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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 6 of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932, hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 188 SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • Municipal Corporation Act 1882 (45.46 Vict. Ch. 50)
  • provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution.
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • costs.A/K.S.B24. Rule discharged.
  • S., 44, cls. (b), (d), (e) and (h). Rules 3
  • Municipal Act, 1923
  • same.12. Rule 22
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 6 of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932, hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • SECTION 188 SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • Municipal Corporation Act 1882 (45.46 Vict. Ch. 50)
  • provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution.
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • costs.A/K.S.B24. Rule discharged.
  • S., 44, cls. (b), (d), (e) and (h). Rules 3
  • Municipal Act, 1923
  • same.12. Rule 22
Smart Summary

Summary of Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are ratepayers and voters in the Uttarpara Municipality (Hooghly district). The Municipality was originally divided into four wards, each having two elected Commissioners (total eight). The District Magistrate fixed a general election date (originally 9-11-1952). Nomination papers were invited and processed on the basis that eight Commissioners were to be elected (two per ward). After publication of electoral rolls, the State Government issued a notification altering the total number of Commissioners from eight to nine and later to ten, reallocating seats among wards (notably increasing Ward I and Ward IV from two to three seats each). No re-opening of nominations followed the increase in seats; the election was ultimately held on 8-2-1953 and ten Commissioners were elected.

The petitioners challenged the election process by obtaining a rule to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not issue directing opposite parties to stop proceedings with the election complained of and/or to hold a fresh election. The District Magistrate had earlier suspended proceedings after objections under the Act. The ten elected Commissioners were later made parties to the application. The petitioners argued that, because the number of seats was increased after nominations had been filed, nominations should have been reopened to allow additional candidates to be nominated for the increased seats. The respondents (represented by Mr. Bose) argued there was no provision in the Act or rules requiring nominations to be reopened.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the general election held on 8-2-1953 (after the increase in the number of Commissioners and re-apportionment of seats among wards) was valid where no fresh invitation for nominations was issued for the newly-created seats.
  2. Whether the petitioners could invoke the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution (seeking a writ of mandamus) instead of pursuing the statutory remedy provided by the Bengal Municipal Act (i.e., filing an election petition under Ss. 36 to 39B of the Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Nominations relate directly to the number of seats: increasing seats increases the likelihood of new candidates coming forward; therefore the electorate must be given an opportunity to nominate additional candidates when seats are increased.
  • Since the basis of the election (number of seats) changed after nominations were filed, the original nominations were no longer sufficient or valid for the election actually held on 8-2-1953.
  • The public grievance (resolutions passed at meetings noting intended candidates refrained from standing because only two seats were then advertised) was brought to the District Magistrate yet not remedied.

Respondents' / Mr. Bose's Argument

  • There is no provision in the Bengal Municipal Act or the Election Rules requiring reopening of nominations where the number of seats is altered; therefore nominations need not be reopened.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Barnes Corporation; Exp. Hutter, (1933) 1 K.B. 668 Shows that under English law, if an election is not carried out according to statute, remedy may be by writ of mandamus. Cited to contrast English practice with Indian statutory scheme and to note that even in England mandamus is issued only in special circumstances.
Reg v. Chester Corporation, (1856) 25 LJQB 61 Illustrates English practice that high prerogative writs are not issued unless there are special circumstances. Used to show English courts' reluctance to issue prerogative writs in election matters except in special cases.
Reg v. Welchpool Corporation, (1876) 35 LT 594 Another English authority on limited issuance of prerogative writs in election contexts. Reinforces the point that prerogative writs are exceptional remedies under English law.
R. v. Dublin Town Clerk, (1909) 43 I.L.T. 169 English authority on the limited scope for issuing prerogative writs in election disputes. Again cited to illustrate English approach to prerogative relief in election cases.
Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64 Dealt with an Article 226 application for certiorari in an election matter and discussed the relation between statutory election remedies and constitutional writ jurisdiction. The Court relied on the principles enunciated (including the need to look to statutory schemes governing elections and the rule that statutory remedies are generally exclusive) when assessing whether Article 226 was the proper remedy.
Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6 C.B. (N.S.) 336 Statement of the rule that where a statute creates a liability and provides a special remedy, that statutory remedy must be followed (three-class formulation by Willes J.). Adopted as a foundational principle that when rights are created by statute and statutory remedies exist, those remedies must generally be pursued instead of common-law or prerogative relief.
Nevile v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., (1919) A.C. 368 House of Lords approval of the rule that statutory remedy should be followed where the statute creates the right and prescribes the remedy. Cited to show appellate endorsement of the exclusivity principle regarding statutory remedies.
Attorney General Trinidad and Tabago v. Gordon Grant & Co., (1935) A.C. 532 Privy Council reaffirmation of the rule that the remedy provided by statute must be followed where the statute creates a right and prescribes a particular remedy. Used to reinforce the point as settled by the Privy Council.
Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 P.C. 105 Lord Thankerton stated that where a statute creates a liability not existing at common law and gives a particular remedy, that form must be adopted. Cited to support the proposition that statutory remedies are exclusive in such cases.
Sawday v. Singha Roy, AIR 1946 Cal 206 Held that provincial statute did not absolutely take away High Court's power to issue prerogative writs, but where a statutory remedy exists it is a rule of expediency to use it. Relied upon to explain that Article 226 jurisdiction is not absolutely ousted by statutory remedies but that the High Court should ordinarily direct parties to the statutory remedy when one is provided.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis: (A) the substantive validity of the election in the light of the alteration in the number of seats, and (B) the procedural question whether the petitioners should have resorted to the statutory election petition remedy rather than Article 226.

(A) Substantive analysis on alteration of seats and nominations:

  • The rules governing nominations and elections (Rules 3–21, particularly R.17 and R.25) require nomination dates, scrutiny and publication of registered candidates and specify voting entitlements; however, no specific rule had been made dealing with alteration in the number of Commissioners apportioned to a ward when nominations had already been invited and registered.
  • The Court observed that where the number of seats in a ward is altered after nominations have been invited and registered, the basis of the election changes: an election for two seats in a ward is not the same as an election for three seats in the same ward. If alteration of number of seats were treated as immaterial, the same logic would (improperly) apply to alterations of ward boundaries.
  • The Court illustrated the absurdity of leaving newly-added voters or seats without any opportunity to nominate candidates (example: increase from 100 to 1,000 voters) and concluded that such a position cannot be sanctioned in the absence of specific rules permitting that outcome.
  • The Court therefore held that the general election held on 8-2-1953, at least in Wards I and IV (where seats were increased), was conducted without properly following the provisions of the Act and the rules, and that nomination papers filed for the 9-11-1952 election were no longer valid or sufficient for the election actually held on 8-2-1953.

(B) Procedural analysis on appropriate remedy:

  • The Court examined Ss. 36–39B of the Bengal Municipal Act which prescribe the procedure for challenging municipal elections (including the ten-day period after declaration of results for filing an election petition before the District Judge and specific grounds such as non-compliance with the Act — S. 38(c)).
  • Relying on established authorities (Willes J.'s three-class formulation and later approvals in Nevile and Privy Council decisions, and domestic cases such as Ponnuswami), the Court reiterated the principle that where a statute creates rights and provides a special remedy for their enforcement, that statutory remedy should ordinarily be pursued.
  • The Court acknowledged that Article 226 is not necessarily ousted by statutory remedies (Sawday), but stressed it is a rule of expediency that where a statutory remedy exists for a specific violation, the statutory remedy should ordinarily be followed rather than invoking the High Court's extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
  • The Court found no satisfactory explanation for the petitioners' failure to pursue the statutory election petition remedy within the prescribed procedure and time. The forwarding of public resolutions to the District Magistrate did not meet the requirements of S. 36.
  • Because of the petitioners' failure to pursue the statutory remedy and absence of diligence, the Court concluded that it should not exercise its discretion under Article 226 to grant the extraordinary relief sought, despite the substantive defects it found in the conduct of the election in Wards I and IV.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: RULE DISCHARGED.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The Court held substantively that the general election held on 8-2-1953 was conducted without properly following the provisions of the Act and rules in respect of Wards I and IV (the nomination papers filed for the originally-notified election were no longer sufficient for the later election after seats were increased).
  • Despite that substantive finding, the Court refused to grant relief under Article 226 because the petitioners did not pursue the statutory remedy (an election petition under Ss. 36–39B) and there was no satisfactory excuse for the delay or the failure to follow the prescribed procedure. The rule (the Article 226 application seeking mandamus) was therefore discharged.
  • The petitioners remain obliged to pursue the statutory remedies provided by the Act (i.e., an election petition before the District Judge within the periods and manner prescribed by the Act) if they wish to challenge the election result.
  • The Court made no order as to costs.

Note: The opinion does not set out any broader constitutional or binding precedent beyond applying and restating established principles about the exclusivity/primacy of statutory remedies in election matters and the limited circumstances in which Article 226 should be used when a statutory remedy exists.

    Narayan Chandra Mukherjee v. District Magistrate

    1. This is a rule issued upon the respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not issue directing the opposite parties Nos. 1, 2 and 3 from further proceeding with the election complained of in the petition, and/or directing the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 to hold a fresh election according to law or why such other or further directions and/or orders should not be issued or made as to this Court seems fit and proper. This is an unfortunate instance of a case where the petitioners have made out a case on the merits but have followed an entirely wrong procedure. The facts are shortly as follows: The petitioners are residents of Uttarpara in the district of Hooghly. They are ratepayers of the Uttarpara Municipality. The said Municipality was divided into four wards, each having two elected Commissioners. On or about 4-4-1952, an order was passed by the District Magistrate, Hooghly, fixing the General election of the Commissioners of the Uttarpara Municipality on 9-11-1952. On 15-4-1952, the Chairman, Uttarpara Municipality published the same in conformity with R. 2(2) of the Election rules.

    2. Thereafter the Electoral rolls were duly prepared and finally published under the provisions of R. 15(2) of the Election rules. The petitioners are voters whose names appear in the Final electoral roll. They being (belong?) to Ward Nos. I and IV. In respect of the general election, the last day for receiving nomination papers was fixed on 4-10-1952 and the scrutiny of nominations was fixed on 13-10-1952. The preliminary electoral roll having disclosed a large increase in the number of voters, the total number of seats was recommended to be increased to nine and accordingly, the State Government by its Notification No. MT/M-58/52 dated 13-6-1952, published in the Calcutta Gazette on 19-6-1952, (under Section 6 of the Bengal Municipal Act 1932, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) declared its intention of altering the number of Commissioners from eight to nine. Nomination papers were “received in accordance with the previous orders, at on 14-10-1952, a list was published under R. 17(5) of the Election rules framed under the Act, of such candidates whose nomination papers were found valid and who were registered under R. 4(a). The list shows that 8 candidates were nominated for election in Ward I, 4 for Ward II, 7 for Ward III and 7 for Ward IV. Ten candidates withdrew from the election, 3 having withdrawn from Ward I and 3 from Ward III.

    3. Meanwhile, objections were preferred under S. 7 of the Act. On 16-10-1952 the District Magistrate, Hooghly made an order suspending further proceedings. This order was published by the Chairman on 22nd October. Finally, the Government by Notification No. 1-M-58/52/1 dated 11-10-1952, decided to have, ten seats. On 7-11-1952 a Notification No. 1804M was published, determining the number of Commissioners to be elected from each ward. The result will appear at a glance from the following table:

    Ward. Previous number of seats. Seats as altered by Notification dated 7-11-52. I 2 3 II 2 2 III 2 2 IV 2 3 Total 8 10

    4. On 14-11-1952 the District Magistrate modified his previous order of 4-4-1952 and fixed 8-2-1953 as the date of the general election in all the wards. On that day, the general election was held and 10 Commissioners elected.

    5. It will be observed that nominations were originally invited upon the footing that eight Commissioners were to be elected, two from each Ward. When however the number of Commissioners were increased to ten and the Wards reconstituted, no further nominations were invited. The candidates who had already been nominated for the eight seats were put up for election. This procedure gave rise to great dissatisfaction among the electorate, who felt that the reconstitution of the number of Commissioners to be elected from each Ward, made it incumbent upon the authorities to permit further nominations to be made. Resolutions were passed at public meeting in which the petitioners were present to the effect that many intending candidates did not offer themselves for election because there were two seats in a Ward, but they were willing to stand for election, where the seats have been increased.

    6. This resolution was forwarded to the District Magistrate but no steps have been taken to remedy it. The present rule was issued on 5-2-1953. Originally, the ten elected Commissioners were not made parties to this application. As they were directly interested in the result of the application, they have been made parties and have teen represented before me.

    7. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is as follows. They say that the nomination of a candidate has a direct relation to the number of seats in a constituency. The more there are seats, the more number of people are likely to offer themselves for election. If the number of seats in a Ward is increased, people who would otherwise have held back from contesting an election were likely to come forward because of the increased chances in getting elected to a seat.

    8. Therefore, the invitation to file nomination papers at a given point of time is on the basis of the existing number of seats, prescribed by the authorities for the particular Municipality and/or the particular Ward of a Municipality, where it is divided into Wards. Where nomination papers have been filed and registered, and the number of seats is thereafter increased, the basis of the election has altered, and the voters must be given a further chance to nominate, and/or be nominated. I should have thought that this proposition was so clear that it could not be disputed.

    9. Mr. Bose however argues, that there is no provision in the Act or the rules which requires the nomination to be thus reopened. I must therefore examine the Act and the rules. Under S. 6 read with S. 8 of the Act the State Government may constitute a Municipality. Under S. 6(i) read with S. 8(g) of the Act, the Government may alter the number of Commissioners, of a Municipality in consideration inter alia of the increase or decrease in the population, income, number of voters and commercial and general importance of the place:

    10. Under S. 15 of the Act, every Municipality is to have a body of Commissioners which must not be more than thirty or less than nine, as the State Government may specify in the notification constituting the Municipality. Under S. 16, Commissioners are to be elected in the manner prescribed. Under S. 20, the Government has power to divide the Municipality into Wards and to fix the number of Commissioners for each Ward. Section 27 lays down that the manner of holding elections shall be prescribed by rules made under the Act. Section 44 confers upon the Government the power to make rules to regulate and determine the elections, including the alteration of the number of Commissioners apportioned to any Ward of a Municipality.

    11. Rules have been framed by Government in exercise of the powers conferred by S., 44, cls. (b), (d), (e) and (h). Rules 3 to 16, deal with the preparation of the preliminary and final electoral rolls. Rules 17 to 21 deal with the nomination and registration of candidates. Under Rule 17(1), the Commissioners are to fix a date for nomination of candidates, not less than 45 days before the election day. The nomination paper is to be in form ‘B’. The form of course requires the Ward in which election is sought, to be mentioned. Under R. 17(3) the Chairman has to publish a notice in Form ‘C’ fixing the time and date of the scrutiny and registration of the nomination papers which must be not less than 32 days before the election day. Rule 17(4) deals with the scrutiny and registration of nomination papers and R. 17(5) deals with the publication of the same.

    12. Rule 22 onwards deals with the conduct of Elections. Under Rule 25, each voter shall be entitled to vote for the ward and for the special ward, if any, in respect of which his name has been registered and for no other, and to give as many votes as there are vacancies for each ward for which he is thus entitled to vote.

    13. There is thus no specific rule which deals with the case of alteration of the number of Commissioners apportioned to each ward. This is not surprising because the rules purport to be under S. 44, Cls. (b) to (h). Clause (a) which deals with the alteration of the number of Commissioners is left out. In other words, no rules have been made to provide for such a situation. It is certainly high time that such rules were made. But what is the effect of the absence of such rules? Although there is no specific rule as to the alteration of the number of Commissioners in a ward, once the alteration is made, the election of the new Commissioners will be subject to the general rules.

    14. Now, take the case of Ward No. I or IV. Originally, there were two seats in each ward. Candidates were nominated for one of the two seats. When an additional seat was created what is the result? Either it may be said that no one has been nominated for that extra seat, or else it may be said that the election which was then going to take place is not the same election as originally contemplated. Or to put it in another form the voters of these two-wards have had no opportunity to nominate any one for that extra seat and that a general election for two seats in a ward is not the same general election for three seats in a ward. If either the boundaries of a ward are altered or the number of seats are altered, I cannot see how it can be said that it is the same general election as the one which was notified originally. If the alteration in, the number of seats does not make it a different election then alteration of boundaries will also not affect it, since it is equally unprovided for in the rules.

    15. Let us visualise then an election in a ward which consists of a hundred voters. On that footing, let us say 3 people have been nominated. Then the area is increased to consist of a thousand voters. These extra 900 voters will then get no opportunity of putting forward any candidates, because no specific rules have been made under S. 44(a). This to my mind is an absurd position to contemplate. It is equally absurd to say that the Government can go on increasing seats and hold an election without anyone being nominated for the increased seats. I hold therefore that the general election dated 8-2-1953, at least in Wards Nos. I and IV was held without properly following the provisions of the Act and the rules. The voters in these Wards should have been given a further opportunity to nominate candidates and/or to file nomination papers. So far as these two wards are concerned, the nomination papers filed for the general election to be held on 9-11-1952 were no longer valid or sufficient, for the general election held on 8-2-1953. There was therefore a non-compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.

    16. But the more difficult question is as to whether the petitioners have pursued the right course in coming to this Court and making an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, instead of proceeding in the manner laid down by the Act. The procedure to challenge an election is contained in Ss. 36 to 39B of the Act. Under S. 36, any person qualified to vote at an election may at any time within ten days after the date of the declaration of the result of the election file a petition before the District Judge of the district within which the election has been or should have been held. One of the grounds on which an election can be set aside is that

    “the election has been materially affected by any non-compliance with this Act or any rule made under this Act or by any mistake in the forms required thereby or by any error, irregularity or informality on the part of any officer charged with or carrying out any duty under this Act or rule made under this Act (S. 38(c)).”

    17. In this respect, the law in India differs from the law in England. The grounds upon which a Municipal election can be challenged under the Municipal Corporation Act 1882 (45.46 Vict. Ch. 50) is contained in S. 87 of that Act. If an election is not carried out according to the scheme of the charter or statute, the remedy is by an application for a writ of mandamus. (‘In re Barnes Corporation; Exp. Hutter’, (1933) 1 K.B 668 (A)). Under the Indian Act however, an election petition lies under such circumstances. But even under the English law, where an election petition does lie, a high prerogative writ is not issued unless there are special circumstances:— ‘Reg v. Chester Corporation’, (1856) 25 LJQB 61 (B); — ‘Reg v. Welchpool Corporation’, (1876) 35 LT 594 (C & D); — ‘R. v. Dublin Town Clerk’, (1909) 43 I.L.T 169 (sic). Halsbury, Volume 9 at page 774.

    18. I shall now proceed to deal with some Indian case law on the point. ‘Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency’, AIR 1952 SC 64 (E), dealt an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant was one of the persons who had filed nomination papers for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly from the Namakkal constituency in Salem District. The Returning Officer rejected his nomination paper. The appellant moved the High Court of Madras under Article 226, praying for & writ of certiorari to quash the order of the returning officer rejecting his nomination paper and to direct him to accept the same. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of Returning Officer by reason of the provisions of Article 329(b) of the Constitution. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court. I am however not concerned with this aspect of the matter.

    19. Fazl Ali, J., however, enunciated certain principles applicable to election cases in general, which are-relevant to be considered. The learned Judge said as follows:

    “The Representation of the People Act 1951, which was passed by Parliament under Article 32T of the Constitution, makes detailed provision in regard to all matters and all stages connected with elections to the various legislatures in this country ………. obviously the Act is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which means that whenever, we have to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections, we have only to look at the Act and the rules made thereunder. The provisions of the Act which are-material to the present discussion are Ss. 80, 100, 105 and 170 and the provisions of Ch. II of Part IV dealing with the form of election petitions, their contents and the reliefs which may be sought in them. Section 80 which is drafted-in almost the same language as Article 329(b) provides that “no election shall be called in question, except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part” …… Section 105 says that “every order of the Tribunal made under this Act shall be final and conclusive. Section 170 provides that “no civil court, shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action taken or of any decision given by the Returning Officer or by any other person, appointed under this Act in connection with an election” ……………… It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a Statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that Statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated, with great clarity by Willes J. in — ‘Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford’, (1859) 6 C.B (N.S) 336 at p. 356 (F), in the following; passage.

    ‘There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon. Statute, one is, where there was a liability existing at common law, and that liability is affirmed by a Statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law there unless the Statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the Statutory remedy. The second class of cases is, where the Statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy there, the party can only proceed by action at-common law. But there is a third class viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a Statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it …… The remedy provided by the Statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form, given by Statute must be adopted and adhered to’

    “The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in — ‘Nevile v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.’, (1919) AC 368 (G) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in — ‘Attorney General Trinidad and Tabago v. Gordon Grant & Co.’, (1935) AC 532 (H)….”

    20. In — Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.’, AIR 1940 PC 105 (I), the Judicial Committee was dealing with Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act. Lord Thankerton said as follows:

    “The question is whether the present case falls under the third class stated by Willes J. viz., ‘Where the Statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it ………’ With respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the Statute.”

    21. The right to vote at an election, the right to nominate candidates or be nominated as a candidate in a Municipal election, are all rights which have been created by the Act and do not exist apart from it. It therefore follows that where a specific remedy is provided for by the Act for the violation of a provision of the Statute, that remedy should be followed. (Ss. 35, 37, 38, 39A, 39B and 43). I must not however be taken to hold that so far as a Municipal election is concerned, precisely the same principles apply as in an election to a legislature under the Representation of the People Act 1951, which brings into operation Article 329(b) of the Constitution, or that the High Court's power under Article 226 is taken away by S. 39-B or 43 of the Act.

    22. In — ‘Sawday v. Singha Roy’, AIR 1946 Cal 206 (J), Das J. has pointed out that the provincial legislature by enacting the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 had not taken away the power of the High Court under the Charter to issue high prerogative writs. Such an alternative remedy does not absolutely debar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226. It is however a rule of expediency that where the right itself (Here, the right to vote at an election or to stand at an election, or to nominate candidates or to get nominated) is created by a Statute, and where there is a specific remedy provided for in that Statute for a particular violation of it, that remedy, and not the extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution should be allowed.

    23. The Act contains a complete remedy for the particular breach complained of. There is no satisfactory explanation as to why that remedy by way of an election petition was not followed. It is submitted that the particular grievance of the public was brought to the notice of the district Magistrate, who delayed the matter until it was too late. It is not of course argued that forwarding a resolution passed at a public meeting to the district Magistrate is due compliance with S. 36 of the Act. No demand of justice or denial thereof is a condition precedent to the filing of an election petition. There is therefore no excuse for the petitioners allowing time to pass by until it I became too late to file an election petition. Absence of diligence in pursuing a legal remedy can never be a justification for issuing a high prerogative writ. The result is that, however much I regret it, I must refuse to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. The rule must be discharged. There will however be no order as to costs.

    A/K.S.B

    24. Rule discharged.

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    Narayan Chandra Mukherjee v. District Magistrate
    (Aug 13, 1953)