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  • section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis, section 408 of the Indian Penal Code;
  • sections 177, 179 and 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the Code
  • section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bombay Court
  • sub-section (2) of section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • provisions of section 179 of the Code
  • section 408 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 405 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 179 of the Code,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis, section 408 of the Indian Penal Code;
  • sections 177, 179 and 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the Code
  • section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bombay Court
  • sub-section (2) of section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
  • provisions of section 179 of the Code
  • section 408 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 405 of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 179 of the Code,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.R. Das Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition to quash criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Sri S.B. Sarkar, Magistrate, First Class, Alipore, 24-Parganas.

The petition of complaint alleges that the petitioner, a Kabiraj, was in charge of the Asansol branch of the Opposite Party, Dacca Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited. His duties included entering medicines received into the cash book and stock book, remitting sale proceeds and rendering weekly, monthly and periodical accounts to the head office. The cash book allegedly showed that the accused misappropriated Rs. 527-7-6 in the first week of January 1954 and misappropriated over Rs. 1,742 by introducing spurious medicines—specifically “Makaradhwaj”, “Swarnasindur” and “Rasasindur”—into the company stock. Proceedings were instituted against the petitioner in Alipore based on those allegations.

The petitioner seeks quashing on the ground that the Alipore Court lacks jurisdiction because, it is alleged, entrustment and conversion occurred at Asansol.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court at Alipore has jurisdiction to try an offence under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code (criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant) when the petition alleges that the entrustment and the alleged misappropriation or conversion occurred at Asansol.
  2. How sections 177, 179 and 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to determine the appropriate forum for trying an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that for criminal breach of trust or misappropriation the competent Court is the one situated where the entrustment or the positive act of conversion took place, here Asansol, and therefore Alipore lacked jurisdiction.

Opposite Party's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The learned Advocate for the opposite party relied on the decision of Prokash (Pro-hash) Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar (A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 392), as interpreted by Mr. Justice Mukerji, which suggested that where there is merely an allegation of non-accounting, failure to account may be treated as evidence of intention to misappropriate and the offence may be deemed committed at the place where the accused ought to have rendered accounts (thereby supporting jurisdiction at the place where accounts were to be rendered).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re, Jivandas Savchand (I.L.R. 55 Bom. 59) — Chief Justice Beaumont Interpretation of section 179 Cr.P.C.: when an offence is said to be committed by reason of an act done and a consequence which ensued, jurisdiction is conferred on the Court where the act was done or where the consequence ensued, but only if the offence is charged by reason of both those elements. The court accepted Beaumont C.J.'s interpretation of section 179 and relied on it to explain that section 179 does not expand jurisdiction where the offence is not charged as consisting of both an act and a consequence; thus it does not support Alipore's jurisdiction where entrustment and misappropriation are averred to have occurred at Asansol.
Daityari Tripatty v. Subodh Chandra Choudhury (46 C.W.N. 952) — (Judgment by Mr. Justice Blagden) Held that criminal breach of trust is not triable at a place where neither the entrustment nor any positive act of conversion took place; failure to render accounts is often evidence of misappropriation but is not itself an incident of the misappropriation such as to create jurisdiction under sections 179 or 181(2). The court expressly agreed with Blagden J.'s view, treating non-submission of accounts as evidence (not an ingredient giving jurisdiction elsewhere) and applying that reasoning to conclude Alipore lacked jurisdiction when the complaint averred entrustment and misappropriation at Asansol.
Prokash (Pro-hash) Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar (A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 392) — Mr. Justice Mukerji Where there is no definite allegation of misappropriation at any particular place and the allegation is merely of non-accounting, failure to account may itself be taken as evidence of intention to misappropriate and the offence may be deemed to have been committed at the place where the accused ought to have rendered the accounts. The court recognized the decision and the respect due to Justice Mukerji’s view but distinguished it on the facts: in the present case the petition of complaint specifically averred that entrustment and misappropriation occurred at Asansol, unlike the Mukerji case where the complaint apparently rested on non-accounting alone. The court therefore did not follow Mukerji's approach for this factual matrix and noted that Mukerji had not considered section 179 vis-à-vis section 408 IPC in the way other judges had.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court commenced by identifying the statutory framework relevant to territorial jurisdiction: sections 177, 179 and 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 establishes the ordinary rule that an offence is to be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits where it was committed. Section 179 permits inquiry or trial where an offence is charged as being by reason of an act done and a consequence which ensued, by a Court within the limits where such act was done or consequence ensued. Section 181(2) expressly provides that an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local limits any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person, or the offence was committed.

Applying these provisions, the court observed that section 181(2) plainly permits trial where any part of the property was received or retained or where the offence was committed. The court examined the petition of complaint and concluded that it specifically alleged that entrustment and the acts of misappropriation had taken place while the petitioner was in charge of the Asansol branch. On that factual averment, the Asansol Court was the competent forum under sub-section (2) of section 181 Cr.P.C.

The court addressed a contention based on section 179 — that Alipore could try the case because of consequences or acts alleged to have occurred in Alipore. It explained the proper scope of section 179 (endorsing Chief Justice Beaumont’s exposition): section 179 confers jurisdiction only where the offence is charged by reason of both an act and a consequence; the consequence must be part of the offence as charged. The court agreed with prior authorities (Beaumont C.J. and Blagden J.) that mere failure to render accounts is, in many cases, evidential of misappropriation but is not an integral part of the offence of misappropriation so as to create jurisdiction under section 179 when entrustment and conversion occurred elsewhere.

The court considered and distinguished the decision of Mr. Justice Mukerji in Prokash Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar, which had treated failure to account as sufficient in some circumstances to deem the offence committed where accounts should have been rendered. The present court noted that in Mukerji’s case the complaint apparently contained no definite allegation of misappropriation in any particular place and rested on non-accounting alone; by contrast, the present petition specifically alleged misappropriation and entrustment at Asansol. The court also observed that Mukerji had not examined section 179’s effect vis-à-vis section 408 IPC in the same way other judges had.

For these reasons, the court concluded that the Alipore Court was not competent to proceed: the averments in the complaint brought the matter within the territorial ambit of Asansol under section 181(2).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition to quash was allowed; the court held that the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court at Alipore could not be proceeded with there and should be quashed. The Rule was made absolute.

Implications:

  • The immediate and direct effect is that the criminal proceedings before the Alipore Magistrate were quashed by this court.
  • The court expressly held that, on the averments of the petition of complaint, the proper forum for trial would be the Court at Asansol because entrustment and misappropriation were alleged to have occurred there (applying section 181(2) Cr.P.C.).
  • The opinion confines itself to the application of existing statutory provisions and prior authorities to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond the interpretation and application of sections 177, 179 and 181(2) Cr.P.C. in the factual context before it.

End of summary. The above is a faithful synthesis of the reasoning and disposition contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce facts or holdings beyond the text of that opinion.

    Debendra Nath Sen v. Rajendra Chandra Roy Opposite Party.

    S.R Das Gupta, J.:— This is a petition for quashing the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Sri S.B Sarkar Magistrate, First Class, Alipore, 24-Parganas.

    2. The case made in the petition of complaint upon which the said proceedings have been started is as follows: The petitioner is a Kabiraj and was in charge of Asansol Branch of the Opposite Party, Dacca Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited.

    3. It was the duty of the petitioner to enter the medicines received by him in the cash book and the stock book and he was to remit the sale proceeds and render weekly, monthly and periodical accounts to the Head Office. From the cash book it has been found that the accused misappropriated Rs. 527-7-6 in the first week of January, 1954, and has also misappropriated over Rs. 1,742 by introducing spurious medicines, namely, “Makaradhwaj and Swarnasindur” and “Rasasindur” in the stock of the company. Upon those allegations the present proceedings have been started against the petitioner.

    4. The ground on which the said proceedings are sought to be quashed is that the criminal Court, at Alipore, had no jurisdiction to try the alleged offence of the petitioner. The case against the petitioner was under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code, that is to say, criminal breach of trust by a clerk or a servant. The petitioner contends before us that in a case of criminal breach of trust or misappropriation the Court competent to try the same would be the Court situated at a place, where the entrustment or the positive act of conversion took place. But in this case, it was alleged, the petition of complaint shows that the conversion and/or the entrustment took place at Asansol, and, therefore, the Court at Asansol is the Court competent to try this offence.

    5. In our opinion this contention of the petitioner is sound and should prevail. In determining the question as to whether or not the Court at Alipore, has jurisdiction to try this case it would be necessary to consider certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The material provisions to be considered are sections 177, 179 and 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 177 of the Code lays down that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. Then comes section 179 which says that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done or any such consequence has ensued. Section 181(2) provides as follows: “The offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained by the accused person, or the offence was committed.” I have already stated that the case against the petitioner is under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code, in criminal breach of trust by a clerk or a servant. On consideration of the said provisions of the Criminal Procedure, it appears to us that the offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust can be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, any part of the property was received or retained or the offence was committed. This is clear from the plain language of the section 181(2) of the Cr. P.C In this case the petition of complaint clearly shows that the petitioner was in charge of the Asansol Branch of the Company and while in the said charge he had received and misappropriated the sums mentioned in the said petition. It seems to be clear that in the petition of complaint, the case made is that the entrustment and misappropriation or breach of trust took place at Asansol. So, on the averments made in the petition of complaint and on the plain reading of sub-section (2) of section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is clear that the Court which is competent to try this case would be the Court at Asansol, where the entrustment and the misappropriation or the criminal breach of trust had taken place. Some confusion had been sought to be created by reference to the provisions of section 179 of the Code and it has been contended that the Alipore Court is also competent to try this case because of the provisions of the said section. I have referred to the provisions of section 179 of the Code. The effect of the said section, in our opinion, is that if a person is said to have committed an offence by reason of anything done and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be enquired into or tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. In other words, if the ingredients of an offence are (a) an act done and (b) a consequence which follows, then the Court where the act was done or where the consequence has ensued would be competent to try the said case. This was also the view taken by Chief Justice Beaumont in the case of In Re, Jivandas Savchand (1) (I.L.R 55 Bom. 59). Chief Justice Beaumont in considering the effect of section 179 of the Code, in that case observed as) follows: “Now I must confess that, but for the fact that many eminent Judges have taken a different view, I should have thought that the languages of that section was perfectly plain. What it provides is, that when a per son is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of two things, by reason first of anything which has been done, and, secondly, of any consequence which has ensued, then jurisdiction is conferred on the Court where the act has been done or the consequence has ensued. But the offence must be charged by reason of those two things, the act done and the consequence which ensued. If that is so, the consequence is necessarily part of the offence.”

    6. In that case also the question arose whether or not a person can be tried for criminal breach of trust in a place where he was required to render accounts. The complainant in that case had entered into a partnership at Bombay in a business to be carried on in Rangoon. The accused was to manage and conduct the business in Rangoon and he was to send to the Head Office at Bombay statements of the business transacted by him on behalf of the partnership. The accused used to send such statements and accounts and on examination of the accounts sent, the complainant discovered that the accused had dishonestly misappropriated large sums of money belonging to the firm. A complaint was thereupon filed in Bombay charging the accused under section 405 and under section 477A of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that the offence of criminal breach of trust having been committed in Rangoon, under section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Bombay Court had no jurisdiction to try the offence. Chief Justice Beaumont in making the observations to which I have referred, repelled the contention that in a case of criminal breach of trust the offence can be said to have been committed not only at the place, where the actual misappropriation took place, but also at the place, where the accused was liable to render accounts. We very respectfully agree with the view taken by the Chief Justice Beaumont in the said case. In our opinion also the plain language of section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes that position clear. The same view seems also to have been taken by this Court in the ease of Daityari Tripatty v. Subodh Chandra Choudhury (2) (46 C.W.N 952). In that case also the complaint was under section 408 of the Indian Penal Code and the question arose as to which was the Court which should try the said case. Mr. Justice Blagden in delivering the judgment made it quite clear that under the Code of Criminal Procedure an offence of criminal breach of trust was not triable at a place where neither the entrustment nor any positive act of conversion took place.. His Lordship further held that it was also not triable at such place either under section 179 or under section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the footing that failure to render accounts took place there. Mr. Justice Blagden in the course of his judgment stated that the actual crime created by section 405 of the Indian Penal Code consists of any one of four acts— “misappropriation”, “conversion”, “user” or “disposal” of property, and it seemed on principle that a man can personally do an act at that place only, where at the material time, he physically is. With regard to the application of section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Justice Blagden held—and we agree with the said view-that failure to account is often convincing evidence of the act of misappropriation and not an incident of the said act. We respectfully agree with the view, taken by the learned Judges in the said case of Daityari Tripatty v. Subodh Chandra Choudhury (1) (46 C.W.N 952), and of the Chief Justice Beaumont, namely, that non-submission of an account is not an integral part of an act of misappropriation and, therefore it cannot be said that the offence took place not only at the place, where the misappropriation took place, but also at the place, where the accounts were not rendered. The learned Advocate for the opposite party relied the case of Pro-hash Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar (3) (A.I.R 1934 Cal. 392), and on the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Mukerji in that case, where His Lordship held as follows:— “Where there is no definite allegation of misappropriation having been committed, in any particular place, in respect of a sum which forms the subject-matter of a case, but the allegation is merely of non-accounting in respect of the sum, failure to account may itself be taken as evidence of intention to misappropriate and the offence of misappropriation is deemed to have been committed at the place at which the accused ought to have rendered the accounts.” A decision of an eminent Judge like Mr. Justice Mukerji is certainly entitled to very great respect and we would be reluctant to differ from the view taken by bis Lordship unless it was on a very substantial ground. But it appears to us that the case which was before Mr. Justice Mukerji is distinguishable from the case which is now before us. We do not know what the contents of the petition of complaint in that case were as they do not appear from the said report, but from the observations of Mr. Justice Mukerji to which I have referred it seems to us that in the petition of complaint in that case, there was no definite allegation of misappropriation having been committed in any particular place in respect of the sum which formed the subject-matter of that case, but the allegation was merely for non-accounting in respect of the same. In fact, it appears from the said observations that the whole case of misappropriation in that case was founded upon the allegation that there was no accounting in respect of the, money. Thus as I said before although the contents of the petition of complaint in that case are not known, but from those observations it appears that the case of misappropriation was founded only upon the fact of non-accounting. But the petition of complaint in this case is different and is more specific. In the petition in the present case, it has been stated that the petitioner was in charge of the Asansol Branch of the Company and while in the said charge, he committed misappropriation of the sums mentioned therein; in other words, it is clear from the averments made in that petition that the entrustment and the acts of misappropriation had both been committed at Asansol. That being the position, the Alipore Court in our opinion is not competent to proceed with this case. Before concluding this judgment. I may also add that in the said case of Prokash Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar (3) (A.I.R 1934 Cal. 392), Mr. Justice Mukherji did not consider the effect of section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis, section 408 of the Indian Penal Code; in other words, Mr. Justice Mukerji did not consider the matter from the point of view from which Mr. Justice Blagden and Chief Justice Beaumont considered it in their judgments.

    7. In the result, therefore, we hold that the present case cannot be proceeded with in the Court of Alipore and the proceedings pending against the petitioner in the said Court should be quashed, and we make an order accordingly.

    8. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute.

    Mallick, J.:— I agree.

    S.N.S

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    Debendra Nath Sen v. Rajendra Chandra Roy Opposite Party.
    (Jan 6, 1955)