Das Gupta, J.:— These two Rules arise out of a suit brought by a person for recovery of arrears of salary for his service as the driver of a motor car. The plaintiff's claim was at the rate of 75 per month. The defendant pleaded that the salary was at the rate of Rs: 60 per month, that nothing was due and that the claim was barred by limitation. The learned Munsif rejected the plea of payment and decreed the suit at the rate of Rs. 60. He did not, it appears, consider the plea of limitation.
2. The only question raised in the Rule obtained by the plaintiff (Civil Revision No. 3327 of 1953) is that the Munsif was wrong in concluding that the Salary was at the rate of Rs. 60 per month, and not at the rate of Rs. 75 per month.
3. That however is a question of fact and even if the Munsif has come to a wrong conclusion on facts, that would not justify our interfering with his order under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Rule must therefore be discharged.
4. The Rule obtained by the defendant (Civil Revision No. 2277 of 1953) raises an important question of limitation. There are at present two Articles in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act dealing with suits for wages. Another Article, Article 4, which provided a period of 6 months for some of such suits was repealed by Act XX of 1937. The two Articles which are now on the Statute Book on this question are Articles 7 and 102. Article 7 provides one year's limitation for suits for wages of household servants, artisans, labourers, the time running from the date when the wages accrue due. Article 102 provides three years' limitation for suits “for wages not Otherwise expressly provided for by this Schedule”. Here also, the time is to run from the date when the wages accrue due. The question, therefore, is whether Article 7 or Article 102 is applicable to the present suit. Article 7 will be applicable if the driver of a motor car falls within the description of a household servant, artisan or labourer. It is not, and is cannot be, seriously contended that a motor driver is either a household servant or a labourer. The question remains whether he is an artisan. In two cases, one of which is a decision, of this Court, the view was taken that a motor driver is an artisan within the meaning of Art. 7 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act the earlier of these decisions was in the case of R. Sewaram v. Lachminarayan (1) (A.I.R 1927 Rangoon, 279). In that case Maung Ba, J., said:
“According to Webster's Dictionary an artisan is one trained to mechanical dexterity in some mechanical art or trade. A motor car driver is required, at least, to know how to start the car, how to steer it and how to stop it. For such purposes he must possess some skill in manipulating the different parts of the mechanism. I think, he should be included in the category of an artisan. I also cannot see any reason why he should be treated differently from a household servant or a labourer and given the benefit of a longer period under Art. 102….”
5. In the case of Khagendra Nath Chatterji v. Kanti Bhusan Banerjee (2) 62 C.L.J 562, Mitter, J., had to consider whether Art. 7 was applicable to a suit brought by person for wages as a bus driver. His Lordship concluded that a bus driver was an artisan within the meaning of Art. 7 and so, that Article was applicable. His Lordship observed:
“I do not agree in the contention that a bus driver is a household servant. In my judgment, a bus or a motor car driver is an artisan. He must know something of the mechanism of a car, must know how to start it, to stop it and to steer it. He is supposed to attend to the car in emergent cases when the mechanism goes a somewhat out of order during a journey. In this view of the matter I hold that he is an artisan within the meaning of Art. 7…….”
6. With great respect to the learned Judges I am unable to agree that a motor car driver is an artisan within the meaning of Art. 7 of the Schedule. The word “artisan” has not been defined in the Limitation Act. This word is also used in section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code but in that statute also the word has not been defined. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary also gives “artificer” as the meaning of “artisan”. While the word “artificer” has generally been considered to mean a “skilled workman”, it was pointed out in the case Palmer v. Snow (3) [(1900) 1 Q.B 725] that every skilled workman is not an artificer and that an artificer is one who makes something as distinguished from one who does something. In that view it was decdied that a hair-dresser is not an artificer because he only does something. I do not think that it can be doubted that the word “artisan” means a workman, who makes something, that is the same as an artificer as defined in the case of Palmer v. Snow (3) [(1900) 1 Q.B 725].
7. There can be no doubt however that the word “artisan” is also used often as synonymous with a mechanic. This is also clear from the meaning of the word as given in the Webster's Dictionary and the Oxford Dictionary and forms the basis of the decisions mentioned above and also other decisions in which the question of “artisan” was considered. See (4) (A.I.R 1919 Sind. 54).
8. I, therefore, respectfully agree with Maung Ba and Mitter, JJ., that the word “artisan” as used in Art. 7 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act includes a mechanic I am unable to agree, however, that a motor driver is necessarily a mechanic. In my judgment, when we say of some person that he is a mechanic, we mean that he has such special knowledge of some mechanism as to enable him to operate it and to set it right when it goes wrong. I do not think the mere fact that a man can start a machine or control it is enough to give him the name of a mechanic. An electric fan is an intricate mechanism; almost everybody can set it in motion, can control its motion by operating the regulator and can stop it. Will a man who can do these things be called a mechanic? The answer must be an emphatic “no”. When the fan goes out of order, we send for a “mechanic”. That makes it clear that it is only the person who understands sufficient of the working of the mechanism as to handle its parts properly in order to set it right when it goes wrong, that can be called a mechanic.
9. The driver of a motor car is hot, in these respects, essentially different from the man who switches on an electric fan. He can start the engine, put it into gear, steer it, stop it and park it. Ordinarily, he can also change a damaged tyre or tube. Suppose, however, the carburettor goes wrong or the pistons have refused to work. Many, if not most, drivers of motor cars will be able to do nothing in such emergencies. One particular driver may happen to have sufficient skill to be able to repair a defect in the mechanism but most will not have the requisite knowledge or skill. These persons will not, because of such lack of knowledge or skill, cease to be drivers of motor cars but they are clearly not mechanics. It is reasonable to hold that while the driver of a motor car may also happen to be a mechanic, such a driver is not necessarily a mechanic.
10. My conclusion, therefore, is that the driver of a motor car is not an “artisan” within the meaning of Art. 7 of the First Schedule to the Act of Limitation. Consequently, Art. 7 is not applicable to the present case, but Art. 102 applies and the suit was within time.
11. The Rule is accordingly discharged. There will, however, be no order for costs.
Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.
A.K.D.G