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  • (3) 12 C.W.N 115]. Section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 or section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 or section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948,
  • 54, rules 137 and 137A to 137D; Civil Rules and Orders, Volume I, page 80, rule 261; Original Side Rules, Chapter 17, rules 14A
  • rules 35, 36 and 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code.3.
  • Order 21, rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 36 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Article 11-A of the Indian limitation Act.)9.
  • Article 167 of the Indian Limitation Act).
  • SECTION 141 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • R.S.C Order 13, rule 10, Order 27, rule 15.
  • SECTION 47 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code
  • R.S.C Order 12 rule 25)
  • R.S.C Order 13, rule 8).
  • rule 100 of Order 21
  • rule 97 of Order 21
  • Order 21. rule 100
  • Order 21, rule 97,
  • Order 21, rule 98.
  • 21 rule 97
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • (3) 12 C.W.N 115]. Section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 or section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950,
  • section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 or section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948,
  • 54, rules 137 and 137A to 137D; Civil Rules and Orders, Volume I, page 80, rule 261; Original Side Rules, Chapter 17, rules 14A
  • rules 35, 36 and 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code.3.
  • Order 21, rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 36 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Article 11-A of the Indian limitation Act.)9.
  • Article 167 of the Indian Limitation Act).
  • SECTION 141 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • R.S.C Order 13, rule 10, Order 27, rule 15.
  • SECTION 47 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code
  • R.S.C Order 12 rule 25)
  • R.S.C Order 13, rule 8).
  • rule 100 of Order 21
  • rule 97 of Order 21
  • Order 21. rule 100
  • Order 21, rule 97,
  • Order 21, rule 98.
  • 21 rule 97
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerned one room on the ground floor of premises No. 22/1A, Ram Chand Ghose Lane, Calcutta. The plaintiff (landlord) instituted a suit for ejectment against several persons. Defendant No.1 (Dinesh Chandra Ghose) was admitted to be the tenant and the principal defendant. The plaint impleaded defendants Nos.2 to 6 as alleged sub-tenants or trespassers. Defendant No.2 was the petitioner, Gaya Nath Ghose, who in his written statement asserted that he was a sub-tenant. Defendants Nos.3 to 6 denied being sub-tenants and contended they had no interest in the premises and were not necessary parties.

On 13 January 1956 the plaintiff filed a petition asserting that defendants Nos.2 to 6 had earlier asserted a sub-tenancy in criminal proceedings and that the legal question whether the sub-lease was binding on the plaintiff required adjudication; nevertheless, by order dated 13 January 1956 the learned Judge struck out defendants Nos.2 to 6 from the record as neither necessary nor proper parties. On 3 February 1956 the plaintiff obtained a decree for possession against defendant No.1. On 8 March 1956 a writ of possession in Form No.11, Appendix E, C.P.C. was issued. Delivery of possession was resisted; the bailiff's report recorded that Sukhendu Kumar Ghose and his sister resisted execution.

By petitions dated 19 March 1956 and 21 March 1956 the plaintiff applied under Order 21, rule 97, C.P.C. and sought police help (and alternatively detention) against (1) the judgment-debtor Dinesh, (2) Sukhendu, and (3) Sovarani. Notice issued to the opposite parties to show cause. On 24 April 1956 the petitioner Gaya Nath filed a petition stating he was a sub-tenant, that he had been impleaded as a party as such, that resistance on execution was given on his behalf, and asked for time to file objections. The trial Judge rejected Gaya Nath's petition for want of locus and passed an order allowing the matter ex parte, awarding costs, and granting the prayer for police help so that the decree-holder might be put into possession.

Gaya Nath moved this Court in revision against the order dated 24 April 1956. The Court's opinion addresses the legal questions arising from the execution proceedings and the grant of police assistance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in execution of a landlord's decree for possession, the decree-holder should proceed under Order 21 rule 35 (actual possession) or under rule 36 (symbolical possession), depending on who is in actual occupation and whether that person is bound by the decree.
  2. Whether a sub-tenant is bound by a decree against the tenant and may be removed under Order 21 rule 35, or whether a sub-tenant claiming a statutory right under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts is not bound and may resist execution (and seek relief under rule 100).
  3. What is the scope and nature of proceedings under Order 21 rule 97 (i.e., their procedural character, who may apply, who are parties, and the effect of orders made under rule 97).
  4. Whether police help should be granted in aid of execution where a person in actual possession makes a bona fide claim that he is not bound by the decree and therefore entitled to resist eviction.
  5. Whether a stranger (i.e., a person not a party to the execution proceeding) has a right to intervene in or be added to proceedings in execution under Order 21.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Decree-holder

  • Instituted ejectment suit and obtained decree for possession against the tenant (defendant No.1).
  • Applied under Order 21, rule 97, and sought police help (and alternatively detention) to secure execution and put the decree-holder in possession, alleging obstruction to execution by certain persons (Dinesh, Sukhendu, Sovarani).
  • Filed an earlier petition (13 January 1956) asserting that defendants Nos.2–6 had asserted a sub-tenancy in previous criminal proceedings and urging their retention as parties for effective decree.

Petitioner (Gaya Nath Ghose, Defendant No.2)

  • Filed a written statement asserting that he was a sub-tenant.
  • Contended that resistance to execution was given on his behalf and sought time to file objections to the petition for police help and for detention; thus claimed locus to be heard before police assistance was granted.
  • Moved in revision against the trial Judge's order rejecting his petition and granting police help ex parte.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sailendra Nath Bhattacharjaya v. Bijan Lal Chakravarty (I.L.R (1947) 1 Cal. 270 : 49 C.W.N 133) Authority for the proposition that a sub-tenant is bound by a decree for eviction of the tenant if the decree is based on a ground which determines the sub-tenancy. Used to state that where the decree determines the sub-tenancy, the sub-tenant may be removed in execution under Order 21 rule 35(1).
S.N. Talapatra v. M/S Bengal Bonded Warehouse & Anr. (57 C.W.N 455) Illustrates that a sub-tenant who claims a statutory right to occupy (under Rent Control laws) is not bound by the decree and may seek restoration under Order 21 rule 100. Relied on to explain that such a sub-tenant can resist execution and seek restoration if dispossessed.
Sukhan Singh v. Baijnath Goenka (12 C.W.N 115) Supports that a sub-tenant has no right to apply under Order 21 rule 97 for declaration of his right. Applied to show limits on a sub-tenant's procedural remedies in execution proceedings (i.e., cannot use rule 97 for declaratory relief).
Thakurdas Pushparaj v. Dwaraka Prosad (87 C.L.J 181) Authority for the proposition that statutory provisions (section 11(3) / section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts) do not give a sub-tenant a right to intervene in landlord-tenant proceedings. Used to support the statement that such statutory rights do not confer intervention rights in the landlord-tenant suit.
Bhupesh Chandra Dutta v. Dr. M.N. Bose (56 C.W.N 832) Same proposition as above regarding lack of right to intervene under the Rent Control provisions. Cited to reinforce that statutory rent-control rights do not automatically allow intervention in the landlord-tenant suit.
Nityananda Kapuria v. Parbati Nath Dutta (58 C.W.N 407) Supports that a person in possession has no right to apply under section 47 C.P.C. for adjudication/quia timet restraining removal; remedy is a separate suit. Applied to indicate the correct procedural route for the occupant's substantive claims.
Khetramohan Manimohan Saha v. Parbati Nath Dutta (59 C.W.N 289) Same principle: remedy for contested rights is a separate suit rather than section 47 C.P.C. in the execution proceeding. Used together with Nityananda Kapuria to advise that separate suit is the appropriate remedy for adjudication of rights.
Narendra Krishna Bose v. Great Eastern Hotel Ltd. (86 C.L.J 72) Holds that Order 21 provides a complete procedure for protection of rights of persons affected by execution and that ordinarily that procedure should be adopted rather than separate suits. Invoked to show that normally the execution machinery (Order 21) is the appropriate channel for protection of rights.
Rajani Kanta Das v. Dayal Chandra Das (54 C.W.N 376) Support for the view that Order 21 procedures are the ordinary means of protection for persons affected by execution. Referred to as confirming the approach of adopting the execution procedure for protecting rights.
Alagasundaram Pillai v. Pichuvier (I.L.R 52 Mad. 899 F.B : A.I.R 1929 Mad. 757) Establishes that a proceeding under Order 21 rule 97 is an original miscellaneous proceeding in execution, commenced by a petition of complaint by the decree-holder. Relied on to characterise rule 97 proceedings and to explain who is the proper petitioner and what the cause of complaint is.
Kiranshashi Dassi v. The Official Assignee of Calcutta (I.L.R 60 Cal. 8) Referenced regarding forms and practice (Form No. 40, Appendix E) in execution proceedings. Cited to support procedural descriptions of execution petitions and forms.
Surama Sundari Debi v. Kiranshashi Chowdhurani, Berhampur (A.I.R 1938 Cal. 352) Illustrates that only the decree-holder may apply under rule 97 and that a fresh obstruction to a new warrant gives rise to a fresh cause of complaint. Used to explain limitation of applicants under rule 97 and the temporal scope for bringing complaints under rule 97.
Debendra Nath Sarkar v. Parul Bala Ghose (88 C.L.J 105) Authority for declining police assistance where an occupant makes a bona fide claim that he is not bound by the decree until that claim is negatived by appropriate proceedings. Applied to justify caution in granting police help where a bona fide claim of independent right exists.
Sew (Seto) Sankar Lal v. Bejoy Krishna Dutta (57 C.W.N 65) Same principle as above: the Court may decline police help pending adjudication of a bona fide claim; and orders for police help improperly obtained can be set aside. Relied on to support the court's discretion to refuse police aid and to set aside improperly obtained police assistance orders.
Jagat Lakshmi Dasi v. Golam Hossain (60 C.W.N 147) Shows that an order for police help obtained improperly or by suppression of material facts is liable to be set aside. Used to support the proposition that nondisclosure of material facts by decree-holder can invalidate an order for police help.
Minet v. Johnson ((1893) 63 Law Times, N.S 507) English practice: a person not a party to an action for recovery of possession may apply to be added as a party; judgment and subsequent proceedings may be set aside as against him on his election to be added. Noted for comparative purposes, illustrating differences between English practice and the Indian execution procedure; used to highlight that English rules permit post-judgment addition of parties in some circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal principles and their application to the facts before it:

  1. Distinction between Order 21 rules 35 and 36: the decree-holder must choose rule 35(1) (actual possession) only if he is prepared to assert that the person in occupation is bound by the decree; otherwise he should proceed under rule 36 for symbolical delivery. Under a warrant issued under rule 35(1) (Form No.11, Appendix E) only a person bound by the decree may be removed.
  2. Whether a sub-tenant is bound: a sub-tenant is bound by a decree against the tenant if the decree is based on grounds that determine the sub-tenancy (so removable under rule 35). Conversely, a sub-tenant who claims an independent statutory right under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Acts is not bound by the decree and may resist execution and seek restoration under rule 100; but such a sub-tenant has no right to use rule 97 to obtain a declaratory adjudication of his rights or to intervene in the landlord-tenant suit by virtue of the Rent Control provisions.
  3. Nature and scope of rule 97 proceedings: a petition under rule 97 is an original miscellaneous execution proceeding by the decree-holder complaining of resistance to a warrant of possession. Only the decree-holder may apply and must do so within the relevant limitation period; the proceeding is between the decree-holder and the opposite party complained against; the final order binds the parties to that proceeding subject to a suit under rule 103 within one year.
  4. Parties and intervention: a stranger has no right to intervene or be added in an execution proceeding under Order 21; section 141 C.P.C. does not apply to execution proceedings; Order 1 rule 10 is not attracted. An opposite party is entitled to be summoned and to show cause; a separate petition by an opposite party is to be treated as an objection in the proceeding.
  5. Police help: an application for police assistance is different in character from a rule 97 complaint, though often joined in a single petition. Police help vitally affects all persons in actual possession and may lead to immediate summary dispossession of persons who are not bound by the decree. Therefore the Court should exercise great caution in granting police aid. Where an occupant makes a bona fide claim that he is not bound by the decree, the Court should decline police help until that claim is negated in appropriate proceedings. The Court may examine persons, direct notice to persons in possession, and expects the decree-holder to disclose full facts; nondisclosure can render the police-help order vulnerable to being set aside.
  6. Application to the present case: the record (the plaint and the plaintiff's 13 January 1956 petition) admitted that the petitioner Gaya Nath was a sub-tenant and that no effective decree for ejectment could be passed in his absence. On the face of the record there existed a bona fide contention that the petitioner was a sub-tenant not bound by the decree. If that contention were false the decree-holder should not have sought a warrant in Form No.11. The decree-holder failed to disclose these facts when petitioning for police help and for an order under Order 21 rule 98. The trial Court acted illegally in granting police help without considering the record and refusing to hear the petitioner on whether police help should be granted.
  7. Relief tailored to parties: the Court distinguished between the part of the trial Judge's order obtained against the opposite parties named in the decree-holder's petition (Dinesh, Sukhendu, Sovarani), which remains intact as those parties did not appear or seek revision, and the part granting police help which affected the petitioner (a person in actual possession claiming rights) and which the revisional Court set aside as illegally granted against the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The order dated 24 April 1956, insofar as it granted the prayer for police help, is set aside. It is further declared that the remainder of the order dated 24 April 1956 does not bind the petitioner (Gaya Nath Ghose) in any way. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this Rule to be paid by opposite party No.1, Amulya Chandra Sarkar.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The particular grant of police assistance in the trial Judge's order is quashed as against the petitioner Gaya Nath because the decree-holder had on the face of the record admitted the sub-tenancy and failed to disclose that fact when seeking police aid. The petitioner is awarded costs against the decree-holder (opposite party No.1).
  • Scope for other parties: The portions of the trial Judge's order made against the opposite parties named in the decree-holder's petition (Dinesh, Sukhendu and Sovarani) were not set aside by this revision because those parties did not appear before the learned Judge and have not moved in revision; however, those parts do not bind the petitioner.
  • Broader legal implication: The opinion reiterates and applies existing principles about the limited scope of execution proceedings, the distinction between rules 35 and 36, the protective procedures in Order 21 (including rules 97 and 100), and the caution required before granting police assistance where a bona fide claim of independent right exists. The Court's decision provides the immediate remedial outcome for the petitioner; the opinion does not purport to create or declare a new rule of law beyond the application of the principles discussed to these facts.

Disposition: The Rule is disposed of accordingly. (Costs awarded to petitioner against opposite party No.1.)

    Gaya Nath Ghose v. Amulya Chandra Sarkar And Anr. Opposite Parties.

    The judgment of the Court was as follows:

    Bachawat, J.:— The dispute relates to one room in the ground floor of premises No. 22/1A, Ram Chand Ghose Lane, Calcutta. The plaintiff instituted a suit for ejectment against several persons. Defendant No. 1, Dinesh Chandra Ghose, who was admittedly the tenant under the plaintiff was the principal defendant. The plaintiff impleaded five other defendants, alleging that they were either sub-tenants or trespassers. The petitioner Gaya Nath Ghose was defendant No. 2. He filed a written statement and asserted that he was a subtenant. Defendant No. 3, Badal, defendant No. 4, Rakhal alias Sukhendu, defendant No. 5, Gouranga and defendant No. 6, Rai Mohon, asserted that they were not sub-tenants and had no interest in the premises. Defendants 2 to 6 contended that they were not necessary parties to the suit. On the 13th January, 1956, the plaintiff filed a petition stating that defendants Nos. 2 to 6 had asserted a sub tenancy in their favour in a previous criminal proceeding and that the question whether the sub-lease was legally binding on the plaintiff requires to be adjudicated in order that the plaintiff might obtain an effective decree for possession. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed that defendants Nos. 2 to 6 should be retained as parties. By the order dated the 13th January, 1956 the learned Judge directed that the names of defendants Nos. 2 to 6 be struck out from the record holding that they were neither necessary nor proper parties. On the 3rd February, 1956, the plaintiff obtained a decree for possession against defendant No. 1. On the 8th March, 1956, on the application of the plaintiff, a writ of possession in Form No. 11, Appendix E of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued. Delivery of possession under this writ was resisted. The bailiff's report shows that Sukhendu Kumar Ghose and his sister resisted execution.

    1. By his petitions dated the 19th March, 1956 and the 21st March, 1956, the plaintiff applied for an order under Order 21, rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and for police help against (1) the judgment-debtor Dinesh, (2) Sukhendu and (3) his sister, Sovarani. The decree-holder prayed for police help and in the alternative for detention of Sukhendu and Sovarani. Notice was issued on the opposite parties to show cause. On the 24th April, 1956, the petitioner Gaya Nath filed a petition stating that he was a sub-tenant, that he was impleaded as a party to the suit as a sub-tenant and that resistance was given by Sukhendu and Sovarani on his behalf and asked for time to file his objection. The learned trial Judge rejected this petition of Gaya Nath, holding that he had no locus standi. He then passed the following order:

    “This case is allowed exparte with costs. Pleader's fee Rs. 10 only. Prayer for police help is allowed. Police be written to the decree-holder be put into possession.”

    2. Gaya Nath moves this Court in revision against this order. The application raises interesting questions with regard to the practice relating to the execution of a decree for recovery of possession of immovable property obtained by a landlord against a tenant and the scope of rules 35, 36 and 97 to 103 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    3. Where the landlord decree-holder seeks to execute his decree for delivery of immovable property, he has to make up his mind whether he should ask for actual possession under rule 35(1) or symbolical possession under rule 36 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. If he is prepared to say that the person in actual occupation is bound by the decree and has no right to remain in occupation of the property, he may proceed under rule 35(1) and obtain a warrant of possession in Form No. 11 of Appendix E with a general direction to the bailiff to remove any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate. If he is not prepared to say this, he has no business to ask for the assistance of the Court under rule 35(1). If the property is in the occupancy of some person who is entitled to occupy the same and is not bound by the decree to relinquish the occupancy, the decree holder must proceed under rule 36 and be content with an order of symbolical delivery of possession.

    4. Under a warrant of possession issued under rule 35(1) in Form No. 11 of Appendix E, only a person bound by the decree may be removed from the property.

    5. A sub-tenant is bound by the decree for eviction of the tenant if the decree is based upon a ground which determines the sub-tenancy and he may then be removed in execution of the decree under rule 35(1). (See Sailendra Nath Bhattacharjaya v. Bijan Lal Chakravarty, (1) [I.L.R (1947) 1 Cal. 270 : 49 C.W.N 133]. On the other hand, a sub-tenant, who claims a statutory right to occupy the property independently of the tenant under the Rent Control laws, e.g under section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 or section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, is not a representative of a judgment-debtor and is not bound by the decree for ejectment and he may not, therefore, be removed in execution of a decree against the tenant. He is, therefore, entitled to resist execution of the warrant and if he is dispossessed he may apply under rule 100 of Order 21 for restoration of possession [See S.N Talapatra… v. M/S Bengal Bonded Warehouse & Anr.…Opposite Parties. (2) 57 C.W.N 455]. But he has no right to apply under rule 97 of Order 21 for declaration of his right. [See Sukhan Singh v. Baijnath Goenka (3) 12 C.W.N 115]. Section 11(3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 or section 13(2) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, gives him no right to intervene in the proceedings between the landlord and the tenant, (See Thakurdas Pushparaj v. Dwaraka Prosad (4) 87 C.L.J 181 and Bhupesh Chandra Dutta v. Dr. M.N Bose (5) 56 C.W.N 832). He has no right to apply under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code for an adjudication of his rights and for a quia timet order restraining his removal and his remedy is to institute a separate suit for adjudication of his rights. See Nityananda Kapuria v. Parbati Nath Dutta (6) (58 C.W.N 407) and Khetramohan Manimohan Saha v. Parbati Nath Dutta (7) (59 C.W.N 289). At the same time this Court has also held that Order 21 provides a complete procedure for the protection of his rights and that ordinarily he should adopt that procedure and not the procedure of a separate suit for such protection and for injunction. Narendra Krishna Bose v. Great Eastern Hotel Ltd. (8) (86 C.L.J 72). See also Rajani Kanta Das v. Dayal Chandra Das (9) (54 C.W.N 376, 378).

    6. If the execution of the warrant of possession is resisted and the decree holder is prepared to say that the resistance is by the judgment-debtor or by some persons bound by the decree or at their instigation, be may apply under rule 97 complaining of the resistance.

    7. A proceeding under rule 97 is an original miscellaneous proceeding in execution, Vide Alagasundaram Pillai v. Pichuvier, (10) (I.L.R 52 Mad. 899 F.B : A.I.R 1929 Mad. 757). The lis is commenced by a petition of complaint. The petitioner is the decree-holder. The cause of complaint is resistance or obstruction to the execution of the warrant of possession by the bailiff. (See Form No. 40, Appendix 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure; Vide Kiranshashi Dassi v. The Official Assignee of Calcutta (11) (I.L.R 60 Cal. 8). Only the decree-holder may apply under rule 97 and he may do so within 30 days of the obstruction complained of. (See Article 167 of the Indian Limitation Act). A new obstruction to a new warrant of possession gives rise to a fresh cause of complaint. [See Surama Sundari Debi…Claimant v. Kiranshashi Chowdhurani, Berhampur…Auction-Purchaser Opposite Party. (12) (A.I.R 1938 Cal. 352)].

    8. The parties to the proceeding are the decree-holder and the opposite party against whom the application is made. The final order is conclusive and binds all parties to the proceeding subject to any suit which may be instituted under rule 103 within one year from the date of the order. (See Article 11-A of the Indian limitation Act.)

    9. The opposite party is entitled to be summoned and to show cause in Form No. 40 of Appendix E of the Civil Procedure Code. A separate petition by the opposite party may and should be treated as an objection in the proceeding (Vide (5) 56 C.W.N 832 referred to above).

    10. A stranger has no right to intervene and to be added as a party. Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply as the proceeding is a proceeding in execution. Order 1, rule 10 of the Code is not attracted.

    11. On a petition under Order 21, rule 97, the decree-holder may obtain an order that he be put in possession of the property. If he is still resisted by the party he may obtain a further order for the detention of such party in civil prison under rule 98 read with Form No. 41 of Appendix E. These orders do not bind persons who are not parties to the proceedings.

    12. If the decree cannot be effectively executed without police help the decree-holder may apply to the Court for the grant of such help. An application for police help is essentially different from an application under order 21 rule 97 though the two applications are often joined in one petition. This Court has framed special rules for dealing with applications for police help (See Manual of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta, Volume II, Part 4, Chapter IV, page 54, rules 137 and 137A to 137D; Civil Rules and Orders, Volume I, page 80, rule 261; Original Side Rules, Chapter 17, rules 14A to 14D.

    13. An order for police help vitally affects all persons in actual possession of the property. With the powerful backing of such an order all persons in actual possession whether they are bound by the decree or not are likely to be evicted brevi manu from the property summarily. Relief by way of restoration of possession obtained by an application under Order 21. rule 100 is poor consolation for a person who is unlawfully dispossessed. The Court should, therefore, proceed with great caution in granting police help. The Court should not hesitate to give such aid if execution of its process is unlawfully obstructed and its process cannot be executed without such aid.

    14. But where there is a bona fide claim by an occupant that he is not bound by the decree and as such is entitled to resist eviction in execution of the decree the Court may and should decline to give such aid until his claim is negatived in appropriate proceedings. See Debendra Nath Sarkar v. Parul Bala Ghose (13) (88 C.L.J 105, 106, 107) and Sew Sankar Lal v. Bejoy Krishna Dutta (14) (57 C.W.N 65, 66). The claimant is vitally affected by an order for police help and is entitled to be heard on an application praying for such help. The Court has unfettered discretion and ample power to do justice. The Court may examine any person it thinks fit and hear him. If necessary, the Court may direct notice to all persons in actual possession by advertisement or otherwise. The decree-holder is under a duty to disclose full facts. An order for police help obtained improperly or by suppression of material facts is liable to be set aside. See Jagat Lakshmi Dasi v. Golam Hossain (15) (60 C.W.N 147); Seto Sankar Lal v. Bejoy Krishna Dutta (14) (57 C.W.N 65).

    15. The English practice with regard to an action for recovery of possession and the issue of a writ of possession is materially different but it may usefully be noted and compared. A person not a party to such an action may apply to be added as a party (See R.S.C Order 12 rule 25) The plaintiff is entitled to judgment in default of appearance (See R.S.C Order 13, rule 8). The Court has unfettered power to set aside the judgment. (See R.S.C Order 13, rule 10, Order 27, rule 15. The decree for recovery of possession is enforced by leave of the Court by a writ of possession after clue notice to all persons who are likely to be affected. (See R.S.C Order 47). The writ is in Form 8, Appendix H to the rules of the Supreme Court and it commands the bailiff to enter on the land and cause the plaintiff to have possession. On the application of a person in possession of a property who was not made a party to the action for its recovery and who being unaware of the action could not apply to be made a party earlier, the judgment in the action and all subsequent proceedings including the writ of possession may be set aside so far as it concerns him on his electing to be added as a defendant to the action. (Vide Minet v. Johnson (16) [(1893) 63 Law Times, N.S 507].

    16. The facts of this case are simple enough. In the plaint and the petition dated the 13th January, 1956, the decree-holder admitted that the petitioner was a sub-tenant and that no effective decree for ejectment could be passed in his absence.

    17. In his written statement, the petitioner asserted that he was a sub-tenant. On the face of the record, there is the bona fide contention that the petitioner is a subtenant and that he is not bound by the decree for ejectment. If in fact the petitioner is not a sub-tenant, the decree-holder was ill-advised to ask for an warrant of possession in Form No. 11 of Appendix E. The decree-holder acted illegally in not disclosing these facts in his petition praying for police help and for an order under Order 21, rule 98. The court acted illegally in passing an order for police help without considering the facts appearing on the face of the record and in refusing to hear the petitioner on the question whether police help should or should not be granted. The order for police help is clearly illegal and must be set aside at the instance of the petitioner who is vitally affected by the order. The remaining part of the order passed under order 21, rule 97 against the opposite parties to the decree-holder's petition, namely, Dinesh, Sukhendu and Sovarani cannot be set aside. Those opposite parties did not appear before the learned Judge. They have also not moved this Court in revision against the order. The order against them will, however, in no way, bind the petitioner.

    18. I pass the following order:

    The order dated the 24th April, 1956 so far as it allows the prayer for police help is set aside. It is declared that the rest of the order dated the 24th April, 1956 does not bind the petitioner in any way. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this Rule from the opposite party No. 1, Amulya Chandra Sarkar.

    19. The Rule is disposed of accordingly.

    A.K.D.G

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    Gaya Nath Ghose v. Amulya Chandra Sarkar And Anr. Opposite Parties.
    (Aug 7, 1956)