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Judgment Summary — K.C. Das Gupta, J. (Reported Opinion Provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were tried by a Special Tribunal constituted under the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 (West Bengal Act 14 of 1952). The Tribunal framed charges of conspiracy under S. 120-B read with Ss. 302, 324, 342 and 427, Penal Code, Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act (1878). Several appellants were also charged with specific offences including murder (S. 302 IPC), causing disappearance of evidence (S. 201 IPC), possession and use of explosives (Sections 3 and 5, Explosive Substances Act), wrongful confinement (S. 342 IPC), causing hurt (S. 324 IPC) and mischief by fire/damage (Ss. 435 and 427 IPC).

The prosecution alleged that between 24 and 26 February 1949 several workmen at Jessop Factory at Dum Dum conspired to murder European officers and to commit offences in furtherance of that purpose. On 26 February 1949 explosions, assaults with iron rods, murders and disposal of bodies in furnaces, confinement of other officers, and damage/arson to motor cars were alleged to have occurred. The Tribunal convicted many of the appellants on the conspiracy charge and on various specific charges; those convicted of murder were sentenced to transportation for life.

The present opinion is an appellate judgment reviewing legal questions (jurisdiction of the Tribunal, tendering of pardon, admissibility of previous trial records, and validity of consent for trial under the Explosive Substances Act) and the evidence, and disposing of multiple appeals by allowing, dismissing or altering convictions and sentences as recorded in the judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Tribunal constituted under the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 (West Bengal Act 14 of 1952) was competent to try offences allegedly committed before the enactment of that Act (February 1949).
  2. Whether the Special Tribunal acted illegally in tendering a pardon to an accused (Akkas Ali) and, if so, whether the evidence of Akkas Ali could be considered.
  3. Whether statements recorded at a prior trial before a Special Court (presided over by Mr. S.N. Guha Ray), which earlier had been held an invalid trial, were admissible or entitled to the presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act.
  4. Whether there was valid legal consent to try Rajkrishna Chakravarty for offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, given that the function of giving consent had been delegated under the Government of India Act, 1935, and whether that delegation remained valid after the Constitution came into force.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Tribunal constituted under the 1952 Act was not competent to try offences committed prior to that Act, so trials for February 1949 offences were without jurisdiction.
  • The pardon tendered to Akkas Ali by the Tribunal was illegal and therefore Akkas Ali's evidence was not legal evidence for the trial.
  • Section 338 CrPC (power to tender pardon after commitment) could not apply to the Tribunal because there was no commitment to the Tribunal; hence the appellants argued Section 338 could not be invoked.
  • Records of witness statements from the previous trial presided over by Mr. Guha Ray should not attract the presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act because that Special Court was not a competent court to try the offences.
  • After the Constitution came into force, the previous delegation (under the Government of India Act, 1935) of the Central Government's power to give consent for prosecution under the Explosive Substances Act to provincial governments had no legal validity; therefore consent given by the State of West Bengal was invalid.

State / Respondent Arguments (as presented in opinion)

  • The 1952 Tribunals Act did not create new offences or increase punishments but related to procedure; therefore its provisions were retrospective and applicable to offences committed before the Act.
  • The words in S.10 (that the Tribunal shall apply provisions of the CrPC "as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction") should be read to produce the consequence that a case of which cognizance is taken would be deemed to have been committed to the Tribunal, making provisions like Section 338 CrPC applicable.
  • Consent given by the State (Exhibit 53) for trial under the Explosive Substances Act was valid because the Central Government had earlier delegated functions under s.124(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, to provinces, and Article 73(2) of the Constitution preserved such executive powers until otherwise provided by Parliament.
  • Regarding prior records, the State contended that signatures on the previous depositions and other indicia might prove the correctness of those records despite the earlier trial being invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghose, AIR 1945 Cal 159 Principle that presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act does not attach to records of a court which was not competent to try the case. The Court applied this principle to hold that the records of the previous trial before Mr. S.N. Guha Ray (a Special Court later held not competent) do not attract the presumption of correctness under S.80 and thus cannot be taken at face value as proof of what was said at the earlier trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the legal questions in sequence:

  1. Tribunal competence and retrospectivity of the 1952 Act:

    Reasoning:

    The Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 did not create new substantive offences nor increase punishments; apart from Section 8 (right of appeal to the High Court) its provisions concern trial procedure. Consequently, those procedural provisions are retrospective and apply to trials held after the Act even if the alleged offences were committed earlier. Section 8, being substantive (right of appeal), applies whenever the trial is held after the Act. The court concluded the Tribunal could validly try offences committed in February 1949.

  2. Tendering of pardon to Akkas Ali:

    Reasoning:

    The West Bengal Act 16 of 1952 (the Tribunals Act) contains a provision (S.10) that, so far as applicable and not inconsistent, provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply "as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction." Section 338 CrPC empowers a Court of Session to tender pardon after commitment. The court examined whether this made Section 338 applicable where there had been no commitment to the Tribunal. It reviewed the prior Special Courts Act, 1950 provisions (which had explicitly empowered pardon and deemed it to be under S.338) and noted that the 1952 enactment omitted the explicit power to tender pardons. From that omission and the prior statutory history, the court concluded that the Legislature intended to remove the power to tender pardons from Special Tribunals. Therefore the learned Special Judge acted without jurisdiction in tendering pardon to Akkas Ali, and the evidence recorded from Akkas Ali could not be considered.

  3. Admissibility of statements from the previous (invalid) trial:

    Reasoning:

    The earlier Special Court presided by Mr. S.N. Guha Ray was held not to be a competent Court to try the offences; consequently, the presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act does not attach to its records (following Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghose). However, the Court recognized that the absence of that presumption does not preclude proof of what statements were actually made on a previous occasion by other evidence. The court examined the record situation: depositions bore signatures purportedly of Mr. Guha Ray (proved to be his), and sheets carried the phrase "Read over and explained to the witness in the presence of the accused and admitted by him to be correct". But the evidence showed that the stenographer typed the depositions at Mr. Guha Ray's dictation, so there is scope for omission by either the presiding person or the typist. The court indicated a careful, statement-by-statement approach: simple factual statements (e.g., "I saw X and Y") are likely to be proved even without Section 80 presumption; more complex statements (e.g., lists of recognised persons) could well have omissions and cannot be regarded as proved simply by producing the former record. Where defence seeks to use the entire prior record to show a statement was not made, the possibility of omission makes such reliance unsafe absent independent proof.

  4. Validity of consent to try under Sections 3 and 5, Explosive Substances Act:

    Reasoning:

    The power to give consent to prosecution under the Explosive Substances Act was vested in the Central Government; under sub-s. (1) of s.124 of the Government of India Act, 1935 the Central Government had delegated these functions to provincial governments. Counsel for the appellants contended that this delegation lost validity after the Constitution commenced. The court relied on Article 73(2) of the Constitution which preserves, until Parliament otherwise provides, the power exercisable immediately before commencement by a State or an officer of a State. The Court held that the effect of this provision was to validate the power West Bengal had to give consent at the relevant time; consequently the consent (Ex. 53) was valid.

  5. Evaluation of evidence on conspiracy and other substantive offences:

    Reasoning:

    After scrutinizing the proved events on 26 February 1949 (explosions, assaults, murders, confinement and disposal of bodies in furnaces, attempts on the Mechanical Section, damage to motor cars, arrival of police and discovery of skeletal remains), the Court concluded there was a conspiracy among several Jessop Factory workers to murder European officers and to wrongfully confine other officers at the time of the attack. However, the Court was not satisfied that agreements had been reached to commit offences under the Explosive Substances Act, the Arms Act, or to commit mischief generally. Hence convictions were treated in terms of conspiracy under S.120-B read with Ss.302 and 342 IPC where appropriate, with individual assessment of the evidence against each appellant and consequent modifications of convictions and sentences as indicated in the dispositional paragraphs of the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court allowed and dismissed various appeals after (1) holding the Tribunal competent to try offences committed before the 1952 Act, (2) ruling that the pardon tendered to Akkas Ali by the Special Tribunal was without jurisdiction and his evidence could not be considered, (3) holding that records of the prior invalid Special Court do not attract the presumption under S.80 Evidence Act though parts may be independently proved, and (4) upholding the validity of State consent to try certain charges under the Explosive Substances Act by application of Article 73(2) of the Constitution.

Direct Consequences for the Parties (as stated in the opinion)

  • The appeals of Anwarali Sarkar, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Nepal Chandra Manna, and Ramjatan Singh against their convictions and sentences under S.302 IPC were allowed; they were acquitted of those murder charges (paragraph 53).
  • The appeals of Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh and Rajkrishna Chakravarty against convictions under S.201 IPC were allowed and they were acquitted of those charges (paragraph 53).
  • The convictions on the conspiracy charge for Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh, Rajkrishna Chakravarty, Makhan Lal Bose and Saraswati Prosad Tewary were altered: the Court convicted them under S.120-B read with Ss.302 and 342 IPC. Sentences: Anwarali Sarkar, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh and Makhan Lal Bose were sentenced to transportation for life; the Tribunal's life sentences against Rajkrishna Chakravarty and Saraswati Prosad Tewary were maintained (paragraph 54).
  • The appeals of Kartic Chandra Manna, Nepal Chandra Manna and Santosh Kumar Mitra against their conspiracy convictions were allowed and they were acquitted of that charge (paragraph 55).
  • The appeals of Kartic Chandra Manna, Nepal Chandra Manna and Kartic Chandra Dhara against convictions under S.342 IPC were dismissed. No sentence was passed against Kartic Chandra Dhara for those offences; Kartic Chandra Manna and Nepal Chandra Manna were each sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year for each charge, to run concurrently (paragraph 56).
  • The appeal of Santosh Kumar Mitra against conviction under S.435 IPC was dismissed; he was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years. His appeal against S.427 IPC conviction was allowed and he was acquitted of S.427 (paragraphs 57–58).
  • The appeal of Rajkrishna Chakravarty against conviction under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act was dismissed — his conviction on those counts was maintained (paragraph 59).
  • The appeal of Makhan Lal Bose against conviction and sentence under S.302/34 IPC was allowed and he was acquitted of that charge; his appeal against conviction under S.324 IPC was dismissed (paragraphs 60–61).
  • The appeal of Simon Ram against his conspiracy conviction and his S.302 IPC conviction was allowed and he was acquitted of those charges and ordered to be set at liberty at once (paragraph 62).
  • Kartic Chandra Manna and Nepal Chandra Manna were noted as having already served out the sentences now imposed on them and were to be set at liberty at once (paragraph 62).

Implications beyond the parties: The Court emphasized careful statutory construction regarding retrospective application of procedural statutes (the 1952 Tribunals Act), the necessity of explicit statutory authorisation for extraordinary procedural powers such as tendering pardons (and that an omission may indicate withdrawal of such power), the limited reliability of records from tribunals or courts not competent to try the case (impacting application of Section 80 Evidence Act), and the saving operation of Article 73(2) of the Constitution in preserving pre-Constitution executive delegations until Parliament provides otherwise. The judgment altered various convictions and sentences but did not purport to establish a novel general rule beyond these reasoned applications of statute and precedent.

Order: The judgment contains the specific disposals enumerated above; the opinion concludes with the direction "Order accordingly." (paragraph 63).

    Anwarali Sarkar And Others v. The State .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    K.C Das Gupta, J.:— The appellants were tried by a special Tribunal constituted under the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952, (West Bengal Act 14 of 1952). The learned Judge who presided over the Tribunal framed charges against all the appellants of conspiracy to commit offences under Ss. 302, 324, 342, and 427, Penal Code and Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act of 1878.

    2. Seven of the appellants together with one Nepal Chandra Mazumdar who has been acquitted were also charged with specific offence under S. 302, Penal Code for having intentionally caused the death of F.G Turnbull, a foreman of the Structural Section of Messrs Jessop and Co. at Dum Dum. One appellant, Simon Ram was charged with a specific offence under S. 302, Penal Code for having intentionally caused the death of A. Dwyer, an employee of Messrs Jessop and Co. The seven appellants who were charged with the specific offence of murder of F.G Turnbull, were also charged with a specific offence under S. 201, Penal Code on the allegation that they had caused evidence of the murder to disappear by removing the dead body of Turnbull and throwing it into a burning furnace; appellant Rajkrishna Chakravarty was charged under S. 201, Penal Code for causing the evidence of the murder of A. Dwyer to disappear by removing his body and putting it inside a burning furnace.

    3. Raj Krishna Chakravarty was further charged with a specific offence under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act for causing explosion by explosive substances and another under S. 5 of the same Act for being in possession of explosive substances, namely, bombs; the appellant Makhan Lal Bose was also charged with a specific offence under S. 302, Penal-Code for intentionally causing the death of Augier, a Foreman of the Mechanical section of Jessop Factory and another offence under S. 324, Penal Code for having caused hurt to Asoke Kumar Das, an Assistant Foreman of the Company by means of iron rods.

    4. He was also charged under Section 3 of the Explosive Sub-stances Act for having caused explosion by means of explosive substances; the appellant Santosh Kumar Mitra was further charged with si specific offence under S. 435, Penal Code for commission of mischief by fire in respect of a motor car belonging to A.E Howell and another offence under S. 427, Penal Code for mischief by causing damage in respect of a motor car belonging to Mr. Vajda; the appellants Nepal Chandra Manna, Kartic Chandra Manna and Kartic Chandra Dhara were further charged with a specific offence under S. 342, Penal Code for wrongful confinement of Madan Mohan Sadhukhan and Durgadas Lahiri; Kartic Chandra Dhara was further charged under S. 342, Penal Code for wrongful confinement of P.C Bose; Ramjatan Singh was further charged under S. 342, Penal Code for two offences of wrongful confinement of A.P Thakur and of Sambhupada Banerjee.

    5. All the appellants have been convicted of the conspiracy charge, that is, under S. 120-B read with Ss. 302, 324, 342, and 427, Penal Code, Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and 19(f), Indian Arms Act. Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Nepal Chandra Manna and Ramjatan Singh have all been convicted further under S. 302, Penal Code for the murder of Turnbull.

    6. Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara and Ramjatan Singh have been convicted under S. 201, Penal Code for causing the evidence of the murder of Turnbull to disappear. Simon Ram has been convicted of the charge under S. 302, Penal Code for causing the death of A. Dwyer. Rajkrishna Chakravarty has been convicted under S. 201, Penal Code for causing disappearance of the evidence of the murder of A. Dwyer.

    7. He has also been convicted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act; Makhan Lal Bose has been convicted under S. 302, Penal Code for causing the death of Augier and under S. 324, Penal Code for causing hurt to A.K Das and under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act; Nepal Chandra Manna, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Kartic Chandra Manna and Ramjatan Singh have further been convicted of, several specific offences under S. 342, Penal Code with which they had been charged; Santosh Kumar Mitra has been further convicted of specific offences under Ss. 435 and 427, Penal Code with which he was charged.

    8. The appellants convicted of the offence of murder have been sentenced to transportation for life for that offence and no separate sentence has been passed for the other offences. Those appellants who have not been convicted of any offence under S. 302, Penal Code have been sentenced to transportation for life on the conspiracy charge and no separate sentence has been passed for the other offences as against them.

    9. The prosecution case is that between the 24th and 26th February 1949 these appellants who were all workmen at that time of Jessop Factory at Dum Dum entered into a conspiracy for committing several offences, the principal offence agreed upon being the murder of European officers of the Company and upon offences agreed upon being the wrongful confinement of other officers of the company, the possession and use of explosive substances, the commission of mischief to property, the causing of hurt, the possession of arms in order to facilitate the achievement of the main object of the conspiracy, namely, the murder of Eupropean officers of the Company.

    10. It is alleged that for more than a year before these dates relations between the Company and the workmen, specially those who were paid wages every week on a daily basis, had been strained over tile claim of bonus; and that matters came to a head with the discharge of 137 workmen of the Mechanical Section of the company on the 24th February.

    11. It is said that exasperated by tins last move, the leading members of the Labour Union to which most of the workmen of the Company belonged, agreed on a scheme to murder European officers of the company and that to prevent obstruction from Indian and Anglo-Indian officers they agreed further that at the time the European officers would be attacked and murdered, the Indian and Anglo-Indian officers would be kept confined in such places and in such manner as would make it impossible for them to see the actual occurrence.

    12. For a proper appreciation of the evidence, it will be convenient to set out at this stage the main allegations of the prosecution as regards what happened in the Factory on 26-2-1949. These are: At about 11 a.m on that date some of the conspirators including Rajkrishna Chakravarty, who was carrying in a haver-sack some bombs came into the westernmost room of the office building of the Structural Section situated at a short distance from the main gate of the section which opens on the Station Road; and that Rajkrishna Chakravarty, threw several bombs inside the room. This room was being used at that time as the office room by the Works Manager of the Structural Section and W.E Howell, Works Manager was at that time sitting in the room along with Dwyer, one Birchenough and one excise officer, Mr. Dwyer was an officer of the Mechanical Section of the Factory which is situated north of the Structural Section.

    13. He was also secretary of the Social Club of the Factory. Dwyer had come with Birchenough and the excise officer to discuss matters in connection with an excise licence for the Club. When the bombs were thrown, all of them ran out of the room, Howell being the last to get out. Some of the Conspirators who were waiting on the southern verandah by which all these officers tried to escape set upon Dwyer and killed him one of the things which he was struck being a bearer's stool. Birchenough and Howell managed to escape.

    14. F.G Turnbull, who was at that time the Foreman of the Assembling shop was then in the Assembling Shop which is situated several hundred yards to the north of the office room. Immediately east of the office building is the Preparing Shop, running north to south for length of 420 ft., north of that being the Drilling Shop running north to south for another 420 ft., north of the Drilling Shop being the Assembling Shop.

    15. On hearing the sound of explosion, he ran towards the office building. Before however Turn-bull could reach that building he was surrounded by a number of conspirators and beaten with iron rods. He died on the spot and then his body was dragged to one of the furnaces and thrown in there. The body of Dwyer who had died as a result of the attack on him was also dragged to the same furnace and thrown into it.

    16. Mr. Brennon who was the Foreman of the Press Shop situated towards the east of the Assembling Shop was also murdered by the conspirators and his body was thrown, into another furnace.

    17. Some time before Rajkrishna threw the bombs in Howell's room, some of the conspirators had set about the task of confining Indian and Anglo-Indian officers. Two of them were confined in the strong room of the Electric Godown; two in the office of the Drilling Shop and six in the Assistant Foreman's office room. It was after the murders had been perpetrated & the bodies disposed of in the manner mentioned above, that these officers who had been confined were brought out of their places of confinement and led to the gate of the Factory on the Dingla Road and allowed to depart.

    18. Before this, however, things had been happening in the Mechanical Section of the Factory also. Within a few minutes after the attack on the officers commenced in the Structural Section, scree of the conspirators attacked the office of the Works Manager in the Mechanical Section; and while they were unable to break open the door of the room in which A.E Howell, the Works Manager and some others had shut themselves, one of the attacking party threw a bomb through an opening that had been made in the wooden panel of the door.

    19. Two officers who were near the Machine Shop were also attacked and while one of them Mr. A.K Das escaped with minor injuries, the other viz., Augier received serious injuries, as a result of which he died later on the same day. Some of the conspirators set fire to a motor car belonging to A.E Howell, Works Manager of the Mechanical Section while another motor car belonging to one Vajda was also damaged.

    20. The police arrived shortly after 11-30 a.m They went to the Mechanical Section first and later in the day to the Structural Section. Sometime after it was discovered that the three officers, Turnbull, Brennon and Dwyer were missing, three skeletons were discovered in the furnaces. What remained of the bodies could not be taken out of the furnaces that day because of the extreme heat.

    21. All the accused pleaded not guilty. The defence case is that some of the workmen of the Mechanical Section who had been discharged had entered the factory on the 26th February and there was some trouble between them and the ??? officers; and that there was no conspiracy at all of the nature as alleged to murder European officers and to commit other offences for facilitating the commission of murder.

    22. In any case, they pleaded that none of them were parties to any such conspiracy. From the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the defence case further appears to be that the story that Turnbull or Brennon or Dwyer was murdered is not true; that the skeletons that were found in the furnaces were the remains of the bodies of workmen of the Factory whom the European officers killed that day.

    23. The defence further is that even if it be found that Turnbull or Brennon or Dwyer was murdered, the accused persons took no part in the murder. Makhan Lal Bose's defence is that he took no part in any attack on A.K Dass or on Augier and that he has been falsely implicated as he had some trouble with his superior officer shortly before the date of occurrence.

    24. As regards the charge of wrongful confinement of Indian and Anglo-Indian officers, the defence case is that workmen who were loyal to these officers helped them to get inside places of safety and stood outside the doors to protect these officers from injury. The case of some of the accused further appears to be that they have been falsely implicated as they were known or suspected to be taking leading part in the activities of the Labour Union.

    25. Before we can come to the consideration of the evidence for deciding whether the appellants have been rightly convicted, it is necessary to consider first several questions of law that have been raised. The first of these is that the Tribunal which was constituted under West Bengal Act 14 of 1952 was not competent to try offences committed prior to the enactment of this Statute and so the trial of the present appellants for offences committed in February 1949 was without jurisdiction. In my judgment, this contention must fail. The Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952, did not create any new offences nor did it provide for enhanced punishment for any old offences. Apart from S. 8 which provides for an appeal to the High Court by a person convicted by the Tribunal, the provisions of this Act relate to the procedure for trial of offences and consequently must be held to be retrospective in their operation.

    26. Section 8 giving a right of appeal is no doubt a provision of substantive law, but as it gives the right of appeal to any person convicted on a trial held by a Tribunal, it applies whenever the trial itself is held after the Act was passed. I have, therefore come to the conclusion that the provisions relating to a trial by a Special Tribunal constituted under the Act are applicable to offences committed before the Act was passed.

    27. The next contention is that the Special Tribunal acted illegally in tendering pardon to Akkas Ali who was one of the accused and consequently the evidence of Akkas Ali is not legal evidence that can be considered at the trial.

    28. The West Bengal Act 16 of 1952 does not itself contain any provision as regards the tendering of pardon by the Tribunal. Section 10 of the Act, however, provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as they may be applicable and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all matters connected with, arising from, or consequent upon, a trial by a Tribunal constituted under this Act as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction.

    29. Section 338 of the Cr PC empowers a Court of Session to which a case has been committed to tender pardon to an accused after commitment. On behalf of the appellants, it is argued by Mr. Datta that as there is no commitment to the Tribunal, the provisions of Section 338 of the Cr PC which come into play only after commitment cannot apply.

    30. While Section 193 of the Cr PC provides that a Court of Session will take cognizance of cases on commitment, Section 5 of the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952 provides that a Tribunal may take cognizance of scheduled offences without the accused being committed to it for trial. If there had been any provision in this Act saying that even in the absence of an actual commitment, the case would be deemed to have been committed for trial the provisions of Section 338 of the Cr PC would have become applicable.

    31. It is contended on behalf of the State that the words “as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original Criminal jurisdiction” necessarily produce the consequence that the case of which cognizance is taken would be deemed to have been committed to the Tribunal even though, in fact, there has been no commitment.

    32. If there was nothing else, I would have been, inclined to accept this argument and to hold that the words “as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction” should be read as, “as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, after commitment.”

    33. The words used by the Legislature cannot, however, be said to put the matter beyond doubt. It is necessary and proper, therefore, to examine the previous state of the law. The Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952, was enacted in place of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, which is repealed by S. 12 of the present Act.

    34. In West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950, we find it provided in sub-s. (3) of S. 6 that a Special Court may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, the offence, tender a pardon to such person, it being further provided that any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of Ss. 339 and 339A of the Code, be deemed to have been tendered, under S. 338 of the Code.

    35. It is well to remember that in the preceding sub-section of S. 6, it had been provided that in matters not coming within the scope of sub-s. (1) — that is, as regards cognizance being taken without commitment and the procedure of warrant cases being followed and English being deemed to be the language of the Court the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, shall apply to the proceedings of a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session.

    36. There was also in Section 17 of the Special Courts Act, 1950, provisions similar to what we find in S. 10 of the Act 14 of 1952, that the provisions of the Code in so far as they may be applicable and in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall apply to all matters connected with, arising from or consequent upon, a trial by a Special Court.

    37. It is true that S. 17 of the 1950 Act did not say, “as if the Tribunal were a Court of Session exercising original criminal jurisdiction”, but that can hardly be considered to be a real distinction as the words “a Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session,” appeared in sub-s. (2) of S. 6.

    38. It is obvious, therefore, that the Legislature was of opinion that the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 6 and the provisions of S. 17 were not sufficient to empower a Special Court to tender pardon to an accused and in that view made special provisions therefor in sub-s. (3) of S. 6. When in 1952, the Legislature repealed the 1950 Act and enacted in its place this new Act, the Tribunals of Criminal Jurisdiction Act, 1952, the Legislature in its wisdom has omitted any provision similar to what had been enacted in sub-s. (3) of S. 6.

    39. I find it impossible, in view of this, to escaper the conclusion that the Legislature decided to take away the power and jurisdiction of tendering pardon from the Special Tribunals. The conclusion that necessarily follows from this is that the learned Special Judge presiding over the Special Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction in tendering pardon, to Akkas Ali and that consequently the evidence as recorded by him of Akkas Ali cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of this case.

    40. A question as regards the admissibility of the evidence of statements of some of the witnesses at the previous trial has been raised by the learned Standing Counsel. Some of these accused persons were tried by Mr. S.N Guha Ray as a Special Judge presiding over a Special Court under the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950.

    41. As, however, the sections of the Act which empower a Special Court to “try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct,” was held by this Court and ultimately by the Supreme Court to be ultra vires the trial by Mr. Guha Ray was held to be invalid and there has been a fresh trial by the Special Judge constituted under the 1952 Act.

    42. During the Cross-examination of several of the witnesses, attention of the witnesses was drawn to what they were alleged to have deposed at the previous trial before Mr. Guha Ray for the purpose of contradiction of their present evidence under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It appears to have been contended before the learned Judge presiding over the Special Tribunal that as the Special Court presided over by Mr. Guha Ray was not a competent Court, there was no presumption of correctness of the record of the statements and consequently what had been produced to show what statements were made by these witnesses at the previous trial was not sufficient to show that such statements were actually made.

    43. The learned Judge while agreeing that no correctness of presumption under the Evidence Act attached to these records, was of opinion that the correctness of the record was proved by the fact that the witnesses themselves admitted their signatures appened to their previous depositions.

    44. It is now contended by the learned Standing Counsel that the mere presence of signatures of the witnesses does not show the correctness of the record.

    45. In reply to this, Mr. Dutt tried to convince us that even though the Special Court over which Mr. Guha Ray presided was not a competent Court to try the offences, he was competent to record the evidence and consequently the presumption of correctness of the record under Section 80 of the Evidence Act applied. In my judgment, the presumption of correctness cannot attach to the record of a Court which was not competent to try the case. When the Court was not competent to try the case, it was really not functioning as a Court at all and we must proceed on the basis that Mr. Guha Ray was recording statements of witnesses not as a Court, the functions of which he could not, in law, perform. Consequently, it must be held as was held in the case of — ‘Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghose’, AIR 1945 Cal 159 (A), that the presumption of correctness of the record under Section 80 of the Evidence Act does not attach to these records.

    46. Obviously, that, however, does not mean that there was no other means of proving that such statements were made. In every case where a statement is said to have been made on a previous occasion, we have therefore to look to the evidence that has bee given to see whether this previous statement is proved to have been made. In the different documents said to contain the depositions of witnesses we find signatures purporting to be of Mr. S.N Guha Ray, which signatures have been proved by the evidence to be of Mr. S.N Guha Ray. We also find above the signatures which have been proved to be of Mr. Guha Ray the words “Read over and explained to the witness in the presence of the accused and admitted by him to be correct”. It appears, however, from the evidence that has been given, that what was recorded in those sheets of paper was not recorded by Mr. Guha Kay himself but was typewritten by a stenographer at his dictation. What appears to have happened is that after a witness made his statement, Mr. Guha Ray dictated in English what was to be typed and then and there the stenographer printed those words with his typewriting machine. There is, of course, the chance that some statement made by the witness would be missed by Mr. Guha Ray and there is again the chance that something dictated by Mr. Guha Ray may be omitted by the stenographer. In view of this it is necessary in each particular case to examine what is the nature of the statement said to have been made. For example, if the statement said to have been made is “I saw two persons there, X and Y” and we find such a statement recorded, it is hardly probable that any mistake has been made and we ought to hold that it has been proved even without the presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act that such a statement was, in fact, made on the previous occasion.

    47. If, however, the statement is “I recognised X, Y, Z and W”, it may very well be that in addition to X, Y, Z and W some other name was mentioned which either the learned Judge omitted to dictate or though the learned Judge dictated the stenographer omitted to print. In the absence of presumption of correctness under Section 80 of the Evidence Act it will in such a case not be proper in my opinion, to hold that on the previous occasion the statement was exactly as we find recorded — viz. “I recognised X, Y, Z and W” and no other names were mentioned. Where the defence wants to use the entire record of the evidence of a witness at the former trial to show that a certain statement was not made, the probability that the statement said not to have been made, may have actually been made but omitted from the record, remains even greater, in the absence of the presumption of correctness of the record under Section 80 of the Evidence Act.

    48. In such cases, consequently, I am of opinion that the record that has been produced purporting to be the evidence as recorded by Mr. Guha Ray at the previous trial, will not be sufficient to show that the statement alleged not to have been made was not made. His Lordship then proceeded to discuss evidence in the case. He considered the various tilings which were proved to have happened in the Jessop Factory on the morning of the 26th February and concluded from the proved circumstances that there was a conspiracy between several persons—workers of Jessop Factory—to murder European officers of the company and to wrongfully confine other officers during the murderous attack, but he was not satisfied that the commission of offences under the Explosive Substances Act or the Arms Act or of mischief was agreed upon, and field that whoever was a party to the conspiracy committed an offence punishable under S. 120-B, read with Ss. 302 and 342, Penal Code.

    49. After discussing the evidence on the charge of murder of Dwyer and Turnbull aganst some of the appellants, his Lordship considered the question as to how far the evidence proved the appellants to have been parties to that conspiracy and discussed the evidence against each of the appellants. On the charge under S. 201, Penal Code against Rajkrishna Chakravarty, his Lordship held, on consideration of the evidence, that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge. The judgment then proceeded:

    50. As regards the charges, under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act against Rajkrishna Chakravarty, Mr. Datta raised a point that there has been no legal consent to Rajkrishna's trial for offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. Consent to the “Second Tribunal at Alipore constituted by the Judicial Department Notification No. 4633-J, dated 22-8-1952, proceeding to the trial” of Rajkrishna under Ss. 3 and 5 of the offences under this Act was given by the Government of West Bengal by an order which is marked Ex. 53. The function of giving such consent was entrusted by the Explosive Substances Act to the Central Government. The Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, delegated these functions to the Provincial Governments. Mr. Datta contends that after the Constitution came into force this delegation under the Government of India Act, 1935, has no longer any legal validity.

    51. The objection might have been substantial but for Article 73(2) of the Constitution which is in these words:

    “Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or function as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.”

    52. In my judgment, the effect of this provision is that the power the State of West Bengal had to give consent to a prosecution under the Explosive Substances Act before the commencement of the Constitution continued upto the time of the trial and was a legal and valid consent. (His Lordship then discussed the evidence on those charges and the evidence on charges under Ss..201, 342, 302, 435 and 427 against the appellants and concluded:)

    53. I would, therefore, allow the appeals of Anwarali Sarkar, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Nepal Chandra Manna, and Ramjatan Singh against their conviction and sentence under S. 302, Penal Code and the appeals of Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh and Rajkrishna Chakravarty against their conviction under S. 201, Penal Code and acquit them of these charges.

    54. In the appeals of Anwarali, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh, Rajkrishna Chakravarty, Makhan Lal Bose and Saraswati Prasad Tewary against the conviction on the conspiracy charge, I would alter the conviction to one under S. 120-B, read with Ss. 302 and 342, Penal Code: For this offence, I would sentence Anwarali Sarkar, Balmukul, Kartic Chandra Dhara, Ramjatan Singh and Makhan Lal Bose to transportation for life, and maintain the sentences of transportation for life passed by the Tribunal against Rajkrishna Chakravarty and Saraswati Prosad Tewary.

    55. I would allow the appeals of Kartic Chandra Manna, Nepal Chandra Manna and Santosh Kumar Mitra against their conviction under the conspiracy charge and acquit them of that charge.

    56. I would dismiss the appeals of Kartic Chandra Manna, Nepal Chandra Manna and Kartic Chandra Dhara against their conviction under S. 342, Penal Code and while passing no sentence against Kartic Chandra Dhara for diese offences, would sentence Kartic, Chandra Manna and Nepal Chandra Manna each to rigorous imprisonment for one year for each charge, the sentences to run concurrently.

    57. I would also dismiss the appeal of Santosh Kumar Mitra against his conviction under S. 435, Penal Code and sentence him thereunder to rigorous imprisonment for five years.

    58. I would allow the appeal of Santosh Kumar Mitra against the conviction under S. 427, Penal Code and acquit him of that charge.

    59. I would dismiss the appeal of Rajkrishna Chakravarty against the conviction under Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act.

    60. I would allow the appeal of Makhan Lal Bose against the conviction and sentence under S. 302/34, Penal Code and acquit him of that charge.

    61. I would dismiss the appeal of Makhan Lal Bose against the conviction under S. 324 of the Indian Penal Code.

    62. I would allow the appeal of Simon Ram against his conviction on the conspiracy charge as well as his conviction under S. 302, Penal Code and order that he be acquitted of these charges. He should be set at liberty at once. As Kartic Chandra Manna and Nepal Chandra Manna have already served out the sentence now imposed on them, let them be set at liberty at once.

    Guha, J.:— I agree.

    V.B.B

    63. Order accordingly.

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    Anwarali Sarkar And Others v. The State .
    (May 26, 1955)