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  • sections 208, 212, 218 and 219 of the) Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951).
  • sections 8 and 9 of the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919,
  • provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
  • Carriage Act, 1919 (Bengal Act I of 1919),
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citation codes
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  • sections 208, 212, 218 and 219 of the) Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951).
  • sections 8 and 9 of the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919,
  • provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
  • Carriage Act, 1919 (Bengal Act I of 1919),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Prior to 31 March 1953 the suburb of Tollygunj had its own Municipality. By a Government of West Bengal notification dated 21 March 1953, Tollygunj was brought within the jurisdiction of the Corporation of Calcutta.

Under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919, rickshaws are included within the definition of "Hackney Carriage" and must be registered annually by a Registering Officer (a Deputy Commissioner of Police appointed by the State Government). Earlier notifications had already included various neighbouring municipalities, including Tollygunj, within the definition of Calcutta for the purposes of that Act, thereby making rickshaws plying for hire in Tollygunj subject to registration.

Before amalgamation, about 500 rickshaws were plying in Tollygunj but only 168 were registered under the Act. After amalgamation the Calcutta Corporation issued trade and road licences in respect of a number of rickshaws (under provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951), though the precise number issued is not stated in the opinion.

In July 1953 rickshaw-owners applied for registration under the Hackney Carriage Act and traffic police licences. On 24 November 1953 a conference of police and municipal authorities reviewed the position. At that time some 6,000 rickshaws were registered in Calcutta (including 168 in Tollygunj). The Commissioner of Police expressed concern about public safety and congestion and suggested a joint survey. A joint inspection of about 500 rickshaws was made on 24 November 1953, after notices were issued. Authorities considered 268 rickshaws fit for registration.

The Deputy Commissioner of Police recommended that these 268 be allowed to ply within Tollygunj only, with "Tollygunj" marked prominently on the vehicles. Authorities sought legal opinion on whether the area within which rickshaws might ply could be restricted; they were advised such restriction could not be imposed under the law unless the law was amended. The petitioners were not clearly informed of the legal position before spending money (allegedly Rs. 80,000) on repairs; they later challenged the refusal to grant unrestricted licences.

The petitioners brought the present application challenging the legal validity of the restrictions and contending infringement of their constitutional right to carry on a business under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The court heard the matter and delivered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the limitation on the number of licences (by by-law No. 13A framed under section 71 of the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919) and the operation of sections 8 and 9 of that Act amount to an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners' fundamental right under article 19(1)(g) to carry on a trade or business.
  2. Whether the registering authority or other executive bodies can lawfully restrict the area within Calcutta in which a licensed rickshaw may ply (for example, by authorising licences limited to Tollygunj) without statutory amendment permitting zonal limitations.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners (rickshaw-owners) asserted that plying rickshaws is their business and calling and that they have a fundamental right under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on that business in the City of Calcutta.
  • They contended that under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act any hackney carriage (including rickshaws) is entitled to be registered and licensed if fit for the road and municipal charges are paid; therefore they should not be prevented from carrying on their business by limitations imposed in practice.
  • Relying on authorities (Chintaman Rao, Rashid Ahmed, T.B. Ibrahim), they argued that where the cumulative effect of restrictive legislation totally prevents carrying on a trade, such a restriction is unreasonable and void.
  • Mr. Biswas, appearing for the petitioners, also argued that once a rickshaw is registered under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act the license-holder could not be lawfully restricted from plying within the area of Calcutta as defined by the Act.

Respondents' / Authorities' Position (as described in the opinion)

  • The Commissioner of Police and other authorities expressed concern about public safety and congestion; they considered the then-existing total (about 6,000 rickshaws) to be at or near saturation for the City and therefore unsafe to increase further.
  • The authorities indicated they were willing, for safety reasons, to permit some additional licences if the plying of those rickshaws could be restricted to the limits of Tollygunj, but they were informed by legal advice that no statutory power then existed to impose such area restrictions until the law was amended.
  • The authorities proposed (and were prepared to incorporate) a voluntary restriction by license-holders to confine themselves to Tollygunj as a potential practical solution, but the petitioners rejected that proposal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. [(1950) S.C.R. 759] Authority for the principle that where the effect of restrictive legislation totally prevents a citizen from carrying on a trade, business or profession, such a restriction is unreasonable and void. The court acknowledged this principle but distinguished the present case: the restriction here did not amount to a total prohibition because licences could become available as existing licence-holders ceased to ply; accordingly the precedent did not render the by-law or sections invalid.
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana [(1950) S.C.R. 566] Same principle cited: invalidity of legislation whose effect is to totally prevent carrying on a trade. Applied by distinction — the court held that because there was no absolute, permanent prevention of the trade in the present matter, the rule did not mandate invalidation of the impugned provisions.
T.B. Ibrahim v. R.T.A., Tanjore [(1953) S.C.A. 277 : (1953) S.C.R. 290] Same general principle about total prohibition of trade/business being unreasonable and void. Distinguished on the facts: since the present by-law and statutory provisions imposed a limit rather than an absolute bar, the court found those provisions did not amount to the kind of total prohibition condemned by the cited cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first establishing the statutory and factual matrix: the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act includes rickshaws within "hackney carriages" and requires registration; Tollygunj was brought within the Corporation of Calcutta and therefore rickshaw-owners there were subject to the Act. There was an accumulated total of about 6,000 registered rickshaws in Calcutta (including 168 from Tollygunj). Only 168 of the roughly 500 plying in Tollygunj prior to amalgamation were registered; the rest were unregistered and therefore in contravention of the Act.

The court described administrative attempts to deal with the problem: inspections, a recommendation to allow 268 fit rickshaws to ply within Tollygunj only, and legal advice that the law as it stood did not permit area restrictions to be lawfully imposed by the registering authority. The petitioners argued that the restriction violated article 19(1)(g).

The court accepted that article 19(1)(g) protects the right to carry on a trade or business, and it accepted the petitioners' counsel's correct proposition that once a rickshaw is registered a license-holder could not be lawfully restricted from plying within the area of Calcutta as defined by the Act unless the statute or by-law authorised such a restriction.

However, the court emphasized the legitimate state interests served by limiting the number of vehicles: police responsibilities for traffic control and accident prevention, and municipal responsibilities for preserving road arteries. The court reasoned that it is reasonable to entrust executive authorities or public bodies with discretion to determine an outer margin of safety — a figure at which further vehicles would be unsafe or would impose unacceptable congestion.

The court made a policy point by example: if restrictions were declared unreasonable in principle, it would be impossible to prevent an inundation of rickshaws that could block other traffic. The court therefore would not substitute its own view for honest and bona fide administrative assessments on such matters of policy and experience.

Turning to precedent, the court acknowledged authorities holding that a restriction which effectively amounts to a total prohibition of a trade is unreasonable and void. It then analyzed the present facts against that test and found a crucial factual difference: the statutory scheme and by-law imposed a limit rather than an absolute, permanent prohibition. As existing licence-holders cease to ply, vacancies would arise and others could take their places; thus the restriction did not totally preclude the petitioners from carrying on their trade for all time.

On that basis the court concluded that the impugned statutory provisions and by-law constituted a reasonable restriction in view of public safety and municipal concerns and were enacted and applied honestly and bona fide by the authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that sections 8 and 9 of the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919, and by-law No. 13A (framed under section 71) are intra vires and valid.

Immediate effect on the proceedings:

  • The application by the petitioners was dismissed.
  • The Rule was discharged and interim orders vacated.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct consequence is that limits on the number of licences under the cited statutory provisions and by-law remain lawful insofar as they are applied honestly and bona fide to address concerns such as public safety and congestion. The court distinguished prior authorities that struck down total prohibitions, finding those authorities inapplicable because the present scheme did not effect an absolute, permanent bar to the petitioners' trade.

The opinion contains a suggestion that the Government should consider amending relevant legislation to permit zonal licences, but the court did not base its decision on such a legislative change; rather it upheld the existing statutory scheme as valid.

A.K.D.G. (signature/initials as in the opinion)

    Satyaranjan Ray And Ors. v. Commissioner Of Police Opposite Party.

    Sinha, J.:— Tollygunj is a suburb of Calcutta. Prior to the 31st March, 1953, it had its own Municipality. By notification No. M. 1M-79|52(1) dated the 21st March, 1953, issued by the Government of West Bengal, it was brought within the jurisdiction of the Corporation of Calcutta. Under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919 (Bengal Act I of 1919), every “Hackney Carriage” in Calcutta is required to be annually registered by a Registering Officer, who is a Deputy Commissioner of Police appointed by the State Government. Under section 70 (read with the provisions of Chapter VII) of the said Act the provisions are applicable to Rickshaws. Under section 2(b) of the said Act, the Government is empowered to include in or exclude from Calcutta (or any town or local area to which the Act is extended), any local area in the vicinity. By notification No. 4073-P1, dated 10th August, 1935, various Municipalities in the vicinity of Calcutta including the Tollygunj Municipality were included within the definition of Calcutta for the purposes of the said Act. The result was that after that date, all Rickshaws plying within the Tollygunj Municipality for hire, were required to be registered under the said Act. The twenty-one petitioners before me, allege that they are owners of Rickshaws which were plying for hire within the Municipal area of Tollygunj. It is stated that prior to the amalgamation, about 500 Rickshaws were plying in Tollygunj. It is quite clear, that such Rickshaws had to be registered under the said Act. In fact, however, only 168 Rickshaws plying in Tollygunj were so registered. If it be true that the remaining number also were plying for hire, they did so in clear contravention of the provisions of the said Act. None of the petitioners before me were so registered.

    2. Under section 71 of the said Act, the Provincial Government is empowered to make by-laws for carrying out the provisions and intentions of the Act. By-law No. 13A which has been framed under section 71, provides that the Registering Authority shall not register any Rickshaw intended to be used in Calcutta if he considers that there is already an adequate number of Rickshaws intended to be used in Calcutta. After the amalgamation, the Corporation of Calcutta granted trade licences and Road licences in respect of a number of Rickshaws (under sections 208, 212, 218 and 219 of the) Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951). It is however not clear as to how many licences were in fact issued. In July, 1953, the Rickshaw-owners applied for registration under the said Act and Traffic Police license under section 9. On or about 24th November, 1953, a conference was held, attended by the Commissioner of Police, the Joint Secretary to the Local Self-Government Department, the Commissioner, Calcutta Corporation, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Public Vehicles Department, and others. This conference reviewed the position that had arisen, as a result of the application for new licenses from the Rickshaw-owners of Tollygunj. The position was that there existed at the time 6,000 Rickshaws registered under the said Act, including 168 Rickshaws, running in the Tollygunj area, The Commissioner of Police pointed out that for reasons of public safety it was not possible to increase the number of Rickshaws in the City of Calcutta beyond the existing number. It was however suggested that if it was feasible to restrict the plying of Rickshaws to the limits of Tollygunj, a number of new licences could be issued. It was however decided that before doing anything further, a survey of these Rickshaws should be made jointly by the Police and the Corporation Authorities.

    3. Accordingly notices were issued and a joint inspection made of about 500 Rickshaws, on the 24th November, 1953. It is regrettable that the position was not made clear to the Rickshaw-owners including the petitioners, who thought that new licenses were about to be granted; and they naturally spent quite a large sum in repairing and refitting the vehicles. In fact, it is said that they spent the staggering sum of Rs. 80,000 for that purpose.

    4. Upon inspection, the Authorities considered 268 Rickshaws as fit for registration.

    5. Sometime in February, 1954, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Public Vehicles Department, wrote to the Commissioner of Police, pointing out that the Corporation of Calcutta were pressing for a decision as to whether they should issue licenses to the 268 Rickshaws found fit. He recommended that the 268 Rickshaws should be allowed to ply in Tollygunj, the limits being specified and the word “Tollygunj”, prominently written on the body of the vehicles.

    6. On the 8th April, 1954, there was another conference in the office of the Commissioner of Police and it was decided to take legal opinion as to whether the area within which these Rickshaws might ply, could be restricted.

    7. I am informed that the authorities were advised that no such restriction could be imposed until the law was amended.

    8. The soundness of this advice is not challenged by the petitioners. Mr. Biswas appearing on their behalf contends, and in my opinion quite correctly, that once a Rickshaw is allowed to be registered under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, you could not restrict any licence-holder from plying within the area of Calcutta as defined by the Act. Whatever may have been the position before the amalgamation, no such restriction can now be imposed, unless the Act is amended or suitable by-laws promulgated.

    9. The position is therefore rather intriguing. The registering authorities are not unwilling to grant a few more licenses to Rickshaws plying in Tollygunj, provided however that these vehicles do not come up to ply in the already horribly congested streets of Calcutta City proper. But once the license is issued, there is no means of achieving this under the law as it stands. That is why no more licenses are being issued. I thought that a way out of this impasse might be achieved if the petitioners voluntarily agreed to restrict their perambulations to Tollygunj, which is what they were all along doing. What could not be done by the authorities might be done by the licensees voluntarily agreeing to have the same incorporated as a term of their license. The respondents at once agreed to this course, The petitioners however took time to consider this, and have finally rejected this proposal. From the arguments put forward on their behalf it is more than apparent that the fear of the authorities that these new Rickshaws will abandon the confines of Tollygunj and clutter the streets of the City, which is an immensely more paying proposition—is not an idle one It is precisely what the petitioners have in view.

    10. Analysing the position, it comes to this. The petitioners state that plying Rickshaws is their business and calling and they have a fundamental right to ply Rickshaws in the City of Calcutta which is being denied to them, thus violating the provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Under the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, any “hackney carriage”,—and a Rickshaw is included in that definition, —is entitled to be registered and licensed, provided it is found in a fit condition for the road and provided all Municipal charges have been paid. It is by-law No. 13A which grants power to the Registering authority to limit the number of licenses if there happens to be too large a number of such vehicles on the road. The registering authority at present finds that 6,000 rickshaws (including 168 in Tollygunj) now plying on the roads are about the saturation point, and it is unsafe to grant any more licenses. The point is, whether this by-law is a reasonable restriction upon the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on the business of their choice.

    11. The Rickshaw as a vehicle of locomotion is a barbarous mode of travel. It is strange to talk of the fundamental right to exploit a few hapless human beings, and transform them into beasts of burden, transporting heavy loads on superheated asphalt roads, in tropical sun and shower, for a miserable pittance. Until, however, public conscience is sufficiently aroused to see the monstrosity of it, I must assume that to carry on an inhuman business of this description is included in the charter of our rights, conferred by the Constitution. But is it a right which is unfettered and incapable of being restricted? The Police authorities and the Corporation have onerous responsibilities to discharge. The former are responsible for traffic control and the prevention of accidents on the road, the latter are responsible (at least in theory) for making and preserving these arteries of civic life. Therefore, it is by no means unreasonable to confer a degree of control in their hands, so that the number of vehicles of a particular description, using the roads, can be limited. To take an extreme example—if any such restriction is unreasonable, it would be impossible to prevent a citizen from introducing on the roads—say, half a million Rickshaws—so that no other form of vehicular traffic can use the same. Where then is the line to be drawn? It must be left to the discretion, good sense and administrative experience of the executive authorities, or a public body like the Corporation of Calcutta, to arrive at a figure which constitutes the outer margin of safety. Provided it is done honestly and bona fide, this Court cannot substitute its own views for it. I am entirely convinced that the respondents have acted honestly I find them eager and anxious to meet the petitioners half-way, and do what they can, provided it is within the law. They cannot however be made responsible for limitations imposed by the law itself. Those are matters of policy with which they are not concerned and which are beyond their competence.

    12. I hope however that the Government would take early steps to see that the legislation upon the subject is suitably altered to meet the new situation, and that power is granted upon the registering authority to grant Zonal licences.

    13. Mr. Biswas, on behalf of the petitioners, has referred to the cases of Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P (1) [(1950) S.C.R 759]; Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana., Kairana (2) [(1950) S.C.R 566]; and T.B Ibrahim v. R.T.A, Tanjore (3) [(1953) S.C.A 277 : (1953) S.C.R 290].

    14. In all these cases, it has been held that where the effect of a restrictive legislation totally prevents a citizen from carrying on a trade, business or a profession, such a restriction is unreasonable and void. Here, however, there is no total prohibition. It is not as if the authorities have decided that no Rickshaws within Tollygunj can ever be plied. They have fixed a limit. As the registered licence-holders within that prescribed number, cease to ply their Rickshaws, others will step into their place and stead, and the petitioners cannot be said to be prevented from carrying on their business totally and for all times to come.

    15. I therefore hold that sections 8 and 9 of the Calcutta Hackney Carriage Act, 1919, and by-law 13A, framed under power granted by section 71 of the Act, are intra-vires and valid. There is no other point pressed on behalf of the petitioners, and for the reasons stated. this application must be dismissed. The Rule is discharged and interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs.

    A.K.D.G

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    Satyaranjan Ray And Ors. v. Commissioner Of Police Opposite Party.
    (Jul 20, 1954)