefinite delay would be improper, but a brief adjournment to consult the prior petition did not amount to illegality.
  • The Court considered the Magistrate’s treatment of the petitions as written complaints (Section 4(h) Cr. P.C.) and noted that a Presidency Magistrate may, by virtue of the proviso (b) to Section 200, not be required to record statements as in an oral complaint. Thus the Magistrate’s procedural approach was not impermissible.
  • Finally, the Court invoked Section 537 Cr. P.C., which prevents reversal in revision for mere error, omission or irregularity in the complaint unless a failure of justice is caused. The Court found no failure of justice resulting from the magistrate issuing summons and concluded the irregularities alleged did not vitiate the proceedings.
  • On the ultimate question of whether a prima facie case under Section 417 was made out, the Court held that at this preliminary stage it could not be said categorically that no case existed; given the allegations in the earlier petition the Magistrate had prima facie jurisdiction to issue summons.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court affirmed the order of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate dated 15 March 1963 and discharged the Rule sought by the petitioner. The records were ordered to be sent down to the Magistrate at once.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the summons issued against Abdul Samad Bepari under Section 417 I.P.C. remain valid and he is not entitled, on the grounds urged, to quash the proceedings; he may appear pursuant to the summons and stand trial.
  • The Court held that short postponement of examination under Section 200 to consult prior records and treat two petitions together does not necessarily amount to illegality, and that errors or irregularities in the complaint do not warrant reversal in revision unless they occasion a failure of justice (Section 537 Cr. P.C.).
  • The opinion did not announce a new legal rule; rather it applied existing principles and authorities to the facts, reiterating that maintainability of a High Court petition in cases where the accused has not surrendered is a matter of discretion and must be judged on its own circumstances.

Result recorded in the opinion: order of the learned Magistrate affirmed; rule discharged; records to be returned to the Magistrate.

    Abdul Samad Bepari, Accused v. Manasha Charan Bakshi, Complainant Opposite Party.

    1. This rule is directed against the order of the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, dated 15th March, 1963. The petitioner Abdul Samad Bepari has prayed for quashing proceedings pending against him under S. 417, Indian Penal Code. It will appear that under the order of the learned Magistrate process has been ordered to be issued upon him under the aforesaid section. The facts out of which this case arises was that on the 3rd June, 1960 the complainant opposite party Manasha Charan Bakshi filed a petition before the Court of the Additional Chief Presidenay Magistrate against the accused petitioner alleging that the latter on certain false representations, induced the complainant opposite party to copy out, sign and deliver to the petitioner a letter which was drafted personally by the petitioner and that the complainant opposite party also alleged that the petitioner was trying to utilise the said letter for interfering with the rights and interest of the complainant in respect of the shop room and godown at Posta Bazar at the premises No. 231 Maharshi Debendra Road, Calcutta. It is alleged by the petitioner that in that petition dated 3rd June, 1960 no allegation was made for taking any action against him; rather he craved that the petition which was filed by him should be ordered to be filed. In pursuance of this petition an order accordingly was made but on a much later date, that is, on the 8th February, 1963 a cryptic petition without stating any facts whatsoever as to accusation against the accused party was filed before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate with a prayer that the previous petition filed on the 3rd June 1960 should be reopened and for issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. It is further alleged that the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate did not examine the complainant and witness in accordance with the law on the day when that petition was filed on the 8th February 1963, but instead he called for the record in which the previous petition dated 3rd Tune, 1960 was filed. On the 12th February 1963 the learned Magistrate examined the complainant and some of his witnesses and thereafter, sent the case to another Presidency Magistrate for an enquiry under S. 202, Criminal P.C On a receipt of the report from the Magistrate the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate examined the matter, heard the accused also regarding his objection as to the maintainability of the complaint. He, however, negatived the pleas as raised by the accused petitioner and on a perusal of the evidence already heard by him as also on the evidence recorded in the enquiry proceedings he issued summons upon the present petitioner under S. 417, I.P.C

    2. Mr. A.K Dutta, the learned Advocate appearing for the accused petitioner, has submitted before me several points in support of his contention that the entire proceeding before the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate was unwarranted by law. Firstly, he submits that as a matter of fact no accusation was made in the previous petition dated 3rd June, 1960 nor did the complainant ask the Court to bestir itself to take action in due course of law. What, he did on the next day, that is, on the 8th February, 1963 was to ask the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate to reopen the previous complaint and to take cognisance of the same. This, according to Mr. Dutta, was not in accordance with the appropriate provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate ought not to have taken any cognizance on the second petition nor was he justified in restoring the previous petition for his passing an order to the effect that both the petitions taken together constituted a complaint within the meaning of S. 4, Cl. (h), Criminal P.C Apart from this submission Mr. Dutta has also contended that the Magistrate ordered the subsequent petition to be put up on a later date for consideration along with the file.

    3. This he could not do under S. 200, Criminal P.C as it was incumbent upon him to examine the complainant and witnesses forthwith.

    4. Before dealing with the submissions I would now proceed to consider a preliminary objection as raised by Mr. F.M Sanyal, the learned Advocate appearing for the complainant opposite party. He submits that this petition before the Court is not maintainable inasmuch as after the issue of the summons the accused did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court and therefore, unless he did so, such a petition before the High Court was barred. In support of this contention Mr. Sanyal has not been able to show relevant provision of the law and he concedes that there is no direct provision in this regard in the Statute Book. He, however, contends that in this Court the practice is that in such cases unless the accused appears before the learned Magistrate after the process is issued he has no locus standi to file a petition in revision in this Court. In support of his contention he has referred me to an unreported decision made by late N.K Sen J. in the case of Kanailall Jatia v. Ramkrishnadas Gupta, Criminal Revn. No. 750 of 1957: (AIR 1958 Cal 128). In this case, his Lordship observed inter alia;

    “It will be noticed that none of the cases have proceeded beyond the stage of summonses having been issued. Save petitioner No. 1, the other petitioners have not even submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. The applications so far as they are concerned should not ordinarily be entertained at all but since the petitioner No. 1 has by a petition undertaken to produce the books, I will consider the entire matter now before me.”

    5. From this observation it will appear that his Lordship did not refer to any hard and fast rule but has made a cursory observation to the effect that in cases like this the petitions should not ordinarily be entertained. The expression “Ordinarily” as used by his Lordship shows that no hard and fast rule in cases like this can be laid down and each case has to be decided on its own merits. The next case to which I would make a reference is that decided by J.P Mitter and S.K Sen, JJ., in Criminal Revn. Case No. 948 of 1958, K.N Tapurla v. State (Cal). In this case also the accused without appearing before the learned Magistrate in pursuance of a summons moved a petition before this Court against the order by which the process was ordered to be issued. Their Lordships, inter alia, observed that the case being a summons case they did not think it necessary for the petitioner to surrender in Court before moving the Court for a Rule. On a consideration of these two decisions, it appears to me that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the maintainability of a petition like this and there being no statutory provision or the Rules made thereunder, I would like to say that this petition is entertainable by this Court when the accused petitioner has prayed before me that the entire proceeding from the stage of issuing of summons was not warranted by law. Apart from this consideration, it will appear that the accused person did really appear before the Court through an attorney to raise his objection that the petition of complaint was not maintainable. In such circumstances, I do not think that the non-appearance of the accused before the learned Magistrate after summons, renders the petition before me, as not entertainable. In these circumstances, the preliminary objection as raised by Mr. Sanyal cannot be accepted.

    6. Regarding the merits of the case, it will appear from the record that on 3rd June, 1960 the complainant filed a petition before the learned Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate alleging that about the end of Falgun 1366 B.S one Abdul Samad Bepari approached the complainant, describing himself as brother of the deceased Abdul Rashid Bepari and falsely represented that he was ready and willing to advance Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand) for starting business in raw vegetables in partnership with the complainant and that he had the necessary qualifications and permission for doing so and on such false representations induced the complainant to copy out, sign and deliver to him a letter which was drafted personally by the accused. I cannot accept the contention raised by Mr. Dutta that no accusation was made inasmuch as the recitals in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the petition are clear enough to show that definite accusation of cheating was made. Furthermore, it appears that the section under which the accusation is sought to be made has also been made in the preamble of the petition. The only lacuna in this petition is that he did not take any steps to ask the Court to take appropriate action under the Code of Criminal Procedure on such petition. In paragraph 7 it has been stated that the accused was reported to be staying in Pakistan and in the prayer portion it has been stated that in such circumstances, the complainant begs to file this, petition for future reference. In so far as the prayer portion is concerned, as stated before, no submission has been made to take action on the petition, but so far as the other contentions as to the accusation are concerned, the recitals therein are complete for holding that a prima facie case against the accused petitioner was made out. In the second petition, however, dated 8th February, 1963 the complainant has urged that the accused has come back to Calcutta and was living at No. 85, Beadon Street with his friend Suresh Chandra Saha and accidentally the complainant saw him at the City Civil Court premises on 7th February, 1963. As he has come back to India the complainant expressed his willingness to proceed against the accused under S. 417, Penal Code, the accusations whereof were already stated in the petition previously filed. Accordingly, he really prayed to reopen the case which was ordered to be filed and to issue warrant of arrest against the accused and direct the officer-in-charge, Burtolla Police Station to execute warrant of arrest. The learned Magistrate after calling for the previous petition was of opinion that these two petitions taken together constituted a complaint in its true sense and therefore cognizance thereupon could be taken. Mr. Dutta has criticised the action taken by the learned Magistrate inasmuch as the second petition itself not having shown a prima facie case under Sec. 417 I.P.C, the process was not required to be issued under the law. On a careful consideration of the definition of complaint in the Code of Criminal Procedure, it appears to me that it is not always essential that all the details should be given in the petition of complaint and if there is some justifiable reason to hold from the petition that an accusation has been made against a certain person that is, in my opinion, sufficient for a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence. Now in this instant case, I have already stated that the accusations were thoroughly made out in the previous petition and what he states in the second petition is that the case might be reopened and if upon consideration of the two petitions the learned Magistrate said that the accusations had been made and he was satisfied that a prima facie case for taking cognizance was made out, then in that event, I am inclined to hold that there has not been any irregularity or illegality on the part of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence.

    7. The next contention as urged by Mr. Dutta is that even assuming that he took cognizance of the offence as stated in this petition it was wrong on his part to record the evidence of the complainant and his witnesses on a subsequent date. Sec. 200 contemplates that the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, should be examined on oath at once. The words “at once” indicate that ordinarily the complainant who is present in person with his witnesses should be examined. I must say that in the usual course of business the complainant and his witnesses who are present should forthwith be examined, but in this case it appears that in terms of the second petition the previous petition was required to be called for, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the accusations were clearly made out therein and if in doing so, the learned Magistrate deferred the case for a very short time for examination of the complainant I think no illegality or irregularity has been committed. It would have been highly improper if the learned Magistrate after calling for the original petition would have kept the complaints pending for a long time, without disposing them of as promptly as possible. In this case I must observe that in terms of the second petition, promptness was adopted by the learned Magistrate and, as such, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed. I have already stated that each case must be decided on its own circumstances and the circumstances which presented themselves before the learned Magistrate, in my opinion, required postponement of the examination of the complainant and witnesses for a short time.

    8. It will appear that the learned Magistrate accepted these two petitions as a petition of complaint within the meaning of Sec. 4(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and proceeded upon the footing that in view of the proviso (b) of Sec. 200 Cr. P.C, he as a Presidency Magistrate was not required to record the statement of the complainant and his witnesses. Undoubtedly, an oral complaint is on the same footing with a written complaint and in the case of an oral complaint, it is incumbent upon such Magistrate to record the statement of the complainant and his witnesses. The learned Magistrate, however, has discussed the procedure which has to be observed in the matter of oral complaints, but inasmuch as he has accepted the two petitions in writing as forming part of the complaint, it cannot be said that he was required to record the statements of the complainant and his witnesses on the footing that complaint was an oral one. Apart from this consideration, I am of opinion that even if there was any irregularity that does not at this stage vitiate the proceeding before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate as no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered in revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint under Sec. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unless any failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. I do not consider that in the instant case any failure of justice has been caused by issuing summons against the accused petitioner and as such, the contentions raised by Mr. Dutt cannot be accepted.

    9. As regards the merits, Mr. Dutta has said that no case has been made out under S. 417 I.P Code. It is needless to repeat what I have already said that in the first petition accusation was completely set out and the stage has not reached as yet when it can be categorically stated that no case has been made out. In the circumstances, I am of opinion that the learned Magistrate had prima facie jurisdiction to issue summons upon consideration of all the aspects of the case under Sec. 417 of the Indian Penal Code.

    10. I have taken into consideration the overall position as placed before me. I am of opinion that on the face of the observation made by me before the accused petitioner will not be prejudiced, if in pursuance of the summons he appears before the Magistrate and stands his trial under Sec. 417 of the Indian Penal Code. In the result, the order of the learned Magistrate complained of is hereby affirmed and the Rule stands discharged.

    11. Let the records be sent down at once to the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate.

    LH/MVJ/D.V.C

    12. Rule discharged.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Abdul Samad Bepari, Accused v. Manasha Charan Bakshi, Complainant Opposite Party.
    (Nov 20, 1964)